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of MR. JusTCE PowELL.
Cf- /U.#X- ~is m orandum is submitted pursuant to the sug-·
~
gestion of Byron, following our discussion at th e Con'
ference, that I outline my thoughts as to a possible
((remedies approach" to this case.
It seems to me that the Copyright Law, enacted longbefore photocopying was dreamed of, compels us by its
explicit language to hold photocopying to be an infringe-·
ment. There is little doubt, however, that such a holding- without more-would seriously and adversely affect
the public interest in dissemination of knowledge in the
inexpensive, convenient form that photocopying allows.
This public harm would result without, in my opinion ,
any significant compensating increase in the amount of
new work published. This effect would be most severe
if an infringement holding led to the development of a
royalties system like that existing in the music publishing and recording industries, in which transaction costs
are extremely high. But this effect would be significantly
reduced if publishers were restricted to charging a reasonable licensing fee for noncommercial photocopyinO' ri!Thts.
Even a modest licensing fee system probablY would have
some effect on the amount of photocopying. But such a
system also would accord due recognition to the rights of
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authors and publishers and to the purpose of the Copyright Law.
I would deal with the problem by recognizing that
photocopying constitutes an infrin ement and by limitmg e reme ies av ·
for noncommercial hotoco ) ~
uch a remedy approac would be essentially
consistent with
nguage and established
copyright principles. Also it would allow relath·e flexibility in dealing with the cluster of problems that this
case promises to bring in its wake, absent a comprehensive legislative solution.
But before elaborating on a remedies solution. perhaps
I should state my reasons for disagreein~ with the Court
of Claims in its reliance upon "fair use" as the solution.
~'Fair

Use"

Apart from the fair use defense, photocopying all, or
a substantial portion of a copyrighted work (here, incHvidual journal articles) is an infringement of the copyright holder's exclusive right "ft]o print. reprint, publish,
copy and vend the copyrighted work." A fair reading
of the language and purpose of the statute does not seem
to me to allow the contrary conclusion. ' 1To secure the
author the right to multiply copies of his work may be
said to have been the main purpose of the copyright
statutes." Bobbs-Merrill Co. Y. Straus, 210 U. S. 339.
In a sense, however. many works copy or use works
that went before. employing them as a necessary predicate for an original contribution. If, therefore, an
author could extend his copyright interest to all works
that used or included elements of his own, the Copyright
Law's central purpose-the encouragement of the production of new works-would be hampered rather than
enhanced. This observation is the basis of the fair use
defense. Although courts and commentators disagree
widely as to the outer edges of the 'doctrine, there is
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general agreement. as
meanin;;t
co ri hted work is fair when i is for the 'tr )ose of
creating something cssentiall
the econmmc value of the new 'vork
rom Its incorporatina secti~Ou,l~W--J.il't<.l.uu.
The Court of Claims opinion in this case applied many
of the criteria that traditionally have been taken into
account in determining 'vhether a use is fair. I believel,
however. it applied two of these criteria quite erroneously. First, lack of demonstrable loss to the copyright
holder as a result of the infringing act has never been
thought to establish fair use. It can serve only as evidence that the infringing work is not the practical. economic equivalent of the copyrighted work. Second, the
Court of Claims found relevant the motiYe of the libraries,
that their photocopying was not done for profit. but f01·
the advancement of research. But motive in this sense
has never been deemed relevant in fair use cases. Courts
have looked to purpose, but only in the sense of whether
the alleged infringer in.!_ended to create somethi11gile\v,
or to appropriate fOr his o'm benefit the copyright
holder's work.
However justifiable and socially beneficial the libraries~
photocopying practices may be, they cannot be charac. terized as a "fair use" within the established meaning of
that term. The sole value of the photocopies derives
precisely from theoriginal co ri(J'hted work. The copy J
adc s not ling new an
as no economic value independent of the work of the copyright holder.
~
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While the motive for and public benefit derived from·
photocopying are irrelevant in determining the infringment and fair use issues, they may be highly relevant to
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17 U. S. C. § 101 provides:
"If any person shall infringe the copyright in any
work protected under the copyright laws .. . such
person shall be liable
"(a) To an injunction restraining such infringement
"(b) To pay to the copyright proprietor such
damages as the copyright proprietor may have
suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the
profits which the infringer shall have made from
such infringement . .. or in lieu of actual damages
and profits, such damages as to the court shall ap~~---\.
r/_
to be just .. . and such fin lieu] damages shal~be ~ /YIO ~ C~
less than the sum of $250, and shall not be regarded A~~ ~ ~
as a penalty."
trr'
!"",040 , , .
Petitioner brought this action under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1498 (b) , which provides that the copyright proprietor
may bring an action in the Court of Claims for ((reasonable and entire compensation" when the United States
has infringed his copyright. Since no injunctive relief
is available under this section, I turn first to § 101 (b)'s
damages provisions.
If petitioner were restricted to a remedy of damages
for actual lost profits and profits gained by the infringer/
the problem presented in this case would be largely
eliminated. As to individuals who photocopy for their
own use a single item in a larger work, it would be nearly
impossible for the proprietor to establish loss, and of
course the infringer would have made no profit. With
respect to library photocopying for patrons, the copy-

1

1

-----

Most courts have held that the proprietor is entitled to eitherhi:; damages or to the infringer's profits, whichever are grca ter. See·
2 Nimmer on Copyright , at 667. The Second Circuit hns held, however, that the proprietor is entitled to both. See Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. Y. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F. 2d 194 {CA2 1964) . This Court
hns never ruled on the question.
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right holder might in some cases be able to demonstrate
that he did lose a modest amount. since the library (or its
patrons) might have purchased additional copies. Moreover, the library might have purchased a photocopying
license. But the library would have made no profits.
Allowing the proprietor to recover for these slight losses,
plus costs of the suit (as required by 17 U. S. C. § 116)
and possibly attorney's fees, would probably lead to the
institution of a system of modest license fees added
to the subscription rates of those subscribers-mostly
libraries--that plan to xerox.
The same damage rules would discourage unlicemed
commercial xeroxing, since the copyright holder could
recover, under the Second Circuit's rule, both his damages
and the commercial xeroxer's profits, plus costs of suit
and in some cases attorney's fees. The rules would also·
tend to discourage the copying of whole works or journal
issues, rather than parts, since it would be somewhat
easier to establish reduced demand for the work as pub- ·
lished. Thus, the damage rules would give the copyright holder substantial returns for commercial exploita-·
tion of his work, without unduly discouraging single copy,
not-for-profit xeroxing by libraries or their patrons.
The "in lieu" damages provisions of § 101 introduce
a complicating element but do not necessarily change·
this result. The cases are inconsistent as to when these
in lieu provisions may or must be invoked. There is
a fair amount of agreement, however, as to the follo·wing
general rules: (i) When both the infringer's profits and
the proprietor's losses can fairly be determined and are·
higher than the statutory in lieu maximum, the in lieu
provisions generally are not invoked; and (ii) when there·
is lack of adequate proof as to either actual damages or
the infringer's profits, the in lieu provisions may be
invoked in the trial court's discretion. . This is the holding in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc.~.
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344 U. S. · 228, this Court's most recent decision on
the subject. In that case, the Court discussed the
policy considerations governing invocation of the in lieu
provisions:
"A rule of liability which merely takes a.wa.y the
profits from an infringement. would offer little discouragement to infringers. It would fall short of
an effective sanction for the enforcement of the copyright policy. The statutory rule, formulated after
long experience ... is designed to discourage wrongful conduct. The discretion of the court is wide
enough to permit resort to statutory damages for
such purposes. Even for uninjurious and unprofita.hle invasions of copyright the court may, if it
deems it just. impose a liability within statutory
limits to sanction and vindicate the statutory
policy." 1d., at 233.
Much of this is dictum. Even so. it says only that the
court may, in the interest of justice. invoke the in lieu
provisions when there is lack of adequate proof of damages or profits, or even when such damages and profits
are nonexistent. No decision of this Court or any court~
says that in the absence of any evidence of injury, the
in lieu provisions are mandatory.
In short. I see no obstacle to our formulating a rule
along the following lines to govern the trial court'~
cretion in determining whether it is just to allow in lieu
damages: In the case of noncommercial photoduplication
for personal use by private parties or by libraries for their
patrons:t""he in lieu provisions ""should rarely be used.
The statutory minimum would almost always grossly
exceed any possible damage the proprietor has suffered.
It would, therefore, take on a punitive aspect unjustified
2
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by the purposes of the copyright law, in light of the
great public interest that noncommercial xeroxing serves.
Normally, therefore, the trial court should require the
best evidence of the proprietor's actual losses, and may
award the proprietor's normal photoduplication licensing
fee if found to be reasonable. This rule would leave the
result as to noncommercial xcroxers substantially unchanged. while allowing use of the in lieu provisions
against commercial xeroxers. In would , however, allow
awards of in lieu damages in particularly egregious cases
of noncommercial use-where. for example, a library refuses to pay a reasonable licrnsing fee and instead chooses
to engage in large-scale infringement .
This damagr analysis satisfies . in large measure, the
public interest considerations so evident in this case.
The availability of an injunctive remedy, however, could
substantially alter the situation. If the copyright proprietor can obtain an injunction , he may be able to
compel the photocopier to agree to pay royalties rather
than a reasonable licensing fee. The payment of royalties could be prohibitive. It certainly would be more
likely to discourage noncommercial xeroxing th an '"ould
. a fixed fee licensing system.
I would avoid this result by allowing an unconditional \
injunctive remedy only with respect to commercial
photocopiers. It has been said that, once infringment
is established, irreparable injury from continued infringment is assumed because of the difficulty in determining
damages precisely. But nothing in the statute nor in
the case law necessarily precludes the court from engaging in the normal balancing of equities and public interest
considerations in determining whether to issue an injunction in a particular case. On the contrary, § 101 states
only that an infringer "shall be liable" to an injunction,
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not that an injunction must issue in every case. And
§ 112 provides that:
"Any court mentioned in [28 U. S. C. § 1338] ...
shall have power ... to grant injunctions to prevent
and restrain the violation of any right secured by
this title, according to the course and principles of
courts of equity, on such terms as said court or
judge may deem reasonable."
Finally, limitations on normal equity power to decide
whether an injunction should issue are not lightly implied. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321.
I think it is possible to formulate along the foregoing
lines an equitable rule to deal with noncommercial
photocopying infringers, a rule derived from the public interest considerations in prom<n!ng noncommercial
ph~ one side and in protecting the
reasonable interests of the copyright proprietor on the
other. As in other areas of property law, see Ham:Sonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334, the
public interest can be held to require that the injunction
be denied, conditional on the infringing, noncommercial
user agreeing to pay a. reasonable license fee for the privilege of photocopying in the future. In the absence of
agreement between the parties as to what fee is reasonable, the amount would be set by the court. See 2 Nimmer on Copyright, at 656.4-656.5 (1974 ed.).
The injunction problem is not directly presented in
.this case, .but
. it would be desirable to address the problem
m our opmwn.
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and East [Sr DJ])
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v.

o1c

Universal City Studios, Inc.,
and Walt Disney Productions
SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

This is the famous Betamax case, in which the

CA9 held that manufacturers of videotaping devices violate the
copyright laws.

Petrs argue (1) that videotaping for private use

of free off-the-air television programming does not violate the
copyright statute; (2) that even if it does violate the copyright
laws, manufacture, sale, and advertisement of home videotape
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recorders is not contributory infringement; (3) that home
vi~ng

of such programming constitutes a "fair use" of a

copyrighted work; (4) that the CA erred in suggesting that the DC
on remand might impose a compulsory license on the copyright
owner and continuing royalties on the infringer; and (5) that the
CA improperly ignored the DC's findings of fact.
Respondents Universal City

FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW:

Studios and Walt Disney Productions own copyrighted productions
that are broadcast over television.
Betamax, a videotape recorder (VTR).

Petr Sony Corp. manufactures
Resps sued Sony, four

retailers that sell Betamax, Sony's advertising agency, and one
individual owner of a Betamax for copyright infringement.

(The

individual Betamax owner was sued as a nominal defendant and is
not a petr.)

The~CDCal (Ferguson) ruled in favor of petrs,
~

finding that noncommercial videotaping is

i~liedly

excepted from

the copyright statute; that, in any event, noncommercial
videotaping is permitted by the fair use doctrine; that, even if
the videotaping constitutes infringement, petrs are not liable
because Betamax is a staple item of commerce; and that even if
petrs are liable, resps are entitled to no relief because resps
did not interfere with petrs' business relations.

The ~9

reversed.

Title 17

u.s.c.

§106 of the Copyright Act

of 1976 grants the copyright holder exclusive rights in the
copyrighted material.
§§107-118.

Those rights are subject to exceptions in

The critical question, reasoned theCA, is not

whether Congress intended to protect copyrighted material against
~

videotaping but whether Congress intended to withdraw the broad

- 3 -

protection granted by §106 in the case of videotaping.
found no such congressional intent.

The CA

The statute shows special

solicitation for audiovisual materials; §108 (h) excludes all
audiovisual materials except those dealing with the news from the
§108 exemption.

Also, in 1971 Congress permitted home recording

of sound recordings, but it made no mention of home video
recording. Importantly, nothing in the statutory language
suggests an exemption for videotaping from the broad protection
of §106.

The legislative history contains some isolated comments

about video recording, but they do not constitute a considered
congressional

vie~

the issue.

Nor does the fair use doctrine excuse home video recording.
The fair use doctrine concerns the productive use of an author's
~

work by a second author, not the mere reproduction of a work to
use it for its intrinsic purpose.

The DC relied upon Williams &

Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct Cl 1973), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), but that case
is distinguishable and unpersuasive.

There, the Ct Cl permitted

the National Institute of Health to copy entire articles
published in medical journals.

The Ct Cl was concerned about the

damage to medical science if the journals could not be copied,
and there is no corresponding societal benefit on the side of
petrs in this case.

The Ct Cl's decision is unpersuasive because

it permitted mere photocopying under the rubric of fair use.
Application of Williams & Wilkins is especially inappropriate in
the context of new technology, which permits the mass
~

reproduction of copyrighted material.

- 4 In addition, §107 of the 1976 Act specifies four factors to
be considered when applying the fair use doctrine, and they
indicate that the doctrine does not apply.

(1) "The purpose and

character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes"
The copyrighted material is not used for a nonprofit educational
purpose, even though it is used in the home.

(2)

"The nature of

the copyrighted work" -- The movies are creative rather than
informational works.

(3)

"The amount and substantiality of the

portions used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole"
This factor also cuts against finding fair use, since Betamax
owners typically videotape the entire work. (4) "The effect of
r

the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work" -- Resps did not have to show actual damages; they showed
enough by demonstrating that home videotaping tends to diminish
the potential sale of their work.

It is extremely difficult for

a copyright plaintiff to prove harm from the activities of
specific defendants.

The DC should have paid more attention to

the cumulative effect of videotaping on resps' copyrighted works.
After finding that home-use videotaping was an infringement
of resps' copyrights, theCA held Sony, the retailers, and the
advertising agency liable.

Betamax machines do not fall within

the "staple item of commerce" theory, as do typewriters or tape
recorders.

They are manufactured, advertfsed, and sold primarily

for reproducing television programming, virtually all of which is
copyrighted material.

The DC relied upon the fact that before

this law suit, petrs could not know that they were violating the

- 5 -

copyright laws.

TheCA concluded that petrs' mistake might

affect the relief granted (such as the amount of statutory
damages), but that, to be held liable, petrs need only have had
knowledge of the infringing activity.

Petrs of course know that

Betamax will be used to reproduce copyrighted material, and there
is no doubt that marketing Betamax induced others (Betamax
owners) to infringe resps' copyrights.
The CA remanded for the DC to formulate relief, advising
that a copyright plaintiff is generally entitled to a permanent
injunction when there is a threat of continuing infringement and
that the DC should not be overly concerned about prospective harm
to petrs.
(

The CA also noted that the DC might consider awarding

resps a continuing royalty instead of an injunction against
production of Betamax.
petrs' defenses:

On remand, the DC will also consider

(1) laches and estoppel; (2) copyright

invalidity; (3) unclean hands/copyright enforceability.
CONTENTIONS:

Petrs underscore the importance of this

case, claiming that it will have a greater impact than any prior
copyright decision.

Sales of VTR's and tapes will exceed $1

billion in 1982, and VTR's are used in over 3 million American
homes.

Petrs also emphasize the importance of the question

whether private noncommercial recording of material broadcast
over the public airwaves is a copyright infringement.

And petrs

note that the Court has never examined the fair use doctrine.
Petrs insist that there is no reason for the Court to wait
for the conclusion of the remand.

The CA has decided the

critical copyright issues; the defenses to be raised on remand

- 6 -

are factual and unique to petrs.

The CA decision has left the

important VTR industry unsettled, and postponing decision by this
Court will exacerbate the uncertainty.

Although Congress has

reacted to the CA's decision, only this Court can settle the
application of the 1976 Act to VTR's.
On the merits, petrs insist that videotape recording of free
television broadcasts is not copyright infringement.

The CA did

not examine the legislative history of the 1976 Act, insisting
that the statutory language was conclusive.

The legislative

history shows that Congress intended home video recording to be
fair use within the meaning of §107.
began in 1955.

Revision of the 1909 Act

In 1961, the Register of Copyrights reported to

Congress that the private use of home reproductions of televised
motion pictures should not be precluded by the copyright laws.

A

House Report on the 1971 Amendment to the 1909 Act stated that
the committee did not intend to restrain home recording for
private use of recorded performances.

And Rep. Kastenmeier, the

subcommittee chairman, stated on the House floor in 1971 that
home recording of a television program would not be banned by the
copyright laws.

Nothing in the legislative history of the 1976

Act itself is to the contrary.
Furthermore, the equitable doctrine of "fair use" should
permit home videotaping for private use.

It is a necessary step

between free off-the-air TV broadcasts and home viewing for which
the program owners have been paid.

In addition, "fair use" is

inherently a factual question, and the CA should not have
disturbed the DC's finding of fair use, since the DC did not act

.

;

- 7 clearly erroneously.

When the §107 "fair use" factors are

applied, a finding of fair use is compelled.

(1) As to the

purpose of the use, the CA held that since the copies are used
for the same purpose as the original, fair use could not be
found.

This conclusion alone presents a certworthy issue.

(2)

As to the nature of the copyrighted work, the DC correctly noted
that resps had voluntarily chosen to have their productions
telecast over public air waves to individual homes free of
charge.

(3) As to the amount copied, this factor is inextricably

bound up with the issue of harm, and resps suffered no harm.

(4)

As to the effect of the copying on the potential market, the DC
found no harm.

The CA assumed that copying diminished the

,-

potential market for resps' works.

Any "mass reproduction" would

~

merely be the cumulative effect of home viewing intended when the
production was broadcast.

?'

The ~ decision

conflicts with the Ct Cl 's decision in

Williams & Wilkins Co.

In that case, the Ct Cl found fair use

when medical journal articles were reproduced for the same
purpose as the original articles.
underlying rationale of the Ct Cl.

The CA expressly rejected the
Furthermore, the CA decision

conflicts with decisions of this Court, because the CA held that
the suppliers of a staple item of commerce (an item suitable for
substantial non-infringing use) were contributory infringers.
See Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222

u.s.

55 (1911); see also

Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Covertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.
476 (1964); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled
on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film

- 8 -

Mfg. Co., 243

u.s.

502 (1917).

TheCA disregarded the DC's

conclusion that VTR's have varied uses.

The DC found that there

was no evidence that petrs induced the copying of copyrighted
productions, and the CA discarded that finding.
Petrs also object to the suggestion in the CA's opinion that
the DC might impose a compulsory license on resps and a
continuing royalty on petrs instead of enjoining the production
of VTR's.

There is no precedent for such a judicially-created

license.

Finally, petrs urge the Court to correct the improper

fashion in which the CA dismissed many of the DC's findings of
fact.
Resps present several reasons why the Court should not hear
(

'

the case now.

The CA remanded the case for consideration of

unresolved affirmative defenses and for the DC to fashion a
remedy.

Thus, petrs may yet win the case on remand; and even if

petrs lose, the remedy may satisfy all parties.

Nor is there any

l

urgency that would cause the Court to hear the case before the
completion of trial.

VTR production has continued unhindered

during the six-year history of the litigation.

Petrs continue to

market VTR's, and if an injunction ever issues against them, it
can be stayed pending appeal and review by this Court.

And if

the DC orders only payments, petrs can of course continue
production.
Moreover, Congress will likely dispose of the issue in the
near future.

A number of bills have been introduced to deal with

the problem of VTR's.

The Senate has concluded hearings, and the

House hearings are expected to end in June 1982.

By the

- 9 -

conclusion of the trial on remand and a second appeal, Congress
will probably have amended the copyright law to deal explicitly
with this problem, and the Court will not have to consider the
issue.
On the merits, resps defend the CA decision.

On their face,

the 1909 and 1976 Acts unambiguously proscribe home video
recording of copyrighted motion pictures.

None of the exemptions

in §§107-118 of the 1976 Act apply to uncompensated reproduction
of copyrighted works for private use.

Indeed, there is only one

narrow exception for any reproduction of copyrighted motion
pictures, an exception for offshore cable systems for temporary
use outside the continental U.S., §111 (e).
/~

Contrary to petrs'

suggestion, the CA did examine the legislative history, and it
supports the clear import of the statutory language.

Petrs rely

upon the legislative history of an entirely different Act, the
Sound Recording Act of 1971.

Petrs also cite comments by the

Register of Copyrights and others, but those were casual
statements made during discussion of matters unrelated to VTR
copying.
There is no conflict with the CA's fair use decision.

The

CA criticized the Ct Cl's Williams & Wilkins decision, but it
also found the decision clearly distinguishable.

In that case,

the federal government copied medical journals to advance medical
research; this copying was thus a variety of productive use
required by the fair use doctrine.

VTR copying, in contrast,

does not further scholarship or scientific research.

Moreover,

Williams & Wilkins was decided under the 1909, not the 1976, Act.

- 10 In the 1976 Act, Congress included a specific provision, 17

u.s.c.

§108, for library photocopying.

Petrs also challenge the

CA's application of the four fair use criteria in §107.

There is

no reason for this Court to grant cert in order to apply the
established principles of §107 to the facts of this case.

Resps

of course agree with the CA's analysis of the four factors.
Nor did theCA's decision conflict with this Court's
decisions when the CA found that petrs were contributory
infringers.

Under Kalem and Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., supra, a

seller of an article capable of both infringing and noninfringing
uses is liable for contributory infringement if he "intends and
expects" the article to be used for infringing, especially when
I

the infringing use is the "most conspicuous use."

As theCA

determined, Betamax is manufactured and sold for the primary
purpose of reproducing copyrighted television programming.

Thus,

contrary to petrs' arguments, the CA did not hold petrs liable as
contributory infringers for manufacturing a mere staple article
of commerce.

The Betamax is something quite different.

Petrs object to the CA's reference to a possible mandatory
license and continuing royalty, but it would be premature for the
Court to consider that question until the DC decides whether to
impose such a royalty.

And petrs' challenge to the CA's

consideration of the DC's factual findings is not worth review by
this Court.

I

There are twenty amicus briefs.

Briefs by retailers, VTR

manufacturers, and suppliers of VTR accessories of course urge
the Court to grant.

They emphasize the importance of the case

- 11 -

for the VTR industry.

In addition, there is a brief from a group

of consumer organizations (Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council,
et al.) contending that the First Amendment interests of
television viewers are at stake.

(This brief is particularly

interesting because it contains a number of political cartoons
inspired by the Betamax decision.)

And an amicus brief has been

submitted on behalf of several states supporting petrs.

There

are a few amicus briefs in opposition, from CBS, distributors and
producers of motion pictures, associations of writers, and the
Motion Picture Association.
Some of the amicus briefs add a few helpful points.

The Ad

Hoc Committee on Copyright Law explains that VTR's are used to
record programs for educational issues by teachers and
librarians.

The Consumer Electronics Group emphasizes that VTR's

have seemingly unobjectionable uses besides reproducing
copyrighted material, such as time shifting (to permit a viewer
to see a program at a different time), composition of home
movies, and playing prerecorded programming on sale in various
stores.

Finally, the states (Missouri, et al.) emphasize that

·much of television programming is unlike the productions
copyrighted by resps.

VTR owners record sports broadcasts;

religious programming; educational programming; and local
programming, which is often not copyrighted.
DISCUSSION:
important case.

There can be no doubt that this is a very
The size of the VTR industry, the use of VTR's

by millions of Americans, and the threat of the CA's decision to
the industry make this a case that the Court might want to grant.

- 12 -

In addition, it is debatable whether the CA was correct in
concluding that home videotaping for private use is not a fair
use of copyrighted materials broadcast over the public airways.
On the other

hand~ th~ase

usual tests for granting.
demands resolution.
Cl decision.

does not satisfy some of the

There is no square conflict that

The CA did reject the Williams & Wilkins Ct

But the CA also distinguished that decision: it

dealt with photocopying for medical research, and Betamax use
does not fall so clearly into the category of
educational/scientific use.

Also, the CA's decision in some ways

does not seem unreasonable.

Section 106 does grant the copyright

------------

holder broad rights, and none of the subsequent exceptions apply.
There are some passages in the legislative history that support

(

petrs, but the CA appears to have reached a defensible conclusion
when it decided that those passages were isolated comments that
would not support a copyright exception.

~

Finally, the CA was not

clearly wrong when it held that the Betamax was not a staple item
of commerce, since an important function of VTR's is to record
copyrighted programming.
The strongest argument against granting this case is that

~ongress

is considering legislation to solve the problem.

If the

Court denied the case, it would retain the option of reviewing
the CA's decision after remand.

By thus postponing review, the

j

Court would give Congress a chance to pass legislation aimed

(

directly at VTR's.

On balance, the Court might well deny at this point, in the

- 13 -

hope that Congress will amend the copyright law before the
conclusion of the remand of the case to the DC.

At the same

time, the Court would be justified in granting the case because
of its importance.!

There is a response and twenty amicus briefs.

May 19, 1982

Holleman

Opn in petn

1 rf the Court does decide to grant, it might consider
eliminating question 4 from the scope of the grant, because the
proper scope of relief need not be resolved at this point. The
Court might also consider eliminating question 5, since it deals
with the facts of the case; but because the facts are intertwined
with the legal issues, the Court should probably grant question 5
also, if it grants the first three questions.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 81-1687
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
January 14, 1983

Michael F. Sturley

Questions Presented
(1)

Is

home

videotape

recording

of

free

off-the-air

television programming solely for home use a copyright infringement, or is such recording protected by the "fair use" doctrine?
( 2)
petrs'

If such recording is a copyright infringement, do

actions

in manufacturing,

selling,

and advertising home

videotape recorders constitute contributory infringement?

..
·.·

.

'l

'
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I.
A.

Background

The Statute
Under the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, the owner of a

copyright,

subject

to

certain

exceptions,

"has

the

exclusive

rights to do and to authorize" certain activities, including the
"reproduc[tion of]
§106(1).

the copyrighted work

-

in copies."

u.s.c.

Of particular

The exceptions are found at §§107-118.
~ ----""-

17

-....,.......,

relevance here is the "fair use" exception:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sect ion 106, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such u_9e by
reproduction in copies ... for purposes such asvcriticism, Vcomment,Vnews reporting,vteaching (including multiple copies for classroom use) , v scholarship, or vfesearch, is not an infringement of copyright.
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-( 1) the purpose and character / of the use, in- ~ c:;.cluding whether such use is of a commercial nature ~
or is for 'fionprof it educational purposes; <'1f(lit.
- (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; -~ 0
f..e~
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portio~'~.=~~~~
used in relation to the copyrighted work as ~--~~-·· 1
whole; and
~-~
( 4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17

u.s.c.

§107.

In enacting this fair use exception, Congress's

intention was to codify the existing
..______ judicial doctrine .

-----

B.

Facts
Petr Sony Corporation of America is the manufacturer of

the "Betamax," a videotape recorder

(VTR) designed for home use.

A VTR has the capacity to record television programming as it is
being broadcast, and replay it at a later time.

VTR owners com-

page 3.
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monly use

the off-the-air

recording capacity for

two purposes:

(1)

"time shifting," i.e., automatically recording a program when
t
--- ... _..
it is broadcast in order to watch it once at a later time, and
(2)

"librarying,"

order

to

watch

i.e., recording a program while viewing it in

it

a

second

time,

or

recording

a

program

and

watching the tape two or more times.
The remaining petrs are stores that sell the Betamax and
the agency that advertises the Betamax.

Resps are film studios

holding copyrights on works that are broadcast on television.

C.

Decisions Below
Resps

initiated the present copyright infringement ac-

tion against petrs and
Ferguson) .

a nominal Betamax owner

emption,

~~ home

Congress

did

not

to cover audio recording

use (e.g., off-the-air recording of radio broadcasts).
f(.

~ same

~··

Although there is no express ex-

intend

~

VL-, 1~

(CD Cal;

The DC held that VTR recording for home use was not

covered by the copyright laws.

IJ-C::.

in DC

Congressional

intent excludes VTR

ed before 1976 by the judicial fair use doctrine.

u.s.c.

The
'I

~ e_:- use

any event, VTR home-use recording is "fair use."

tected by 17

for

recording.

In

It was protectIt is now pro-

§107.

The DC went on to conclude that, even if VTR recording

-

violates the copyright laws, Sony is not liable under any of the
three theories advanced by plaintiffs: direct infringement, contributory infringement, or vicarious liability.
infringement claim failed
staple

II, ••

._

for

several

i tern of commerce," with varied

The contributory

reasons.
uses,

The VTR

is

"a

so Sony cannot be

page 4.
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held liable if the owner uses the VTR for an infringing activity.
Sony was not aware of any specific recording.

Even if Sony had

"constructive knowledge" of the recording of copyrighted work, it
did

not

know

that

such

recording

was

an

infringing

activity.

Furthermore, Sony did not induce or materially contribute to any
infringing

activity.

There

was

no

proof

that

any

of

Sony's

Betamax advertisements contributed to any of the recording proved
at trial.
Finally,

the

DC

held

that

injunctive

relief

would

be

inappropriate even if VTR home-use recording violated the copy-

---

right laws and Sony could be held liable for such infringing activity.

An

injunction is an equitable remedy,

inequitable to issue one here.

and it would be

Plaintiffs proved no irreparable

harm, and an injunction would deprive the public of new techno!ogy capable of noninfringing activity.
/

~~ersed

On appeal, CA9

and remanded.

(Kilkenny, Canby, East [DJ, D.Ore.])

The CA firs {0found that VTR home-use re-

~

cording was an infringing activity.

~ .yoA

by the unambiguous

)-

exemptions saves it.
the

re-

Such recording is prohibited

language of §106, and none of the statutory
This is beyond the fair use doctrine--both

judicial and statutory versions--despite the

purpose is noncommercial.

fact

that

its

It does not satisfy any of the crite-

ria of §107.
CA9 found Sony liable for the recording of Betamax own-

~''
.
ers as a contr1butory
commerce,"
use.

since

.
.
,,
1nfr1nger.

it does

not

.
.
A VTR 1s
not " a staple 1tem
of

have

a

substantial

noninfr inging

It is irrelevant that Sony did not know that home-use re-

II T fl. LA---- ~~~a.~
/,vU.- ~ ~h ~~
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9r~
u~~e~

/
cording

was

an

Betamax would

infringing
be

used

to

activity.
record

Sony did

copyrighted

"know"

that

matierials,

the

since

"[t)hat use is intended, expected, encouraged, and the source of
the product's consumer appeal."

eA 4

. u_)-

CA9 remanded to the DC for consideration of the appro-

~~pr iate

The CA noted several possibilities,

relief.

including a

~ ~~ continuing royalty.

~
II.
I

Discussion

find this a close and difficult case, raising inter-

esting questions about the application of traditional copyright
law

to

rapidly developing

new

technologies.

Perhaps

the

most

interesting (and difficult) question, however, is the one that is
not before the Court:
fortunately,

formulation of an appropriate remedy.

the nature of

the

remedy

Un-

is closely bound to the

extent of the infringement, so it might have been better to wait

~

on this case until the DC had fashioned a remedy.

A.

Fair Use
Petrs rely on the fair use doctrine in arguing that VTR

~

recording of

~ oes

under

free

off-the-air

programming

not violate the copyright laws.
traditional

fair

I

for

private home use

think this claim fails

use analysis and under

§107 of the new

statute.

Cour ~es
___,_

This

not seem to have passed on the fair use

doctrine, save in a meaningless one-sentence decision: Williams &
Wilkins Co.

v.

United States,

420

u.s.

376

(1975)

(per curiam)

/

page 6.
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(aff'g
Court) .

203

Ct.

But

Cl.

-----

74,

in~

by an equally divided
a lengthy memorandum

& Wilkins

(essentially an outline of a draft opinion)

in which you summa-

rized fair use:
Although courts and commentators disagree widely as to
the outer edges of the doctrine, there is general
agreement as to its central meaning: use of a copyrighted work is fair when it is for the purpose of creatLng somethin~ssentially~ new, and when the economic
value OI the new worK aces not derive primarily from
incorporating sections of the old.
Memorandum

in Williams

&

Wilkins,

No.

73-1279,

at 2-3.

It is

clear that VTR copies do not satisfy this test, for they are not
"essentially new"

and

they derive

from being copies of the origina1. 1

______

from

your

earlier
___,

they

are well

their

value

solely

I see no reason to retreat

(albeit unpublished)

supported by the

economic

views on

fair

use,

for

lower courts and commentators.

The glaring exception in the lower courts is Williams & Wilkins
itself, which you voted to reverse.

Whatever precedential value

1 My conclusion that VTR copies do not satisfy the fair use test
should be limited to the type of copying actually proven in this
case (and most frequently discussed by the parties), i.e., recording of entertainment programs for later viewing at the user's
convenience. There certainly are circumstances where VTR recording could be fair use. A few examples come readily to mind: An
English literature specialist may wish to record one of the BBC
Shakespeare productions to help him in writing a scholarly arti' ~le.
A sociologist may wish to record selected programs to asr~ ist her in her research into modern American culture.
A busi~
ness school student may wish to record certain commercials to
~ assist her
in writing a marketing report.
And a grade school
~
teacher may wish to record an educational program to show to his
class as a basis for further discussion.
In each of these cases,
the use made of the copy would be fair under the test you propose.
(These cases also demonstrate potential noninfringing uses
that could be relevant on the contributory infringement issue.
See section II.B., infra.)

page 7.
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that case may have,
The most

facts.

it can easily be

respectable

limited to

secondary source

to

its peculiar
the contrary

seems to be Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors,
Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982).

82

This article relies heavily on Wil-

liams & Wilkins, and seems more concerned with reforming the fair
use doctrine than with applying it.
I

think

the result

is

jJ07

the same

under §107.

First of -

all, the legislative history is clear that §107 is intended to be

a....

.

~-

nothing more than a codification of the preexisting judicial doc- ~
trine.

Second, the statute speaks of using a work "for purposes

~

such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... , scholarship, or research."
~ her

Although these examples are illustrative

than exhaustive,

they all represent cases where a person

A •••~~~ uses a work to "creat [e)
.,,_,

vV~
a .

--

economic value of

bJ~

[where]

the

-

the new work does not derive primarily from
of
o

should apply

something essentially new

the old."

Finally,

the statute sets

illustrate the considerations that a court

in resolving

a

fair

use

issue.

I

agree with CA9

that all four of these factors tend to cut against a finding of
fair use, petn app 19-25, despite the DC's arguments to the contrary, petn app 75-87.
Petrs'

strongest argument is that traditional fair use

alysis is poorly suited to a case involving rapidly developing
VTR technology.

"lt1me
.

.

.

~

sh1ft1ng

Here,

for example,

(without librarying)

they can argue that s YJ!Ple
./

is fair

use because the VTR

owner obtains only what the copyright owner intended him to have:

bench memo: Sor" v. Universal
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a single viewing of the television broadcast.

Time shifting has

a very different purpose than traditional copying, §107(1), and
the time shift does not have a significant effect on "the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work," §107(4).
though
work,

time

shifting
the

§107(3),

technically

copy

is

involves

copying

viewed only once.

It

the

Al-

entire

thus may be

viewed as a "temporal slice" of the entire work that constitutes
only a portion of the whole, unlike a traditional infringing copy
that

is

kept

permanently.

7lllrz...

This argument is appealing
-1

ways, but ultimately unconvincing.

It fails the traditional re-

--------------------~~

quirement

that

the

user

in some

"creat[e]

something

essentially

new

[whose] economic value ..• does not derive primarily from incorporating

sections of

the old."

This requirement may be a bad

policy decision, but that is a matter for Congress to decide.

As

long as we have the traditional fair use doctrine, VTR recording
remains an infringement.
Television, Inc., 392

e

~

ing)

Se~Fortnightly

u.s.

390, 404

Corp. v. United Artists

(1968)

(Fortas, J., dissent-

-

("[T]he fact that the [1909] Copyright Act was written in a

different day,

for different factual situations, should lead us

to tread cautiously here.

Our major object, I suggest, should be

~~ to do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright prin~-

ciples and to business relationships,

until the Congress legis-

lates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the interested
parties face.")

page 9.
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B.

Contributory Infringement { f1A.L

{9)

2~

Working on the assumption that VTR recording is an infr ingemen t,

there

remains

the

di ff icul t

are liable as contributory infringers.

quest ion whether petr s
The accepted definition

of contributory infringement was enunciated by Judge Anderson of

~~

the Second Circuit:

~~

[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activ~y~~
induces, causes or materially contributes to the in- ~
fringing conduct of another, may be held 1 iable as a
_ 4u
1
"contributory" infringer.
·~
J

. _

-

'

Gershwin Publishing Corp.

v.

Columbia Artists Management,

443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (cA2 1971)

Inc.,

(footnote omitted).

r

The strongest argument against applying this definition •
here is that such an application would represent a

significant

------------------------------------------------------------Those pre-

expansion of the contributory infringement doctrine.

viously held liable as contributory infringers had participated

J~.
lf&oj~,cA·

in

the

infringement

have done here.

far more

directly than Sony

is alleged to

In Gershwin Publishing, for example, the defen-

dant was a concert manager that organized local organizations to
sponsor

concert

series

in

worked closely with these

their

respective

local groups

communities.

It

in planning the series,

helping them with the finances and the selection of performing
artists.

The artists then paid a large commission (up to 25% of

their gross fee)

to the defendant for

(in addition to the regular management

this organizational work
fee).

Once an artist's

schedule was arranged, the defendant would contact him or her to
learn the works that he or she would perform at these concerts.
With

~

..

this

information,

the

defendant

printed

concert programs

bench memo: Sorm v. Universal
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-

(prominently featuring its own name)
organizations.

which it sold to the local

On these facts, CA2 concluded that the defendant

was liable for the infringement that occurred when an artist performed a copyrighted work without permission from the copyright
owner.

The defendant specifically organized each infringement,

was specifically aware of each infringement, and earned a profit
on the basis of each specific infringement.

Its "pervasive par-

ticipation"

conclusion

in

the

activity

caused the infringement.
fall

within

supported

the

443 F.2d, at 1163.

that

it

Although Sony may

the definition articulated by Gershwin Publishing,

its actions are a far cry from those condemned in prior contributory

infringement cases.

The

considerations

Court against expanding the fair

that

counsel

use doctrine beyond its tradi-

tional boundaries to accommodate developing VTR technology,
Fortnightly Corp.
404

v.

the

United Artists Television,

see

Inc., supra, at

(Fortas, J., dissenting), also counsel against expanding the

contributory infringement doctrine.
After considerable reflection, however, I am unconvinced
/

by the argument I make in the preceding paragraph.

~~ tual

If CA9's fac-

assumptions are correct, I think Sony probably has gone far

~ ~enough

to be a contributory infringer.

designed essentially to
tended r

expected r

consumer appeal."

It sells an item that was

infringe copyrights.

enCOUraged r

and

Petn app 27.

the

SOUrCe

"That use
Of

the

is in-

prOdUCt IS

Sony may not organize any spe-

cific infringement, but its making the VTR available encourages
and enables the infringement.

Similarly, it may not be aware of

any specific act of infringement, but it must know that the VTR

r

bench memo: Sor" v. Universal
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is frequently used for infringing recording.

Finally, it may not

make a profit from any specific infringement, but the VTR's ability to infringe is the source of its profitability.

Under CA9's

view of the facts, a VTR is less like a photocopying machine than
like

one

of

the

infamous

"black

boxes"

that enable

telephone

callers to avoid the payment of long distance tolls.

--

The problem here is that there is no clear indication in

-

the record that CA9's factual assumptions are correct.
suggested in four different places that VTRs

The DC

(like photocopiers

and unlike black boxes) are suitable for noninfringing uses, petn
app 92,

104,

106-107,

114,

but CA9 dismissed

virtually without discussion,
addressing

Sony's

id., at 26,

this possibility

and certainly without

suggested possibilities.

On the actual case

tl

before the Court, there is very little evidence of any contribu. f .
tory 1n
r1ngement.\;\

Resps proved the existence o

heir copyrighted work, and with respect to these copies there
no finding that Sony contributed to the infringement
hesitant to rely on this lack of evidence

I

am

(or at least lack of

factual findings) as a ground for reversal, however, since I feel
certain that much

(if not most)

of what CA9

says

is true.

would be improper

to rely on such extra-record feelings,

It

but I

think the Court would look like an ostrich with its head in the
sand to ignore what almost everyone must suspect is true.

~

~and

My

recommendation

to the DC.

to

resolve

these difficulties

is a

On remand, the DC can give resps the opportu-

nity of proving (and take for itself the opportunity of finding)
that

there

has

been

substantial

infringement

of

resps'

copy-

rights, and that Sony has contributed to this infringement.
importantly,

More

the DC can review the possible noninfr inging uses

and make detailed findings on the issue.

Sony's claims have con-

siderable appeal, but in the absence of specific findings by the
DC it is very difficult for an appellate court to evaluate them.

C.

The Remedy
The most interesting issue in this case is probably the

-

formulation of a remedy, but at the moment that issue is not before the Court.

~

It might nevertheless be helpful to offer some

broad guidance here.
would

For example, I would not think that a total
be

noninfringing uses.

appropriate

if

there

are

realistic

In my view, even the continuing royalty sug-

gested by CA9 would not be justified unless the DC could develop
a means to correlate the royalty to the frequency and severity of
infringement.
s ible,
Corp.

This may well mean that no judicial remedy is pos-

but e.~
v.

again Jus ~~For tas' s

United Artists Television,

Inc.

~~
1n Fortnightly
.

wa~n1n

is appropriate:

"[T]he

fact that the Copyright Act was written in a different day,

for

different factual situations, should lead us to tread cautiously
here.

Our major object,

damage

as

business

possible

to

I

suggest,

should be to do as little

traditional copyright

relationships,

lieves

the

embarrassment

face."

392

u.s.,

until
which

at 404 (1968)

the
we

Congress
and

the

principles
legislates
interested

and
and

to
re-

parties

(Fortas, J., dissenting).
'·

bench memo: Sor"' v. Universal

III.

page 13.

Conclusion

The copying specifically at issue here is not protected
by the fair use doctrine (although some types of copying would be
protected}.
for

If CA9's view of the facts is correct Sony is liable

contributory

evaluate

this

infringement,

issue properly.

but

the record is inadequate to

Accordingly,

the decision below

should be affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part.

..
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CHAMBERS 0,-

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 20, 1983

Menorandum to the File
Re:

81-1687 - Sony Corp. v.
Studios

Universal City

These are thoughts based on a review of the 1976
Copyright Act (90 Stat. 2541) and the House Report.
1. First, some general comments: Some subjects,
such as cable television a~d various aspects of library
use and the rest are treated in extraordinary detail,
yet there is no specific consideration of the problem
of taping (either music tapes or video tapes) even .
though that problem was obviously one that Congress was
well aware of.
2. Unlike the patent statute, there is no
provision covering the problem of . contributory
infringement.
3. Throughout the statute there is repeated _
emphasis on commercial factors, public performances and
distributions, and almost no reference to private use.
4. Most significantly, a careful reading of §106
itself indicates that the private reproduction .of a
single copy of a copyrighted work would not violate any
of the five exclusive rights granted by the statute. ·
First, it is noteworthy that subparagraph 1 refers only
to multiple copies, subparagraph 2 refers to the
preparation of derivative works, subparagraph 3 refers
to the commercial distribution of copies, subparagraph
4 refers to public performance, and subparagraph 5 to
public display of the copyrighted work.
In sum, there
simply is no prohibition against the reproduction of a
single copy for the private use of the person making
the reproduction •

•

"1.

1.::; .,

-2-

5. It is also noteworthy that §107, the fair use
exception, also talks only about the reproduction of
multiple copies.
(In this connection it is noteworthy
that the House Report at page 65 points out that the
fair use doctrine is "an equitable rule of reason" for
which no generally applicable definition is possible
and each case raising the question must be decided on
its own facts.
6. Then, on page 66, the report states that the
reference to copies of phono records and so forth was
intended to make clear that the doctrine has as much
application to photocopying and taping as to older
forms of use. The second paragraph on page 66, though
not quite explicit, certainly emphasizes the
significance of the question whether the reproduction
is for commercial or noncommercial purposes. At page
66, the report also emphasizes the latitude that should
be given to the Court in making a case-by-case
application of the doctrine.
7.
It is noteworthy that in §108, Congress
demonstrated that it was able to differentiate between
multiple copies and single copies because it
specifically referred in the library exception to
reproducing "no more than one copy." Again, in §l08g
the statute differentiates betw~en - "the isolated and
unrelated reproduction or distribution of a single copy
or phono record" as opposed to the reproduction of
multiple copies.
8.
If the manufacturer of reproduction equipment,
such as a xerox machine or a tape machine, could
reasonably believe (a) that purchasers of the equipment
would use it primarily for single copy reproduction for
private use; and also (b) that the statute would not
regard such single copy reproduction as infringements
since it does not literally violate the statute, is it
appropriate to impose vicarious liability on the seller
of the equipment, particulary when the statute contains
no contributory infringement prohibition and when the
authors of the statute were well aware of the problem
presented by such equipment manufacturers?

..

-3-

9. Although I am not sure I understand the
library provisions completely, I get the impression
that they basically adopt the Government's position in
the Williams and Wilkens case.
10. At page 73 of the House Report, it is noted
that the making of multiple copies or phono records of
a work for general circulation requires permission of
the copyright owner, but "the making of a single copy
or phonograph by an individual as a free service for a
blind person would properly be considered a fair use
under §107." Although this comment obviously does not
extend to single copy reproduction for the copier's own
private use, it does seem significant that there is
such a plain difference between that kind of use and
multiple copy commercial reproduction.
11. Section 109 preserves the rule that the owner
of a particular copy of a copyrighted work has the
right to sell or otherwise dispose of it without the
permission of the copyright owner. Literally, this .
section would not apply.
12. The remedies for infringement are spelled out
in §504. As I read subsection c, statutory damages
must be granted to the copyright owner if he so elects.
Although the normal amount is $250 or more, if the
infringer proves that he had no reason to believe that
his acts constitute an infring ement, the award may be
reduced to a sum of "not less than $100." There are
specific provisions for remitting any statutory damages
for employees of nonprofit educational institutions or
public broadcasting entities, but not simply for the
private home user. Thus, an affirmance would seem to
mandate a damage award of at least $100 for each
provable copying of any one of the respondent's
programs.
13. It is important to keep in mind the
distinction between the exclusive rights granted by the
Patent Act--namely, to make, use; and to vend - -and the
five exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act,
when analyzing a contributory infringement problem. In
general, the contributory infringement doctrine in
patent law applies to the supplying of an essential

·'

' .

"

.

,.

·.

-4-

element to a combination patent, a situation which
really is not duplicated in the copyright area. The
Ben-Hur case on which the plaintiffs rely so heavily is
one that involved an infringement of the copyright
owner's performance rights and the holding, in essence,
was that the producer of the performance, as well as
the actual performers, should be held to have violated
that right. That seems only sensible since they
actually directed the infringement itself. That
holding is quite a long distance away from a holding
that the supplier of a piece of equipment that enables
a person to make a single copy of a copyrighted work is
equally responsible for the conduct of his customer.
14. In the Government's brief in Williams and
Wilkins, No. 73-1279 O.T. 1974, at pages 16-17, n. 26,
the Government argues that the Copyright Act was never
intended to cover the copying of printed works for
private use. Among other things, the Government cites
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555; the pre1909 case of Harper v. Shappell, 26 Fed. 519, and
argues that the existence of a solid doubt with regard
to copying for private use strongly supported the
notion that as long as there was no commercial element,
it should be considered a fair use rather than an
infringing use.
.-

.•

15. On page 21, n. 30, tbe Government cites a
statement by Cohen in an ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium
stating:
"Anyone may copy copyrighted materials for
purposes of private study and review."
16. The amicus curiae brief (in the Wilkins case)
of the American Library Association argued at some
length that library photocopying for private use was
not a violation of the 1909 Act, or the pre-1909
statute, relying heavily on the practices of Dr.
Herbert Putnam, who served as Librarian of Congress
during that period.
17.
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392
390, the question was whether the lead
.
transmission of a copyrighted motion picture over cable
TV systems was an infringement of the copyright owner's
exclusive right to perform the copyrighted work

u.s.

-5-

publicly.
In holding that there was no infringement,
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court first noted that
the exclusive rights of the holder are those
specifically enumerated in the statute, later expressed
concern about extending liability to various persons
who participated in the total process of television
broadcasting, included that cable TV was to be placed
on the viewer's side of the line that divided the
broadcaster (performer) from the viewer (audience).
The Court held that the CATV operators, like viewers
and unlike broadcasters, do not perform the programs
that they receive and carry. 392 U.S., at 400-401.
JPS.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re:

January 21, 1983

No. 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios

Dear Chief:
Harry Blackmun has agreed to do the opinion in the
above case.
Sincerely,

11

T.M.

- .,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference
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Dear Chief:
Harry Blackmun has agreed to do the opinion in the
above case.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 24, 1983

Re:

81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.

Dear Harry:
Because the point that most strongly supports a
reversal was not adequately developed during the
argument, and because I expect to emphasize it in
dissent, it occurs to me that it may be helpful to you
in the preparation of your opinion--and conceivably
might persuade one of your adherents to reconsider the
matter before positions have become absolutely firm-for me to put the basic outline of my argument on
paper.
The central question is whether the making of a
single copy of any copyrighted work for a private,
noncommercial use is a copyright infringement. The
separate question of whether the vendor of copying
equipment should be held vicariously liable for the
activities of the purchaser of - the equipment depends
largely, I believe, on the extent to which it is fair
to presume that the vendor either knew or should have
known that the purchaser's private use of the equipment
would be unlawful (because the Copyright Act, unlike
the patent statute, does not expressly prohibit
contributory infringement).
It is my understanding that the question whether
the making of a single copy of a copyrighted written
work for private use could be an infringement was never
decided under the 1909 Act. The fact that Dr. Herbert
Putnam who served as the Librarian of Congress in 1909,
had developed a practice of allowing single copies of
copyrighted works to be made at the Library, and that
this practice was known to Congress in 1909, provided

~~;]~~~~,

a~d{~~
~)~;~

~-

~

~
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activity was thought to be a fair, noninfringing use,
even if it might have literally violated the exclusive
rights granted by the Act.
Even though the practice of copying written works
on microfilm and later xerox duplicating equipment was
fairly common, the issue apparently did not become
important to the Copyright Bar until the practice of
recording or taping musical compositions developed. In
1955, at one of the frequent symposia on copyright law
sponsored by ASCAP, the subject was discussed and
Professor Saul Cohen, who I believe was counsel to
ASCAP, remarked:
"Anyone may copy copyrighted materials for
purposes of private study and review."
The problem of private taping of copyrighted songs
was, of course, well known to the Bar and to Congress
in 1971 when they considered the broad subject of
record piracy and enacted detailed legislation to
control that commercial activity. As you know, there
were several comments during the 1971 legislative
history expressing the understanding that a child who
taped a copyrighted song for his own use would not be
committing an unlawful act, and apparently no one
expressed a contrary opinion at that time.
Again, in 1976, when the entire copyright law was
finally revised, both the Copyright Bar and Congress
were obviously well aware of the actual use of copying
equipment by private individuals for sound recordings
and also the potential use of similar equipment for
copying television programs, but quite remarkably, in
the detailed revision of the entire law, Congress
studiously avoided any direct comment on the singlecopy-private-use question. Neither in the lengthy
statute itself, nor in the committee reports, did
Congress directly confront the issue.
Indeed, even in the text of §106 itself, there is
a curious choice of langauge. As you know, the section
defines the five exclusive privileges that the owner of
a copyright may enjoy. Four of those privileges (2, 3,
4, and 5) expressly relate to either public or

, ,,..l'_,_
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commercial use of a copyrighted work. The first
privilege is not expressly so limited, but it is
interesting to note that literally it only grants the
copyright holder the exclusive right to make multiple
copies. It reads:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the
owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work
in copies or phonorecords: •••• "
I have tried to find a comment in the Committee
Reports on the narrow question whether a single-copyfor-private-use would be an infringement, and have not
yet found anything directly in point.
I have found a
reference to thl making of a single copy of a song for
a blind person.
The report states unequivocally that
such an act would be a "fair use," which may imply that
it would be prohibited if not protected by the fair use
criteria in §107.
I do not believe, however, that the
fair use concept developed in §107 was intended to
operate as an exemption or affirmative defense, but
rather as a guide to construing the scope of the
express rights granted by §106. Indeed, the House
Repo2t seems to describe the fa~r use concept in this
way.
1

"The making of a single copy or phonograph by an individual
as a free service for a blind person would properly be
considered a fair use under §107."

2
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the
fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of
the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is
an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable
definition is possible, and each case raising the question
must be decided on its own facts.
Footnote continued on next page.

-4-

If I am correct in my view that the single-copyfor-private-use issue was an unanswered question in
1976, and that Congress deliberately refused to
confront it when it revised the entire statute, it
becomes appropriate to ask where the burden of
persuasion should lie when a court is asked to pass on
the legality of this private conduct. There are three
important values that seem to me to point in the same
direction:
(1) the privacy interests implicated

*

*

*

"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to
be considered--'the purpose and character of the use'--to
state explicitly that this factor includes a consideration
of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not
intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit
limitation on educational uses of copyrighted works.
It is
an express recognition that, as under the present law, the
commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not
conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions.
"General intention behind the provision
"The statement of the fair -use doctrine in section 107
offers some guidance to users in determining when the
principles of the doctrine apply. However, the endless
variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that
can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of
exact rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose
and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but
there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the
statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what
fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the
courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis." House Report 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 65-66.
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whenever the law seeks to control conduct within the
home~ (2) the principle of fair warning that should
counsel hesitation in branding literally millions of
persons as lawbreakers; and (3) the economic interest
in not imposing a substantial retroactive penalty on an
entrepreneur who has successfully developed and
marketed a new and useful product, particularly when
the evidence as found by the District Court indicates
that the copyright holders have not yet suffered any
actual harm.
I go not _be l i ey e I would read the first
s b ara raph of 106 so literal)3L fhat I would
forec ose the possibility tha t the making of a single
copy for a commercial purpose, or for the purpose of
conducting a public performance, would be an
infringement, but I believe I would read §106 and §107
together to conclude that the making of a single copy
for a purely private use would not constitute an
infringement. If we take this course, Congress can
confront the problem in the same way that it has
confronted and resolved the whole subject of cable
television transmissions of copyrighted works. On the
other hand, if we affirm, I am afraid the courts will
be required to undertake the responsibility of
fashioning a detailed series of remedies that can be
much better handled by the legislature.
Finally, I would note that ~ven though we put the
remedy entirely to one side at this time, I do not
believe we can in good conscience overlook the fact
that the statute does create an absolute liability of
at least $100 per infringment if the act of making a
single copy for personal use is indeed an infringement.
This is potentially a truly staggering liability both
for the manufacturers of copying equipment, and for the
millions of persons who have actually been engaging in
this practice during recent years. We would hardly
encourage respect for the law if we were to announce,
in effect:
"Anyone who time shifts a single copy of a
sportscast owes the copyright holder either $250 or
$100, but fear not because this law will never be
enforced."

-6-

I feel very strongly that the consequences of an
affirmance would be most unfortunate both to the public
at large and to the courts that will have to confront
these problems, whereas a reversal would not preclude a
congressional solution that would fairly protect the
various competing interests at stake.

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
P.S. For what it is worth, I also enclose a copy
of the memorandum that I dictated for my own use on the
day before Conference. As will _be obvious to you, it
is pretty rough but it will at ~east identify some of
the concerns that motivated my vote.

.h:pt-mtt <lJouri of ut~ ~b 5tatte
Jrulfi:ugton. ~ . OJ. 20~'1~

v
February 3, 1983

CHAMBERS OF

.J USTI CE HARRY A. BLAC KMUN

Re: No. 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your letter of today. This, of course, is a
difficult case. I suspect that the difficulties we all encounter will wash out one way or another in the writing. It may be
that the case will have to be reassigned, but, for now, I would
like to let that possibility rest until further work has been
done.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.§nprttttt Clfltnrlltf tqt ~tb .§tatts

-a:sJringhm. [B. <!f. 20~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/

February 3, 1983

Re: No. 81-1687, Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc.
Dear Lewis:
When we spoke about this case over lunch I had some
doubts about John's argument that the use of the word
"copies" indicates that anyone is permitted to make one copy
of a copyrighted work. Although I am no more informed about
the details of the Copyright Act now than I was then, it
does occur to me that 1 u.s.c. §l has some bearing on the
case. That statute provides:
"In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise-words importing the singular include and
apply to several persons, ~arties or things;
words importing theplural include the
singular."
I am not now prepared to claim that this statute is
conclusive, but I do think that it presents a significant
argument with which John has not dealt.
Sincerely,

tJl

Justice Powell
cc: Justice Blackmun

~

February 3, 1983

81-1687

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.

Dear Harry:
I voted with you at Conference, being then persuaded
that CA9 had correctly applied Copvriqht Law. This also was
in accord with the view I held when Williams and Wilkins was
here.
~he "sinqle copy" arqument that John advance~ at Conference was new to me. At least, I had not thought there
was any suhstance to it. I have now had an opportunity to
read carefully John's letter memorandum to you of January
24, and I must sav that it makes the question more difficult
for me.

I write at this time merely to sav that J am not at
rest, and need to qo back to the "books". In anv event, I
will await your writing and John's.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
LFP/vde
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t~. ~ had ever held that the act of making a single copy of a
\"-

~'~ opyri2 hted work for a private, noncommercia f use constituted
~~ ~7U4,~C!P~\\~~~ -2.2-.
copyright ~ fringement.
In a variety of contexts scholars and
(a.-)~ /rl.j~ -2.z..
legislators have expressed the opinion that "anyone may copy
H-) ?U'.I ~~
~- 2-2.
· hted material for the purpose of private study and review,
/t:.).
u-t-.-A.Ll~.J-a..tj~.a.,..,~'~~~ ~~".:
~
and th~at_~~~:is compl E;tely a utside the -sc6 pe cfnd in t ent 'Z.lf
(
~ ~ <::(..1 ~~'.J,.4C1 '~,.,.~ ?- '2..,s-'
of the restriction by copyright."! This caseequ Yres - the Court

..

to decide whether that opinion is correct.

1 Holland, The Audio Visual Package: Handle With Care, 22
Bull. Copyright Society, 104, 124 (1974).
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The Court of Appeals held that companies that manufacture
and distribute copying equipment can be held liable as
contributory infringers.

The validity of that holding depends on

whether the primary use of that sort of equipment is an
infringing use.

The District Court found that the primary use of

the video tape recording equipment involved in this case was for
"home use recording."

Its explanation of that use 2 makes it

clear that it satisfies three critical criteria: (1) the alleged

2

"'Home-use' recording as used in this op1n1on is
the operation of the Betamax in a private home to
r~cord a pro9ram for subsequent nome Viewing:
T1ie
programs involved in this lawsuit are broadcast free to
the public over public airwaves. The court heard
LJ C;
extensive testimony from defendant William Griffiths
~
and four non-defendant individuals about this activity,
,
and the court's ,peclaration of no~~infringement is
limited to this home use-situation.
~
~
"It is important to note the limits of this holding.
Neither pay nor cable television stations are
plaintiffs in this suit and no defendant recordeg the
signals from either. The court is not ruling on ~ape
swapping; organized or informal. The court is~t
ruling no 1ape duplicatioN within the home or outside,
by inaiv~ua!s, groups ~corporations. Nor is the
court ruling on off-the-air recordi~ for use outside
the home. e.g., by teachers for classrooms,
corporations for employees, etc. No defendant engaged
in any of these activities and the facts necessary to
determine their legality are not before this court.
"The ramifications of this new technology are
greater than the boundaries of this lawsuit. A court
reviewing the limited claims of specified parties in a
particular factual setting cannot and should not
undertake the role of a government commission or
legislative body exploring and evaluating all the uses
and consequences of the videotape recorder." App. to
Pet. for Cert. 55-56.

NO.
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did not make more than one copy of any copyrighted
he made no public performance or other public use of
the copy; and {3) he made no commercial use of it.

In my

opinion, conduct that meets these three conditions is not
prohibited by the statute.

Before commenting specifically on the

home use of video tape recorders, however, I shall briefly review
a series of other innovations that led to revisions in the
statutory protection Congress has provided for the authors of
original compositions pursuant to Article I, clause 8 of the
Constitution.

This history reveals a remarkable consistency in

the way that two themes have reoccurred.

First, the Court has

repeatedly declined to extend copyright protection until after
Congress has evaluated the new development and enacted amendatory
legislation; second, no interested party has ever seriously
suggested that a penalty, or any form of statutory liability,
should be imposed upon an individual for making a single copy of
any copyrighted work for his own private use. 3

3Both of these themes are reflected in the press release
issued by one of the respondents after its victory in the Court
of Appeals in this case. It stated, in part:
"Millions of families in the United States and
around the world are now involved in videotaping
programming in their own homes for their own private
use. We have no intention, in this or any other
litigation, of pursuing individuals to interfere with
this practice.
"We first initiated this case in 1976, more than
five years ago, when there were relatively few tape
recorders in homes. Since that time we have come to
realize that the interests of all concerned can be
better accommodated by passage of new laws." Excerpt
Footnote continued on next page.
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Long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35
Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to
copyrights in this country is wholly statutory.

Wheaton v.

Peters, 33 U.S.

The remedies for

(8 Peters) 591, 661-662 (1834).

infringement "are only those prescribed by Congress."

Thompson

v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151 (1889).

In 1831 Congress extended copyright protection to musical
compositions.

4 Stat. 436.

This extension did not, of course,

interfere with the individual's right to play or sing copyrighted
songs for his own gratification, even though he thereby made an
"intrinsic use" of the copyrighted material. 4

The copyright

statute has never required a license "to sing a copyrighted lyric
in the shower."

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.

from statement by E. Cardon Walker, Chairman of Walt
Disney Productions, on November 2, 1981.

4

"Singing for one's own gratification without
intending thereby to represent anything, or to amuse
any one else, would not, I think, be either a
representation or performance, according to the
ordinary meaning of those terms, nor would the fact of
some other person being in the room at the time of such
singing make it so.
" Wall v. Taylor, 11 Q.B.D.
102, 106-107 (1883) (Brett, M.R.).
We quoted that passage with approval in Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 n. 4.

No. 81-1687
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151, 155.

The development and marketing of player pianos and
perforated rolls of music at the turn of the century gave rise to
litigation raising the question whether the use of such rolls
infringed the copyrights owned by composers and music publishers.
The sale of well over a million rolls in 1902 made it evident
that the economic issue was significant.

Adopting a construction

of the pre-1909 version of the Copyright Act that, as Justice
Holmes acknowledged, gave to the music "copyright less scope than
its rational significance", the Court held that the piano rolls
were not copies of copyrighted songs within the meaning of the
Act.

White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1

(see Holmes, J., concurring, at 19).

Quoting from an English

case considering a similar question, the Court noted that the
copyright on the sheet music did not involve any exclusive right
"to the performance in private of the music indicated by such
sheets", id., at 13.

The Court assumed that Congress was aware

of the prevailing view, reflected in an international convention
to which the United States was not a party, that "the manufacture
and sale of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the
[copyrighted music] are not considered as constituting musical
infringement."

Id., at 14-15.

It held that the policy

considerations at stake "properly addressed themselves to the
legislative, and not to the judicial, branch of the government."
Id., at 18.
Act of 1909.

The following year Congress enacted the Copyright
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When the 1909 Act was passed, the Librarian of Congress, Dr.
Herbert Putnam, was following a practice of allowing single
copies of copyrighted works to be made at the Library. 5
Presumably Congress was familiar with this practice.

Even though

the 1909 Act might have been construed literally to prescribe the
practice, no one seems ~ have ~Je ;y challenged the activity of
individuals who merely made single copies for their own use.

The

matter did not seem to merit serious attention until innovations
in copying techniques made it relatively easy to reproduce entire
articles or to make multiple copies.

When the National Institute

of Health and the National Library of Medicine adopted the
practice of photocopying entire articles from medical journals
and supplying them to researchers, litigation did ensue.

~ Williams and Wilkins v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct.Cl.
1973) affirmed by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).

In that litigation it was expressly assumed that the making
of a single copy of a copyrighted article by a scholar for his

5That practice was described at page 6 in the 1913 edition
of the Library of Congress Rules and Practice governing the use
and issue of books as follows:
"Photo-duplicates of books, newspapers, maps, etc., can
be furnished at a reasonable rate by means of the
photostat, installed in the Chief Clerk's Office.
Apply to the Chief Clerk for a schedule of charges."
Dr. Putnam, of course, made an important contribution to the
drafting of the 1909 statute. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
213.
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the statute--and that it was the development of the capacity to
make photocopies that made the issue significant. 6

In his brief

in this Court, the Solicitor General of the United States
stated: 7
"The congressional understanding, as well as the
longstanding library custom, is that the making of a
single copy of an entire article for private use is a
fair use, even if the copy is made purely for personal
pleasure."
brief appended the following footnote at that point:
"'Anyone may copy copyrighted materials for purposes of
private study and review.' Cohen, 'Fair Use in the Law
of Copyright,' ~SCAP, Copyright Law SYmposium (No. 6,
1955), 43, 58."
6

"Some forms of copying, at the very least of portions
of a work, are universally deemed immune from
liability, although the very words are reproduced in
more than de minimis quantity. Furthermore, it is
almost unan1mously accepted that a scholar can make a
handwritten copy of an entire copyrighted article for
his own use, and in the era before photoduplication it
was not uncommon (and not seriously questioned) that he
could have his secretary make a typed copy for his
personal use and files. These customary facts of
copyright-life are among our givens. The issue we now
have is the complex one of whether photocopying, in the
form done by NIH and NLM, should be accorded the same
treatment--not the ministerial lexicographic task of
deciding that photoduplication necessarily involves
'copying' (as of course it does in dictionary terms)."
487 F.2d at 1350.
7see Brief for the United States, No. 73-1279, October Term,
1974, pp. 20-21.
8 Id., at 21, n. 30.

Earlier in his brief, the Solicitor

General had stated:
"Prior to the 1909 Copyright Act, the exclusive
Footnote continued on next page.
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The issue, however, was not resolved by the litigation which
terminated in 1975, but rather was later addressed by Congress
when it revised the Copyright Act in the following year.
of the 1976 revision, Congress enacted a
exemption for library copying.

~ecial

In §108

statutory

That exemption twice draws an

explicit distinction between the reproduction of multiple copies
and the "reproduction or distribution of a single copy." 9

rights granted to the author of a published work did
not include the right to copy the work. Har~er v.
Shappell, 26 Fed. 519 (C.Ct., S.D. N.Y.). T e 1909 Act
reorganized the provisions of the prior law, but was
not intended to expand its coverage (H.Rep. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess., 4).
"It was assumed, both before and after the enactment
of the Copyright Act of 1909, that the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner did not include the right to
control the copying of the copyrighted material for
personal use. " Id., at 16-17, n. 26.

9 §108 provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106,
it is not an infringement of copyright for a library or
archives, or any of its employees acting within the
scope of their employment, to reproduce no more than
one co~y or phonorecord of a work, or to distribute
such copy or phonorecord, under the conditions
specified by this section, if-~
(1) the reproduction or aTstriijUtion is made without
any purpose of direct or indirectAcommercial adva~tage;
(2) the collections of the library or archives are
(i) open to the public, or (ii) available not only to
researchers affiliated with the library or archives or
with the institution of which it is a part, but also to
other persons doing research in a specialized field;
and
(3) the reproduction or distribution of the work
includes a notice of copyright.

***
Footnote continued on next page.
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Nothing in that amendment implies that Congress intended to
proscribe the reproduction of "no more than one copy" for an
individual's private noncommercial use.

A similar sequence of events followed the development of
technology that made it possible to retransmit television
programs by cable or by microwave systems.

In 1960, United

Artists Television, Inc., the owner of a number of copyrights on
motion pictures, sought to enjoin the operator of a community
antenna television system (CATV} from intercepting and
retransmitting signals carrying its copyrighted productions.

The

Court held that the CATV operator did not "perform" the
copyrighted works in the "manner envisioned by the Congress that

"(g) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this
section extend to the isolated and unrelated reproduction or
distribution of a single copy or phonorecord of the same material
on separate occasions, but do not extend to cases where the
library or archives, or its employee-(!} is aware or has substantial reason to believe
that it is engaging in the related or concerted
reproduction or distribution of multiple copies or
phonorecords of the same material, whether made on one
occasion or over a period of time, and whether intended
for aggregate use by one or more individuals or for
separate use by the individual members of a group~ or
(2} engages in the systematic reproduction or
distribution of single or multiple copies of
phonorecords of material described in subsection (d)~
Provided, That nothing in this cause prevents a library
or arch1ves from participating in interlibrary
arrangements that do not have, as their purpose or
effect that the library or archives receiving such
copies or phonorecords for distribution does so in such
aggregate quantities as to substitute for a
subscription to or purchase of such work."

;l_'
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tH-.lb~

I

- 10 enacted the law in 1909."

Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists,

392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968}.

Although the Court was sharply divided

on the question whether that was a fair reading of the statutory
language, there was complete agreement on the proposition that
Congress was far better equipped than the Court to fashion a fair
resolution of the problems presented by the sophisticated
technological developments that had occurred in recent years. 10

The Fortnightly case was followed by Teleprompter Corp. v.
CBS, 415 U.S. 394, in which the Court considered the copyright

10
"We have been invited by the Solicitor General in an
amicus curiae brief to render a compromise decision in
this case that would, it is said, accommodate various
competing considerations of copyright, communications,
and antitrust policy. We decline the invitation. That
job is for Congress." [footnotes omitted] 392 U.S. at
401.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas wrote:
"Our major object, I suggest, should be to do as little
damage as possible to traditional copyright principles
and to business relationships, until the Congress
legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and
the interested parties face." Id., at 404.
At the end of his opinion, he added:
"The task of caring for CATV is one for the Congress.
Our ax, being a rule of law, must cut straight, sharp,
and deep; and perhaps this is a situation that calls
for the compromise of theory and for the architectural
improvisation which only legislation can accomplish."
Id. , at 408.

- 11 holders' argument that CATV systems diluted the commercial value
of the market for licensed television programs.

Recognizing that

the re-transmissions by CATV systems would augment the size of
the potential audience for a broadcast--much as would the video
tape recording of programs for later home viewing--the Court
concluded:
"These shifts in current business and commercial
relationships, while of significance with respect to
the organization and growth of the communications
industry, simply cannot be controlled by means of
litigation based on copyright legislation enacted more
than half a century ago, when neither broadcast
television nor CATV was yet conceived. Detailed
regulation of these relationships, and any ultimate
resolution of the many sensitive and important problems
in this field, must be left to Congress." Id., at 414.

In due course Congress did enact legislation that regulates
the complex relationships among copyright holders, commercial
television stations, and CATV system operators in a comprehensive
and detailed way that could not possibly have been fashioned by a
court. 11

11 The statutory prov1s1ons themselves, see 17 U.S.C. §111,
are much too long to quote in full, but their complexity is
indicated in the following paragraph from Judge Markey's opinion
in Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d
12 5 , 12 9 {CA2 19 8 2) :
"Under the congressionally mandated scheme,
television broadcast stations like WOR-TV continue to
pay license or royalty fees directly to copyright
owners like Doubleday, while CATV systems pay license
fees under their compulsory licenses to the United
States Copyright Office in accord with formulae
provided in 17 U.S.C. §lll{d){2){B). The fees paid by
CATV systems are distributed to copyright owners like
Doubleday by Copyright Royalty Tribunal {Tribunal), as
Footnote continued on next page.
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The technological change that most closely parallels the
innovation that gave rise to this litigation was the development
of the audio tape recorder.

That device made it simple for any

individual to make copies of copyrighted songs played on the
radio.

Because the practice that became known as "record piracy"

became so widespread, the recording industry persuaded Congress
to enact a special statute extending copyr} ght prote~to
.......

sound recordings.

The legislative history of the Sound Recording

Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391, makes it perfectly clear that
Congress did not then believe that taping a single copy of a
copyrighted song for private use was an infringement, and did not
intend to proscribe that sort of copying.

The House Report is unambiguous:
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee
that this limited copyright not grant any broader
rights than are accorded to other copyright proprietors
under the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not
the intention of the Committee to restrain the home
recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of
recorded performances, where the home recording is for
private use and with no purpose of reproducing or
otherwise capitalizing commercially on it. This
practice is common and unrestrained today, and the
record producers and performers would be in no
different position from that of the owners of copyright
in recorded musical compositions over the past 20
provided for in 17 u.s.c. §lll(d)(5). The
Congressional scheme thus provided for compensation
from CATV systems to copyright owners measured by the
number of cable viewers or potential viewers, and
placed the responsibility for payment of that
compensation on the CATV systems." (footnotes omitted)

.

~~·

.
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years."

H.Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7,
in [1971] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp.
15 6, 1572.
re~rinted

This subject had been expressly considered during the House
Committee hearings.

As the District Court noted in this case,

Representative Beister of Pennsylvania engaged in the following
dialogue about off-the-air recording with Ms. Barbara Ringer,
then Assistant Register of Copyrights:
"Mr. Beister. I do not know that I can add very
much to the questions which you have been asked so far.
"I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own
home.
"My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a
particular record becomes a hit, he will retrieve it
onto his little set.
"Now, he may retrieve in addition something else
onto his recording, but nonetheless, he does retrieve
the basic sound, and this legislation, of course, would
not point to his activities, would it?
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No,
it would not.'
"I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video
cassettes lately, and this question is usually asked:
'What about the home recorders?'
"The answer I have given and will give again is that
this is something you cannot control. You simply
cannot control it." Hearings on S. 646 before the
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 22 (June 9 and 10, 1971).
That this was the opinion of the sponsors of the legislation is
confirmed by the following colloquy when the 1971 amendment was
being discussed on the floor of the House of Representatives.
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for
commercial purposes only?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes.
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to
record off of a program which comes through the air on
the radio or television, and then used it for her own
personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this would
not be included under the penalties of this bill?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill.

No. 81-1687
- 14 I am glad the gentleman raises the point.
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,'
Members will note that under the bill the same practice
which prevails today is called for; namely, this is
considered both presently and under the proposed law to
be fair use. The child does not do this for commercial
purposes. This is made clear in the report." 117
Cong. Rec. 34, 748 (1971).

In its periodic revisions of the copyright laws, Congress
has confronted one technological innovation after another, but it
has never expressed any specific intent to treat the reproduction
,~

of a copyrighted work as an infringement if these three

~~

~ __ j

are met: (1) the user made no more than one copy; (2)
he made no public use of the copy; and (3) he made no commercial

~~se of

it.

~~gislative

What is perhaps most remarkable about the overview of
responses to technological changes in the copyright
-

").{..t>

~~ ield is the complete absence of any-specific consideration of

fe
~~

the problems generated by the development of the video tape
recorder.

Is there reason to believe Congress intended the non-

commercial, home use of such recorders to have different legal
consequences than the private use of audio tape recorders?
Congress has never expressed any such intent.

Moreover, an

examination of the statutory language is entirely consistent with
the conclusion that such home use should not be regarded as an
infringement unless and until Congress expressly so directs.

II

The~ is

whether the 1976 Congress intended to prohibit

the home use of a videocassette recorder.

The 1976 Copyright Act

No. 81-1687
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its conclusion on the belief that such conduct violates one of
the "exclusive rights" of a copyright holder.

The language of

the statute does not compel that conclusion, and a host of
common-sense concerns make me think that Congress did not want
the judiciary to draw it.

A

The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control
over all possible uses of his copyrighted work.

An unlicensed

use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts
with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the
statute.

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,

154-155.

In order to determine whether the copying of a

television program constitutes an infringement, it is therefore
necessary to examine the specific exclusive rights granted to the
owner of a copyright.
1~7t
Section 106 of the Act provides:
-1
~
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of
~~b~ .
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to
.
do an~o authorize any of the following:
~ to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
~
phonorecords;
~-·~
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
if,..- '; vv
copyrighted work;
~
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
{ ~~~
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
~
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
~~ ~
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic,
1
/~---~ A~
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion
tl~~- ~
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
~~~~ copyrighted work publicly; and

~-·

..

~
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and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to display the copyrighted work publicly."

It is immediately apparent that subparagraphs (2) and (3)
have no application to the home use of videotape recorders,
although they, of course, would preclude the commercial
exploitation of taped copies, and subparagraph (3) would appear
to prohibit trading or lending of copies.

Subparagraphs (4) and

(5) both explicitly apply to motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, but both of those sections merely grant the
right "to perform" or "to display the copyrighted work publicly."
Thus, the only subparagraph that is even arguably applicable is
the first.

It gives the owner the exclusive right "to reproduce

the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords."
added)

(Emphasis

Although the use of the plural word "copies" obviously

encompasses the singular as well, see 1 U.S.C. §1, the fact that
Congress did select the plural form repeatedly, not only in the
Act itself, but also in the Committee Reports, does tend to
identify the problem that they were most concerned about--namely
the reproduction of a copyrighted work for commercial purposes
which, of course, would normally be in multiple copies.

What is especially significant about the text of §106 is
that it provides no basis for distinguishing between the taping

-

of a copyrighted song broadcast over the radio and the taping of
a copyrighted television program.

-

If the House Committee Report
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the private use of an audio tape recorder is not infringement, 12
that opinion applies equally to the private use of a video tape
recorder. 13

12 contrary to the op1n1on expressed in
Report, Professor Nimmer takes the rather
that audio fiome recording for private use
statute. He argues, inter alia, that the
simply wrong:

the House Committee
surprising position
does violate the
Committee Report is

"Although the House report offers the opinion that home
recording does not infringe the copyright in underlying
works, this statement is nothing more than the House's
view in 1971 of the meaning of the 1909 Act. The
observation does not have the force of a statement of
legislative intent." Nimmer, Copyright Liability for
Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68
Va. L.Rev. 1505, 1509-1510
..__ } .
Later he added:
"No one has claimed that the pre-1971 copyright
statutes contained any provision other than the
doctrine of fair use for exempting home recording from
copyright infringement of the musical works thereby
produced. Since the House report states that the
purpose of the Amendment is to extend the same
protection to sound recordings, it is clear that the
Amendment did not create a new exemption for home
recording. The most one can fairly attribute to the
House report, then, is an opinion that home recording
constitutes fair use." Id., at 1511,

!

13 Even Professor Nimmer, the scholar taking the most extreme
position concerning the scope of copyright protection for sound
recordings, see n. 12, ante, agrees with this proposition:
"Although the Betamax case involved video home
recording, the finding of contributory infringement and
the imposition of a continuing royalty would apply
equally well to the manufacturers and sellers of audio
home recording equipment." Id., at 1526.
Footnote continued on next page.
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reading of

§

106 in order to interpret the statute in light of

its historic purpose--to prohibit unfair commercial exploitation
of the monopoly rights granted to the author, composer, or
publisher. 14

For the definition of the exclusive rights in

§

106

------------~-----------------~--------~
is prefaced by the words
"subject to sections 107 through 118."

Those sections describe a variety of uses of copyrighted material
that "are not infringements of copyright notwithstanding the
provisions of

§

106. 15

One of the more illuminating of those

/

14
"An author who possesses an unlimited copyright may
preclude others from copying his creation for
commercial purposes without permission. In other
words, to encourage people to devote themselves to
intellectual and artistic creation, Congress may
guarantee to authors and inventors a reward in the form
of control over the sale or commercial use of copies of
their works." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
555.

15 Thus, for example, §110 provides in part:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the
following are not infringements of copyright:

***

(5) communication of a transmission embodying a
performance or display of a work by the public
reception of the transmission on a single receiving
apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes,
unless-(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the
transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further
transmitted to the public;"
Footnote continued on next page.

•·

No. 81-1687
- 19 sections is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the doctrine of
"fair use."

The 1909 Act did not have a "fair use" provision.

Moreover,

that Act's compendium of exclusive rights--"to print, reprint,
publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" 16 --was plainly
broad enough to encompass the making of a single copy for purely
private use.

Yet the statute was never so construed.

The courts

simply refused to read the statute literally in every situation.

I

When Congress amended the statute i.p 1976, i_t indicated that it
"intended to restate the present

"ju<!ic~l

--------~~--------· ~

doctrine of fair use,

not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66.

House Report

Congress therefore

codified § 107 in a form that does not set forth categorical

(

defenses, such as for example those found in the provisions of
the Robinson-Patman Act.

Rather, it identifies factors that

And §lll(a) provides, in part:
"The secondary transmission of a primary
transmission embodying a performance or display of a
work is not an infringement of copyright if-(1) the secondary transmission is not made by a
cable system, and consists entirely of the relaying, by
the management of a hotel, apartment house, or similar
establishment, of signals transmitted by a broadcast
station licensed by the Federal Communications
Commission, within the local service area of such
station, to the private lodgings of guests or residents
of such establishment, and no direct charge is made to
see or hear the secondary transmission~"
17 u.s.c. §111.
16 copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075.

•'

• i

· ••.

1(l.:

...
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-rather than any belief that an infringing act has been

these comments

I

"Although the courts have considered and
the fair use doctrine over an~~~~&9~~~UL~~·
definition of the conce
as ever emerged. In e d,
since the doctrine is n equitable rule of _reason, no
generally applicable efinitfon is possi61e, and ach
case raising the quest'on must be decided on i
facts. . ..
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria
to be considered--'the purpose and character of the
use'--to state explicitly that this factor includes a
consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.'
This amendment is not intended to be interpreted as any
sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses
of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition
that, as under the present law, the commercial or nonprofit character of an activity, while not conclusive
with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed
along with other factors in fair use decisions.
General intention behind the provision

I

"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section
107 offers some guidance to users in determining when
the principles of the doctrine apply. However, the
endless variety of situations and combinations of
circumstances that can rise in particular cases
precludes the formulation of exact rules in the
statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general
scope of the judlciai aoctr1ne of: fair use, ~ but there
is
1
o
o reeze
oc r1ne in the
statute, especially during a period of rapid
technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory
explanation of what fair use is and some of the
criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to
adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a caseby-case basis." House Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., pp. 65-66.
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neutralized by an affirmative defense--that would defeat a
suggestion that singing a copyrighted song in the shower is an
infringing use.

The fair use prov1s1on ratifies the judicial understanding
~

that courts should not push the copyright monopoly to its logical
extreme.

Congress has asked the courts to exercise judgment,

restraint, and common sense.

I believe the Court of Appeals in

this case failed to do so.

B

It would be most surprising if the 1976 Congress would have
found the Court of Appeals' conclusion reasonable.

Three serious

concerns point directly in the opposite direction.

First is the fact that this case concerns a noncommercial
activity performed within the privacy of the home.

Special

constitutional values are implicated whenever the government
seeks to regulate such an activity. 1 8

It would plainly be

18

"Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes
regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into
the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds."
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 u.s. 557, 565-566 (1969).
Footnote continued on next page.
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unconstitutional to prohibit a person from singing a copyrighted
song in the shower or jotting down a copyrighted poem he hears
over the radio.

Although making a videotape of a TV program may

be constitutionally distinguishable, an important canon of
statutory construction calls upon us to presume that Congress
steers clear of constitutional boundaries.

And in this

particular statute, the dialogue between Representative Beister
and Assistant Register Ringer, supra at ___, hardly reveals any
interest in unloading the canon.

~) This

:oncern

o~ ~riv~cy

activity at issue in this case.

is magnified by the nature of the
A television program is beamed

into the living rooms of millions of viewers at no charge, and a
citizen uses a timer and a Betamax simply to watch it at a more
convenient time.

It is unlikely that the average voter would see

any moral or economic distinction between watching the program
"live" and watching it later with the assistance of a new
technology.

Surely the citizen should be entitled to more notice

than this statute has provided before such a distinction is made
the basis for a judicial determination that he has trampled on
the federally protected rights of a fellow citizen.

~~)

My second concern relates to the most common response to the

first--the admission that, of course, nor ne would ever prosecute

No. 81-1687
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the citizen for making a single copy at horne.

See n. 3, supra.

This response implies that Congress intended to prohibit certain
conduct, expected that the prohibition would not be enforced
against the primary violator, all for the purpose of allowing
lawsuits against the corporation that created the technological
means for this conduct.

We should not lightly stretch an

ambiguous statute on the assumption that Congress intended to
make behavior that is engaged in by millions of citizens into a
violation of federal law, all the while intending the violation
to go unpunished.

-

Such laws have an enormous potential to breed
-

-=:----=

--~~-__,.,.

disrespect for fundamental societal institutions. Congress should
not be assumed to create them on the sly.

It is significant that the Act does not purport to create
"safe" violations.

It plainly provides that every act of

infringement--even if performed in complete good faith--gives
rise to a minimum statutory liability of $100. 19

That command

cannot simply be transformed into a matter of indifference
because the copyright owners do not intend to collect the pounds
of flesh--! should say the tons of flesh--that are their due.
19 section 504(c) (2) provides, in part:
"In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of
proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was
not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her
acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the
court in its discretion may reduce the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $100."

No. 81-1687
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The problem of remedying the supposed violation by the
primary infringer leads directly to

m~

the

problem of remedying the supposed contributory infringement.

As

--------------------------------

I have noted, the respondents do not seek a declaration that home
taping violates the law for the purpose of collecting $100 from
the home taper.

Rather, they seek such a declaration in order to

obtain relief from petitioner, the alleged contributory
infringer.

Putting aside some troubling conceptual questions, I

will assume, as the respondents suggest, that a finding that home
use violates the copyright law gives rise to remedies against the
petitioner.

Before making that finding, one surely must wonder

about what those remedies are.

In their complaint, respondents prayed for an injunction
against the further manufacture or sale of video cassette
recorders.

They do so despite the fact that they have suffered

no tangible harm. 20

They claim the injunction is required by the

20
"Plaintiffs admitted that at the time of trial, no
existing contract, license or advantageous business
relationship of either Universal or Disney had been
injured, interfered with or disrupted by the sale or
use of Betamax and Betamax tapes or by any other
activity of any defendant. This includes without
limitation plaintiffs' theatrical, television, 8 or 16
mm, and video-disc products.
"In addition, plaintiffs conceded that neither the
sale nor the use of Betamax and Betamax tapes had by
the time of trial caused Universal or Disney any
measurable monetary damage, economic loss or revenue
loss. 1978 was a very successful year for both
Universal and Disney. It was Disney's eleventh
Footnote continued on next page.
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Surely that impact

can be more precisely gauged by legislators than by this Court,
on this record.

Not surprisingly, neither scholars nor the Court of Appeals
take the prayer for an injunction against manufacture and sale
very seriously.

Instead, it is widely suggested that a trial

court, exercising equitable powers, can establish a "compulsory
~----------------

~

licensing" system.
spelled out clearly.

The details of such a system are never
It would, of necessity, require every

manufacturer of videocassette recorders and every manufacturer of
videocassettes to be joined as defendants in a single lawsuit and
assessed some arbitrary tax on their sales.

The proceeds of the

"equitable excise tax" would then have to be allocated by the
court--equitably, to be sure--among the untold numbers of
copyright holders who license works for broadcast over the public
airwaves.

Each would join as a co-plaintiff.

Nielsen would be

appointed as a special master.

Volume 451 of the United States Reports contains two

consecutive year of increased profit and the most
profitable year in history for Universal Pictures'
Theatrical Division. Universal's television revenues
had increased steadily over the three years prior to
trial and Disney received its highest television income
in 1978." Opinion of District Court, Pet. for Cert.
50.
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unanimous opinions of this Court about whether it is proper for
the federal judiciary to fashion a new remedial structure to
supplement the remedial structure established by Congress.

In

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America,
451

u.s. 77 (1981}, we stated:
"In almost any statutory scheme, there may be a need
for judicial interpretation of ambiguous or incomplete
provisions. But the authority to construe a statute is
fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a ;~
new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congres has
decided not to adopt." Id., at 97.

And in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630 (1981}, we concluded:

"The policy questions presented by petitioner's
claimed right ... are far-reaching. In declining to
provide [that] right .•. ,we neither reject the
validity of those arguments nor adopt the views of
those opposing ..••
Rather, we recognize that,
regardless of the merits of the conflicting arguments,
this is a matter for Congress, not the courts, to
resolve.
"The range of factors to be weighed in deciding
whether a right to contribution should exist
demonstrates the inappropriateness of judicial
resolution of this complex issue. Ascertaining what is
'fair' in this setting calls for inquiry into the
entire spectrum of antitrust law, not simply the
elements of a particular case or category of cases."
Id., at 647.
We concluded that case with a quotation from Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980}:

"The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high
policy for resolution within the legislative process
after the kind of investigation, examination, and study

.·
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That process involves the balancing of competing values
and interests, which in our democratic system is the
business of elected representatives. Whatever their
validity, the contentions now pressed on us should be
addressed to the political branches of the Government,
the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts."

III

Respondents argue in this Court that an abstract
theoretician's view of the essence of the copyright monopoly
allows them to control the way a private citizen watches
television.

In the name of that abstract vision, they ask the

federal courts to establish a bureaucracy more complex than
anything Congress has established in the field of copyright to
date, in order that they may levy an excise tax on a burgeoning
new industry.

The issue posed by this innovative new technology is similar
to the question that was presented by the development of player
pianos, sophisticated copying machines, cable television systems
and audio tape recorders.

In each of those situations the Court

read the relevant statutory language in a way that allowed
Congress to accommodate the competing interests of all parties.
We should follow a similar course here.
Court of Appeals should be reversed.

The judgment of the
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687

I

have not studied JUSTICE STEVENS's memorandum in de-

tail, but I think he makes a strong case.
pathetic audience.

I

right,

law

even

if

the

Of course I am a sym-

have thought all along that he should be
is against him.

When JUSTICE BLACKMUN

circulates his draft, I will study both positions more carefully.
In the meantime, I have two thoughts on the memorandum.

~

it was

not clear

to me on first

framework JUSTICE STEVENS is adopting.
to

think

that home

use

is

acceptable

reading which analytic
At some points he seems

because Congress did not

intend the Copyrights Act to cover it at all.

J language

of the Act,

video-taping.
video-taping

Despite the broad

it is not broad enough to include home-use

At other points he seems to think that home-use

---

falls

within

the

"fair

use"

In

exception.

other

----------------------~----~words,
the general language of the Act includes it, but a narrower provision excludes it.
tion can be correct.
apply here.

I do not think that the latter posi-

Fair use is a narrow doctr} ne that does not

(JUSTICE STEVENS's reliance on Williams and Wilkins

v. United States is particularly troublesome.
here,

you

fought

very

hard

to have

it

When that case was

reversed.)

I

think

he

makes a much more convincing case on the former position.
Second,
Court for

I

am not

sure

that JUSTICE

his views even if you join him.

I.

:·

STEVENS can get a
JUSTICE BRENNAN, at

least,

would

building."

distinguish

between

JUSTICE STEVENS does

"time

shifting"

and

"library

not mention library building,

but I do not see how his analysis could fail to apply to it.

If

a majority of the Court {JUSTICE BRENNAN and the rest of JUSTICE
BLACKMUN's supporters) continues to believe that library building
is illegal,

it presumably would be necessary to remand the case

to determine if Sony is liable on that account.

·,, ..

t ~.

Personal
81-1687

Sony Corp. v.

Univers~l

City Studios

I have enioved reading vour draft of June 3.
clear, well written, and persuasive.

It is

I have no sp~cific suqqestiona. You make two basic
arguments: {i) the 1976 Act does not cover home video copying ~xclusively for hom~ use, and (ii) in anv event this
would come within thP "fair use" judicial do~trine that at
least arquably was adopte~ hv CongrAss in Section 107.
Subject to further consideration, I am inclinPd to
think that the former i.s a more solic'l analytical fr."lmet..tork.
As you note, thf> Vmquage of Sf>ct ion 106 does not compel the
reading given it hv CAQ, and the leqislative history of. the
Copyright Act {incluoing numerous expressions in Congressional Committee reports) fairlv can bP sai.n to provide E-vidence of no Congressional int~ntion to proscribf> single
copyi.nq for home u.se only. This readinq of Congressional
intent may be buttressed by the judicial doctrine of "fair
use", althouqh that ha~ been construed rather narrrowlv (as
T recall).
I do not believe you mentioned "lihrarv builr=tinq".
I
suppose your three "critical criteria" \~oul0 not oreclune
this so lonq as the only pur.pose was home use.

My unpublished oninion in Wilkins v. United qtates reflect the view I held at that time. Perhapfi that case is
distinquishahle on its facts, as Nlti not only was copying
but was making rather wide oistribution to scholars and researchers.
T will, of course, reserve a final decision until I see
what Harry writes. The case always has been a close one for
me. It is another example of Congressional "passinq of the
buck" - a practice I would like to check although as lonq as
"this r.ourt sits" it probahly expects too much to think that
politicianq would not take this advantage of us.
Sincerely,
Justice Stevens
LFP/vde

;inpr.tttu <!fo-url o-f Hr~~ttit.t~ ~hdt.tr

Jl'a.tr.frin.gton. ~. <!f. 2D~J!'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal
Studios, Inc.

The attached printed memorandum was prepared
before receiving Harry's draft opinion. On Saturday,
Harry kindly made a typed copy available to me, and ·I
delivered this memorandum to his office. Having
studied his opinion, I expect to circulate a few
supplemental comments later today or early tomorrow.
Respectfully,

fz

.§upunu <!Jcmi of tltt ~tclt .:§hrltll'

Jirurl[i:n:ghm. ~-

<!J.

2!Tgtl!'

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal
Studios, Inc.

Now that Harry and I have each circulated our
views, I offer the following additjonal comments.
First, as a general matter I note that Harry
agrees that this is a case of first impression on the question whether the making of a single copy for a
noncommercial, nonpublic use is an infringement.
Similarly, he does not question the central thesis of
Part I of my memorandum--Congress has always taken the
lead in responding to major technological changes that
affected the copyright system.
Indeed, it is
significant that he concludes his opinion with a
quotation from the dissenting opinion in Fortnightly.
As for the specific question presented, I
read Harry's opinion as agreeing with Professor Nimmer
and me that there
is C9 legal disti ~y tion under present
1
law between the ~~ di d tap e recor q ing of a broad~ ast
(§..§} <l!l9 ~eo '' taQ.e recording of a televised
program.
For that reason, the 1971 SQund- Recording
Amendments, discussed at pp. 9-11 of my memorandum and
pp. 14-18 of Harry's opinion, are critical. The legal
argument can be stated in a three part syllogism:
(a) Under the 1909 Act, the I ~ riter•' of a
song that was played over the radio was given
protection identical to that given the writer of a
movie screenp t ay that was broadcast on television.
The 'fperforme r of the song, however, was given no
protection. The 1971 Amendments were intended to
bring the song performer into the same position as
the song writer and the movie writer.

(b) A literalist reading of the 1909 Act
would have made home recording for private use an
infringement of the song writer's rights.
But the
~ 1971 House Report explicitly declares that such a
literalist reading of the 1909 Act would have been
wrong.
It states tha~ after the 1971 Amendment,
"the record producers and performers would be in
no different position from that of the owners of
copyright in recorded musical compositions over
the past 20 years." 1971 House Report 7. And it
states that "it is not the intention of the
Committee to restrain the home recording, from
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded
performances, where the home recording is for
private use and with no purpose of reproducing or
otherwise capitalizing commercially on it." Thus,
the House Report on the Sound Recording Amendments of 1971 indicates that a literalist reading of the
1909 Act was wrong. Noncommercial home taping was
exempt.
(c) The 1976 Act was not intended to
change the rules on private home recording.
As
Harry concedes in n. 5, "the controlling legal
principles under the [1976 and 1909] Acts are the
same." Thus, noncommercial home taping is still
exempt.

l

I believe the releva nt q uestion is thus whether
the intent of Congre ss is more accurately reflected by
the 1971 House Report and the colloquy with
Representative Kastenmeier--as I cont~nd-~or by the
negative inferences Harry draws from certain explicit
exem2 tions in the 1 ~~ 6 Act. See Harry's opinion, at
12-14.
I disagree with Harry's view that my reading of ~~
the Act would make these exellrptions "s 1;1 perfluous"; al y
, of them concern copying that is either 'p ublic "or
commercia l or ~o th .

My aRproach does not separate "infringement"
analysis ana "rair use" analysis 1nto separate
compartments in the context of this case.
I base my
r
\ conclusion that there is no infringement in this case
Q
5
' on _ the facts that Congress has never ex p licitly sought
~ to regu t a £e pr i va t e noncommercia l copy i ng, t hat

PS

-3-

- ~ongress

has recognized that such activity is exempt
in the audio recording context, and that the courts
fashioned the "fair use" exception long before it was a
statutory term in order to avoid extending the
copyright monopoly to activities literally covered by
the statute but unforeseen by Congress. Because "fair
use" lies at the core of Harry's analysis, however, I
shall comment on his approach.

qpS
J

~

~

On the one hand, Harry appears to agree with
me that fair use was not historically understood as a
rigid four-factor test. On the other hand, he proposes
a new synthesis of that history that tur ~ on tliQ ·
fact~rs:
whether the copying activi ~~ socially
la~ le," p. 23-, and whether it wo ~'affect the
value of, or the rn_grket .Jg r, the author's work," p. 26.
My problem with the first factor derives from this
case. Harry's opinion suggests that "VTR recording _
creates no public benefits sufficient to justify
[allowing it]," p. 24, and that horne use of a VTR
"creates no benefit to the public at large," p. 27.
, ~ But t i me shifting makes television p r p grarnrning
.J..
avai l ab l~ t_g- v :Lewe_J s wn o would otherwise miss it,
~rr·/ thereo y- 13erV1 ng a public i n Eerest that we unanimously
recognized in our vtottfried opinion earlier this year,
slip op. at 9-10, id., at 6 (dissenting opinion). My
problem with the second factor is that it does not
enter the analysis until too late:
it is irrelevant "unless the user can demonstrate affirmatively that
permitting the use would have no tendency to harm the
market for or the value of the copyrighteg work," p.
26. Although Harry's opinion suggests- that a citizen
"photocopying a newspaper clipping to send to a friend"
may be able to carry that burden, I find that somewhat
doubtful.

.

J<

I

I should also comment specifically on a
statement in the ~975 Senate Report that is quoted at
pages 25-26 in Harry's opinion and that can easily be
misunderstood. The sentence appears in a paragraph in
which the Senate Committee gave an illustration of offthe-air recording in orde~ to enable the program to be
seen at a more convenient time, and states that the
r.articular example of time shifting would constitute
'fair use." The Committee then added a comment that it

----------------~
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- ~id not intend to suggest that every recording for

convenience should be considered fair use.
The
complete paragraph reads as - follows, with the sentence
in question italicized:
"The committee's attention has been
directed to the special problems involved in the
reception of instructional television programs in
remote areas of the country.
In certain areas it
is currently impossible to transmit such programs
by any means other than communications satellites.
A particular difficulty exists when such
transmissions extend over several time zones :
within the same state, such as- in Alaska. Unless
individual schools in such states may make an offair recording of such transmissions, the programs _
may not be received by the students during the
school's daily schedule. The committee believe~
that the making by a school located in such a
remote area of an off-the-air recording of an
instructional television transmission for the
purpose of a delayed viewing of the program by
students for the same school constitutes a 'fair
use.'
The committee does not intend to suggest,
however, that off-the-air recording for
convenience would under any circumstances, be
considered 'fair use.'
To meet the requirement of
temporary use the school may retain the recording for only a limited period of time after the
broadcast." S. Rep. 94-473, pp. 65-66.
A hasty reading of the itali~ized sentence-especially the phrase "under any circumstances"--might
suggest that the committee intended to prohibit~
time-shifting. But the sentence preceding the
italicized one proves that reading impossible, since it
expressly authorizes certain time-shifting for public
display.
In context, the italicized sentence merely
ensures that the preceding sentence not be read too
broadly. The Committee wanted to make sure that its
approval of one form of time shifting for public
display (instructional television for students in
remote areas) , not be read as suggesting that all time
shifting for public display is permissible.
In brief,
the words "under any circumstances" obviously mean

.'

-~-

- ~always."

There is no reason to believe that the
sentence was intended to re?ch beyond the context of
the paragraph (public displays), and to bring horne
taping for non-public viewing within the scope of the
Act's coverage.

Finally, Harry and I agree that the
prospective harms of which respondents complain "are
speculative at present," p. 29, that "there can be no
really satisfactory solution of the problem presented
here, until Congress acts," p. 37, and that in the
meantime fashioning judicial relief "might require
bringing other copyright owners into court," p. 37,
n.48. There can be no doubt concerning the enormous
complexity of the remedy issues. Although Harry does
not believe that these factors affect the likelihood
that Congress intended the underlying conduct to be
covered by the statute, I would not read congressio~al
silence as commanding the Judiciary to take the lead in _
resolving issues comparable to those presented by cable
TV and the compulsory licensing of sound recordings.
Respectfully,

CHAMBERS Or

.JUSTICE WM . ..J. BRENNAN, .JR.

June
No. 81-1687

wf/3~~
14, 1983 ~ wf_~
f.t>_~\

Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
It is only with some trepidation that I add to the pile of
material we are all studying in this case, but I think it will be
difficult for me to join either Harry's or John's opinion as
written, and I would like to put a third alternative on the table.

At Conference, I expressed the view that CA9 should be af-

firmed in part only, on the ground that "library building" was
infringement but that "timeshifting" was fair use.

I continue to

believe that for purposes of fair use a distinction can be drawn
between the two, but I doubt an all-encompassing definition of
either can or should be framed, and I now agree with John that
CA9 should be reversed outright and that this litigation should
end here.

In brief, here are my reasons.

I cannot agree with John that Congress has implicitly enacted a broad exemption from the Copyright Act for all cases of
private, noncommercial, single-copy reproduction.
randum 12.

See JPS Memo-

At most, one might interpret the 1971 Act as embody-

ing an exemption for home audio
.._ recording of that nature, although Harry's opinion demonstrates that if a case were to put
that directly in issue the answer would not be clear.

The home-

use audio exemption, if it exists, was the product of a specific
political compromise, and it cannot provide a theoretical basis

for a broader exemption.

Under my view, however, it is unneces-

I

sary to address this question.
What I now consider dispositive are questions of the relationships between fair use and contributory infringement, and
between contributory infringement and remedy.

As Harry explains,

Sony can be liable for contributory infringement only if the
Betamax's "most conspicuous purpose" .or "primary use" is an infringing use.

Opinion 35.

I understand Harry to suggest that

all unauthorized recording of copyrighted material for "ordinary"
use is infringment.

I, however, think that a good deal of

timeshifting is fair use.

Like John, see JPS Memorandum to the

Conference 3, I question whether the "ordinary"/"productive" distinction can be used to shift the burden of proving or disproving
economic harm in a broad class of cases, see HAB Opinion 25-27,
although it describes a relevant "sliding scale" that could be
used in case-by-case fair use determinations.

The prospect of

economic harm to the copyright holder is relevant to a fair use
determination, especially where--as here--considerations of privacy and the public interest in maximizing use of the video spectrum are involved.

In my view, the Studios' allegations of po-

tential harm, which Harry discusses at 27-28 of his Opinion, are
simply empty when applied to most timeshifting.

Unless the bur-

den is shifted, there is no need for a remand to determine that a
substantial amount of timeshifting is fair use.

And if that is

true, then I cannot agree that the Betamax's "primary use" is
infringement or that Sony's advertisements evince a purpose to
profit from infringement.

Given that conclusion, I do not think that the Copyright Act
authorizes the sort of complex, multiparty proceeding that
Harry's opinion contemplates to frame an appropriate remedy.

If

a court could enjoin sales of the Betamax altogether under §502
of the Act, it might be able to impose a half-measure like compulsory royalties instead of a ban.

But I do not think there is

authority to ban the Betamax if its primary use is not infringement, and therefore I find no legislative authority for an intermediate solution other than statutory damages for each infringement.

Bear in mind that in enacting the Copyright Act Congress

carefully specified those areas in which a tax-like compulsory
license was appropriate, and it created a specialized legislative
tribunal to administer those areas.

Not only does the Copyright

Royalty Tribunal have precise directions from Congress on such
issues as the size of the royalty, the parties who should be responsible for payment, and how the royalty should be divided
among copyright owners, it also has special procedures for handling disputes like this, whiCh involve everyone in several industries at once.

In Harry's view, as I understand it, see HAB

Opinion 36-37, the District Court may proceed to do much the same
thing in this case without specific legislative authorization.

I

just can't go that far--it would require writing "ghost" legislation as complex as the actual Copyright Act or the treaties Harry
cites in his n. 48.
In sum, I think that much home video recording is infringement, but that muCh is not infringement.

I would not attempt to

define precisely the line between fair use timeshifting and in-

..

~

.

fringing library building, because that would be unnecessary to
this case.

.

I

As long as the Betamax has substantial noninfringing

use, and Sony did not promote it specifically for infringing
uses, the Copyright Act cannot be read to authorize the kind of
complex proceedings and delicate remedy this case would seem to
require.

Accordingly, I would reverse and remand with instruc-

tions to dismiss.

.....----------

Copyright owners can, if they wish, seek dam-

ages for specific acts of infringement, and Congress can and
should amend the Act, as it has in the past, to provide some more
efficient method for compensating copyright owners.
In due course, I shall put these views in

o~orm.

Given the date, however, I am content to express them only in
"bare bones" fashion, unless a substantial number of others agree
with me.

Since~ely,
I 1/

/~~

.

WJB, Jr.

c

.. -
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CHAMBERS OF

JU S TICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 14, 1983
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: No. 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
The circulating opinions in this case must speak for

them-

selves, of course, but I think a few comments are in order in response to John's detailed memorandum of June 13.
(1)

John is correct in noting that Congress previously has

"taken the lead in responding to major technological changes that
affected

the copyright system."

Congress has done so,

however,

---~

only because this Court consistently had refused to apply copyright

-------------

statutes to technologies that were not specifically considered by
Congress at the time the statutes were passed.

I see nothing
in
; '"·

~

the 1976 Act to indicate that Congress approved of this state of
affairs or

intended to preserve it.

To the contrary,

reaction· to this Court's limiting decisions in the

Congress'

copyrigh~

area

. !

was hostile.

See, e.g., 1975 Senate Report 51

(broad language of

§102 "is intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable
distinctions, derived from cases such as White-Smith Publishing Co.
v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), under which statutory copyrightability has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the
work is fixed"); 1976 House Report 52
("The majority of
Corp. v. Aiken, 422

(same); 1976 House Report 87

the Supreme Court . in

u.s.

[Twentieth Century Music

151 (1975)] based its decision on a narrow

construction of the word 'perform' in the 1909 statute.

·."i'·

This basis

.

I

'

Page 2.

for

the decision is completely overturned by the present bill and

its broad definition of 'perform' in section 101").
The legislative history of the 1976 Act makes clear to me that

----------·---------------

Congress wanted the 1976 Act, unlike its predecessors, to cover all
technologies and all uses whether or not they were specifically
contemplated or

even known at the time the Act was passed.

In

other words, Congress wanted to free itself of the need to amend
the statute to accommodate each technological change -- as this
Court's

restrictive decisions

had

forced

it

to do in the past.

See, e.g., 1975 Senate Report 60 ("performance" may be accomplished
by "all kinds of equipment for reproducing or amplifying sounds or
visual

images,

any sort of

transmitting apparatus,

any

type of

electronic retrieval system, and any other techniques and systems
not yet in use or even invented") ; 19 76 House Report 6 3

(same) ;

1975 Senate Report 61 (definition of "transmit" is "broad enough to
include all conceivable forms and combinations of wired
communications media,

or~wireless
•.

including but by no means limited to radio

and television broadcasting as we know them"); 1976 House Report 64
(same); 1975 House Hearings 115 (remarks of Representative Kastenmeier)

("the operation of the bill does apply whether or not we

specifically deal with a subject or not"); see also 17
~7

u.s.c.

§101,

(protection extends to copying "by any method now known or later

developed").
(2)

I

do

not

believe

"[u]nder the 1909 Act,

John

is

correct

in

asserting

that

the writer of a song that was played over

~

Page 3.

the radio was given protection identical to that given the writer
of a movie screenplay that was broadcast on television."
Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,

u.s.

209

1

In White-

(1908), this Court

had held that a mechanical r e production of a song wa s not a "copy"
of the song and therefore was not infring e ment of the song writer's
copyright.

The 1909 Act gave song writ e rs protection against the

making of unauthorized me chanical reproductions, but the protection
was not complete.
ered

"copies"

of

Mechanical reproductions still were not considthe

song.

Reproduction

still was

permissible

without authorization,

although the reproducer was required to pay

a

This

statutory royalty.

lirni ted mechanical-reproduction right

was an odd hybrid that did not fit neatly into the pattern of copy 7
right law, and the nature of the right was never fully

explo~ed

by

the case law.
Horne reproduction of

1

sound recording copyright

1ing

\ \

It

sound recordings .did not infri:ge the

~r

to 1976, because the sound record-

copyright was limited to protection against commercial piracy.

Whether

horne

reproduction

technically

infringed the songwriter's

copyright was, as Congress knew, a meaningless question; the pennywise limitation of damages made the right unenforceable and consequently no "right" at all.

The 1976 Act did change the nature of

the sound recording copyright, and it may well be that horne repro-

---

duction of sound recordings is now an infringement of co
(Footnote 5 of my opinion states that the legal principles concern-

'i

\l

i ng motion pictures are

,:;.

.

'

.

the same under

the 19 09 and 19 76 Acts;

l
7

Page 4.

other aspects of copyright law, of course, changed significantly.)
The question of home reproduction of sound recordings is not raised
in this case, and my opinion does not reach it.
make clear,

however,

I have tried to

that the principles governing mechanical re-

production of songs prior to 1976 bear very little relationship to
the legal principles governing reproduction of motion pictures at
a ny time.
(3) There is nothing particularly startling about the fact that
no recovery is being sought from individual Betamax users in this
case.

It is frequently impossible to recover from individu 1 in-

fringers, and it is precisely this fact that gave rise to the doc-

.....

trine of contributory infringement.

This was explained recently in

Daw s on Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448

u.s.

176, 188

(19~.0),

a ..

patent case; after describing an early case in which liability was
imposed on a manufacturer whose product enabled purchasers to infringe, we stated:

•.

"The court permitted the patentee to enforce his rights
against

the

fringement,

[manufacturer]

who

brought

about

the

in-

rather than requiring the patentee to under-

take the almost insuperable task of finding and suing all
the innocent purchasers who technically were responsible
for completing the infringement •••.
"[This early case]
prehensible
infringement

setting,

demonstrates,

the

doctrine.

reason
It

for

exists

to

in a readily comthe

contributory

protect

patent

,,

Page 5.

rights

from

subversion by

those who,

without

directly

infringing the patent themselves, engage in acts designed
to facilitate infringement by others.

This protection is

of particular importance in situations ... where e nforcement against direct

infringers would

be difficult,

and

where the technicalities of patent law make it relatively
easy to profit from another's invention without ri s king a
charge of direct infring ement."
Similar concerns were expressed by Barbara Ringer, the Register of
Copyrights,

in explaining

to Congress

the need for

copyright liability in the "dance hall" context.

contributory

See 1975 House

Hearings 1813.
(4)

-

I agree with John that the remedy problem is a difficult ..

one, but I see no reason to assume, prior to briefing and prior to
exploration of the problem by the District Court, that it will be
insuperable.

Complex class litigation is a familiar part,of our

..

modern judicial system, and it should be fairly simple for plaintiff and defendant classes to be joined in this litigation on remand.

' ···

With respect to the royalty and licensing schemes discussed

by the parties, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal is already in place
and authors'

collecting societies have successfully issued blanket

licenses for years;

these institutions may well be able to aid in

the collection and distribution of any agreed-upon fees.
mand,

of

relief of

course,
this

the District Court may decide

kind is not possible.

that

On re-

fashioning

The Studios then would be

I

'

Page 6.

relegated to statutory damages for particular instances of copying
that they could prove.

But the possibility that complete relief

may be unavailable should not, I believe, affect our interpretation
of the statute.

Our

job,

at the moment,

home VTR recording violates the 1976 Act.

is to determine whether
I am not aware of any

doctrine of statutory interpretation that should lead us to find no
violation simply because relief is uncertain.
(5) Finally, I might note that the single-copy exemptions listed in the House and Senate reports do not all "concern copying that
is either public or commercial or both."

The making of a single,

free recording of a work for a blind person, and the copying of a
brief excerpt of a work by a student calligrapher, are perhaps the
be st examples.
I

repeat that the opinions circulating must speak for

them-

selves, for John and I do not wish to get into a "battle of memoranda."
''

.....
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687

The principal dispute between JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS is on the 1971 legislative history.
relies

almost

legal argument.

exclusively on

this

legislative

JUSTICE STEVENS
history

for

See JPS draft, at 9-11, and 11-12 n. 12.

his
JUS-

TICE BLACKMUN has a full section explaining why the 1971 legislative history is simply inapplicable in the Betamax context.
HAB draft, at 14-19.

See

As a legal matter, I think JUSTICE BLACKMUN

has the better of the argument.
The secondary dispute revolves around the fair use doctrine.

JUSTICE STEVENS believes

"fair use," either under
because Congress never

that home use video-taping

the statutory "fair use"

intended

to cover

it.

exception or

JUSTICE BLACKMUN

argues that home use video-taping is not "fair use."

On a clean

slate, I could see this argument being resolved either way.
if you

still adhere

Wilkins v.

to your

United States,

I

unpublished

views

is

But

in Williams and

think you must agree with JUSTICE

BLACKMUN.
Last winter you voted with JUSTICE BLACKMUN at Conference.

Shortly thereafter JUSTICE STEVENS circulated a memo sug-

gesting that he had a new theory supporting reversal.

The dis-

putes I discuss here, however, are the same arguments that were
stressed by the parties.

Although JUSTICE STEVENS may express

·-

,,

..

the arguments better, I do not think he has added anything fundamentally new.

His discussion of "copy" versus "copies" may sup-

port his legislative history argument, but I do not think it can
stand

alone.

And

his

addressed to Congress.

other

arguments

seem more

appropriately

In short, I do see any reason to change

your Conference vote that was not already before you at Conference.
I

should add that this memo is limited the basic ques-

tion: which way to vote?

If you decide to join JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

I will have several more specific points to raise.

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687

This memo addresses two points: your unpublished opinion
in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, No. 73-1279, and the
damages problem.

I

I should preface my discussion by noting that there are
at least two reasons why you should not feel compelled to follow
your unpublished opinion in Williams & Wilkins.

The first, and

most obvious, is that it was an unpublished memorandum.
ond is that the case arose under the 1909 Act.

The sec-

Neither of these

factors require you to abandon your earlier views.

Opinions can

be correct without being published in the United States Reports-and vice versa.

Although the 1976 Act incorporated the judicial

doctrine of "fair use" without change (and Congress clearly said
that this is what it was doing), Congress carefully left open the
question of whether the court of claims view in Williams & Wilkins was a correct statement of the doctrine.

But if you have

changed your mind, these two factors can give you an "out."
The
cant.
charged

factual

setting

in Williams & Wilkins

is signifi-

Petr was a publisher of medical journals and books.
that

the

Dept.

of

Health,

Education,

and

It

Welfare--

operating through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the
National Library of Medicine (NLM)--was infringing its copyrights

'.

in certain medical journals.

In particular, NIH regularly made

photocopies of journal articles for the benefit of NIH research
workers.

NLM provided photocopies of difficult-to-obtain journal

articles to other libraries and similar "research-and-educationoriented institutions."

Both NIH and NLM would provide only a

single copy of an article pursuant to a given request.

And on

the record before the court of claims, all copies were made for
researchers "in connection with their professional work and were
used solely for

those purposes."

487 F.2d 1345, 1349

{Ct. Cl.

1973).
~

If we focus on JUSTICE STEVENS's three factors

{single

../'"

copy,

private, ·~ncommercial

three are present,

-----------....
{i) Although

kins.

use),

therefore, we find

-------------

at least to some extent,

that all

in Williams

&

Wil-

NIH and NLM might copy a given article more

than once over the course of time, they would make only a single
copy for a single researcher.

The court of claims relied on the

single-copy aspect of the case.
1354.

{ii)

See, e.g.,

487 F.2d, at 1351,

The NIH and NLM photocopying was not so private as

home-use video-taping, which is generally done in the privacy of
one's living room.

But it was not public, either.

The photo-

copying was available only to a narrow class of people and institutions who had some continuing tie to NIH and NLM.
1354-1355.
mercial.

{iii)

Finally,

See id., at

the photocopying was clearly noncom-

The court of claims

relied on

this

fact,

see, e.g.,

id., at 1354, and you noted it in your memorandum, see, e.g., p.
1.

Indeed,

the facts in Williams & Wilkins are about as sympa-

thetic as one could imagine, for the photocopies were being used
to advance medical research.
In this context, you still concluded that the "fair use"
exception did not apply.

You wrote:

Although courts and commentators disagree widely as to
the outer edges of the doctrine, there is general
agreement as to its central meaning: use of a copyrighted work is fair when it is for the purpose of creating something essentially new, and when the economic
value of the new work does not derive primarily from
incorporating sections of the old.
Memorandum

in Williams

&

Wilkins,

No.

73-1279,

at

2-3.

In my

view, the application of this test in Williams & Wilkins itself
was a close case.
taping

an

viewing),

episode

In the stereotypical Betamax situation (videoof

the answer

M*A*S*H

or

Masterpiece

is much clearer.

Thatre

for

later

There is no question of

the viewers creating something new, and the sole economic value
of the copy is derived from the prior work.
copyright

infringers,

Betamax

users

must

be

If NIH and NLM are
infringers

in

the

stereotypical situation.

II
In my bench memo I did not discuss the remedy issue in
any detail, since the question is not before the Court.

I said

then, and I continue to believe, that a total sales ban would be
inappropriate if there are realistic noninfringing uses.

I also

suggested that the continuing royalty proposed by CA9 might be
unjustified if the DC were unable to correlate the royalty to the
frequency and severity of infringement.

In light of these prob-

.'

lems, I noted that a judicial remedy might be infeasible.

I as-

sume that you are now interested in the argument advanced by JUSTICE STEVENS

(with some

indirect support from JUSTICE BRENNAN)

that the lack of an effective remedy counsels the Court to conclude that there has been no infringement.
I do not agree completely with JUSTICE BLACKMUN's treatment of this problem in his opinion.

As I mentioned in my last

memo, "[i]f you decide to join JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I will have several more specific points to raise."
some changes

in this section.

One of these is to suggest

For example,

the opinion should

make clear that the DC is free to reject CA9's continuing royalty
approach if it is impossible to implement in a judicial proceed·~

ing.

(I understand that JUSTICE BLACKMUN is willing to make this

change.)

Nevertheless,

MUN's treatment.

I

essentially agree with JUSTICE BLACK-

The choice of a remedy is a difficult one, but

that difficulty should not prevent us from recognizing the existence of infringement.
I do not know if the continuing royalty solution would
be possible.

Since no one has taken the time to study the prob-

lem in detail, we have very little to guide us.

(I have long

thought that it was a mistake to grant this case in its interlocutory posture.)

As a matter of approach, I note that CA9's pro-

posal is not all that different from your suggestion in Williams
&

Wilkins.

See pp.

3-8 of your memorandum.

The specifics of

that suggestion do not survive the passage of the 1976 Act, but
you

at

least

indicated a willingness

solution to the problem.

to consider

an equitable

Even if the continuing royalty solution

would be impossible,
available.

however,

the DC would have other remedies

For example, it clearly could award statutory damages

in individual cases of proven infringement.
quire

Sony

to

include

copyright

warnings

It might also rein

its

advertising,

rather than buried in its owners' manuals.
In sum,
instructions

to

But

not

that

is

it would be a mistake to remand this case with
the

DC to

the

impose a

continuing

only option available.

there are some feasible remedies available.

It

royalty system.
is clear

that

Those remedies may

not be what the studios hoped to win, but they do not prevent the
Court from deciding whether home-use video-taping can be a copyright infringement.

III
Once again,

I

add that this memo is limited in scope.

If you decide to join JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I will have several more
specific points to raise.
changes you propose.

I am sure he will be receptive to any
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CHAM BERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 14, 1983
Re:

No. 81-1687

~

So:11y -corp. v. Universal City Studios

Dear Harry:
The fourth part of your memorandum of today, dealing
with the remedy in this case, satisfies my previously
expressed concerns about that aspect of it.
If you can
see your way clear to put a few of the observations presently
contained in your memo into the last part of your opinion,
I will be happy to join it.
Sincerely,

(}~

--·
Justice Blackmun
cc:
I

I

1

l
I

I
1
j

I

The Conference

;§u.prmu <!Jonrl Ltf t4t ~~ ;§taftg
~ag4htglll~ ~. (!}. 20~'!'
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 15, 1983

Re:

No. 81-1687, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
Studios, Inc.

Dear John:
I join.

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

'"
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'Jltas!p:ngtcn, :!B. QJ. 2Ilgi~~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 15 , 19 8 3
Re:

No. 81-1687

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your second draft.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

.;§upumc ~omt o-f tltt ~ttilib' ;%;tail's
~asfri:n.ghm. ~. ~· 20p>!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 16, 1983

Re: No. 81-1687, Sony Corporation v. Universal City Studios
Dear Sandra: .
Thank you for your letter of today.
I do think it is important that we have an opinion for the Court in this case, and
I hope to be able to accommodate your concerns.
I have some
difficulty with the solution you propose, but I believe a compromise might be possible.
Upon a close re-reading of the District Court's opinion, I
cannot agree that the District Court held the possibility ot
harm to be too speculative for purposes of ~ fair use inquiry.
The court recognized that the issue of harm was relevant in
making three separate determinations: whether the use was fair
use, whether an injunction was appropriate, and the amount of
damages that should be awarded.
480 F. Supp., at 451.
The
court did not discuss the third of these, since statutory damages are available under the 1976 Act, but it discussed the
other two in separate portions of its opinion.
The court's discussion of harm as it relates to fair use is·
fairly short.
See 480 F. Supp., at 451-452.
The court n.9ted
that no actual harm had yet occurred; that plaintiffs' experts
had not been able to predict the year in which harm would occur
or the number of Betamax sales that would cause the harm; and
that plaintiffs' claims of harm were based on a series of relatively speculative assumptions. The court then said that it was
"hesitant to identify 'probable effects' of home-use co~ying,"
and rather than identify those effects, it concluded that · "even
if this factor of the fair use analysis were determined in
plaintiffs' favor, it would not render the use unfair."
Id., at
452 (emphasis added). The court also noted that plaintiffs were
claiming a harm that would reduce their profits, rather than a
harm that would keep them from producing new works altogether.
This ended the discussion of harm as it related to fair use.
The District Court returned to the question of harm when it
discussed the propriety of injunctive relief.
The court correctly noted that injunctive relief ordinarily is proper only
when irreparable harm to the plaintiff is shown.
Id., at 464.
The court then went on to "weigh the evidence of harm offered at
trial .•. in the context of the effect of an injunction in this
case." Id., at 465.
In its subsequent discussion, id., at 465468, the court concluded that because each of the harms advanced
by plaintiffs was somewhat speculative, injunctive relief was

....-

Page 2.

not warranted. The court did not find that such harms would not
occur.
It simply concluded that, in the absence of direct evidence that the harms would occur, plaintiffs had not shown a
"likelihood of harm" sufficient to justify an injunction.
Id.,
at 468.
--I read the District Court's opinion as finding that at this
stage of technological development, it is impossible to say
whether or not harm will occur.
For the reasons given on page
26 of my opinion, I believe this finding requires a conclusion
that home VTR use is infringement; otherwise, we run the risk of
holding that new uses of copyrighted works are permissible only
to find later that the harm to the copyright owner has been
subst antial.
I recognize, however, that the District Court's findings
are subject to more than one interpretation; you read the District Court as making an affirmative finding of no potential for
harm.
In light of our differing r ea dings of the opinion, what
would you think of remanding to the District Court for further
consideration of the issue of harm?
If you could accept this
compromise, I would alter Part IV B of the opinion simply to set
out the relevant standards, and leave it to the District Court
to apply them.
Your l e tter also expressed concern about the relevant
standard for determining harm, and particularly about the burden
of proof.
The burden of proof becomes particularly important,
it seems to me, when we are dealing with a new technology where
predictions of harm are necessarily based on assumptions and
opinions.
I do not mean to suggest, in Part IV B, tha~plain
tiffs can shift the burden of proof merely by alleging a potential for harm.
Yet I question whether the burden of proof can
be placed on the plaintiffs; requiring affirmative "proof" of a
potential or possibility of harm is somewhat of a contradiction
in terms.
Would it satisfy your concerns if the opinion made
clear that the plaintiffs' burden of production is a substantial
one, and that unsubstantiated speculation is not enough?
I
would be glad to consider any suggestions you might have regarding specific language changes, of course.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference

~
....________

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687

v
This memo focuses on questions of proof: which side has
the

burden of

proof,

standard been met

what

here,

is

etc.

the
I

standard of proof,

write this

has

that

in response to the

exchange between JUSTICES BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR, and I comment on
her draft opinion.

I

JUSTICE O'CONNOR's draft opinion is not so clear as it
might be.

I think that her analysis is essentially as follows:

(i) individual Betamax users violate §106 when they video-tape
copyrighted programs:
(ii) these §106 violations do not constitute "infringements" if
they are "fair use" under

§107~

(iii) one aspect of fair use is "the effect of the use upon the
potential market

for

or

value of the copyrighted work,"

§107(4)~

(iv) where there

is no harm

(or potential for any harm), the

use must be "fair": and
(v) the studios did not prove any harm (or potential for any
harm) in this case.
She concedes that the

individual users fall within §106.

Once

she makes that concession, I think the statutory scheme requires
a

finding of "infringement" unless one of the statutory excep-

tions applies.
is

§107--fair

The only exception that is even arguably relevant
use.

And within the

§107{4} seems to fit.

"fair use"

exception,

only

She thus errs in saying that there is not

"fair use" but there is nevertheless no "infringement."
An alternative

analysis

that she could make,

but that

seems less likely from her opinion, is that §106 does not encompass

de

minimis

violations

of

the

copyright

holder's

rights.

Where there is no harm {or potential for any harm} , the violation
is de minimis.

And the studios did not prove any harm {or poten-

tial for any harm} in this case.

I find this analysis preferable

if you want to follow one of the two.

The statutory language of

§107 seems to require that the potential fair use be a productive
use

before

one

even considers the

four

factors.

But adopting

this analysis means that JUSTICE O'CONNOR errs in admitting that
there is a §106 violation.
I note that JUSTICE BLACKMUN agrees with most of JUSTICE
0' CONNOR's

reasoning,

route he takes.

although

he

is also unclear

as

to which

Indeed, her fuzziness may be the result of want-

ing to follow his draft to the extent possible.

In any event, he

is clear that there is no "infringement" when there is no harm
{or potential for any harm} •
The essential disagreement between JUSTICES BLACKMUN and
0' CONNOR

is on their

readings of the District Court's opinion.

She appears to read it as saying, "even if the studios are right
on their other contentions,

they have

harm or potential for any harm."

been unable

to show any

He appears to read it as fail-

ing to find any harm because it was operating under a mistaken

legal impression.

Since most of the District Court's discussion

of harm was in the context of injunctive relief, I tend to think
that he is right.

At the very least, there is enough doubt that

the District Court understood the proper standard that a remand
would be appropriate.

This is particularly true in the present

context, where the potential for harm is obvious--even if it was
not proven and even
mature

if

it happens that the potential does not

into actual harm.

The Court will

look

like an ostrich

with its head in the sand to say that it does not see any harm
here because the District Court did not find any.
If a majority of the Court wishes to reverse the case
outright, I think it would be a mistake for the majority to discuss any more than is necessary.

To be more specific, if JUSTICE

O'CONNOR wants to reverse on her theory, there will probably be a
majority to reverse outright

(depending on whether JUSTICE WHITE

adheres

to his Conference vote) .

mistake

to

have

Court opinion.

parts

In that case,

it would be a

I-IVA of JUSTICE BLACKMUN' s

It would be unnecessary dicta.

draft

as

a

There is no need

for such guidance in an area that Congress will fix as soon as
the Court

finishes

with

it.

There

is simply a danger of

the

Court doing something best left to Congress in a case where there
is no need to do it, and in a field where mistakes may come back
to haunt us in unintended ways.

case for

In sum,

I think the best course would be to remand the

further

fact-finding under clearer standards than JUS-

TICE BLACKMUN now provides.

I

hope

this

is

a compromise that

will be acceptable to JUSTICE O'CONNOR.

If not, I do not think

she should join parts I-IVA of JUSTICE BLACKMON's draft.

II
Assuming that a remand is appropriate,

I

think JUSTICE

BLACKMON's draft needs some serious improvement on the standards
that will apply on remand.
burden-of-proof

discussion

In particular, I
is

inadequate.

think the present

JUSTICE BLACKMUN

is

right to conclude that it would be unfair to require the copyright holder to prove that he will be harmed by the infringer's
use,

but that does not mean that the infringer must prove that

there will be no harm.

I think the better course is to leave the

burden on the copyright holder, but with a lower standard.
The precise language could be a matter for discussion.
I would prefer something along the lines of the current burden of
production

in

JUSTICE

BLACKMUN' s

draft.

The

copyright

holder

should be required to prove that there is a real possibility of
harm (or a reasonable likelihood, or something along such lines).
He does not have to prove that the harm will occur, or that the
harm is more likely than not.
the

way

in which

he

foresees

It should be enough if he outlines
that

the harm might occur,

then

shows that there is a reasonable possibility of its occurring in
that way.
Here,

for

example, Disney might argue

that the use of

Betamaxs will harm its market for prerecorded cassettes of Disney
television programs.

It would then have to show that there is a

reasonable possibility that (i) such a market will exist:

(ii) it

would be economically feasible

for Disney to enter

that market

with its own prerecorded cassettes: and (iii) the use of Betamaxs
will harm Disney's sales in this market.

I might add that Disney

would have to show a reasonable possibility that all of the elements in its senario will be true, rather than showing a reasonable possibility for each element.
This
that

would

copyright

meet

holders

JUSTICE
would

against new technologies.

be

BLACKMUN's

practical

unable

defend

to

concern

themselves

It would also meet JUSTICE O'CONNOR's

concern that the Court is confusing the law of burdens of proof
in an unprincipled way.

(I, by the way, do not think that JUS-

TICE BLACKMUN's allocation of the burden of proof
pled.

is unprinci-

It seems entirely logical to view lack of harm as an af-

firmative defense that an infringer must prove once the copyright
holder has proven a nonproductive use that violates §106.

But to

the extent JUSTICE O'CONNOR does, this should meet her concern.)
It also seems more sensible to me.

III
To the extent you might be inclined to decide this case
on a failure of proof theory, I would prefer to see it done on
the contributory infringement issue.

I have consistently found

this aspect of the case to be the most troubling.
issue, however,

I

think the appropriate course is to remand the

case to the District Court.
findings

about

Even on this

the

The District Court made no explicit

relative

proportions

of

infringing

and

noninfringing use, and if it had made such findings, they would

have been colored by its failure to appreciate which was which in
certain instances.
This is another area where I think we should make substantial suggestions to JUSTICE BLACKMUN.

I

have

the feeling

that with proper instructions, the District Court will ultimately
find that Sony is not liable as a contributory infringer.
do not think that the Court should make that finding now.

But I

Sony Corporation v. Universal, No. 81-1687

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting.

I agree with the Court that the petitioners violated
the respondents'

exclusive right to make copies of their

copyrighted material, 17 U.S.C. §106(1), and that the petitioners' actions did not constitute a "fair use" of that
material, 17 U.S.C. §107.
I-IVA of the opinion.

Accordingly, I concur in Parts

However, I would defer to the Dis-

trict Court's finding that "the facts do not show harm to

., "

[respondents]

480

F.

Supp.

429,

469

Cal.), and would find that the petitioners cannot be
ble as

infringers under

the facts of this case.

the petitioners cannot be infringers at all,

(C.D.
lia~

Because

they cannot

be contributory infringers and I would not remand the case
to determine whether

"'virtually all

television program-

ming is copyrighted material.'" Ante, at 35. ·
The

Court

acknowledges

that

"there

are

situations

2.

where

permitting

even an

unproductive use would have no

effect on the author's incentive to create, that is, where
the use would not affect the value of, or the market for,
the

au thor's

work."

Id.

at

2 5-26.

Although

the Court

recognizes that an unproductive use may not amount to an
infringement where the use causes no harm to the copyright
owner, the Court inexplicably refuses to apply its rule to
the facts as found by the District Court.
The District Court determined that "in five weeks of
trial, there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the
Betamax will change the studios'
F.Supp., at 469

(1979).

financial picture."

480

Further, the respondents "admit-

ted that no actual harm to their copyrights has occurred
to date.

[Respondents']

knew neither
occur

nor

the year

the

number

cause the harm."

experts also admitted that they

in which
of

Id.,

the predicted harm would

Betamax

at 451.

purchases

which

would

Although the respondents

attempted to show potential or probable harm, the District
Court held that these "prediction [s]

of harm

[are]

based

on so many assumptions and on a system of marketing which
is rapidly changing,
tify
452.

'probable

[and] this court is hesitant to iden-

effects'

of

home-use

copying."

Id.,

at

3•

The Court rejects these findings,

reasoning that the

District Court "applied an incorrect substantive standard
and misallocated the burden of proof" because it required
the respondent to show that there was actual harm, rather
than

requiring

potential harm.

the

petitioner

Ante, at 28.

to

show

that

there

is

no

In the Court's view, "when

the proposed use is an unproductive one, a copyright owner
need produce only evidence of a potential for harm.

In-

fringement then will be found, unless the user can demonstrate affirmatively that permitting the use would have no
tendency to harm the market for or value of the copyrighted work."

Id., at 26.

Although the Court is not entirely clear in its analysis, it seems to suggest that the copyright owner has the
burden of persuasion to show both that an exclusive right
has been violated,
use.

that

the

use is not a productive

The owner also has the burden to produce evidence of

potential
Once

and

the

harm

caused

by

copyright owner

the

alleged

unproductive

use.

satisfies his burdens on these

issues, the alleged infringer has the burden of persuasion
to show that the the unproductive use is not potentially
harmful to the value of the copyright.

The only support

that the Court offers for its view is that under §107(4),

4.

the effect of a use on the "potential market" is a factor
to consider in deciding whether a productive use is also a
See id., at 26. 1

fair use.

Assuming arguendo that "Congress left burden of proof
questions to the courts" in this area, id., at 27, n. 37,
I see no reason to shift the burden of proof to the alleged
show

infringer.
that

the

Normally,

defendant's

it is the plaintiff who must
actions have caused harm.

See

e.g., Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 891, 894
( CA 5 19 7 5 ) ,
York v.

cer t .

Ransom,

den i e d ,

64 U.S.

4 2 5 U. S • 9 9 3
487,

488

( 19 7 6 ) •

(1859).

Cf.

New

The fact that

damages or harm may be difficult to prove does not usually
result in shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant,

and,

indeed,

may

result

in

the

inability

of

the

plaintiff to recover damages. "[I]t is hornbook law •

1 The two sources cited by the Court for
its novel
proposition of evidence law do not directly support its
point; rather, these commentators argue that the alleged
infringer ought to bear the burden of persuasion on the
issue of lack of injury as a factor in the fair use inqui£Y•
See 3M. Nimmer, Copyright§ 13.05[E] [4] [c], at 13-84
(1982); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1626 (1982).
The Court
has already determined in this case that there is no fair
use.

5.

that even if injury and a cause of action have accrued as
of a certain date,

future damages

that might arise from

the conduct sued on are unrecoverable if the fact of their
accrual

is

speculative

unprovable."
401

u.s.

or

their

Zenith Radio Corp.

321,

339

(1971)

amount

v.

and

nature

Hazeltine Research,

However,

even

if Court were

correct to hold that the burden does shift to the alleged
infringer

once

the copyright owner

potential harm,

produces

evidence of

it is clear that the District Court found

that the respondents simply failed to produce

~

evidence

of harm, potential or otherwise, and merely predicted harm
based on "speculation about audience viewing patterns and
ratings,

a

measurement
calls

system
a

which

Sheinberg,

480 F.Supp.,

at

MCA 1 s

president,

469.

Respondent Universal is a wholly owned subsidiary of

1

black art.

Sidney
1

"

MCA. 2
This

Court 1 s

holding

reflects

the

analysis

of

the

2 Al though the Court acknowledges that the "evidence [of
harm] is speculative at . present," ante, at 29, it concludes that a mere recitation of speculative harms should
be sufficient to shift to the alleged infringer the burden
of showing that there are no harms, a burden that the
Court admits may be "impossible in an area where the effect of a new technology is speculative." Id., at 27.

6.

Court of Appeals in this case.

Although the Court of Ap-

peals characterized the District Court opinion as "elaborate,

painstaking,

(CA9

1981),

the

and

thoughtful,"

659

F.2d

appellate court determined

963,

that

964

the re-

spondents needed to prove only that the use tended to diminish the potential value of the copyright.

See id., at

974.

What the Court of Appeals ignored is that the Dis-

trict

Court

found

that

no actual harm had occurred

and

that any prediction of future harm was "based on personal
belief

and

speculation."
,

480

F.Supp.,

at

451

(emphasis

added) •

In addition, the Court of Appeals held, without

support,

that the District Court "did not pay sufficient

attention to the cumulative effect of mass reproduction of
copyrighted works" for purposes of the allocation of burden.

659 F. 2d, at 974.
In my view, the Court of Appeals neglected the well-

settled principle

find~

that " [ i] n reviewing the factual

ings of the District Court, the Court of Appeals was bound
by the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a), Federal
Because of the deference

Rules of Civil Procedure.
due

the

trial

judge,

unless

an appellate court

is

left

with the 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been

committed,'

United

States

v.

United

States

Gypsum

7.

Co.,

3334 U.S.

364,

court's findings."
oratories,

395

(1948), it must accept the trial

In~ood

u.s.

Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Lab-

__ ,

(1982)

(footnote omitted).

It is clear that the Court of Appeals failed to follow our
holding

in Inwood Laboratories by

ignoring

the District

Court's finding that any harm to respondents was so speculative

that

it

could

not

even

be

"'probable effect' of home-use copying."
452.

identified

as

a

480 F. Supp., at

We compound the error committed by the Court of Ap-

peals in holding, contrary to the findings of the District
Court, that there was sufficient harm to make an unproductive use an infringing use.

....
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SONY2 SALLY-POW
81-1687 Sony

Dear Harry:
This will summarize my reaction to the exchange
of views between Sandra and you in your respective letters
of June 21 and June 23.
May I say at the outset that I hope it is not
"Pollyannaish" to think that the differences are not
substantial enough to foreclose agreement.

On this

assumption I make the following comments with respect to
the four points under discussion.
1.

You are willing to remove the sentence on p.

24, and the addition you suggest to n. 45, p. 35,
satisfactorily modifies the sentence in question.

2.

I agree with Sandra that it should be made clear
that certain VTR copying may qualify as permissible
unproductive use.

The suggested sentence to be added to

the end of the carryover paragraph on pp. 25-26 would be
helpful.

You are reluctant, however, to include the

second sentence suggested by Sandra.

Perhaps it would be

acceptable if the words "including the advertisements"
were omitted and a more general qualifier, such as "in
some circumstances" were added.

I think it rather

important to emphasize that some time shifting may have no
significant economic impact on the copyright.
2.

This deals with the burden of proof, a

question important to all of us.

I suggest as a

compromise the following language, the underscoring
reflecting changes in Harry's draft:

i

3.

J

We conclude that, at least when the
use is an unproductive one, a copyright
need prove only a reasonable likelihood of arm
to the potential market for, or value of, the
copyrighted work. Proof of actual harm often
will be impossible in an area where the effect
of a new technology is speculative, and
requiring such proof would present the "real
danger • . • of confining the scope of an
author's rights on the basis of the present
technology so that, as the years go by, his
copyright loses much of its value because of
unforeseen technical advances." Register's
Supplementary Report 14. Infringement thus will
be found if the copyright owner demonstrates
that the proposed use reasonably may be expected
to harm the potential market for, or the value
of, the particular copyrighted work. In
attempting to show that there is harm to a
potential market, the plaintiff must offer more
than mere speculation to carry its burden. When
the use is one that creates no benefit to the
public at large, however, copyright protection
should not be denied on the basis that a new
technology that appears likely to result in harm
has not done so yet.
3. Sandra has suggested substitute language, in
place of the language on pp. 27-28.

Your response, Harry,

states that you would have no objection to including some
of this language.
I think it is important to limit the scope of
the remand by identifying unanswered questions of
importance.

I approve, therefore, of Sandra's suggested

4.

language except for her last sentence.

It is unnecessary

to say we "in no way disapprove" of the DC's findings.
We could add a note to the effect that we have no occasion
to consider the correctness of particular findings of fact
by the District Court.

These should be reexamined in

light of the standards we have approved.
A footnote along the lines suggested by Sandra
in the last two sentences of her discussion of point 3
would be helpful.
4.

We all agree that contributory infringement

may be found through either inducement or material
contribution.

If I induce someone to xerox a copyrighted

book, I could be a contributory infringer -- even if I do
not provide the book, the paper or the xerox machine.
will make the distinction clear but would prefer not to

You

5.

delete Part V{A) entirely.

Perhaps it could be revised to

provide guidance on the legal standards, leaving open for
the District Court the question whether Sony induced
infringement.
As to the "dance hall" cases, I am essentially
neutral.

I would not object to leaving them out, but

perhaps it would be preferable simply to make the
distinctions clearer ••
The standard for contributory infringement, of
course, is an important point.

I understand that you

will accept language similar to that proposed by Sandra.

* * *
The foregoing was dictated late Thursday.
has now been read to Sandra this morning and I am

·'

It

6.

authorized to say that, in order to reach an agreement and
obtain a Court opinion, she is agreeable to the foregoing.
I am grateful to you both, as I have in in
serious doubt about this case.
Sincerely,
Justice Blackmun

..

.,
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CHAM B ERS OF

.JU S TI C E S ANDRA DAY O'C ONNOR

June 16, 1983
Re:

Sony Corporation v. Universal, No. 81-1687

Dear Harry,
I think that I can agree with your opinion that Sony
violated the respondents' exclusive right to make copies and
that the "fair use" exemption is not applicable in this
case.
However, I have considerable difficulty in rejecting
the District Court's view that the respondents suffered no
harm, actual or potential, as a result of Sony's use. Your
approach to this rests on the notion that the District Court
failed to allocate the burden of proof to Sony, and that the
court incorrectly required proof of actual harm.
I am not
satisfied that the burden should shift to the unproductive
user once the copyright owner shows that there has been a
violation of an exclusive right, and that the use is not
productive.
However, even if I agreed with this burden
shift, I read the District Court opinion as holding that the
proof of potential harm was too speculative as well.
Therefore, even under your framework, the respondents failed
to carry their burden of producing evidence of potential
harm.
The District Court's findings
are not clearly
erroneous, and I think that we should live with them.
In sum, I think that I can join parts I-IVA of your
opinion, but if the opinion remains as it is, I cannot join
the balance or the judgment.
Is there any possibility that
you could alter part IVB to reflect my concerns?
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 17, 1983

Re:

81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios

Dear Byron:
In response to what you and Bill Brennan have
written, I would agree that failure of proof of
contributory inrr1ngement, which rests in part on the
total failure of any proof of any impairment of the
copyright monopoly, either actual or prospective, is an
adequate ground for reversing the judgment.
There is nothing in either the statute itself or
any of our prior cases that even remotely suggests that
the manufacture of copying equipment, which has a
variety of legitimate uses, can be held liable as a
contributory infringer for advertising and selling the
equipment to the general public.
If there are five
votes for that approach, I will be more than happy to recast my memorandum into an opinion taking that
position.

I

Respectfully,

J~
Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

June 17, 1983

81-1687 - Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.

-------------------------------------------------------~---------

Dear Bill,
My vote in conference in this case was closer to yours than
to either Harry's or John's, and after studying the interesting
and thoughtful writings that are now in circulation, I am not at
all convinced that Congress intended each home recorder of
copyrighted works to be an infringer, whether he records sound or
video.
Before 1976 it is reasonably clear that the home sound
recorder did not infringe, and I can't believe that Congress
intended to change the law in that respect in 1976. By the same
token, I seriously doubt that the 1976 Act made the video
recorder of copyrighted works an infringer subject to the usual L" / _ _ ~
damages for infringement. Thus I cannot agree with Harry's draft ~
and am closer to John than to you with respect to the home
k
recorder.
~

'h
...
~~
Wh atever may b e t h e case wit
respect to the Individual ~.
~
viewer and recorder at home, I agree with you that relief against
r;p
n
s
nt ibutor
·
i er i
rantea.
John, of
urse, would reverse the judgment against Sony for his own
~ easons, but can't you two get together?
Since no relief was
~
sought against the homeowner, if in any event Sony is not a
contributory infringer, need the status of the homeowner be
decided at all? Harry must decide it to hold Sony, but if there
were five votes to reverse as to Sony, t~ issue of ~ the ho~owner
is
a
ressin
uestion.
It would also seem that if the
judgment should be reversed for failure of proof as to injury or
damages, the status of the homeowner and that of Sony, for that
matter, need not be addressed.

~
Lt5jo ~
~

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

J . BRENNAN, JR.

June 17, 1983

No. 81-1687

Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios

Dear Byron:
John and I have had some communication, and I have
every reason to think that we can get together on an
opinion reversing on contributory infringement grounds
without deciding the question of the homeowners.
Sincerely,

·~ ·{( I j L. s
v~__./
A./ .

WJB, Jr.
WJB/j hs

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

CHAMBERS Qpr

JUSTICE

w...

J . BRENNAN, JR.

/l-M
.h.tue 18,

No. 81-1687

19 83

Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios

Dear Harry:
The suggestions Sandra has made to you ·in this difficult case seem very constructive, and I shall be most
interested in your response.

WJB, Jr.
WJB/j hs

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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CHA M BERS OF

J U S TI CE SA ND R A DAY o ' CON NOR

June 18, 1983
Re:

No.

81-1687:

Sony

Corporation
Studios

v.

Universal

City

Dear Harry,
Thank you for the response to my letter.
I appreciate
your efforts to satisfy my concerns.
However, I am not
entirely certain that a remand on the issue of harm would be
fruitful.
It appears clear that whatever standard we a sk
the District Court to apply, the result is very likely to be
the s ame given the court's strongly expressed view that the
harm in this case was entirely too speculative to establish
even "probable" harm. The District Court determined that "in
five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to
suggest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial
picture. "
4 8 0 F . S u pp. ,
at 4 6 9
( 19 7 9 ) •
Fur the r ,
the
respondents
"admitted
that
no
actual
har.m to
their
copyrights has occurred to date.
[Respondents'] experts
also admitted that they knew neither the year in which the
predicted harm would occur nor the number of Betamax
purchases which would cause the harm."
Id., at 451.
Although the respondents attempted to show--potential or
probable
harm,
the
District
Court
held
that
these
"prediction [s] of harm [are] based on so many ass umptions
and on a system of marketing which is rapidly ch a nging,
[and] this court is hesitant to identify 'probable effects'
of home-use copying."
Id .. , at: 452.
Nevertheless, I have not dismissed the possibility of a
remand, but that disposition raises certain issues that I
feel strongly about, but did not feel it nece s sary to
mention before, given my preference to reverse outright.
In
the interests of achieving more of a consensus, let me
mention some of the other aspects of copyright law that you
discuss.
Your draft discusses the relationship between the fair
use doctrine and unproductive uses that entai 1 de minimis
harm.
I
originally read your draft as holding that a fair
use had to be a productive use, and that although an
unproductive
use could not be a
fair
use,
it could
neverthel e ss qualify as "noninfringing" if the harm was de
min1m1s.
On further reflection, it seems to me that it
might be better to approach the analysis entirely from the

2.

fair use perspective, rather than creating a nonstatutory
exemption for certain unproductive uses.
I would consider
it essential that you state that fair use contemplates both
productive and unproductive! uses.
This would accord more
with the flexibility that has historically been associated
with the fair use doctrine.
Second, if we were to remand to the District Court, I
feel strongly that the burden of persuasion, as well as the
burden of production, should stay with the plaintiff, who is
the copyright owner, to show actual or potential harm. The
burden of proof on harm and damages traditionally remains
with the plaintiff, and I see no sufficient reason to shift
it to the alleged infringer.
In addition, it would be
inappropriate in the light of the clearly erroneous standard
to indicate disapproval of the factual findings that the
District Court did make.
Any remand should be solely for
the purpose of permitting the court to apply the correct
standard.
Third, if we remand, rather than reverse outright, it
would be necessary to provide the District Court with
guidance on the issue of contributory infringement. As the
opinion reads now, it is somewhat unclear as to what would
constitute contributory infringement in the copyright area.
My initial reaction here is that the District Court was
correct to borrow the "staple article of commerce" doctrine
from the patent law, and I am not entirely sure why you
reject it.
I agree that patent law and copyright law are
dissimilar in important ways.
Nevertheless, as you point
out, these bodies of law derive from a common constitutional
source. They both concern balances that are struc~ between
the right of creators to enJOY~ monopoly over their work,
and the so 'al concerns that arise when monopolists go too
far.
I ha
ought that the
s ap
r 1c e"
octrine
developed in order to limit the atent holder f~om_depriving ~
society of the good that comes rom t e existence of other b~~~
en e
se
a
nevertheless frustrate the patent holder's /~-A. - ·
monopoly to some degree.
I see no reason why we should not ~
be similarly concerned with what the copyright holder does ~
with his monopoly.
If the videorecorder has substantial ~
noninfringing uses, we should be reluctant to find vicarious ~-~
liability.
In addition, I think that the focus of the ~~~ --~
inquiry should not be whether virtually all of the copied~. _ - ..,
material is copyrighted, but rather, whether virtually all ~

of the copying amounts to an infringement.
Even if you do
not wish to import the "staple article" doctrine directly to
the copyright area, I fail to see why the same standard-- ~?

- ~~

3.

whether the item is capable
use--should not be used.

of

substantial

noninfringing

I will be interested to know whether you believe that
modifications along these lines are within the realm of
possibility.

Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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C HAM BERS Or

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

June 18, 1983
Re:

No.

81-1687:

Sony

Corporation
Studios

v.

Univer~al

City

Dear Harry,
Thank you for the response to my letter.
I appreciate
your efforts to satisfy my concerns.
However, I am not
entirely certain that a remand on the issue of harm would be
fruitful.
It appears clear that \vhatever standard we ask
the District Court to apply, the result is very likely to be
the same given the court's strongly expressed view that the
harm in this case was entirely too speculative to establish
even "probable" harm. The District Court determined that "in
five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to
suggest that the Betarnax will change the studios' financial
picture • "
4 8 0 F • S u pp. ,
at 4 6 9
( 19 7 9 ) •
Further ,
the
respondents
"adrni tted
that
no
actual
harm
to
their
copyrights has occurred to date.
[Respondents'] experts
also admitted that they knew neither the year in which the
predicted harm would occur nor the number of Betarnax
purchases which would cause the harm."
Id., at 451.
Although the respondents attempted to show--potential or
probable
harm,
the
District
Court
held
that
these
"prediction[s] of harm [are] based on so many assumptions
and on a system of marketing which is rapidly changing,
[and] this court is hesitant to identify 'probable effects'
of horne-use copying." Id., at 452.
Nevertheless, I have not dismissed the possibility of a
remand, but that disposition raises certain issues that I
feel strongly about, but did not feel it necessary to
mention before, given my preference to reverse outright.
In
the interests of achieving more of a consensus, let me
mention some of the other aspects of copyright law that you
discuss.
Your draft discusses the relationship between the fair
use doctrine and unproductive uses that entail de minimis
harm.
I
originally read your draft as holding that a fair
use had to be a productive use, and that although an
unproductive
use could not be a
fair
use,
it could
nevertheless qualify as "noninfringing" if the harm was de
rnin1rn1s.
On further reflection, it seems to me that it
might be better to approach the analysis entirely from the

..

2.

fair use perspective, rather than creating a nonstatutory
exemption for certain unproductive uses.
I would consider
.~
it essential that you state that fair use contemplates both
S'~l,A
productive and unproductive uses.
This would accord more
wP-with the flexibility that ' has historically been associated
~ ~ fair use _doctrine.

~~
1

Second,

if we were to remand to the

D ~rict

I

Court, I

~~- ~~e~ strongly tha (Ithe burden of persuasion ~s well as the

~

~ en of production, should stay with the plaintiff, who is /~t-

•lA.~ the copyright own er,

to s how act ual or EOtential harm.
The
burden of proof on harm ana d amages traditionally remains ~
f..~'
w,i);bl the plaintiff, and I see no sufficient reason to shift a..e:..~
. .• ~~ to the alleged infringer.
In addition, it would be
.. ~~
~nappropriate in the light of the clearly erroneous standard
~
vv· AL'·
to indicate disapproval of the factual findings that the J,., .~~ ~ J "
vv-~
District Court did make.
Any remand should be solely for F ~
, -.0
the purpose of permitting the court to apply the correct ....~a
~
standard.
~"
'!~ ~-

9

~

~·

Third, if we remand, rather than reverse outright, it
be necessary to provide the District Court with
, ~
.
1dance on the issue of contributor
infringement. As the
~
opiniOn _ reads now,--rt is somewhat unclear as to what would ~
~~constitute contributory infringement in the copyright area. ~ ~
~
;..-- .My initial reaction here is that the District Court was
,~
orrect to borrow the "staple article of commerce" doctrine
11
W~
from the patent law, an
I am not entire y sure why you
reject it.
I agree that patent law and copyright law are
dissimilar in important ways.
Nevertheless, as you point
out, these bodies of law derive from a common constitutional
source. They both concern balances that are struck between
the right of creators to enjoy a monopoly over their work,
and the social concerns that arise when monopolists go too
far.
I had thought that the "staple article" doctrine
developed in order to limit the patent holder from depriving
society of the good that comes from the existence of other
enterprises that nevertheless frustrate the patent holder's
monopoly to some degree.
I see no reason why we should not
be similarly concerned with what the copyright holder does
with his monopoly.
If the videorecorder has substantial
noninfringing uses, we should be reluctant to find vicarious
liability.
In addition, I think that the focus of the
inquiry should not be whether virtually all of the copied
material is copyrighted, but rather, whether virtually all
of the copying amounts to an infringement.
Even if you do
not wish to import the "staple article" doctrine dihectly to
the copyright area, I fail to see why the same standard--

~
~~
uld

+-
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whether the i tern is capable
use--should not be used.

of

substantial

0

noninfr inging

I will be interested to know whether you believe that
modifications along these lines are within the realm of
possibility.

Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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As you may have surmised I have had more than a
diffiulty with this case. John's post-conference
memorandum, and now his full memorandum, present ~ersuasive
arguments for the view that Congress never intended to protect a copyright from the kind of home use involved in this
case.
And I do believ~ that the exchange of thoughtful
memos from several Chambers has helped to bring us closer
together. ~ _ .
littl~

.~

r>

·~ •

.:\ '

' '.

1i

•

'

t

' ' '·"

': '

am strongly tempted to do as Byron has suggest- ,;"·
ed: ~ simply conclude on the basi.s of the findinqs made by
the District Court that there can be no contributory
infringement in this case.
"', . I

,r

ii.l

~

~

Ill•

At least for now, however, I resist this temptation because such a resolut i.on would allo"' Congress to continue to defer ~ plarifying the law. Also, we granted this
case to address -the substantive statutory issue
iii

J:e,,

~y·c :¥J.;: ...,.~,.,_

::?.-

·'

~v

"' .'"· ~

.,,

~,;'\~''

~

1.

1

,,·,., I wr1te now to say that the suggestions made in
. '
Sandra Is letter of ,June 18 appeal to me. . If you should re'.:
vise your opinion generally along the lines of her letter, I
believe I could join you. As the case was assiqned to you - -~
in part I suppose - on the basis of my Conference vote, I
feel some obligation to remain with you absent a genuine
conviction to the contrary. I also think your opinion has
the sounder argument with respect to the statutory language
and the most relevant legislative history.
:1.

i',;,

~

''lo'ilt·

I do emphasize the i.mportance to me of the points ·""'
made in Sandra's letter. First, that we must read enough
flexibility into the fair use doctri.ne so that distinctions "'
can be made between productive and unproductive uses. This •
could become, in effect, a balancing process in which injury
to the copyright owner would be weighed against the natu ~~
of the home use.
l;ji'rl;fi

i

:,;,

0'

L!
I

2.

I also agree fully with S~ndra with respect to the
burden of pPrsua~ion as well as the burden of Production on
proof of actual and potential iniury. And whether. we expressly analogize to oatent law, I am in accord with her
paragraph marked "third" as to the need to provide guidance
on the issue of contributory infringement. The DC's reasoning on the issue has considerable merit.
Sincerely ,o '
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

June 20, 1983

No. 81-1687 - Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.

Dear Sandra:
Thank you for your detailed letter of June 18.
see what I can do.
Sincerely,

~~

Justice O'Connor
cc:

Justice Brennan
Justice Powell

Let me

.hvrmtt <!fourl ltf tlft ~ttittb ~tatts
._Mlfittgbm. ~ .

<q.

20,;1'!.~

June 21, 1983

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKM U N

Re:

No. 81-1687 - Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.

Dear Lewis and Sandra:
Your respective letters of June 18 and 20 set forth your
concerns about this complex case. Bill Brennan, by his note
of June 18, has indicated interest in my response.
Because
Thurgood and Bill Rehnquist joined the recirculation of June
15, whatever we do by way of compromise, of course, must be
acceptable to them.
The third draft being circulated is a sincere endeavor on
my part to bring at least five of us, and perhaps six, together.
The changes appear from page 25 on and cover Parts
!VB, V, and VII of the opinion. Specifically:

~~ ~

1.

I have no concern about the first point raised
Indeed, I thought it was implicit
even un roductive uses may be fair if they create
no poten 1a
or
r .
1 ,
owever, is now made explicit in the new draft.

_~in $andra's letter.

~

fJ1I""

~

'~

-~~

pr

~den

2. I still believe the
of persuasion is more
properly
aced on the ros ective user. Many commentators regard fa1r use as an a 1rma ive defense.
The
crucial point, however, is that the copyright owner
should not be required to rove that harm has occurred
or
1s mo e 1 ely_ t an not 1n
uture. When
a new-teCi1i10I.09y is - at issue, this is a burden that
could not be met, and the legislative history of the
1976 Act makes clear that copyright owners are not to be
· e rived of protection simply because the effects of a
ew technology are unknown. As I read Sandra's letter,
she agrees that only potential harm need be shown.
J / Thus, I am willing to compromise on the burden of per- /
suasion issue.
I do not-rornk it would be unreasonable
· require th copyrigh t _ o~ ner to show a cgotentiai' for
~ ' and
r
I VB has been alter ed accordingly.

rv

3.
I am reluctant to adopt the "staple article of
commerce" doctrine "lock, stock, and barrel" into copyright law.
I think we do well to avoid importing technical doctrine from one area of the law to another without being fully aware of where this may lead. Further,
I am not persuaded that the considerations underlying

Page 2.

the "staple article" doctrine in patent law are entirely
analogous to the considerations in this case. The Betamax is a tool which can be used by the owner both for
infringing purposes and for noninfringing purposes. It
is fairly safe to say that most Betamax owners would not
have bought the device if they were restricted to noninfringing uses. This is not the case with the use of a
"staple article" in patent law.

l

I am willing, however, to adopt Sandra's proposed
standard for contributory infringement, provided that an
opinion for the Cour~hereby can be obtained. I agree
that the question of contributory infringement turns on
the amount of VTR use that is infringing rather than the
amount of television programming that is copyrighted.

You will see what has been done in this draft. I feel it
meets the concerns that have been expressed. Of course, I do
not know whether Thurgood and Bill Rehnquist will go along.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Justice O'Cormor

cc:

Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Rehnquist

.$iu.prtutt OJ!11trt cf tltt ~ttiftlt ;§faft.i\'
~a,s-Jrington, ~.

OJ.
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CHAMBERS OF

J U STICE SANDR A DAY o ' CO NNOR

June 21, 1983
Re:

81-1687:

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios

Dear Harry,
I appreciate your changes as reflected in the third
draft.
Although they partially meet the concerns expressed
in my prior letters, the opinion is still inconsistent with
portions of my views as previously set forth.

~ rs L> my purpose in wanting the notion of fair use to
enc ~both productive and unproductive use is to open up
·
the . possibility that certain VTR use, e.g., timeshifting
/J...A~
with all advertisements preserved, may be fair use because
~ l
g e nerates de minimis harm.
I understand this to be Bill
en nan's concern as well.
Although you now say that an
, ~ . Junproductive use may be a fair use, you use language that
~\
~ uld
ostensibly preclude a finding that any VTR copying
_ ~ (other than that which could be characterized as "productive
~l~
use") could be fair use.
On p. 24, you state that "[a] VTR
"P .~
recording creates no public benefits sufficient to justify
~ .'
limiting this right [to cut off access].
On page 35, inn.
45, yo u, ~tp te that "[c] opying an unregistered work is still
r
~
·n ri ~ t."
Perhaps
you
could
delete
these
two
;YP'.
1.~ements
•
.,,

L /)
./

~ ·

C.

~

~

In addition, I would like to see a reference to VTR use
included in your discussion of examples of unproductive fair
use.
This would make it clear to the lower courts that
certain VTR copying ~ qualify as permissible unproductive
use.
Perhaps you could add the following sentences to the
end of the carryover paragraph on pp. 25-26:
"Indeed, it
may even be the case that certain VTR use may cause no
significant harm to the copyright holder. For instance,
timeshifting of programs including the advertisements, may
not have any significant economic impact on the potential
market for, or value of, a copyrighted work."

~,

is my continuing concern about the burden of
that burden is now where I believe it
belongs, I still have misgivings about the content of the
burden.
As you point out, the statute talks in terms of
"potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."
Rather than requiring the copyright owner/plaintiff to show

pro~though

...___ __
2.

harm to the value of the copyright or to a potential market,
you state that the burden is satisfied by showing "a
reasonable possibility of harm." In my view, the content of
burden of proof should follow the statute. Would you change
the first sentence of the second paragraph on p. 26 to read:
"In adhering to the statutory language, we conclude that the }
copyright owner 1;must show harm" to the potential market for,
or value of, the · copyr1ghted work."
I suggest omitting "or
even probable harm" from the next sentence, and changing the
end of that paragraph to read:
"Infringement thus will b ~
found if_ the copyright owner demonstrates, · at a mfnimurn,
tnet tJ"le use pf!I fiarm the potential marl<et tor, or the
value Of, the pa r t1cu!ar copyrighted work.
In attempting t
show that there is harm to a potential market, the plaintiff
must offer more than mere speculation to carry its burden.
The plaintiff must prove harm to a potential market for, or
the value of, the copyrighted work." I suggest omitting the
last sentence from that paragraph as it now reads.
Third, I am troubled by pp. 27-28, where you seem to
suggest
that
the
Studios
have
already
demonstrated
sufficient harm.
I am not sure that the Studios ever made
these arguments to the District Court, and if they did not,
I see no reason to require the District Court to reopen the
record in this case in order to give the Studios a "second
chance." If the Studios did allege these harms before, then
the District Court may evaluate them in an attempt to
determine whether potential markets have been affected.
In
place of the language on pp. 27-28, would you substitute
something along the following lines?:
"It is not clear from the District
Court opinion whether that court considered
the effect on the potential market that the
studios may have alleged.
The District
Court determined that "in five weeks of
trial, there was no concrete evidence to
suggest that the Betamax will change the
studios' financial picture."
48 0 F. Supp. ,
at 469
(1979).
Further, the respondents
"admitted that no actual harm to their
copyrights
has
occurred
to
date.
[Respondents'] experts also admitted that
they knew neither the year in which the
predicted harm would occur nor the number of
Betamax purchases which would cause the
harm."
Id., at 451. Although the District
Court was "hesitant to identify 'probable

3.

effect' of home-use copying,"
id.,, at 52,
we are unable to determine whether the court
meant that there was no harm to potential
markets, or whether it declined to apply the
"potential harm" standard in expressing its
hesitancy in finding "probable effects." We
are
also
uncertain
whether
the
court
considered the ways in which VTR recording
could
af feet
the
value
of
copyrights.
Therefore, we remand to the District Court
for reconsideration of the issue of the
effect on potential markets.
Our remand is
intended only to permit the District Court
to apply the standard that we have approved,
and we in no way disapprove of the findings
that the District Court did make.
You might add a footnote explaining that if the Studios did
present evidence below that VTR recording injured them in
the ways that you suggest, then the District Court might
consider that evidence as it affects potential markets.
However, I would not want to create the impression that we
believe that the Studios have already satisfied their
burden.
Fourth, I see a certain tension between your discussion
of contributory infringement in Part V(A) of inducement and
your discussion in V (B) of substantial noninfringing use.
Gershwin seems to indicate that there are two ways to engage
in contributory ·infringement.
First, one may induce the
infringement.
Second, one may materially contribute to
infringement.
In the context of this case, one would
materially contribute to infringement for purposes of being
a contributory infringer if one provided a device that is
not capable of substantial noninfringing use. In any event,
it seems that contributory infringement may result from
either inducement or material contribution.
It seems to me that we should accept the District
Court's finding that Sony did not induce any infringement,
and just remove Part V (A) from the opinion.
I should add
that I am uncomfortable with the reliance on the "dance
hall" cases because they involved instances of . control by
the party found to be the contributory infringer. Whatever
else the VTR manufacturers may do, they certainly do not
have any control over VTR users.
Further,
I
remain
convinced that the standard for contributory infringement
should be the one that I articulated in my letter of June

4.

18:
is the VTR capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
Accordingly I suggest replacing the second paragraph on p.
33 with the following:
"We therefore conclude that there
can be no contributory infringement if the VTR is capable of
significant noninfringing uses. If a significant portion of
what is available to copy on the VTR is either not
copyrightable or
is
copyrighted but
the owners have
authorized copying, then the VTR must be deemed capable of
substantial noninfringing uses irrespective of the actual
uses to which the VTR' s are put.
If virtually all of the
rna ter ial available for copying is such that it may not be
copied without infringement, then the VTR must be deemed to
be incapable of substantial noninfringing use at present."
To make the remainder of the opinion consistent with this,
perhaps the third sentence in the first full paragraph on p.
34 should be changed to read:
"The key question is not the
amount of television programming that is copyrighted, but
the amount of programming the copying of which would amount
to infringement."
The fifth sentence in that paragraph
should perhaps be changed to read:
"The proportion of
programming whose copying would be infringement is primarily
a question of fact,
n
If you
opinion.

will

make

these

changes,

I

will

Sincerely
Justice Blackrnun
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 23, 1983
Re: No. 81-1687 - Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
Dear Sandra:
Your letter of June 21 raises four points.
In general, if you
would give way on the second, I believe (but am not certain) that I
can satis f y you on tfi e o tfier three. Of course, there is no point in
our sparring with each other until I know Lewis' position.
If you
and I cannot get together, or if he does not join, I probably shall
revert to my original position.
John then probably will take over
the case.
More specifically:
1. On your ~ I have no objection to removing the sentence on page 24 ~d sentence, in n. 45, is intended to make
the point that infringement does not depend on whether the copyrighted work has been registered.
I am willing to change the sentence to
read "copying an unregistered work still can be infringement," but I
otherwise wish to retain the concept.
To give VTR use as an example of fair use in the introductory
paragraph on page 25 seems to me to beg the question. We could put
something like your proposed first sentence near the end of the discussion of harm. Your proposed second sentence, however, bothers me, ,
for it seems like a heavy suggestion as to how the District Court
should
decide the case on remand.
.

~

2. Your ~ expresses the fear that language on pages
27-28 could b~a4·~ uggest that the Studios already have demonstrated sufficient harm.
I feel that ~y language could be clarified
somewhat, and I would have no objection to including some of the
language ou suggest as well.
3. In your fourth ' point, you distinguish between contributory
infringement through inducement and contributory infringement through
material contribution.
This d~stinction is acceptable, and I would
have no problem with eliminating the "inducement" portion of the
discussion.
I hesitate, however, to eliminate Part V-A altogether.
I could rewrite that part to clarify its relationship to Part V-B.
Frankly, I do not understand your objection to a description of the
"dance hall" cases; the opinion does not rely on them but merely
describes them to illustrate the type of "knowledge" found necessary
in other cases.
It seems to me to be somewhat counterproductive to
take this reference out.

Page 2.

You now say that you want the ~tan ~ d for contributory infringement to be whether the VTR is "capable of substantial infringing uses." That is the patent standard.
I read your prior letter to
say that the question should be "whether virtually all of the copying
amounts to an infringement." This latter standard was incorporated
into the latest draft because I thought that was what you wanted.
Although I think the standard in the current draft makes more sense,
I believe I 5 o ~d _ live with lan~~ ge similar to that which you now
propose.
4. Your ~
~ concerns the burden of proof. The statutory language to wh+d ! you refer comes 1 n t:o p r ay wfi en a productive
use is found. Under your proposal, the copyright owner would have to
prove actual harm to the value of the copyright or to a potential
market even for unproductive uses.
The problem with this, as I have
tried to point out, is that copyright owners would be deprived of
protection when the technology is a new one and when predictions of
harm are necessarily imprecise.
I strongly feel that the standard
articulated in the opinion -~ that the copyright owner must show a
"reasonable possibility of harm11 - - is the correct one.

·

~

Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc: Justice Powell

I

lfp/ss 06/24/83
SONY
,differences with .JPS may be summarized as follows:
John emphasizes the
Harry's answer is persuasive:

"i~n0cencP.>

of c:;ony"

J 7) •

It must have been obvious to

Sony that the Primary purpose of and market for
for recording TV proqra111s.

(t).

Bet~max

was

Most of this would be. done in

'

i

J

homes, and this ·case. is limited to non-commercial home use.
But
ble.

dr~wing

lines is difficult if not J?ractlcallv impossi-

One home user may record only for his time ,shr1rinq

personal , use.

Others may "library", uqe for entettaininq

guests at large or small Parties, etc.
Harry would not have to find Sony wholly innocent.
He would hold no contributory

infringem~nt

by apoJvinq to

copyright law the concent of a "staple article of commerce"
tha,t is fami lar to patent law.
staple~

He reasons that Betamax is a

article of commerce because it is capable of signifi-

cant non-infringing uses.

(22, 2'3).

Thus, for. John, the question is whether Betamax is
in fact capable of non-infringing uses, and he is certainly
right in saying that non-commercial, private time sharing in.
tre home should not be viewed - despite the statutory language - as an infringemPnt.
My 0ifficulty with his theory is that it would
relieve Sonv of llabi1ity for substantial non-home commer-
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2.
cial use simply because Betamax also has the capability of
substantial non-infringing uses.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

.,.

June 25, 19R3
81-1687 Sony v. Universal

Dear Harry:
I

have a copy of Sandra's letter of June 23.

~a I wrote you on JunP 20, I was generally in accord with the changes suqqeste~ in her letter of the lRth.
I also have, of course, followed the latest exchanges between the two of you. J. fi.nd her vi.ews genera1ly fn accor ·'1
with my own. Her reframinq of the burden of. ?roof paragraph
seems quite close to both yours and John's.

l.

I recognize, of course, that you are being ~ e
quested - by both of us in effect - to m.l kc changes in an
opinion on which you ha,re devoted a great deal of thought.
For me, this is by far the most difficult case of the 'i'erm.
The exchange of views between you and John has been Pducational - at l~ast for me. I must say that John's latest
circulation (differing substantially from his first) is persuasive. Nevertheless, if you and Sandra can aqree - as I
hope you can - I t.·'1ill ntay '~i.th you.
1 suppose reargument is an ooti.on in vie\·l of the
difficulty at this time of working out differences.
I normallv am unsympathetic to rearguing a case adequately presented to the full Court. But we all have the problem of
the lateness of the Term.

Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
cc: Justice O'Connor
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CHAM B ERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

June 25
Re:

No. 81-1687:

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios

Dear Harry,
Thank
you
for
your
June
23
letter
exploring
alternatives to the suggestions made in my letter of June
21.
It appears as though some of the differences that we
have can be satisfactorily resolved, such as the sentence in
n. 45, and perhaps other changes on pp. 27-28. Apparently,
however, you are reluctant to change your treatment of the
burden of proof standard.
This issue is significant,
because the burden will likely determine the outcome of not
only this case, but most others in the future.
I recognize
the delicate balance we must make between protection of the
copyright owner and encouragement of new technology.
You
may be right but I am not persuaded that we should impose a
standard even for unproductive use that differs from the
statutory language.
I notice that in John's circulation of June 23, at p.
31, he proposes the following burden of proof:
"[A] ny plaintiff seeking to challenge
the use of a copyrighted work should, as a
threshold
matter,
prove
that
if
the
challenged use became widespread, it would
be more likely than not that some nonminimal damage would result to the potential
market for, or the value of, his particular
copyrighted work.
Actual present harm need
not be shown; such a requirement would leave
the copyright holder with no defense against
predictable damage."
While it seems to me that the word "non-minimal" should be
changed to "significant," I agree essentially with John's
articulation of the burden and would be willing to accept
such a standard.
I have attached a copy of p. 31 · of John's
June 23 draft.
I see no reason not to include
timeshifting as a possible instance of
feel uncomfortable with a mere allusion
context given the detailed findings by

references to VTR
fair use.
I would
to VTR use in this
the District Court.

2.

I think that the point should be emphasized rather than made
the subject of only a passing - reference to a possibility.
With
respect
to
the
standard
for
contributory
infringement, I think that the analogy to the patent cases
is
close
enough
that
the
"capable
of
substantial
infringement" language is quite useful and appropriate.
It
does not differ from my earlier suggestion.
I had thought
that a copyright owner could establish liability of the
contributory infringer under that standard by proving that
virtually all of what was available to copy is such that its
copying would amount to infringement.
Perhaps a re-write of Part V-A would meet the concerns
previously stated, but I would want to see it before
approving it.
I am uncertain that we even need to discuss
anything but the "material contribution" issue if we affirm
the District Court's finding that Sony did not induce
infringement.
In short, it appears we may still differ on burden of
proof
and
contributory
infringement
and
on
specific
language.
Although I have requested a number of specific
changes, I had been under the impression, perhap~ wrongly,
that it could be helpful to you in getting a Court on this
exceptionally challenging case.
If you choose not to make
the changes, I certainly understand.
Sincerely,

cc:

Justice Powell

J. "' - •
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For that reason, any plaintiff seeking to challenge the use

I

.

I

1

of a copyrighted work should, as a threshold matter, prove that
if the challenged use became widespread, it would be more likely
'S1 '3•'1 JII,,..,-\-

mi~im~l

I

than not that some non

\

potential market for, or the value of, his particular copyrighted
work.

Actual

L

prese~t

damage would result to the

harm need not be shown; such a requirement

would leave the copyright holder with no defense against
predictable

_d_~~':.~_ ·__) N~;

is it necessary to show with certainty

that future harm will result.

All that is necessary is a showing

by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful
likelihood of future harm exists.

In this case, respondents did not carry that burden with
regard to home time-shifting.
found to the contrary.

The district court explicitly

See 480 F.Supp., at 466; supra, at

The nature of the evidence was described by the court as
follows:

"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at s everal points in
the trial that the time-shifting without librarying
would result in 'not a great deal of harm.'
Plaintiffs' greatest concern about tim e -shifting is
with 'a point of important philosophy that transcends
even commercial judgment.'
They fear that with any
Betamax usage, 'invisible boundaries' are passed:
'the
copyright owner has lost control over his program.'
"These 'nuances,' 'perceptions,' and 'points of
phiJosophy' are understandable, though not always
logical.
They do not, however, justify an injunction.
Harm from time-shiftinq is speculative and, at . best,
minimal."
480 F. Supp., at 467 (emphasis added).
The District Court's conclusions that respondents "did not
establish even a likelihood of harm" and offered "no concrete
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE

w... J .

BRENNAN , JR.

June 27, 1983

No. 81-1687

Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

After reviewing both Harry's and John's most recent
circulations in this case, it may be helpful to have me
say that John's memorandum comes closer to expressing the
views I expressed at Conference and in my memorandum of
June 14.
Sincerely,
' I. -

t

WJB, Jr.
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J . BRENNAN, JR .

June 27, 1983

No. 81-1687

Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

After reviewing both Harry's and John's most recent
circulations in this case, it may be helpful to have me
say that John's memorandum comes closer to expressing the
views I expressed at Conference and in my memorandum of
June 14.
Sincerely,
I

.
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WJB, Jr.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 28, 1983

Re:

No. 81-1687-Sony v. Universal City Studios

Dear Harry:
I am still with you.
Sincerely,

--1 u I

(..,....-/
,/!
,.

T.M.

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687

JUSTICE STEVENS'

law clerk has given me a cut-and-paste

version of their next circulation.

The print shop informs him

that a printed version should be ready by 6:00, so you should be
able to take a copy home with you tonight.

I

If JUSTICE STEVENS wants to bring the op1n1on down in

its present form,
part.
write

I

sugge~do

not

join it--even in

I recommend that you either stay with JUSTICE BLACKMON or
a

separate opinion concurring

in the

judgment along

the

lines I suggested in my last memo.
If JUSTICE STEVENS is willing to make major changes in
the

contributory

that section.

infringement section,

you probably could

join

At the moment, there are two major problems.

(1)

He adopts the patent law standard for contributory infringement.
This standard is ridiculously high, and would make it virtually
impossible to find contributory infringement in all but the most
extreme cases.

Moreover,

high standard here.

(2)

it

is not

necessary to adopt such a

He incorporates a number of statements

about direct infringement, fair use, etc., in the section on contributary infringement.

These statements are unnecessary for his

conclusion in this case, and are inconsistent with the views that
you have expressed.

If JUSTICE STEVENS is willing to make major changes in
the opinion as a whole, you could join the entire opinion.

These

changes would generally be deletions of statements inconsistent
with your views rather than substantial rewriting.

II
Whether or not the case should be reargued depends on
what you want to do.
I

If you want to stay with JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

think the answer depends on what he is able to do.

If he can

have his opinion quickly converted to a dissent with which he can
be satisfied, we might as well bring the case down.
If you want to change your vote and join some or all of
JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, I think there is a lot of work to do.
We have devoted a
opinion carefully.

lot of
We

review JUSTICE STEVENS'.

time

have

to

reviewing JUSTICE BLACKMUN' s

had no where near so much time to

If everyone jumps on now, without the

opportunity for careful review, I think a lot of the broad statements in his opinion will come back to haunt us.

At the moment

he has a lot in there that is too broad--and is probably wrong.
I think it would be better to put the case over and give it the
proper review that it deserves.
If you want to write an opinion concurring in the judgment, I am sure we could be ready to hand it down by next Wednesday.

But I see no urgent need to hurry everyone else.

mfs 06/28/83

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687

Now that JUSTICE BLACKMON has decided he can go no further

\

to

accommodate JUSTICE

O'CONNOR's

views,

it

appears

JUSTICE STEVENS will have a Court opinion in this case.
ingly, JUSTICE BLACKMON will be writing the dissent.
you with an entire range of options.

that

Accord-

That leaves

This memo sets out what I

see as the most likely possibilities.
(1)
the same

If JUSTICE BLACKMON's dissent stays in essentially

form as

That would make
this course.

his

latest circulation,

this

First,

a 5-4 case.
I

in his legal analysis.

I

you could join that.

see several advantages

think JUSTICE BLACKMON is probably right
In this case,

it may be better to vote

the right way than to join the majority for
part of the Court.

in

the sake of being

This not an area where lower courts will be

looking to this Court for clear guidance.

Second, a 5-4 decision

will give a better indication to Congress of just how close this
case really is.

Congress might read a 6-3 decision as a strong

indication of what

the Court thinks the law should be.

A 5-4

decision might leave Congress in a better position to do what it
should have done initially.
MUN at Conference.

Third, you voted with JUSTICE BLACK-

There is some value in adhering to your Con-

ference vote.
(2)

If JUSTICE BLACKMON returns to his

initial posi-

tion, there will be portions of the opinion that I do not think

...

page 2.

you should join--such as the standards for burden of proof and
contributory infringement.

You could ask him to leave these sec-

tions essentially as they are in order to keep it a 5-4 decision.
Or you could write a short, separate dissent indicating a general
agreement with his position, but noting these points of disagreement.

(3)

If JUSTICE STEVENS writes a narrow opinion relying

entirely on contributory infringement, you could join that.

We

have thought all along that the contributory infringement question is close, and could go either way.

If JUSTICE STEVENS' dis-

cussion is closely tied to the record, and does not say too much

~

I

about what is a noninfringing use, it should be acceptable.
(4)

If JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion is too broad, you could

join those parts that discuss contributory infringement (assuming
that they are suitably narrow).

(5)

You could write a brief opinion concurring in JUS-

TICE STEVENS'

judgment.

In such an opinion, you could indicate

agreement with much of what JUSTICE BLACKMUN says if you think
that would be appropriate.

If you write such an opinion, I sug-

something along the following lines:
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgement.
I agree with much of what JUSTICE BLACKMUN has said
about

direct
I

because

infringement and

nevertheless
I

do

not

concur

believe

fair

use.

See post at

in

the

Court's

judgment

that

the

respondents

have

proved contributory infringement in this case.
Contributory infingement is a narrow doctrine
copyright law.
authorization

•

i'

in

Although there is no explicit statutory
for

a contributory

infringement action,

page 3.

the legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that
Congress recognized--and approved--the concept as it
has been developed by the judiciary.
[citation]
But
as JUSTICE STEVENS explains in Part ___ of the Court's
opinion, ante, at ___ , the concept previously has been
applied only in cases where the contributory infringer
has had a much greater degree of involvement with the
direct infringer than was proved in this case.
Congress, of course,
of

contributory

is free to expand the concept

infringement

as

it

sees

fit.

This

Court, however, should be cautious in expanding the
concept beyond its traditional limits without congressional approval.

See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-

ists Television, Inc. ,
tas, J., dissenting).

392 U.S.

This may be the best course of all.

-------------

390,

404

(1968)

It permits you to indicate

your views without having to write a long opinion.
also would be helpful for Congress.
with

your

other

work

without

points with other Justices!

t '

(For-

I

think it

And it allows you to get on

having

to

negotiate

individual
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 28, 1983

Studios, Inc.

Re : No • 81-16 8 7

Dear Sandra:
I have endeavored over the past several days to accommodate
your many concerns.
My letter of June 23 to you represents the
limit of what I am willing to do. Five votes are not that important to me when I feel that proper legal principles are involved.
It therefore looks as though you and I are in substantial disagreement.
The case will have to go its own way by a different route
from the one I have proposed.
Sincerely,

J~

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference

j
mfs 06/29/83

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687

r

trf/~Lf
If you would like to join JUSTICE STEVENS I draft opin-

ion ~ there
comments

are some major points you should note.

in the margin of the attached draft.

22, 26, 27, 34, 40.
During

the

day,

I

I have written
See pp.

10, 18,

I am sure there will be minor points, too.
will

reread

the draft more closely.

But

I

thought you should have these major points before Conference in
case this is discussed there.

. -· .

I

g I 1 1 ff3
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Betamax Battle·
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But this course has serious implications -for · in the marketpla~ will make (it difficult for lie policy. Our copyrlght -·~rly protect
, consumers and for an important AmericaJl in- · man~1facturers to try to pass through a signifi- . all creations of the intellett, wlletller they have
, dustry. Without "SOme reasonable system of cant portion of the royalty to the retailer, and' commercial. value or no.L The fact that t.!lpitlg- "
royalty compensation, the erosion of revenue . thus only a small portion, of the royalty fee occurs in the -home shouldn't, divert us fro'~·
' streams on which motion picture .Jmxluction ,tnay he passeq on to consumers, at least in the recognizing that sudt 'behavior will soon oceur lit·
depends will mean fewer high-quality pictures short term. But as a strong consumer advo- 50 miUion living roorris and. this will materially• · ':.produced in this country.
cate, I'm not afraid to say the consumers who affect the economic viability of the motion pic- . ··u
.Just as import<mt: without some form of roy- receive something of value should pay for it.
'ture and televisioo priduction industries.
~ _; • 1·.
alty system, quality motion pictures will he
The manufacturers are. trying desperately · How should Corigress resolVe the Betam,ax..: ..•,,,
taken oil' commercially ·supported television, · to convince Congress that, if consumers must ,_., dilemma? The battle between VCR and taw ,,,;<
from which they are taped. This means that . pay anything to ~rd and perhaps keep a manufacturers and the motion picture industry· . _;:.
those Americans who can't afford or don't have -. copy of "Mary Poppins," they are ' being has gone on too long. We need a truce. We need ~ :
access to pay and cable TV, or can't afford to abused. It's sad when consumeri~m is tnarlipu- · a compromise so that COngress can 11-ct and we-' :'
take the family b) the moviel!, will he deprived Ia ted· for the enrichment of one industry at , tan move on to other important issues.
· . ·• '1
of the type of "free" entertainment they now . the expense of another.
· I understand that efforts were mane laM· --~
get. This could be as many as one-half ()!' all
Who would have access to a royalty pool? ' year by the motion picture industry ·to ap. · .!
American homes. Hut tape and VCR manufac- · Here again the VCR and equipment manufae-- · proach privately the VCR manufacturers -tp :}!
· tluers don't seem b> care about the future of turers would have Congress believe that a roy- see whether agreement could be reached on ~ · ,n
free television.
.
· alty system would support rich Hollywood legislation. The manufacturers said "!)O _ ~ ·
Who should pay the royalty? It should be movie stars. The facts are otherwise. Large ' deal" because they thought they could win ',i>
paid by those who stand to benefit economi- and small production companies, members of in the Supreme Court and perhaps in Con• ~ ·'
. cally from home taping, in proportion to their unions and creative guilds alLacross.America gress. '
. · · ·· · ~
gain. This means that manufacturers nf the would be the beneficiaries o~a royalty system,
The time has come for those who make ', u·.,
machines and tape should he required by law some of them on the basis of negotiated bar- VCRs and tape to come to the table in go~ · .. 11 j
to pay a copyright royalty for the privilege of gaining with their employers. By the way, faith and begin talking with representatives of . , ,
selling their pmducts. This concept is a well- unemployment in the entertainment com- the American creative community. This is a . ' .i
established practice in our copyright system · munity is substantially above the national sensible way to resolve this problem and paye .. ,<
and has guaranteed a flow of ideas and crea- average.
the way for a fair congressional solution.
-·
tions for the public's benefit since the foundThe Post asserts that copyright protection
·~ ~
ing of our nation.
"properly applies only to commercial use." This
The write·r is a Democratic rep·re- · :·~
Moreover, the ferocious price competition statement is both legally incorrect and bad pub- sentat-i-ve from California.
·· ~.

------.

dac 09/29/83
To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

David

Re:

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687

I believe that the JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion is fundamentally correct in its analysis of the legal issues in this
case.

The first section of this memorandum discusses whether

home use of VTRs to copy programs off-the-air constitutes fair
use.

The second section considers whether Sony may be held lia-

ble for infringing uses of the VTRs it sells.
While I think that JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion might be
improved in significant ways, this memorandum does not discuss
any suggested changes except to point to possible flaws in his
analysis.
I. Fair Use
JUSTICE STEVENS' final draft abandons his earlier argument that the Copyright Act creates an implied exception for the
making of single copies off-the-air for private use.

As to the

underlying question of infringement, the issue is whether such
copying is privileged under the fair use doctrine.
Section 107 of the
mula ted fair use doctrine.

euf

Copy~ht \ adopts

the judicially for-

The four factors to be considered in

fair use analysis point towards a flexible balancing of the benefits derived from the use against the harm that the use inflicts
upon the value of the copyright.

Congress conceived of the fair

use doctrine, enacted as section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act,
as a "equitable rule of reason."

Particularly, although Congress

did not intend itself to "expand" the doctrine in any way by enacting it, it did indicate that the courts were to adapt the doctrine to new technologies. House Report, at 65-66.
In addition, Congress indicated in the legislative history the types of factors which were to be considered in applying
the very general terms of the fair use doctrine to particular
cases.

First, Congress indicates that the fact that single,

rather than multiple, copies are made makes a differnce in fair
use analysis

See, e.g.,

House Report, at 73 {fair use to make

single, but not multiple copies, for blind); Senate Report, at 63
{single but not multiple copies for teachers preparing classes).
Further, Congress indicates that the copying of entire works,
including timeshifting of audiovisual works, may be fair use,
although one may infer from Congress' discussion that this will
be the exception rather than the rule.

E.g., Senate Report, at

65-66 {timeshifting of educational programs in Alaska and copying
of works for blind); id. at 64 {reproduction of works for classroom) •
However, the indicia of legislative intent discussed by
JUSTICE STEVENS are unconvincing.

First, JUSTICE STEVENS refers

to a 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights.

This Report has

only an attenuated connection with the law enacted by Congress in
1976.

Further, although the Report recommends that both private

"performances" of motion pictures in the home and reproduction of
televised motion pictures be permitted, Congress adopted only the
first recommendation. See§ 106{4), {5) {copyright as to motion
pictures applies only to public display).

It is hard to find in

this history an endorsement of the recommendation which Congress
in fact did not adopt.
Second, JUSTICE STEVENS relies on the legislative history of the 1971 Act.

But as JUSTICE BLACKMON persuasively ex-

plains, this history addresses the problem which arose because no
copyright protection applied to recordings, except for protection
of the underlying composition.

Op., at 16-18.

[I shall refer to

JUSTICE BLACKMON's proposed opinion as "op." and to JUSTICE STEVENS' memorandum as "mem."]

The situation with regard to home

VTRs, used to copy works which enjoy full copyright protection,
is clearly different.
Thus, the legislative history supplies only general indications that off-the-air copying, particularly of single copies
for home use, might, in certain circumstances, be fair use.

Oth-

erwise, the legislative history supplies little guidance as to
how the balancing process involved in determinations of fair use
is to be conducted.
Aside from his use of the legislative history, JUSTICE
STEVENS arrives at a different result from JUSTICE BLACKMON on

~~~mphasizes

the fair use issue in two ways.

First,

permitting off-the-air copying.

Mem., at 40-42.

benefits to

Second, and

more importantly, he would impose a higher standard of proof on
the copyright holder who seeks to establish that an allegedly
infringing use has diminished the value of the copyright.

Mem.,

at 30-34.
I find JUSTICE STEVENS' discussion of the benefits of
permitting VTR use in the home largely unconvincing.

' ,

First,

'·.

there are no special constitutional values implicated merely because the government seeks to regulate conduct "within the privacy of the home."

Stanley v. Georgia, 394

u.s.

557 (1969), the

only case JUSTICE STEVENS cites, concerns a content-based regulation on what is read in private -- in that case, on pornography.
The Court concluded that the reading even of pornography in one's
home deserved some first amendment protection.

Id., at 564-565.

In contrast, the copyright laws as applied in this case would not
regulate what an individual reads or experiences in

private~

they

would regulate copying in private and consequently the subsequent
use of the infringing copies.

It is a fundamental premise of

copyright law that an infringing use of a work deserves no first
amendment protection.

E.g., United States v. Bodin, 375 F.Supp.

1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974)

~

Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pi-

rates, 345 F.Supp. 108, 115-116 (N.D. Cal. 1972).

If off-the-air

copying violates the copyright laws, the first amendment does not
protect this copying whether the copies are viewed in the home or
in public.

Further, Stanley is premised on the observation that

the justifications for banning public distribution of pornography
do not apply to its private use.

394

u.s.,

at 567.

In con-

trast, the purposes of copyright law are served by banning copying whether the copies are used in the home or displayed publicly.
Second, JUSTICE STEVENS emphasizes the benefits from
expanding access to television programs. But an infringer always
increases access to the works he disseminates. Rather, one must
inquire whether the purportedly fair use provides access not ob-

tainable by transactions authorized by the copyright holder.
See, e.g., Senate Report, at 64 {"key ••• factor is whether or
not the work is available to the potential user
mal channels"}.

through nor-

And convenience to the user of the infringing

copy does not suffice to establish fair use.

See, e.g., H.C.

Wainright & Co. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F.Supp. 620,
627 {S.D.N.Y. 1976} {synopses of marketing studies}.

JUSTICE

STEVENS does not cite evidence to show that time-shifting expands
access beyond what is available through normal broadcasting, reruns, or renting of tapes; nor does he demonstrate that off-theair copying serves more than the convenience of the viewer.
Further, JUSTICE STEVENS's cursory analysis fails to
distinguish productive from non-productive uses.

This point

bears more directly on the analysis of standards for proof of
harm, and I shall discuss it below.
Third, JUSTICE STEVENS observes that a finding of "no
fair use" would brand millions of Americans as law-breakers.
Further, although award of statutory damages under the old Copyright Act was discretionary with the trial judge, the language of
the new Act supports JUSTICE STEVENS' conclusion that award of
statutory damages of $100 is now mandatory.

See

504{c} {1}
an award of

{"the copyright owner may elect ••• to recover
statutory damages for all infringements ••• "};

§

§

504 {c) {2}

{in

certain cases "the court ••• may reduce the award to a sum not
less than $100"}.
This is a troubling argument.

I agree with the implied

premise that the law should not stray too far from the moral in-

..

tuitions of the community.

However, it is for Congress, and not

this Court, to act as the vehicle by which popular preferences
are enacted into law.

The moral constraint upon this Court is

not responsiveness to the public will but fidelity to precedent
and the rule of law.

If the doctrines of fair use which Congress

enacted in section 107 indicate that off-the-air copying is infringing, then the fact that a majority of Americans find such
copying both convenient and blameless is beside the point.

Con-

gress remains free to permit this copying, as it might have done
in 1976 had it responsibly considered the problem.
Thus, while off-the-air copying undoubtedly confers
benefits, as JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion acknowledges, these benefits do not deserve the special weight in fair use analysis which
~

JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion attaches to them.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS

also differ on the

threshold showing that the copyright holder must make of harm to
the copyright.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN would require only a "reasonable

possibility" that harm will result; JUSTICE STEVENS "some meaningful likelihood of future harm."

The choice between these two

standards is difficult because it essentially requires a legislative judgment whether to favor protection of the copyright over
free dissemination of copied works.

Neither past precedent or

the 1976 Act clearly guides the Court's decision.

Nonetheless,

there are reasons to think that JUSTICE BLACKMUN's formulation is
sounder.
In most contexts, a showing that an entire work was cop~~

ied for an unproductive use would end the fair use inquiry.

-

'

E.g.

Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F.Supp.
686, 689-690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974);
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977).
plicit showing of harm would be required.

No ex-

Courts in effect pre-

sume substantial harm when an alleged infringer makes a copy
clearly substitutable for the original work: analysis of the
similarites between between the copyrighted and the infringing
work replaces direct analysis of harm. See, e.g., Trebovik v.
Grossman Music Corp., 305 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1969); H.C.
Wainright & Co v. Wallt St. Transcript Corp., 418 F.
627.

In a competitive market, as for books or magazines, there

is no question that the infringer's sales take away from the
sales of the legitimate copyright holder: the copyright holder
presumptively loses a sale each time an infringing copy is purchased or used.

The defendant may attempt to overcome this as-

sumption by showing that the the infringing copies are used by
individuals who otherwise would be unable or unwilling to obtain
the item directly or indirectly from the copyright holder: i.e.,
that the copy expands access in the ways discussed above.

E.g.,

Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1356-1357
(Ct. Cl. 1973).
The present case poses two difficulties for the copyright holder not present in the ordinary case.

First is the

unique structure of the "market" for television programs. Advertisers, rather than viewers, pay the program producers.

With the

market structure of television, prediction of economic harm is
~~

more speculative.

Second, speculation is required because VTR is

a new technology.

The standard approach to fair use analysis

adopted by the courts is therefore difficult to apply.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's "looser" standard for demonstration
of harm would help to ensure that the unique difficulties of
proof in this case are erected as barriers to enforcement of the
programmers' copyrights.

This is consistent both with congres-

sional intent and judicial precedent.

Congress emphasized that

the courts should attempt to deal with the problems posed by new
technologies.

House Report, at 66.

To adopt JUSTICE STEVENS'

higher standard of proof in effect decides that new technologies
will rarely be found to be infringing, simply because it will be
difficult to prove with any certainty what their effects will be.
Further, JUSTICE STEVENS' standard may be inconsistent
with precedent in two respects.

First, it ignors the difference

between productive and unproductive uses. The basic rationale for
the fair use doctrine is to further the very creativity the copyright laws themselves were meant to foster by permitting creative
use of already copyrighted works.

As JUSTICE BLACKMUN reasons,

the justification for extending the doctrine to unproductive
copying is simply that when there is no harm to the copyright
holder, there is no point to forgoing that increased public access that the copying affords.

Op., at 21-23.

The extension of

the doctrine to unproductive works is not unprecedented or unjustifiable; but, as discussed above, wholesale copying whose purpose is merely to increase access to the copyrighted work is more
readily condemned than copying which is a component of a creative
effort.

But JUSTICE STEVENS would recognize no difference in the

standard governing productive and unproductive uses.

If his

standard is appropriate for productive uses, a lesser standard is
surely appropriate for non-productive ones.
Further, by not adjusting the burden to the special difficulties of this case, JUSTICE STEVENS would make it considerably more difficult for programmers than for other authors to proteet their copyright.

(Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's formula would

apply in any case of unproductive use, the choice between his
formula and JUSTICE STEVENS' only makes a difference in especially difficult cases such as the present one.

As I have suggested

above, in most cases of wholesale copying of an entire work for
an unproductive use, harm will be easily demonstrable under any
standard.)

The premise of copyright is that limiting public ac-

cess to works is justified to reward authors' creative endeavors;
JUSTICE STEVENS' standard makes it harder for the programmers to
limit public access and thereby thwarts this policy as it is embodied in past fair use cases.

In copyright as in other areas of

the law, standards and modes of proof are often adjusted to take
into account the evidentiary difficulties posed by special types
of cases or issues. See, e.g., 3 Nimmer on Copyright, at§
13.0l[B]

(presumption that proof of access plus similarity estab-

L

lishes copying) ; and at least some courts have acknowledge that a
~

"speculative" analysis of a potential market may be the basis for
a finding of "no fair use."

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase At-

lanta Co-op. Prod., 479 F.Supp. 351, 361 (N.D. Georgia 1979)
(predicting the market for stage adaptation of book). See also
Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago, 546 F. Supp.

113, 121 (S.D. N.Y. 1982)

(examining "potential" impairment of

copyright value.)
II. Contributory Infringement
The cases establish that a defendant may be liable for
contributory infringement (1) if he is in a position to control
the direct infringer and derives profit from the infringement, or
(2) if he knowingly aids or participates in the infringing activity.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS do not differ on the

basic formulation of the doctrine.
Sony cannot directly control the infringing activities
of horne users; however, Sony has been aware of VTR's infringing
uses and might be said to aid and participate in them by selling
VTRs and by advertising their infringing uses.

Op., at 31-33.

Nonetheless, it is a close question whether Sony might be held
liable under the second prong of contributory infringement doctrine.

The past cases which enunciate this standard concern aid

or participation whose sole function is to further an infringing
enterprise.

In contrast, as the DC found, VTR may be used for

noninfringing as well as infringing purposes.

In other words,

Sony knows that its production and sale of VTRs is contributing
to some copyright infringement, although it cannot know in any
individual case whether the user of its VTR is an infringer.
To hold Sony liable as a contributory infringer thus
expands the doctrine beyond its application in prior cases.

How-

ever, this expansion seems to follow logically from the basic
doctrine that an individual who knowingly aids in the commission
'-~

of a tort is jointly and severally liable with the tortfeasor.

;

See Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.,
256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)

(applying tortfeasor doc-

trine to distributors and advertisers of pirated records).

The

only difference in the case is that Sony knows of a pattern of
infringement but cannot know that any given individual purchaser
of the VTR is a direct infringer.
The only reason not to expand the doctrine in this way
is that holding Sony liable would interfere with the legitimate - noninfringing -- uses of VTRs.

This problem does not arise in

prior cases under this branch of contributory infringement doctrine because these cases these cases concerned actions whose
only purpose was to aid infringement.

Here, because the contrib-

utory activity also serves valuable, noninfringing purposes,
these purposes must be considered in fashioning a rule which
might condemn Sony's sale of VTRs.
As both JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS recognize,
this concern is similar to that embodied in the "staple article"
doctrine of patent law.

Op., at 32-24; Mem., at 20-22.

Howev-

er, there are differences between patent and copyright that make
it dangerous to use the doctrine as more than a rough analogy.
The patent standard evolved in reaction to attempts to control
the use of additional articles which were used in conjunction
with the patented device.

For example, when a patentee attempts

to require his licensee to purchase his refrigerant as well as
pay royalties for his patent, the patentee attempts to dominate a
second market -- that for refrigerant -- as well as to enforce
his patent.

.....

It .,.

~ ..

t

Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283

u.s.

27, 33-34 (1931).

Such requirements were condemned, under the

doctrine of "patent misuse," as attempts to "expand the scope of
the patent."

"Contributory infringement" and "patent misuse"

were thus diametrically opposed doctrines: for example, the patentee could not sue a rival seller of refrigerant for contributory infringement because the attempt to exert the power over a
second market constituted patent misuse.
v. Rohm

&

Haas Co., 448

u.s.

See Dawson Chemical Co.

176, 191-197 (1950)

of contributory infringement doctrine).

(tracing history

Congress eventually re-

solved the opposition between these two doctrines by legislating
that attempts to control the use of staple articles of commerce
constituted "patent misuse"; otherwise, patentees could control
the articles to be used with their patented devices under the
'-

doctrine of contributory infringement.

35

u.s.c.

§271.

The patent law is not directly applicable here because
there is no equivalent in copyright to "patent misuse."

The

copyright-holder who attempts to prevent copying of his program
by VTR does not attempt to derive profit from a second market: he
simply seeks to enforce his copyright.

The difference is this:

The attempt of the patentee to control the second market has no
redeeming virtue; the attempt of the copyright holder to enforce
his copyright serves purposes central to copyright law.

;_

Thus, the strict patent law standard for demonstrating
contributory infringement is not justified for copyright.

JUS-

TICE STEVENS may be correct in asserting that that "there is no
reason to grant the copyright holder any broader right to bar
noninfringing activities than the patent holder."

...

...•

However, that

observation does not call for use of the patent standard in this
case, because the patent standard was developed to solve a totally different problem -- use of the patent to derive profit from a
second market, not to bar infringement.
I believe that the standard proposed by JUSTICE BLACKMUN
better accommodates the concerns of copyright law.

If only an

insignificant proportion of VTR use is noninfringing, then the
classical test for liability for aiding a tortfeasor is reasonably satisfied.

And a finding of contributory liability hardly

interferes unduly with legitimate uses of VTR if these uses constitute only an "insignificant" portion of total use.

In that

case, a balance of the interest in protecting the copyright with
that in preserving legitimate VTR uses, would surely favor the
'-

former.
III. Conclusion
While the outcome reached by JUSTICE STEVENS is intuitively more appealing than that reached by JUSTICE BLACKMUN, it
is useful to remember that his opinion does not reach any final
decision on any of the issues raised by this suit.

His opinion

should perhaps be revised to emphasize that, on remand, it remains to the district court to balance the benefits and harms of
off-the-air copying after it has applied the standard for harm
that the opinion sets forth.

This balance may indicate the this

copying is fair use even after plaintiffs have made the threshold
showing that VTRs cause some harm.

In addition, as JUSTICE STE-

VENS suggests, the DC may find that most copying is of programs
not copyrighted or programs whose copyright holders permit copy-

ing. (Indeed, it is arguable that these findings, or a finding
that no possibility of harm, is dictated by the record as it now
stands.

However, JUSTICE BLACKMON correctly observes that the

district court declined to make findings on factual issues which
are central to the analysis of the case.)
Further, as JUSTICE BLACKMON observes, the DC retains
broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy.

At this

stage, the court can effectively consider any doubts about the
fairness or practicability of treating Sony as a contributory
infringer.

lfp/ss 09/29/83
MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE:
81-1687 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios
The purpose of this memo is to identify - as a
memory refresher -some of the principal points in David's
fine memo of 9/29.
The
divisions:

memo

is

divided

logically

into

two

main

"fair use" and "contributory infringement".
In his final draft of June 27, John abandons his

"implied exception to the Copyright Act for single copies
for private use only".

He now relies solely on the fair

use doctrine of §107.
The

four

factors

to be considered in fair use

analysis suggest a balancing of the benefits derived from
the

use

against

copyright owner

the
and

harm
the

legislative history and John about

that

the

use

inflicts on

policy of copyright

laws.

the
The

though viewed differently by Harry

indicates that Congress was thinking primarily

"single"

rather

than

"multiple"

copies.

It

also

considered - perhaps as the controlling factor - whether
the use was "productive or beneficial".
to

which

the

use

may

be

productive

against the harm done the copyright •

...

•'

Also, the extent
is

to

be

balanced

John

finds

some

recording for home use.

benefit

from

VTR

single

I find this rather unpersuasive.

If a home user misses a program, the better programs are
public

Also

television.

tapes

may

be

reproduced

on

purchased.

My private view is that relatively few of the

drama type programs are beneficial in any public sense of
that term.

I feel differntly about Redskins games.
Note:

Williams

&

See my memorandum, circulated in 1974 in

Wilkins.

At

that time,

productive and nonproductive use.

I distinguished been

For me then, productive

use meant:
"The creating of something essentially new when
the econmic value of the new work does not
derive primarily from the old". (p. 3)
Typical
manuscripts
use

for

examples

in new articles

educational

include

use

of

in scientific

purposes

in

schools

portions
journals,
and

of
and

colleges.

Here, the entire copyrighted program is copied and usually
only for the personal benefit of the homeowner.
Showing of Harm.

John and Harry differ in the

wording of the standard:
John:
"Copyright
holder
must
show
some
meaningful likelihood of future harm" - p. 6.
HAB:

"Only need show a reasonale possibility".

Again, David thinks HAB has the better argument.
The general

rule

is quite

straightforward:

copying an

entire work for nonproductive use is a conclusive answer
to a fair use argument.
John argues that TV is sufficiently different to
have

a

different

rule.

Advertisers

-

not

the

viewers

(consumers) - pay the owners of the copyrighted programs.
David is not persuaded that this makes any difference.

Contributory Infringement
Again David agrees with Part V (pp.

28-35) of

HAB's third draft of June 21.
Harry's views are as follows:
"A finding of contributory infringement has
never depended on actual knowledge of particular
instances of infringement; it is sufficient that
the
defendant
have
reason
to
know
that
infringement is taking place (i.e. constructive
knowledge) •

* * *
"It is undisputed that Sony had reason to know
that Betamax would be used by some owners to
tape copyrighted works." (p. 31).

* * *
"Off the air recording is not only a foreseeable
use of Betamax, but is the intended use." • • •
"Sony has induced and materially contributed to

the

infringing conduct of Betamax owners."

(p.

32)

HAB concedes, however, and indeed the DC found,
that

some

i.e.

the

of

the

Betamax

programs

were

recording
not

was

noninfringing
HAB

copyrighted.

-

then

concluded:
"If a significant portion of the product's use
is noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers
cannot be held contributorily liable for the
product's infringement.
If virtually all of the
product is to infringe, contributory liability
may be imposed."
As
critical

the

issue

DC
of

made

no

whether
would

factual

finding

significant
remand

the

?

on

this

portions

are

case

for

noninfringing,

HAB

reconsideration,

leaving broad authority to the DC as to

the remedy.

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

October 6, 1983

Re:

No. 81-1687-,Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios

Dear Harry:
I will be delighted to join your dissent in
this case.
Sincerely,

-r:Jl1.
T.M.

Justice Blackmun
cc:

Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
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CHAMBERS OF

October 6, 1983

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 81-1687 -Sony Corp':'' 6£ America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
Dear Thurgood:
In view of yesterday's vote, I shall, with your
permission, undertake the dissent in this case.
Is this
all right with you?
..•1 -

Jl~
'

·. \ '
._
,

~

'

/

Justice Marshall
cc: Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
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'·

C!Jonrl ttf tqt ~b .:§tatts
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C HAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Oct

er 11, 1983

Re: No. 81-1687 - Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios
.

: •;

;

~

.

~ .

Dear John:
As you will have
dissent in this case.

surmised,

I

shall

be

undertaking

the

Sincerely,
.. t c ...

.\ ,•
._

'

I

Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

Qf&tlttt of tJtt ~~ .l\tatts
._ufringhtn. ~. <!f. 2ll.;i_,.~

jJu.pTttttt

CHAMI!IERS 01"

November 25, 1983

THE CHIEF" JUSTICE

Re:

No. 81-1687 - Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.

Dear John:
I join.

I would be happier not to rest on the first

of your "two conclusions" at the top of page 36.
the "second" is enough

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

For me,

the case for your result.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

November 28, 1983

Re:

No. 81-1687-Sony. v. Universal

Dear John:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

...

-

Novemb~r

28, 1983

81-1687 Sony v. Universal

near

John~

T will await the

di~se nt.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

November 29, 1983

Re:

81-1687 - Sony Corporation of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.

Dear John,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
cpm

.·

.tu.prtntt ~111trt ltf t4t ~nittb ,jtzdt.G'

Jht.s-lfington, ~. ~·

20'~~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

November 30, 1983

No. 81-1687

Sony v. Universal City Studios

Dear John,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens

Copies to the Conference

....

'\'\:
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.

.ittpTnnt <!fqurl of flrt ~b .itaftg
JfaslfingLtn. J. Ql. 2Dgt'l-~
CHAMI!IE:RS Of"

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN, JR.

December 1, 1983

No. 81-1687
Son¥' Corporation of America
v. Un1versa1 City Studios, Inc.

Dear John,
I agree.
S incere1y,
(

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

,juprtnu Qfllltrl of tlrt ~b .i>tatts
11las4htgtcn. !9. <!f. 2ll.;i~~
CHAMBERS 01"

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

I

January 3, 1984

Re:

No. 81-1687-Sony v. Universal City Studios

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Blackrnun
cc:

The Conference

January 4, 1984

81-1687 Sony v. Universal City Studios

Dear Harry:
Please jni'l me- in your tUssent.

Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
cc:

~he

Conference

.Bnprmu Clftnrd(JI tJrt ~b .Blatt•
._ufri:ngton. ~. <!f. 20bi~~
C HAMSERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 5, 1984
Re:

No. 81-1687

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

•

;r
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~/ LJ J STICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
~ ~The introduction of the home videotape recorder (VTR)
~f'1Lt_-~ the market has enabled millions of Americans to make
t:2A- ~dings of television programs in their own homes, for fu~ _.,. _1ure and repeated viewing at their own convenience. While
~ fov-'~s practice has proved highly popular with owners of televi~ ,.,sf9n sets and VTRs, it understandably has distressed the
._ ~ ~lders of copyrights in the recorded programs. The result
~~e present litigation, raising the questions whether the
~-~~ ~' home recording of television programs is an infringement of
_ ~7
copyright, and, if so, whether the manufacturers and distrib~ .f.vu..<_ utors of VTRs are liable as contributory infringers.
We
,-1 " ~
have little doubt that these questions ultimately and definiy I.
L ~~ _..,
tively will be resolved by Congress; our task in the interim is
c:vv;
to resolve them under existing copyright law.
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City Studios, Inc., and
Walt Disney Productions (the Studios) brought this copyright
infringe~ent action 1 against petitioners Sony~
Corporation

~~~·~s~

L-t.-

_ 'The St# ios also l ileged misrepresentatiOn under § 43( of the TradeMark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a), and unfair compe-
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and Sony Corporation of America (Sony), the manufacturers
and distributors of the Betamax VTR. 2 The Studios sought
damages, profits, and a wide-ranging injunction against further sales or use of the Betamax or Betamax tapes.
The Betamax, like other VTRs, is capable of recording
television broadcasts off the air on videotape cassettes, and
playing them back at a later time. 3 Two types of Betamax
usage are at issue here. 4 The first is "tiiile-shifting," in
which the user records a program in order to watch it at a
later time, and then records over it after a single viewing.
The second is "library-building," in which the user records a @
program to keep for repeated viewing over a longer term.

CD

tition and intentional interference with business relationships under state
law. App. 4. These claims are not before us.
2
Also named as defendants were a number of retailers that sell the
Betamax (Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.; Associated Dry Goods Cor- .
poration; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Camera Corporation); the advertising agency employed by Sony Corporation of America to promote the Betamax (Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc.); and William
Griffiths, an individual Betamax user. With the exception of Griffiths,
these defendants are also petitioners here. Except where indicated, we
refer to the petitioners collectively as "Sony."
8
The Betamax has three primary components: a tuner that receives
television ("RF") signals broadcast over the airwaves; an RF adapter that
converts the RF signals into audio-video signals; and a recorder that
records the audio-video signals on magnetic tape. Sony also manufactures
VTRs without built-in tuners; these are capable of playing back prerecorded tapes and recording home movies on videotape, but cannot record
off the air. Since the Betamax has its own tuner, it can be used to record
off one channel while another channel is being watched.
The Betamax is available with a number of auxiliary features, including a
timer, a pause control, and a fast-forward control; these features permit
Betamax owners to record programs without being present, to avoid (if
they are present) recording commercial messages, and to skip over commercials while playing back the recording. Videotape is reusable; the user
erases it by taping over the prior recording.
' This case involves only the home recording for home use of television
programs broadcast free over the airwaves. No issues are raised concerning cable or pay television, or the sharing or trading of tapes.
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Sony's advertisements, at various times, have suggested that
Betamax users ''record favorite shows" or "build a library."
Sony's Betamax advertising has never contained warnings
about copyright infringement, although a warning appears in
the Betamax operating instructions.
The Studios produce copyrighted "movies" and other
works that they release to theaters and license for television
broadcast. The Studios also rent and sell their works on film
and on prerecorded videotapes and videodiscs. License fees
for television broadcasts are set according to audience ratings, compiled by rating services that do not measure playback of videotapes. The Studios claim that VTR recording
of their works may decrease their revenue from licensing
their works to television and from marketing them in other
ways.
After a five-week trial, the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, in a detailed opinion,
ruled that home VTR recording did not infringe the Studios'
copyrights under either the Act of March 4, 1909 (1909 Act),
35 Stat. 1075, as amended (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C.
§ 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)), or the Copyright Revision Act of 1976
(1976 Act), 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed.,
Supp. V). 5 The District Court also held that even if home
VTR recording were an infringement, Sony could not be held
liable under theories of direct infringement, contributory infringement, or vicarious liability. Finally, the District
Court concluded that an injunction against sales of the
Betamax would be inappropriate even if Sony were liable
under one of those theories. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979).
The Studios introduced evidence at trial of 32 individual instances in
which their copyrighted works were recorded on Betamax VTRs. Two of
these instances occurred after January 1, 1978, the primary effective date
of the 1976 Act; all others occurred while the 1909 Act was still effective.
Our analysis focuses primarily on the 1976 Act, but, as we show infra, the
controlling legal principles under the two Acts are the same.
5
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
!!1 virtually ~1 resEects. 659 F. 2d 963 (1981). It
held tha.t the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act contained no implied
exemption for "home use" recording, that home use recording
was not "fair use," and that the use of the Betamax to record
the Studios' works therefore infringed their copyrights. The
Court of Appeals also held Sony liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that Sony knew and expected that the
Betamax would be used to record copyrighted material off
the air, and that Sony had induced, caused, or materially contributed to the infringing conduct. The Court of Appeals
then remanded for consideration of the question of relief,
suggesting that the District Court could consider awarding
damages or a continuing royalty in lieu of an injunction. I d.,
at 976.
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we
granted certiorari. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982).

re~rsed

II
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8,
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." This Nation's initial copyright statute was
passed by the First Congress. Entitled "An Act for the encouragement of learning," it gave an author "the sole right
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending"
his "map, chart, book or books" for a period of 14 years. Act
of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, as the technology available to authors for creating and preserving their
writings has changed, the law has changed with it. Through
many amendments, and through complete revisions in 1831,
1870, 1909, and 1976, 6 authors' rights have been expanded to
• Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 8fr-111,
16 Stat. 212--217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17
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provide protection to any "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression," including motion pictures and other audiovisual works. 17 U. S. C. § 102(a). 7
Section~ of the 1976 Act grants the owner of a copyright
a variety o!exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, 8 includU. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified as 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V)).
7
Section 102(a) provides:
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
"(1) literary works;
"(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
"(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
"(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
"(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
"(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
"(7) sound recordings."
"Audiovisual works" are "works that consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." § 101, 112.
"Motion pictures" are "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related
images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion,
together with accompanying sounds, if any." § 101, 1!17. Most commercial television programs, if fixed on film or tape at the time of broadcast or
before, will qualify as "audiovisual works." Since the categories set forth
in § 102(a) are not mutually exclusive, a particular television program may
also qualify for protection as a dramatic, musical, or other type of work.
8
S~6 provides:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the e~ve rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
"(1) to reproducetlleCopyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
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ing the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords." 9 This grant is expressly made subject to
§§ 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limitations on the copyright owner's rights. The most important
of these sections, for our present purposes, is § 107; that section states that "the f~se of a copyrighted work . . . is not
an infringement of copyright." 10

III
The 1976 Act, like its predecessors, 11 does not give the
copyright owner control over all possible uses of his work.
lending;
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly."
9
A "phonorecord" is a reproduction of sounds other than sounds accompanying an audiovisual work, while a "copy" is a reproduction of a work
in any form other than a phonorecord. § 101, ~~ 19, 7.
10

~ection.JOlprovides :

"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by Y Yother means specified by that section, for purm>ses such ascriticism, comment,'!iews reportin~ "teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use),VScholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include"(!) the purpose ~acter of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; "(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted w~~
The four factors listed in this section are intended to be "illustrative and
not limitative." § 101, ~ 14.
11
The 1976 Act was the product of a revision effort lasting more than 20
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If the work is put to some use not enumerated in § 106, the
use is not an infringement. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 393-395 (1968). Thus, before considering whether home videotaping comes within the scope of
the fair use exemption, we first must inquire whether the
practice violates the exclusive right "to reproduce the copy- {_
righted work in copies or phonorecords" granted by § 106(1). J
.-c-'

A
Although the word "copies" appears in the plural in
§ 106(1), it is clear that the making of even a' single unauouse repo s
thorize co y is rohi · ed. ~- he enate an
explain that" t]he references to 'copies or phonorecords,' although in the plural, are intended here and throughout the
bill to include the singular (1 U. S. C. § 1)." 12 1975 Senate
years. Spurred by the recognition that "significant developments in technology and communications" had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate,
S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); see H. R. Rep. No.
94-1476, p. 47 (1976) (1976 House Report), Congress in 1955 authorized the
Copyright Office to prepare a series of studies on all aspects of the existing
copyright law. Thirty-four studies were prepared and presented to Congress. The Register of Copyrights drafted a comprehensive report with
recommendations, House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the
U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Register's 1961 Report), and general revision bills were introduced near the end
of the 88th Congress in 1964. H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964). The Register issued a second report in 1965, with revised recommendations. House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965) (Register's Supplementary Report).
Action on copyright revision was held up from 1967 to 1974 by a dispute on
cable television, see generally Second Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law:
1975 Revision Bill, ch. V, pp. 2-26 (Draft Oct.-Dec. 1975) (Register's Second Supplementary Report), but a compromise led to passage of the
present Act in 1976.
12
1 U. S. C. § 1 provides in relevant part:
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Report 58; 1976 House Report 61. The reP.orts then describe the reproduction right established by § 106(1):
'Tf]he rig t 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in' copies
or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material
object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' As
under the present law, a copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial
part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or
simulation." 1975 Senate Report 58; 1976 House Report
61.
The making of even a §ing}e videotape recording at home falls
within this definition;ilieVTR user produces a material object from which the copyrighted work later can be perceived.
Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making
of a single copy for personal use, we must conclude that VTR
recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by
§ 106(1).
The 1976 Act and its accompanying reports specify in some
detail tlleSifiii tio s in which a sin le co y of a co
· te
wo~ade. Section 1 8(a), for example, permits a
library or archives "to reproduce no more than one copy or
phonorecord of a work" fo~on, but only under certain
very limited conditions; an entire work, moreover, can be
copied only if it cannot be obtained elsewhere at a fair price. 13
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context
indicates otherwise . . . words importing the plural include the
singular.. . ."
18
The library photocopying provisions of § 108 do not excuse from liability any person who requests "a copy" from a library if the requester's use
exceeds fair use. § 108(f)(2). Moreover, a library is absolved from liability for the unsupervised use of its copying equipment if the equipment
bears a notice informing users that "the making of a copy" may violate the
~

I

I

I
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§ 108(e); see also § 112(a) (broadcaster may "make no more
than one copy or phonorecord of a particular transmission
program," and only under certain conditions). In other res~ts, the making of sin le copies is ermis ible~hin
the limited confines of the fair use doctrine. The Senate re~·-·
..... --.....port, in a s~e ' ~lean m~lt!ple c~ng," notes
that the fair use doctrine would permit a teacher making a
single copy of a work for his or her own use in the classroom,
but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such as a novel or
treatise. 1975 Senate Report 63-64; accord, 1976 House Report 6~9, 71. Other situations in which the making of a
single copy would be fair use are described in the House and
Senate reports. 14 But neither the statute nor its legislative
history suggests any intent to create a general exemption for
single copies made for personal or private use.
Indeed, it appears that Congress considered and rejected
the possibility of a spec~lJ>riv~e !ll'~ption. The issue
was raised early in the copyright law revision process, in one
of the studies prepared for Congress under the supervision of
the Copyright Office. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted
Works (1958), reprinted in Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revisior(, Studies Prepared for the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960) (~ atman Fair Use Study).
This study found no reported cases supporting the existence
of an exemption for private use, although it noted that "the
purpose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the
copyright law. § 108(f)(1).
•• For example, "the making of a single copy or phonorecord by an individual as a free service for a blind person" would be a fair use, as would "a
single copy reproduction of an excerpt from a copyrighted work by a calligrapher for a single client" or "a single reproduction of excerpts from a copyrighted work by a student calligrapher or teacher in a learning situation. "
1975 Senate Report 66-67; see 1976 House Report 73-74. Application of
the fair use doctrine in these situations, of course, would be unnecessary if
the 1976 Act created a general exemption for the making of single copies.

I
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small amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general
principles of fair use in such a way as to deny liability." I d.,
at 12. After reviewing a number of foreign copyright laws
that contained explicit statutory exemptions for private or
personal use, id., at 25, Professor Latman outlined several
approaches that a revision bill could take to the general issue
of exemptions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of
particularized rules to cover specific situations, including
"the field of personal use." I d., at 33. 15
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copyrights recommended that the revised copyright statute simply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and exemptions to cover specific situations, 16 preferring to rely on
the judicial fair use doctrine to resolve new problems as they
arose. See Register's 1961 Report 25; Register's Supplementary Report 27-28.
The Register's approach was reflected in the first copyright revision bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1964.
16
Professor Latman made special mention of the "personal use" issue because the area was one that
"has become disturbed by recent developments . . . . Photoduplication
devices may make authors' and publishers' groups apprehensive. The
Copyright Charter recently approved by [the Internati~l Confederation
of Societies of Authors and Composers] emphasizes the concern of authors
over 'private' uses which, because of technological developments, are said
to be competing seriously with the author's economic interests." Latman
Fair Use Study 33--34.
16
The one exemption proposed by the Register, permitting libraries to
make single photocopies of out-of-print works and of excerpts that requesters certified were needed for research , met with opposition and was not
included in the bills initially introduced in Congress. See Register's 1961
Report 26; H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Register's
Supplementary Report 26. A library copying provision was restored to
the bill in 1969, after pressure from library associations. Register's Second Supplementary Report, ch. III, pp. 10-11; seeS. 543, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., § 108 (Comm. Print Dec. 10, 1969); 1975 Senate Report 48.
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These bills, like the 1976 Act, granted copyright owners the
exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, subject
only to the exceptions set out in later sections. H. R.
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., §5(a) (1964). The primary exception was the fair use doctrine, id., § 6, containing
language virtually identical to § 107 of the 1976 Act. Although the copyright revision bills changed in many respects
from their first introduction in 1964 to final passage in 1976,
those portions of the bills did not change. 17 We can conclude \ /
only that Qongress; like the Register, intended to rel;y o.!!Jhe
fair use doctr}ne, not a per se exemption for private use, to
separate permissible copYJng om t e 1mpernussi le. 18
17
The 1964 billsJlrovided ~at the !ill!:.J!se of copyrighted material for
purposes "such as criticism, comment, news"feporting'; '"teaching, scholarship, or research" was not an infringement of copyright, and listed .fuyr
"factors to be considered" in determining whether a particular use was fair.
H:lt:'" 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1964). Revised bills,
drafted by the Copyright Office in 1965, contained a fair use provision
merely mentioning the doctrine but not indicating its scope: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is
not an infringement of copyright." H. R. 4347/S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 107 (1965). The House Judiciary Committee restored the provision to its earlier wording, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pp.
5, 58 (1966), and the language adopted by the Committee remained in the
bill in later Congresses. See H. R. 2512/S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 107 (1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., § 107 (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1973); H. R.
2223/S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1975). With a few additions by
the House Judiciary Committee in 1976, see 1976 House Report 5; H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, p. 70 (1976), the same language appears in§ 107 of
the 1976 Act.
~liams &.. Wi~o. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d
1345 (1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), decided
during the process of revising the copyright statutes, the Court of Claims
suggested that copying for personal use might be outside the scope of copyright protection under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that because
"hand copying" for personal use has always been regarded as permissible,
and because the practice of making personal copies continued after typewriters and photostat machines became available, the making of personal
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When Congress intended special treatment for private use,
moreover, it said so explicitly. One such explicit statement
appears in § 106 itself. The copyright owner's right to perform a copyrighted work, unlike the right to reproduce the
work in copies, is limited. Section 106(4) grants a copyright
owner the exclusive right to perform the work "publicly," but
does not restrict private performances by others. A motion
picture is "performed" whenever its images are shown or its
sounds are made audible. § 101, ~ 18. Like "sing[ing] a
copyrighted lyric in the shower," Twentieth Century Music
copies by any other means should be permissible as well. Id., at 84-88,
487 F. 2d, at 1350-1352.
~
There appear to us to be several flaws in this reasoning.
irs it is by
no means clear that the malilllg of a "hand copy" of an entire ork is permissible; the most that can be said is that there are no reported cases on
the subject, possibly because no copyright owner ever has thought it
worthwhile to sue. See Latman Fair Use Study 11-12; 3 M. Nimmer,
Copyright § 13.05[E][4][a] (1982). At least one early treatise asserted
that infringement would result "if an individual made copies for his personal use, even in his own handwriting, as there is no rule of law excepting
manuscript copies from t h t a linfringment." A. Wei!, American Copyright Law § 1066 (1917).
econ , hand copying or even copying by typewriter is self-limiting. T
mvolved in making hand copies ordinarily ensures tliat only necessary and fairly small portions of a work are
taken; it is unlikely that any user would make a hand copy as a substitute
for one that could be purchased. The harm to the copyright owner from
hand copying thus is minimal. The recent advent of inexpensive and
readily available copying machines, however, has changed the dimensions
of the problem dramatically. See Register's Second Supplementary Report ch. III, p. 3; Hearings on H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 194 (1975) (1975 House Hearings) (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 234 (statement of Robert W.
Cairns); id., at 250 (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 354 (testimony of
Irwin Karp); id., at 467 (testimony of Rondo Cameron); id., at 1795 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights). Thus, "[t]he supposition that there is no tort involved in a scholar copying a copyrighted text by
hand does not much advance the question of machine copying." B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 101-102 (1967).

~gery

I
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Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 (1975), watching television at home with one's family and friends is now considered a
performance. 1975 Senate Report 5~0; 1976 House Report 63. 19 Home television viewing nevertheless does not infringe any copyright-but only because§ 106(4) contains the
word "publicly." 20 See generally 1975 Senate Report 60-61;
1976 House Report 63-64; Register's 1961 Report 29-30. No
such distinction between public and private uses appears in
§ 106(1)'s prohibition on the making of copies. 21
Similarly, an explicit reference to private use appears in
§ 108. Under that section, a library can make a copy for a
patron only for specific types of private uses: "private study,
scholarship, or research." 22 § 108(d)(1) and (e)(1); see also 37
In a trio of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390,
398 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
415 U. S. 394, 403-405 (1974); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151 (1975), this Court held that the reception of a radio or
television broadcast was not a "performance" under the 1909 Act. The
Court's "narrow construction" of the word "perform" was "completely
overturned by the [1976 Act] and its broad definition of 'perform' in section
101." 1976 House Report 87.
20
A work is performed "publicly" if it takes place "at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." § 101,
~ 23(1).
21
One purpose of the exemption for private performances was to permit
the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes. The Register noted in
1961 that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not believe the private use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by
copyright." Register's 1961 Report 30 (emphasis added). Significantly,
the Register did not suggest that the private making of a reproduction of a
televised motion picture would be permitted by the copyright law. The
Register later reminded Congress that "[i]n general the concept of 'performance' must be distinguished sharply from the reproduction of copies."
Register's Supplementary Report 22.
22
During hearings on this provision, Representative Danielson inquired
whether it would apply to works of fiction such as "Gone With the Wind,"
'

{
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CFR §201.14(b) (1982). Limits are also imposed on the extent of the copying and the type of institution that may make
copies, and the exemption expressly is made inapplicable to
motion pictures and certain other types of works. § 108(h).
These limitations would be wholly superfluous if an entire
copy of any work could be made by any person for private
use. 23
B
The Di~trict Court in this case nevertheless concluded that
the 1976 Act contained an imnlied exem@on for "home-use
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 444 446. The court relied primarily on the legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the
1909 Act. That amendment addressed the specific problem
of commercial piracy of sound recordings. Act of Oct. 15,
1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amendment). The House report on
the 1971 Amendment, in a section entitled "Home Recording," contained the following statement:
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use and
or whether it was limited to "strictly technical types of information." The
uncontradicted response was that it would apply only in "general terms of
science ... [and] the useful arts. " 1975 House Hearings 251 (testimony of
Robert W. Cairns); cf. i d., at 300 (statement of Harry Rosenfield) ("We are
not asking ... for the right to copy 'Gone With the Wind' ").
23
The House and Senate reports' mention of situations in which copies
for private use would be permissible under the fair use doctrine-for example, the making of a free copy for a blind person, 1975 Senate Report 66;
1975 Senate Report 73, or the "recordings of performances by music students for purposes of analysis and criticism," 1975 Senate Report 63would of course be superfluous as well. See n. 13, supra.
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with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing
commercially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers
would be in no different position from that of the owners
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the
past 20 years." H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7 (1971)
(1971 House Report).
Similar statements were made during House hearings on the
bill 24 and on the House floor, 25 although not in the Senate proThe following exchange took place during the testimony of Barbara
Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights:
"[Rep.] Hiester. . .. I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own
home. My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set.... [T]his legislation, of
course, would not point to his activities, would it?
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' I have
spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question
is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' The answer I have
given and will give again is that this is something you cannot control. You
simply cannot control it. My own opinion, whether this is philosophical
dogma or not, is that sooner or later there is going to be a crunch here.
But that is not what this legislation is addressed to, and I do not see the
crunch coming in the immediate future. . . . I do not see anybody going
into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or forcing legislation
that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.''
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23 (1971)
(1971 House Hearings).
25
Shortly before passage of the bill, a colloquy took place between Representative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee that produced the bill, and Representative Kazen, who was not on the committee:
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes.
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to record off of a program which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used
it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not
be included under the penalties of this bill?
24
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ceedings. In concluding that these statements created a
general exemption for home recording, the District Court, in
our view, paid too little heed to the context in which the
statements were made, and failed to consider the limited purposes of the 1971 Amendment and the structure of the 1909
Act.
Unlike television broadcasts and other types of motion pictures, sound recordings were not protected by copyright
prior to passage of the 1971 Amendment. Although the underlying musical work could be copyrighted, the 1909 Act
provided no protection for a particular performer's rendition
of the work. Moreover, copyrighted musical works that had
been recorded for public distribution were subject to a "compulsory license": any person was free to record such a work
upon payment of a 2-cent royalty to the copyright owner.
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075-1076. Although reproduction without
payment of the royalty was an infringement under the 1909
Act, damages were limited to three times the amount of the
unpaid royalty. § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081-1082; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F. 2d 260, 262-263, 265 (CA21957),
cert. denied, 355 U. S. 952 (1958). Notably, it was observed
that the practical effect of these provisions was to legalize
record piracy. See S. Rep. No. 92-72, p. 4 (1971); 1971
House Report 2.
In order to suppress this piracy, the 1971 Amendment extended copyright protection beyond the underlying work to
sound recordings themselves. Congress chose, however, to
provide only limited protection: owners of copyright in sound
recordings were given the exclusive right "[t]o reproduce
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gentleman raises the point.
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' Members will note
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for;
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be
fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is
made clear in the report." 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749 (1971).
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[their works] and distribute [them] to the public." 1971
Amendment, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17
U. S. C. § 1(f) (1976 ed.)). 26 This right was merely the right
of commercial distribution. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34748--34749
(1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen & Kastenmeier) ("the bill
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only").
Against this background, the statements regarding home
recording under the 1971 Amendment appear in a different
light. If home recording was "common and unrestrained"
under the 1909 Act, see 1971 House Report 7, it was because
sound recordings had no copyright protection and the owner
of a copyright in the underlying musical work could collect no
more than a 2-cent royalty plus 6 cents in damages for each
unauthorized use. With so little at stake, it is not surprising
that the Assistant Register "d[id] not see anybody going into
anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing." 1971
House Hearings 23.
But the references to home sound recording in the 1971
Amendment's legislative history do not demonstrate any congressional intent to create a generalized home use exemption
from copyright protection. Congress addressed only sound
recordings and merely recognized that the 1909 Act had been
unsuccessful in controlling home sound recording; the 1971
Amendment was addressed to a different problem, that of
commercial record piracy. To quote Assistant Register
26
The 1909 Act's grant of an exclusive right to "copy,"§ 1(a), was of no
assistance to the owner of a copyright in a sound recording, because a reproduction of a sound recording was technically considered not to be a
"copy." See 1971 House Hearings 18 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights); 1971 Amendment, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.)) ("For the purposes of [specified sections, not including § 1(a)], but not for any other purpose, a
reproduction of a [sound recording] shall be considered to be a copy
thereof'). This concept is carried forward into the 1976 Act, which
distinguishes between "copies" and "phonorecords." Seen. 9, supra.

~
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Ringer again, home use was "not what this legislation [was]
addressed to." 1971 House Hearings 22. 27
While the 1971 Amendment merely narrowed the sound recordings loophole in prior copyright law, motion pictures and
other audiovisual works have been accorded full copyright
protection since at least 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37
Stat. 488, and perhaps before, see Edison v. Lubin, 122 F.
240 (CA3 1903), app. dism'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904). Congress
continued this protection in the 1976 Act. Unlike the sound
recording rights created by the 1971 Amendment, the reproduction rights associated with motion pictures under
§ 106(1) are not limited to reproduction for public distribution; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work exists independently, and the "mere duplication of a copy may
constitute an infringement even if it is never distributed."
Register's Supplementary Report 16; see 1975 Senate Report
57; 1976 House Report 61. Moreover, the 1976 Act was intended as a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of copyright law. The reports accompanying the 1976 Act, unlike
the 1971 House report, contain no suggestion that home-use
recording is somehow outside the scope of this all-inclusive
statute. It was clearly the intent of Congress that no additional exemptions were to be implied. 28
27
During consideration of the 1976 Act, Congress, of course, was well
aware of the limited nature of the protection granted to sound recordings
under the 1971 Amendment. See 1975 House Hearings 113 (testimony of
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (1971 Amendment "created a
copyright in a sound recording ... but limited it to the particular situation
of so-called piracy"); id. , at 1380 (letter from John Lorenz, Acting Librarian of Congress) (under 1971 Amendment "only the unauthorized reproduction and distribution to the public of copies of the sound recording is prohibited. Thus, the duplication of sound recordings for private, personal
use and the performance of sound recordings through broadcasting or
other means are outside the scope of the amendment").
28
Representative Kastenmeier, the principal House sponsor of the 1976
revision bill and chairman of the House subcommittee that produced it,
made this explicit on the opening day of the House hearings:
"[F]rom time to time, certain areas have not been covered in the bill. But
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We find in the 1976 Act no inu>lied exemption to cover the
home taping of tel~n programs; wnetfier Tt be for single
copies, for private use, or for home use. Thus, taping a
copyrighted television program is infringement unless it is
permitted by the fair use exempti~d in § 107 of the
1976 Act.
IV
The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, "tlleffiost trouBiesome in the whole law of copyright."
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (CA2
1939); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA51980); Meeropol
v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434
U. S. 1013 (1978). Although courts have constructed lists of
factors to be considered in determining whether a particular
use is fair, 29 no fixed criteria have emerged by which that
is it not the case, this being a unified code, that the operation of the bill
does apply whether or not we specifically deal with a subject or not? ...
"Therefore, we can really not fail to deal with an issue. It will be dealt
with one way or the other. The code, title 17, will cover it. So we have
made a conscious decision even by omission....
"By virtue of passing this bill, we will deal with every issue. Whether
we deal with it completely or not for the purpose of resolving the issues
involved is the only question, not whether it has dealt with the four corners
of the bill because the four corners of the bill will presume to deal with everything in copyright." 1975 House Hearings 115.
29
The precise phrase "fair use" apparently did not enter the case law
until 1869, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (CC
Mass.), but the doctrine itself found early expression in Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841). Justice Story was faced there
with the "intricate and embarrassing questio[n]" whether a biography containing copyrighted letters was "a justifiable use of the original materials,
such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs." !d., at 344, 348. In determining whether the use was permitted,
said Justice Story, it was necessary to consider "the nature and objects of
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.... Much must, in such cases,
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determination can be made. This Court thus far has provided no guidance; although fair use issues twice before have
come to this Court, on each occasion the Court was equally
divided and no opinions issued. Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420
U. S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9
1956), aff'd, 356 U. S. 43 (1958).
Nor did Congress provide clear rules when it codified the
fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply incorporated a list
of "factors to be considered": the "purpose and character of
the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the "amount
and substantiality of the portion used," and the "effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." § 107. No particular weight was assigned to any
one of these, and the list was not intended to be exclusive.
The House and Senate reports explain that § 107 does no
more than give "statutory recognition" to the fair use doctrine; it was intended "to restate the present judicial doctrine
of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."
1976 House Report 66. See 1975 Senate Report 62; S. Rep.
No. 93-983, p. 116 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 32 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 61 (1966).
A
Despite this lack of clear standards, the fair use doctrine
plays a crucial role in the law of copyright. - The purp;se of

-

---depend upon the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the
copies, and the degree in which the original authors may be injured
thereby." Id., at 348-349.
Similar lists have been developed by later courts. E. g., Tennessee
Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA5), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 928 (1970); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135
F. 2d 73, 85 (CA6 1943); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (SD Cal. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P.
F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U. S.P.Q. 40, 43 (SDNY 1934); Hill v. Whalen &
Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (SDNY 1914).
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copyright protection, in the words of the Constitution, is to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an
incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219
(1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards \
the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127-128 (1932); see
H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1909).
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of
Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to promote. A clear example is the scholar or researcher whose
own workTependSOn the ability to refer to and to quote the
work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could create a
new work if he were first required to repeat the research of
every author who had gone before him. 30 The scholar, of
course, could be left to bargain with each copyright owner for
permission to quote from or refer to prior works. But there
is a crucial difference between the ordinary user and the
scholar. When the ordinary user decides that the owner's
price is too high, and forgoes use of the work, only the individual user is harmed. When the scholar forgoes the use of a
prior work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public
is deprived of his contribution to knowledge. The scholar's
work, in other words, produces external benefits from which
we all profit. In such a case, the fair use doctrine acts as a
30
"The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our
predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself.' " Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945).

~
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form of subsidy-albeit at the first author's expense-to permit the second author to make limited use of the first author's
work for the public good. See Latman Fair Use Study 31;
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L.
Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982).
A similar subsidy may be appropriate in a range of areas
other than pure scholarship. The situations in which fair use
is most common~zed are listed in § 107 itself; fair use
may be found when a work is used "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship,
or research." The House and Senate reports expand on this
list somewhat, 3' and other examples may be found in the case
law. 32 Each of these uses, however, reflects a common
theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's
work. 33 The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works
Quoting from the Register's 1961 Report, the Senate and House reports give examples of possible fair uses:
"quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or
comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for
illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody of
some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located
in the scene of an event being recorded." 1975 Senate Report 61-62; 1976
House Report 65.
82
E. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-RidderNewspapers, Inc.,
626 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1980) (comparative advertising).
33
Professor Seltzer has characterized this list of uses as "reflect[ing]
what in fact the subject matter of fair use has in the history of its adjudication consisted in: it has always had to do with the use by a second author of
a first author's work." L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright
24 (1978) (emphasis removed). He distinguishes "the mere reproduction
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be
31
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to be used for "socially laudable purposes." See Copyright
Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975
House Hearings 2051, 2055. We are aware of no case in
which the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole
benefit of the user has been held to be fair use. 34
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that every productive use is a fair use. A finding of fair use still must depend
on the facts of the individual case, and on whether, under the
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect the user to bargain
with the copyright owner for use of the work. The fair use
doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created
by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving aucalled the 'ordinary' use of it." When copies are made for "ordinary'' use
of the work, "ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered, not
notions of fair use." Ibid. (emphasis in original). See also M. Nimmer,
Copyright§ 13.05[A][1] (1982) ("Use of a work in each of the foregoing contexts either necessarily or usually involves its use in a derivative work").
While Seltzer's characterization may be said to be somewhat too extreme-a teacher making copies for classroom use is obviously not a "second author" using a first author's work-we find useful Seltzer's distinction
between "ordinary'' uses of a work and what we have referred to in the
text as "productive" uses.
34
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d
1345 (1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), involved the photocopying of scientific journal articles; the Court of Claims
stressed that the libraries performing the copying were "devoted solely to
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge," 203 Ct. Cl., at
91, 487 F. 2d, at 1354, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if
such library photocopying were stopped," id., at 95, 487 F. 2d, at 1356.
Whether the Williams & Wilkins court was right or wrong in concluding
that these copying practices were fair use, we doubt that the court would
have reached the same result if it had not believed the practices at issue
had such serious consequences for the progress of science.
The issue of library copying is now covered by § 108 of the 1976 Act.
That section, which Congress regarded as "authoriz[ing] certain photocopying practices which may not qualify as a fair use, " 1975 Senate Report
67; 1976 House Report 74, permits the making of copies only for "private
study, scholarship, or research." § 108(d)(1) and (e)(1).

.·
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thors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create,
and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly
will reduce the creative ability of others. 35 The inquiry is
necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situations that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules.
But when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its
original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of fair use generally does not apply. There is no need
to provide the ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the author's expense.
The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is
an ordinary rather than a productive use of tfie Studios' copyrighted works. The District Court found that "Betamax
owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original.
They add nothing of their own." 480 F. Supp., at 453. Although applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR recording, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material
broadcast free over the public airwaves, we think Sony's argument misconceives the nature of copyright. Copyright
gives the author a right to limit or even cut off access to his
work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932).
A VTR recording creates np public benefits sufficient to justify limiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the
copyright owner's choice to make the work available over the
public airwaves. Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the
copyright owner the exclusive right to control the performance and the reproduction of his work, and the fact that he
has licensed a single television performance is irrelevant to
35
In the words of Lord Mansfield: "[W]e must take care to guard against
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have
employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts be retarded. " Sayre v. Moore, 1 East *361 n. , 102
Eng. Rep. 139, 140 n. (K.B. 1785). See Register's Supplementary Report
13.

:
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the existence of his right to control its reproduction. Although a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this
fact is equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public library may not be copied any more freely than a book that is
purchased.
It may seem tempting to stretch the doctrine of fair use so
as to permit unfettered use of this new technology in order to
increase access to television programming. But such an extension would risk eroding the very basis of copyright law, by
depriving authors of control over their works and consequently of their incentive to create. 36 Even in the context of
highly productive educational uses, Congress has avoided
this temptation; in passing the 1976 Act, Congress made
clear that .off-the-air videotaping was to be permitted only in
very limited situations. See 1976 House Report 71; 1975
Senate Report 64. And, the Senate report adds, "[t]he committee does not intend to suggest ... that off-the-air record36
This point was brought home repeatedly by the Register of Copyrights. Mentioning the "multitude of technological developments" since
passage of the 1909 Act, including "remarkable developments in the use of
video tape, " Register's Supplementary Report xiv-xv, the Register
cautioned:
"I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in
communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author's
copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commercial interests who wish to use the author's works for private gain. An
equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the
public welfare who fully recognize . . . 'that the real heart of civilization
. . . owes its existence to the author'; ironically, in seeking to make the author's works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions,
they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nurtures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting
demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the fundamental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing
the author's exclusive rights to him for a limited time. " I d ., at xv; see
1975 House Hearings 117 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights).

I
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ing for convenience would under any circumstances, be considered 'fair use.'" I d., at 66. We cannot disregard these
admonitions.
B
We recognize that there are situations where permitting
even an unproductive use would have no effect on the author's incentive to create, that is, where the use would not
affect the value of, or the market for, the author's work.
Photocopying a newspaper clipping to send to a friend may be
one example; copying a quotation to pin on one's bulletin
board may be another. In each of these cases, the effect on
the author can truly be said to be de minimis. Thus, even
though these uses provide no benefit to the public at large, no
purpose is served by preserving the author's monopoly.
Courts should move with caution, however, in depriving
authors of protection from unproductive "ordinary" uses.
Even in the case of a productive use, § 107(4) requires consideration of "the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work" (emphasis added). "[A]
particular use which may seem to have little or no economic
impact on the author's rights today can assume tremendous
importance in times to come." Register's Supplementary
Report 14. Although such a use may seem harmless when
viewed in isolation, "[i]solated instances of minor infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate
a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." 1975
Senate Report 65.
We conclude that, at least when the proposed use is an unpr~ copyrig t o~er nee _.J.!ro uce on_y evidence of a potential for harm: lliliingement then will be
found, unTeSstfle user can demonstrate affirmatively that
permitting the use would have no tendency to harm the market for or the value of the copyrighted work. See 3 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 13.05[E][4][c], at 13-84 (1982); Gordon, 82
Colum. L. Rev., at 1626. 37 This burden may be difficult for
37

During the copyright Jaw revision process, Congress considered pro-

.·
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the user to meet, and indeed may prove impossible in an area
where the effect of a new technology is speculative. But any
lesser burden would present the "real danger . . . of confining the scope of an author's rights on the basis of the present
technology so that, as the years go by, his copyright loses
much of its value because of unforeseen technical advances."
Register's Supplementary Report 14. When the proposed
use is one that creates no benefit to the public at large, the
copyright owner should not be forced to bear this risk.
The Studios have ide t' ed a number of wa in which
VTR recordm could dama e their copYrights. VTR recor mg cou d reduce their ability to market their works in
motion picture theaters and through the rental or sale of prerecorded videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce 1J!eir
rerun audience, and consequently the license fees 'available to
them for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers may be
willing to pay for on!Y "live" viewing audiences, if they believe VTlr viewers will delete commercials or if they are unable to measure VTR use; if this is the case, VTR recording
could reduce the license fees the Studios are able to charge
even for first-run showings. 'rLibrary-building'raises at least
the potential for each of the types of harm identified by the
Studios, and time-shifting
,_______...._ raises the potential for substantial
posals to include in the statute provisions placing the burden of proof on
the issue of fair use as between the copyright owner or the user. The
Register of Copyrights recommended against enacting such a rule, Register's Supplementary Report 28, and the 1966 and 1967 House reports
stated that "any special statutory provision placing the burden of proving
fair use on one side or the other would be unfair and undesirable." H. R
Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66 (1966); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 37 (1967). Although this statement did not appear in
the 1974 Senate report, S. Rep. No. 93-983, or the reports on the 1976 Act,
the Register informed Congress that "its interpretation presumably remain[ed] valid," and that "rigid rules involving legal presumptions and burdens of proof should not be laid out in the statute." Register's Second
Supplementary Report, ch. II, at 23 and 29. As with other aspects of the
fair use doctrine, Congress left burden of proof questions to the courts.
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harm as well. 38
Although the Distri~t _Qgurt foun_d no likelihood of harm
from VTR use, 480 'F.Slip~ we conclude that it~
plied an incorrect substantive standard and misallocateathe
--~--~~
burden of proof. The District Court reasoned that the Studios had failed to prove that librarY:·building would occur "to
any sigriificant extent,"· id., at 467; that the Studios' prerecorded videodiscs could compete with VTR recordings and
were "arguably ... more desirable," ibid.; that it was "not
clear that movie audiences will decrease," id., at 468; and
that the practice of deleting commercials "may be too tedious" for many viewers, id., at 468. To the extent any decrease in advertising revenues would occur, the court concluded that the Studios had "marketing alternatives at hand
to recoup some of that predicted loss." I d., at 452. In general, the District Court found, the Studios had shown no actual harm as of the date of trial. I d., at 451. Because the
Studios' prediction of harm was "based on so many assumptions and on a system of marketing which is rapidly chang-

-

38
A VTR owner who has taped a favorite motion picture for repeated
viewing is less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same motion picture, watc
'sed rerun, or pay to see the picture at a theater. Althou~--tlme-s iftin may not replace theater or rerun viewing or the purchaf(e of prer
e apes or discs, it may well replace rental usage; a
VTR user who has recorded a first-run motion picture for later viewing will
have no need to rent a copy when he wants to see it. Both library-builders
and time-shifters may avoid commercials; the library builder may use the
pause control to record without them, and all users may fast-forward
through commercials on playback.
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting and
librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works.
See 480 F. Supp., at 440. The District Court's findings also show substantial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both parties submitted surveys showing that the average Betamax user owns between 25 and
32 tapes. The Studios' survey showed that at least 40% of users had more
than 10 tapes in a "library"; Sony's survey showed that more than 40% of
users planned to view their tapes more than once; and both parties' surveys
showed that commercials were avoided at least 25% of the time. See id.,
at 438-439.

.
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ing," the court was "hesitant to identify 'probable effects' of
home-use copying." ld., at 452.
The District Court's reluctance to engage in prediction in
this area is understandable, but, in our view, the court was
mistaken in concluding that the Studios should bear the risk
created by this uncertainty. The Studios have demonstrated a potential for harm, which has not been and could
not be refuted at this early stage of technological development. Extensive library-building might well reduce the
market for theater viewing, reruns, and sales of prerecorded
videotapes. Time-shifting may reduce the Studios' ability to
rent prerecorded tapes. Moreover, if rating services prove
unable to measure time-shifting, or if the deletion of commercials by time-shifters makes advertisers unwilling to pay for
VTR viewing, the Studios' license fees could decrease.
While these harms are speculative at present, we cannot
deny the Studios copyright protection on the basis that a new
technology that may result in substantial harm has not done
so yet.
If a business were to tape the Studios' works off the air,
duplicate the tapes, and sell or rent them to members of the
public for home viewing, it would undoubtedly be liable for
infringement of the Studios' copyright. From the Studios'
perspective, the consequences of home VTR recording are no
different. The only distinction is that home VTR users do
not record for commercial advantage; the commercial benefit
accrues to the manufacturers and distributors of the
Betamax. We next discuss whether these manufacturers
and distributors can be held .CQ!ltributorily liable when the
product they sell is used to infringe.

v
It is well established that liability for copyright infringement can be imposed on persons other than those who actu.ally carry out the infringing activity. Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911); 3 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A] (1982); see Twentieth Century Music Corp.
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v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 160, n. 11 (1975); Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). Although the
liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner ... is an infringer of the copyright," 17 U. S. C.
§ 501(a), the House and Senate reports demonstrate that
Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory
infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report

61.39
The doctr~f contributory copYright infringement, however, is not well-defined. One of the few attempts at definition appears in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971). The
Gershwin court stated that "one who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
'contributory' infringer." !d., at 1162 (footnote omitted).
While we have no quarrel with this general statement, it does
not resolve this case; the District Court and the Court of Appeals, both purporting to apply it, reached diametrically opposed results.
A
In absolving Sony from liability, the District Court reasoned that Sony had no direct involvement with individual
Betamax users, did not participate in any off-the-air copying,
and did not know that such copying was an infringement of
the Studios' copyright. 480 F. Supp., at 460. We agree
This intent is further manifested by several provisions of the 1976 Act
that exempt from liability persons who, while not participating directly in
any infringing activity, could otherwise be charged with contributory infringement. See § 108(f)(1) (library not liable "for the unsupervised use of
reproducing equipment located on its premises," provided that certain
warnings are posted); § 110(6) ("governmental body'' or "nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization" not liable for infringing performance by
concessionaire "in the course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair
or exhibition").
39
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with the Gershwin court that contributory liability may be
imposed even when there has been no direct contact between
the defendant and the infringer. The defendant in Gershwin
was a concert promoter operating through local concert associations that it sponsored; it had no contact with the infringing performers themselves. 443 F. 2d, at 1162-1163; see
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at
160, n. 11. Moreover, a finding of contributory infringment
does not depend on actual knowledge of particular instances
of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant have reason to know that infringement is taking place. 443 F. 2d, at
1162; see Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi
Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966). 40 In the socalled "dance hall" cases, 41 in which questions of contributory
In Screen Gems, on which the Gershwin court relied, the court held
that liability could be imposed on a shipper of unauthorized "bootleg"
records and a radio station that broadcast advertisements of the records,
provided they knew or should have known that the records were infringing. The court concluded that the records' low price and the manner in
which they were marketed could support a finding of "constructive knowledge" even if actual knowledge were not shown.
"E. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing &
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977); Dreamland Ball Room,
Inc . v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F . 2d 354 (CA71929); M. Witmark &
Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Mass.
1960); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S., at 157;
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 19~199 (1931); 3 M.
Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A], p. 12-35 (1982).
Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the defendant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities, see,
e. g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H . L . Green Co., 316 F . 2d 304, 307
(CA21963); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74
(WD Mo. 1977), but this notion is to some extent fictional; the defendant
cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play copyrighted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into the performers' contract. Famous Music Corp . v. Bay State Harness Horse
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d, at 1214-1215; KECA Music,
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co ., 432 F. Supp., at 75; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
40
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infringement arise with some frequency, proprietors of
entertainment establishments routinely are held liable for unauthorized performances on their premises, even when they
have no knowledge that copyrighted works are being
performed.
Nor is it necessary that the defendant be aware that the
infringing activity violates the copyright laws. Section
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory
damages when an infringer proves he "was not aware and
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright," but the statute establishes no
general exemption for those who believe their infringing activities are legal. Moreover, such an exemption would be
meaningless in a case such as this, in which prospective relief
is sought; once a court has established that the copying at
issue is infringement, the defendants are necessarily aware of
that fact for the future. It is undisputed in this case that
Sony had reason to know the Betamax would be used by
some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air. See 480
F. Supp., at 459, 460.
The District Court also found no evidence that Sony
caused, induced, or contributed materially to the infringing
activities of Betamax owners. 480 F. Supp., at 460. In a
case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly;
it does not depend on evidence that particular Betamax owners relied on particular advertisements. In an analogous
case decided just last Term, the Court approved a lower
court conclusion that liability for contributory trademark infringement could be imposed on a manufacturer who "sugv. Veltin , 47 F . Supp. 648, 649 (WD La. 1942). In effect, the proprietors
in these cases are charged with constructive knowledge of performances
taking place on their premises. Congress expressly rejected a proposal to
exempt proprietors from this type of liability under the 1976 Act. See
1975 Senate Report 141-142; 1976 House Report 159-160; 1975 House
Hearings 1812-1813 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights); id., at 1813 (colloquy between Rep. Pattison and Barbara Ringer).

l
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gested, even by implication" that a retailer use the manufacturer's goods to infringe the trademark of another. Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844,
851 (1982); see id., at 860 (concurring opinion). We think
this standard is equally appropriate in the copyright context.
The District Court found that Sony has advertised the
Betamax as suitable for off-the-air recording of "favorite
shows," "novels for television," and "classic movies," 480 F.
Supp., at 436, with no visible warning that such .recording
could constitute copyright infringement. Without the aid of
the Betamax or some other VTR, it would not be possible today for home television viewers to infringe copyright by recording off-the-air. Off-the-air recording is not only a foreseeable use for the Betamax, but indeed is its intended use.
Under the circumstances, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Sony has induced and materially contributed to the
infringing conduct of etamax owners.
- ·- B "
..

-· ---------

Sony urges us to hold that the manufacturer or seller of a
product used to infringe is absolved from liablity whenever
the product can be put to any substantial noninfringing use.
Brief for Petitioners 41-42. The District Court so held, borrowing the "staple article of commerce" doctrine governing
liability for contributory infringement of patents. See 35
42

Our conclusion respecting contributory infringement does not include
the retailer defendants, see n. 2, supra. The District Court found that one
of the retailer defendants had assisted in the advertising campaign for the
Betamax, but made no other findings respecting their knowledge of the
Betamax's intended uses. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals
that, at least on this record, the retailers "are sufficiently engaged in the
enterprise to be held accountable." 659 F. 2d, at 976. In contrast, the
advertising agency employed to promote the Betamax was far more actively engaged in the advertising campaign, and petitioners have not argued that its liability differs in any way from that of Sony Corporation and
Sony Corporation of America.

81-1687-0PINION
34

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

U. S. C. § 271. 43 We cannot agree that this technical doctrine of patent law, based on concerns largely irrelevant to
the field of copyright, see generally Dawson Chemical Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187-199 (1980), should be
imported wholesale into copyright law. Despite their common constitutional source, the development of patent and
copyright protections has not been parallel and this Court has
borrowed patent concepts in copyright cases sparingly in the
past. See Bobbs-Merr.ill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339,
345-346 (1908).

The District Court was understandably concerned that if liability for contributory infringement were imposed on the
manufacturer or seller of every product used to infringe-a
typewriter, a camera, a photocopying machine-the "wheels
of commerce" would be blocked. A similar concern was expressed in Kalem Co. v: Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62
(1911), this Court's only prior decision in the area of contributory copyright infringement.
.
The products sold in Kalem were films of the story of a
copyrighted book, and the seller was held liable on the
42
The "staple article of commerce" doctrine protects those who manufacture products incorporated into or used with patented inventions-for example, the paper and ink used with patented prillting machines, Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), or the dry ice used with patented refrigeration systems, Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27
(1931). Because a patent-holder has the right to control the use of the patented item as well as its manufacture, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 509--510 (1917); 35 U. S. C. 271(a),
such protection is necessary to prevent patent-holders from extending
their monopolies by suppressing competition in unpatented components
and supplies suitable for use with the patented item. See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 197-198 (1980). The doctrine
of contributory patent infringement has been the subject of attention by
the courts and by Congress, see id., at 202-212, and has been codified since
1952, 66 Stat. 792, but was never mentioned during the copyright law revision process as having any relevance to contributory copyright
infringement.
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ground that use of the films in infringing exhibitions "was the
most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and
the one for which especially they were made." Id., at 63. 44
In this case, of course, the Betamax has noninfringing uses 45
while the films manufactured in Kalem perhaps did not. But
the existence of noninfringing uses does not absolve the manufacturer of a product whose "most conspicuous purpose" is
to infringe. When copyright infringement is the product's
primary use and, as the Court of Appeals put it, a major
"source of the product's consumer appeal," 659 F. 2d, at 975,
the manufacturer profits directly from the infringing activity
and has a financial interest in its continuation. Even though
the manufacturer itself makes no unauthorized copies, it
"reap[s] the benefit of countless violations" by others. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing &
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213, 1215 (CA11977).

c

/?')

The Court of Appeals concluded th~ny should be held
liable for contributory infring~ment, reasoning that "[v]ideotape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the
pri~ purpose of reproducing television programming,"
a:ri~v ]irtually all television programming is copyrighted
~terial." (\59 F. 2d, at 975. While we agree with the first
of these propositions, 46 the second is problematic. The par44
The making of the films was not itself an infringement under the 1909
Act, see 222 U. S., at 62, but the exhibitions violated the copyright owner's
right to dramatize his work. Ibid.
"' Noninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that
have never been protected by copyright, recording works that have entered the public domain, recording with permission of the copyright owner,
and , of course, any recording that qualifies as fair use. See, e. g. ,
Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U. S.P.Q. 809 (ND Cal. 1979) (use of
home VTR for market research studies).
46
Although VTRs also may be used to watch prerecorded video cassettes
and to make home motion pictures, these uses do not require a tuner such

I4
L

f
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ties and their amici have argued vigorously about both the
amount of television programming that is covered by copyright and the amount for which permission to copy has been
given. The proportion of VTR recording that is infringing is
primarily a quesf10n o act, 7 an the 1s r1ct Court specifically~dings on the "percentage of legal
versus illegal home-use recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
In light of our view of the law, resolution of this factual question is essential. We therefore remand for further consideration by the District Courr--------_._-.. . . . . .__.....__...__

......._

___

....,

VI
The Court of Appeals, having found Sony liable, remanded
for the District Court to reconsider the propriety of injunctive or other relief. Because of our disposition of the issue of
liability, we, too, do not decide what remedy would be appropriate if liability were found. We concur, however, in the
Court of Appeals' suggestion that some form of limited inas the Betamax contains. See n. 3, supra. The Studios do not object to
Sony's sale of VTRs without tuners. Brief for Respondents 5, n. 9. In
considering the noninfringing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses
that would remain possible without the Betamax's built-in tuner should not
be taken into account.
47
Sony asserts that much or most television broadcasting is available for
home recording because (1) no copyright owners other than the Studios
have brought infringement actions, and (2) much televised material is ineligible for copyright protection because videotapes of the broadcasts are not
kept. The first of these assertions is irrelevant; Sony's liability does not
turn on the fact that only two copyright owners thus far have brought suit.
The amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of
the television market as a whole. Sony's second assertion is based on a
faulty premise; the Copyright Office permits audiovisual works transmitted by television to be registered by deposit of sample frames pius a description of the work. See 37 CFR §§ 202.20(c)(2)(ii) and 202.21(g) (1982).
Moreover, although an infringement action cannot be brought unless the
work is registered, 17 U. S. C. § 411(a), registration is not a condition of
copyright protection. § 408(a). Copying an unregistered work is still infringement. Cf. § 506(a) (liability for criminal copyright infringement; not
conditioned on prior registration).

I
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junction, or an award of damages or continuing royalties in
lieu of injunctive relief, may well be an appropriate means of
balancing the equities in this case. 48 Although we express no
view on the merits of any particular proposal, we are certain
that, if Sony is found liable in this case, the District Court
will be able to fashion appropriate relief.
Like so many other problems created by the interaction of
copyright law with a new technology, "[t]here can be no
really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here,
until Congress acts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. 8., at 167 (THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting).
But in the absence of a congressional solution, courts cannot
avoid difficult problems by refusing to apply the law. We
must "take the Copyright Act ... as we find it," Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 401-402 (1968), and
"do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright principles . . . until the Congress legislates." I d., at 404 (dissenting opinion).
VII
Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that home VTR recording for personal use is an infringement of copyright, its
judgment is af
n a ot er respects, the judgment is
48

Other Nations have imposed royalties on the manufacturers of products used to infringe copyright. See, e. g., Copyright Laws and Treaties
of the World (UNESCO/BNA 1982) (English translation), reprinting Federal Act On Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related
Rights (Austria), § 42(5)-(7), and An Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights (Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 53(5). A study produced for the Commission of European Communities has recommended
that these requirements "serve as a pattern" for the European community.
A. Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community 135 (1978). While
these royalty systems ordinarily depend on the existence of authors' collecting societies, see id., at 119, 136, such collecting societies are a familiar
part of our copyright law. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1979). Fashioning relief
of this sort, of course, might require bringing other copyright owners into
court.

~
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vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. No costs are allowed.
It is so ordered.

-
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
The introduction of the home videotape recorder (VTR)
upon the market has enabled millions of Americans to make
recordings of television programs in their own homes, for future and repeated viewing at their own convenience. While
this practice has proved highly popular with owners of television sets and VTRs, it understandably has distressed the
holders of copyrights in the recorded programs. The result
is the present litigation, raising the questions whether the
home recording of television programs is an infringement of
copyright, and, if so, whether the manufacturers and distributors of VTRs are liable as contributory infringers. We
have little doubt that these questions ultimately and definitively will be resolved by Congress; our task in the interim is
to resolve them under existing copyright law.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN

I
In 1976, respondents Universal City Studios, Inc., and
Walt Disney Productions (the Studios) brought this copyright
infringement action 1 against petitioners Sony Corporation
1
The Studios also alleged misrepresentation under § 43(a) of the TradeMark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a), and unfair compe-
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and Sony Corporation of America (Sony), the manufacturers
..and distributors of the Betamax VTR. 2 The Studios sought
damages, profits, and a wide-ranging injunction against further sales or use of the Betamax or Betamax tapes.
The Betamax, like other VTRs, is capable of recording
television broadcasts off the air on videotape cassettes, and
playing them back at a later time. 3 Two types of Betamax
usage are at issue here. 4 The first is "time-shifting," in
which the user records a program in order to watch it at a
later time, and then records over it after a single viewing.
The second is "library-building," in which the user records a
program to keep for repeated viewing over a longer term.
tition and intentional interference with business relationships under state
law. App. 4. These claims are not before us.
2
Also named as defendants were a number of retailers that sell the
Betamax (Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.; Associated Dry Goods Corporation; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Camera Corporation); the advertising agency employed by Sony Corporation of America to promote the Betamax (Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc.); and William
Griffiths, an individual Betamax user. With the exception of Griffiths,
these defendants are also petitioners here. Except where indicated, we
refer to the petitioners collectively as "Sony."
3
The Betamax has three primary components: a tuner that receives
television ("RF") signals broadcast over the airwaves; an RF adapter that
converts the RF signals into audio-video signals; and a recorder that
records the audio-video signals on magnetic tape. Sony also manufactures
VTRs without built-in tuners; these are capable of playing back prerecorded tapes and recording home movies on videotape, but cannot record
off the air. Since the Betamax has its own tuner, it can be used to record
off one channel while another channel is being watched.
The Betamax is available with a number of auxiliary features , including a
timer, a pause control, and a fast-forward control; these features permit
Betamax owners to record programs without being present, to avoid (if
they are present) recording commercial messages, and to skip over commercials while playing back the recording. Videotape is reusable; the user
erases it by taping over the prior recording.
• This case involves only the home recording for home use of television
programs broadcast free over the airwaves. No issues are raised concerning cable or pay television, or the sharing or trading of tapes.

·"'
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Sony's advertisements, at various times, have suggested that
Betamax users "record favorite shows" or "build a library."
Sony's Betamax advertising has never contained warnings
about copyright infringement, although a warning appears in
the Betamax operating instructions.
The Studios produce copyrighted "movies" and other
works that they release to theaters and license for television
broadcast. The Studios also rent and sell their works on film
and on prerecorded videotapes and videodiscs. License fees
for television broadcasts are set according to audience ratings, compiled by rating services that do not measure playback of videotapes. The Studios claim that VTR recording
of their works may decrease their revenue from licensing
their works to television and from marketing them in other
ways.
After a five-week trial, the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, in a detailed opinion,
ruled that home VTR recording did not infringe the Studios'
copyrights under either the Act of March 4, 1909 (1909 Act),
35 Stat. 1075, as amended (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C.
§ 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)), or the Copyright Revision Act of 1976
(1976 Act), 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed.,
Supp. V). 5 The District Court also held that even if home
VTR recording were an infringement, Sony could not be held
liable under theories of direct infringement, contributory infringement, or vicarious liability. Finally, the District
Court concluded that an injunction against sales of the
Betamax would be inappropriate even if Sony were liable
under one of those theories. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979).
The Studios introduced evidence at trial of 32 individual instances in
which their copyrighted works were recorded on Betamax VTRs. Two of
these instances occurred after January 1, 1978, tile primary effective date
of the 1976 Act; all others occurred while the 1909 Act was still effective.
Our analysis focuses primarily on the 1976 Act, but, as we show infra, the
legal principles governing copyright protection for these works under the \
two Acts are the same.
5
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed in virtually all respects. 659 F. 2d 963 (1981). It
held that the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act contained no implied
exemption for "home use" recording, that home use recording
was not "fair use," and that the use of the Betamax to record
the Studios' works therefore infringed their copyrights. The
Court of Appeals also held Sony liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that Sony knew and expected that the
Betamax would be used to record copyrighted material off
the air, and that Sony had induced, caused, or materially contributed to the infringing conduct. The Court of Appeals
then remanded for consideration of the question of relief,
suggesting that the District Court could consider awarding
damages or a continuing royalty in lieu of an injunction. I d.,
at 976.
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we
granted certiorari. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982).
II

The Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8,
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." This Nation's initial copyright statute was
passed by the First Congress. Entitled "An Act for the encouragement of learning," it gave an author "the sole right
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending"
his "map, chart, book or books" for a period of 14 years. Act
of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, as the technology available to authors for creating and preserving their
writings has changed, the law has changed with it. Through
many amendments, and through complete revisions in 1831,
1870, 1909, and 1976, 6 authors' rights have been expanded to
6

Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 8&-111,
16 Stat. 212-217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17
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provide protection to any "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression," including motion pictures and other audiovisual works. 17 U. S. C. § 102(a). 7
Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the owner of a copyright
a variety of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, 8 includU. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified as 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V)).
7
Section 102(a) provides:
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
"(1) literary works;
"(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
"(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
"(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
"(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
"(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
"(7) sound recordings."
"Audiovisual works" are "works that consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." § 101, ~ 2.
"Motion pictures" are "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related
images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion,
together with accompanying sounds, if any." § 101, ~ 17. Most commercial television programs, if fixed on film or tape at the time of broadcast or
before, will qualify as "audiovisual works." Since the categories set forth
in § 102(a) are not mutually exclusive, a particular television program may
also qualify for protection as a dramatic, musical, or other type of work.
8
Section 106 provides:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or

..
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ing the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords." 9 This grant is expressly made subject to
§§ 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limitations on the copyright owner's rights. The most important
of these sections, for our present purposes, is § 107; that section states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not
an infringement of copyright." 10

III
The 1976 Act, like its predecessors, 11 does not give the
copyright owner control over all possible uses of his work.
lending;
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly."
9
A "phonorecord" is a reproduction of sounds other than sounds accompanying an audiovisual work, while a "copy" is a reproduction of a work
in any form other than a phonorecord. § 101, ~~ 19, 7.
10
Section 107 provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."
The four factors listed in this section are intended to be "illustrative and
not limitative." § 101, ~ 14.
11
The 1976 Act was the product of a revision effort lasting more than 20

·"
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If the work is put to some use not enumerated in § 106, the
use is not an infringement. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 393-395 (1968). Thus, before considering whether home videotaping comes within the scope of
the fair use exemption, we first must inquire whether the
practice violates the exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords" granted by § 106(1).
A
Although the word "copies" appears in the plural in
§ 106(1), it is clear that the making of even a single unauthorized copy is prohibited. The Senate and House reports
explain that "[t]he references to 'copies or phonorecords,' although in the plural, are intended here and throughout the
bill to include the singular (1 U. S. C. § 1)." 12 1975 Senate
years. Spurred by the recognition that "significant developments in technology and communications" had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate,
S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); see H. R. Rep. No.
94-1476, p. 47 (1976) (1976 House Report), Congress in 1955 authorized the
Copyright Office to prepare a series of studies on all aspects of the existing
copyright law. Thirty-four studies were prepared and presented to Congress. The Register of Copyrights drafted a comprehensive report with
recommendations, House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the
U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Register's 1961 Report), and general revision bills were introduced near the end
of the 88th Congress in 1964. H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964). The Register issued a second report in 1965, with revised recommendations. House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965) (Register's Supplementary Report).
Action on copyright revision was held up from 1967 to 1974 by a dispute on
cable television, see generally Second Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law:
1975 Revision Bill, ch. V, pp. 2-26 (Draft Oct.-Dec. 1975) (Register's Second Supplementary Report), but a compromise led to passage of the
present Act in 1976.
12
1 U. S. C. § 1 provides in relevant part:
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Report 58; 1976 House Report 61. The reports then describe the reproduction right established by § 106(1):
"[T]he right 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material
object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' As
under the present law, a copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial
part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or
simulation." 1975 Senate Report 58; 1976 House Report
61.
The making of even a single videotape recording at home falls
within this definition; the VTR user produces a material object from which the copyrighted work later can be perceived.
Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making
of a single copy for personal use, we must conclude that VTR
recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by
§ 106(1).
The 1976 Act and its accompanying reports specify in some
detail the situations in which a single copy of a copyrighted
work may be made. Section 108(a), for example, permits a
library or archives "to reproduce no more than one copy or
phonorecord of a work" for a patron, but only under certain
very limited conditions; an entire work, moreover, can be
copied only if it cannot be obtained elsewhere at a fair price. 13
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context
indicates otherwise . . . words importing the plural include the
singular.... "
13
The library photocopying provisions of § 108 do not excuse from liability any person who requests "a copy" from a library if the requester's use
exceeds fair use. § 108(f)(2). Moreover, a library is absolved from liability for the unsupervised use of its copying equipment if the equipment
bears a notice informing users that "the making of a copy" may violate the
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§ 108(e); see also § 112(a) (broadcaster may "make no more
than one copy or phonorecord of a particular transmission
program," and only under certain conditions). In other respects, the making of single copies is permissible only within
the limited confines of the fair use doctrine. The Senate report, in a section headed "Single and multiple copying," notes
that the fair use doctrine would permit a teacher to make a
single copy of a work for his or her own use in the classroom,
but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such as a novel or
treatise. 1975 Senate Report 63-64; accord, 1976 House Report 68--69, 71. Other situations in which the making of a
single copy would be fair use are described in the House and
Senate reports. 14 But neither the statute nor its legislative
history suggests any intent to create a general exemption for
single copies made for personal or private use.
Indeed, it appears that Congress considered and rejected
the possibility of a special private use exemption. The issue
was raised early in the copyright law revision process, in one
of the studies prepared for Congress under the supervision of
the Copyright Office. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted
Works (1958), reprinted in Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960) (Latman Fair Use Study).
This study found no reported cases supporting the existence
of an exemption for private use, although it noted that "the
purpose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the
copyright law. § 108(f)(1).
14
For example, "the making of a single copy or phonorecord by an individual as a free service for a blind person" would be a fair use, as would "a
single copy reproduction of an excerpt from a copyrighted work by a calligrapher for a single client" or "a single reproduction of excerpts from a copyrighted work by a student calligrapher or teacher in a learning situation."
1975 Senate Report 66-67; see 1976 House Report 73-74. Application of
the fair use doctrine in these situations, of course, would be unnecessary if
the 1976 Act created a general exemption for the making of single copies.
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small amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general
principles of fair use in such a way as to deny liability." ld.,
at 12. Mter reviewing a number of foreign copyright laws
that contained explicit statutory exemptions for private or
personal use, id., at 25, Professor Latman outlined several
approaches that a revision bill could take to the general issue
of exemptions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of
particularized rules to cover specific situations, including
''the field of personal use." I d., at 33. 15
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copyrights recommended that the revised copyright statute simply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and exemptions to cover specific situations, 16 preferring to rely on
the judicial fair use doctrine to resolve new problems as they
arose. See Register's 1961 Report 25; Register's Supplementary Report 27-28.
The Register's approach was reflected in the first copyright revision bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1964.
15
Professor Latman made special mention of the "personal use" issue because the area was one that
"has become disturbed by recent developments . . . . Photoduplication
devices may make authors' and publishers' groups apprehensive. The
Copyright Charter recently approved by [the International Confederation
of Societies of Authors and Composers] emphasizes the concern of authors
over 'private' uses which, because of technological developments, are said
to be competing seriously with the author's economic interests." Latman
Fair Use Study 3~4.
16
The one exemption proposed by the Register, permitting libraries to
make single photocopies of out-of-print works and of excerpts that requesters certified were needed for research, met with opposition and was not
included in the bills initially introduced in Congress. See Register's 1961
Report 26; H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Register's
Supplementary Report 26. A library copying provision was restored to
the bill in 1969, after pressure from library associations. Register's Second Supplementary Report, ch. III, pp. 10-11; seeS. 543, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., § 108 (Comm. Print Dec. 10, 1969); 1975 Senate Report 48.
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These bills, like the 1976 Act, granted copyright owners the
exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, subject
only to the exceptions set out in later sections. H. R.
11947/S. 3008, 88th Gong., 2d Sess., § 5(a) (1964). The primary exception was the fair use doctrine, id., § 6, containing
language virtually identical to § 107 of the 1976 Act. Although the copyright revision bills changed in many respects
from their first introduction in 1964 to final passage in 1976,
those portions of the bills did not change. 17 We can conclude
only that Congress, like the Register, intended to rely on the
fair use doctrine, not a per se exemption for private use, to
separate permissible copying from the impermissible. 18
The 1964 bills provided that the fair use of copyrighted material for
purposes "such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research" was not an infringement of copyright, and listed four
"factors to be considered" in determining whether a particular use was fair.
H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1964). Revised bills,
drafted by the Copyright Office in 1965, contained a fair use provision
merely mentioning the doctrine but not indicating its scope: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is
not an infringement of copyright." H. R. 4347/S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 107 (1965). The House Judiciary Committee restored the provision to its earlier wording, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pp.
5, 58 (1966), and the language adopted by the Committee remained in the
bill in later Congresses. See H. R. 2512/S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 107 (1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., § 107 (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1973); H. R.
2223/S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1975). With a few additions by
the House Judiciary Committee in 1976, see 1976 House Report 5; H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, p. 70 (1976), the same language appears in§ 107 of
the 1976 Act.
18
In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), decided
during the process of revising the copyright statutes, the Court of Claims
suggested that copying for personal use might be outside the scope of copyright protection under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that because
"hand copying" for personal use has always been regarded as permissible,
and because the practice of making personal copies continued after typewriters and photostat machines became available, the making of personal
17
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When Congress intended special treatment for private use,
moreover, it said so explicitly. One such explicit statement \
appears in § 106 itself. The copyright owner's exclusive
right to perform a copyrighted work, unlike the right to reproduce the work in copies, is limited. Section 106(4) grants
a copyright owner the exclusive right to perform the work
"publicly," but does not restrict private performances by others. A motion picture is "performed" whenever its images
are shown or its sounds are made audible. § 101, ~ 18. Like
"sing[ing] a copyrighted lyric in the shower," Twentieth Cencopies by any other means should be permissible as well. Id., at 84--88,
487 F. 2d, at 1350-1352.
There appear to us to be several flaws in this reasoning. First, it is by
no means clear that the making of a "hand copy" of an entire work is permissible; the most that can be said is that there are no reported cases on
the subject, possibly because no copyright owner ever has thought it
worthwhile to sue. See Latman Fair Use Study 11-12; 3 M. Nimmer,
Copyright § 13.05[E][4][a] (1982). At least one early treatise asserted
that infringement would result "if an individual made copies for his personal use, even in his own handwriting, as there is no rule of law excepting
manuscript copies from the law ofinfringment." A. Wei!, American Copyright Law § 1066 (1917). Second, hand copying or even copying by typewriter is self-limiting. The drudgery involved in making hand copies ordinarily ensures that only necessary and fairly small portions of a work are
taken; it is unlikely that any user would make a hand copy as a substitute
for one that could be purchased. The harm to the copyright owner from
hand copying thus is minimal. The recent advent of inexpensive and
readily available copying machines, however, has changed the dimensions
of the problem dramatically. See Register's Second Supplementary Report ch. III, p. 3; Hearings on H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 194 (1975) (1975 House Hearings) (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 234 (statement of Robert W.
Cairns); id., at 250 (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 354 (testimony of
Irwin Karp); id., at 467 (testimony of Rondo Cameron); id., at 1795 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights). Thus, "[t]he supposition that there is no tort involved in a scholar copying a copyrighted text by
hand does not much advance the question of machine copying." B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 101-102 (1967) .

..
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tury Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 (1975), watching television at home with one's family and friends is now
considered a performance. 1975 Senate Report 59--60; 1976
House Report 63. 19 Home television viewing nevertheless
does not infringe any copyright-but only because § 106(4)
contains the word "publicly." 20 See generally 1975 Senate
Report 60-61; 1976 House Report 63-64; Register's 1961 Report 29-30. No such distinction between public and private
uses appears in § 106(1)'s prohibition on the making of
copies. 21
Similarly, an explicit reference to private use appears in
§ 108. Under that section, a library can make a copy for a
patron only for specific types of private uses: "private study,
scholarship, or research." 22 § 108(d)(1) and (e)(1); see also 37
In a trio of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390,
398 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
415 U. S. 394, 403-405 (1974); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151 (1975), this Court held that the reception of a radio or
television broadcast was not a "performance" under the 1909 Act. The
Court's "narrow construction" of the word "perform" was "completely
overturned by the [1976 Act] and its broad definition of 'perform' in section
101." 1976 House Report 87.
20
A work is performed "publicly" if it takes place "at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." § 101,
~ 23(1).
21
One purpose of the exemption for private performances was to permit
the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes. The Register noted in
1961 that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not believe the private use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by
copyright." Register's 1961 Report 30 (emphasis added). Significantly,
the Register did not suggest that the private making of a reproduction of a
televised motion picture would be permitted by the copyright law. The
Register later reminded Congress that "[i]n general the concept of 'performance' must be distinguished sharply from the reproduction of copies."
Register's Supplementary Report 22.
22
During hearings on this provision, Representative Danielson inquired
whether it would apply to works of fiction such as "Gone With the Wind,"
19
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CFR § 201.14(b) (1982). Limits also are imposed on the extent of the copying and the type of institution that may make
copies, and the exemption expressly is made inapplicable to
. motion pictures and certain other types of works. § 108(h).
These limitations would be wholly superfluous if an entire
copy of any work could be made by any person for private
use. 23
B

The District Court in this case nevertheless concluded that
the 1976 Act contained an implied exemption for "home-use
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 444 446. The court relied primarily on the legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the
1909 Act. That amendment addressed the specific problem
of commercial piracy of sound recordings. Act of Oct. 15,
1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amendment). The House report on
the 1971 Amendment, in a section entitled "Home Recording," contained the following statement:
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use and
or whether it was limited to "strictly technical types of information." The
uncontradicted response was that it would apply only in "general terms of
science ... [and] the useful arts." 1975 House Hearings 251 (testimony of
Robert W. Cairns); cf. id., at 300 (statement of Harry Rosenfield) ("We are
not asking ... for the right to copy 'Gone With the Wind'").
23
The House and Senate reports' mention of situations in which copies
for private use would be permissible under the fair use doctrine--for example, the making of a free copy for a blind person, 1975 Senate Report 66;
1975 Senate Report 73, or the "recordings of performances by music students for purposes of analysis and criticism," 1975 Senate Report 63-would of course be superfluous as well. See n. 14, supra.
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with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing
commercially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers
would be in no different position from that of the owners
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the
past 20 years." H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7 (1971)
(1971 House Report).
Similar statements were made during House hearings on the
bill 24 and on the House floor, 25 although not in the Senate pro24
The following exchange took place during the testimony of Barbara
Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights:
"[Rep.] Biester. . . . I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own
home. My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set . . .. [T]his legislation, of
course, would not point to his activities, would it?
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' I have
spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question
is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' The answer I have
given and will give again is that this is something you cannot control. You
simply cannot control it. My own opinion, whether this is philosophical
dogma or not, is that sooner or later there is going to be a crunch here.
But that is not what this legislation is addressed to, and I do not see the
crunch coming in the immediate future. . . . I do not see anybody going
into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or forcing legislation
that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.''
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. , 1st Sess. , 22-23 (1971)
(1971 House Hearings).
25
Shortly before passage of the bill, a colloquy took place between Representative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee that produced the bill, and Representative Kazen, who was not on the committee:
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes.
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to record off of a program which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used
it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not
be included under the penalties of this bill?

·'
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ceedings. In concluding that these statements created a
general exemption for home recording, the District Court, in
our view, paid too little heed to the context in which the
statements were made, and failed to consider the limited purposes of the 1971 Amendment and the structure of the 1909
Act.
Unlike television broadcasts and other types of motion pictures, sound recordings were not protected by copyright
prior to passage of the 1971 Amendment. Although the underlying musical work could be copyrighted, the 1909 Act
provided no protection for a particular performer's rendition
of the work. Moreover, copyrighted musical works that had
been recorded for public distribution were subject to a "compulsory license": any person was free to record such a work
upon payment of a 2-cent royalty to the copyright owner.
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 107&-1076. Although reproduction without
payment of the royalty was an infringement under the 1909
Act, damages were limited to three times the amount of the
unpaid royalty. § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081-1082; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F. 2d 260, 262-263, 265 (CA21957),
cert. denied, 355 U. S. 952 (1958). Notably, it was observed
that the practical effect of these provisions was to legalize
record piracy. See S. Rep. No. 92-72, p. 4 (1971); 1971
House Report 2.
In order to suppress this piracy, the 1971 Amendment extended copyright protection beyond the underlying work to
sound recordings themselves. Congress chose, however, to
provide only limited protection: owners of copyright in sound
recordings were given the exclusive right "[t]o reproduce
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gentleman raises the point.
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' Members will note
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for;
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be
fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is
made clear in the report." 117 Cong. Rec. 3474&-34749 (1971).
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[their works] and distribute [them] to the public." 1971
Amendment, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17
U. S. C. § 1(f) (1976 ed.)). 26 This right was merely the right
of commercial distribution. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749
(1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen & Kastenmeier) ("the bill
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only").
Against this background, the statements regarding home
recording under the 1971 Amendment appear in a different
light. If home recording was "common and unrestrained"
under the 1909 Act, see 1971 House Report 7, it was because
sound recordings had no copyright protection and the owner
of a copyright in the underlying musical work could collect no
more than a 2-cent royalty plus 6 cents in damages for each
unauthorized use. With so little at stake, it is not surprising
that the Assistant Register "d[id] not see anybody going into
anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing." 1971
House Hearings 23.
But the references to home sound recording in the 1971
Amendment's legislative history do not demonstrate any congressional intent to create a generalized home use exemption
from copyright protection. Congress addressed only sound
recordings and merely recognized that the 1909 Act had been
unsuccessful in controlling home sound recording; the 1971
Amendment was addressed to a different problem, that of
commercial record piracy. To quote Assistant Register
26

The 1909 Act's grant of an exclusive right to "copy,"§ 1(a), was of no
assistance to the owner of a copyright in a sound recording, because a reproduction of a sound recording was technically considered not to be a
"copy. " See 1971 House Hearings 18 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights); 1971 Amendment, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.)) ("For the purposes of [specified sections, not including § 1(a)], but not for any other purpose, a
reproduction of a [sound recording] shall be considered to be a copy
thereof"). This concept is carried forward into the 1976 Act, which
distinguishes between "copies" and "phonorecords." Seen. 9, supra.
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Ringer again, home use was "not what this legislation [was]
addressed to." 1971 House Hearings 22. 27
While the 1971 Amendment merely narrowed the sound recordings loophole in prior copyright law, motion pictures and
other audiovisual works have been accorded full copyright
protection since at least 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37
Stat. 488, and perhaps before, see Edison v. Lubin, 122 F.
240 (CA3 1903), app. dism'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904). Congress
continued this protection in the 1976 Act. Unlike the sound
recording rights created by the 1971 Amendment, the reproduction rights associated with motion pictures under
§ 106(1) are not limited to reproduction for public distribution; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work exists independently, and the "mere duplication of a copy may
constitute an infringement even if it is never distributed."
Register's Supplementary Report 16; see 1975 Senate Report
57; 1976 House Report 61. Moreover, the 1976 Act was intended as a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of copyright law. The reports accompanying the 1976 Act, unlike
the 1971 House report, contain no suggestion that home-use
recording is somehow outside the scope of this all-inclusive
statute. It was clearly the intent of Congress that no additional exemptions were to be implied. 28
27

During consideration of the 1976 Act, Congress, of course, was well
aware of the limited nature of the protection granted to sound recordings
under the 1971 Amendment. See 1975 House Hearings 113 (testimony of
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (1971 Amendment "created a
copyright in a sound recording ... but limited it to the particular situation
of so-called piracy"); id., at 1380 (letter from John Lorenz, Acting Librarian of Congress) (under 1971 Amendment "only the unauthorized reproduction and distribution to the public of copies of the sound recording is prohibited. Thus, the duplication of sound recordings for private, personal
use and the performance of sound recordings through broadcasting or
other means are outside the scope of the amendment").
28
Representative Kastenmeier, the principal House sponsor of the 1976
revision bill and chairman of the House subcommittee that produced it,
made this explicit on the opening day of the House hearings:
"[F)rom time to time, certain areas have not been covered in the bill. But
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We find in the 1976 Act no implied exemption to cover the
home taping of television programs, whether it be for single
copies, for private use, or for home use. Thus, taping a
copyrighted television program is infringement unless it is
permitted by the fair use exemption contained in § 107 of the
1976 Act.
IV
The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (CA2
1939); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA51980); Meeropol
v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434
U. S. 1013 (1978). Although courts have constructed lists of
factors to be considered in determining whether a particular
use is fair, 29 no fixed criteria have emerged by which that
is it not the case, this being a unified code, that the operation of the bill
does apply whether or not we specifically deal with a subject or not? . . .
"Therefore, we can really not fail to deal with an issue. It will be dealt
with one way or the other. The code, title 17, will cover it. So we have
made a conscious decision even by omission. . . .
"By virtue of passing this bill, we will deal with every issue. Whether
we deal with it completely or not for the purpose of resolving the issues
involved is the only question, not whether it has dealt with the four corners
of the bill because the four corners of the bill will presume to deal with everything in copyright." 1975 House Hearings 115.
29
The precise phrase "fair use" apparently did not enter the case law
until 1869, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F . Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (CC
Mass.), but the doctrine itself found early expression in Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841). Justice Story was faced there
with the "intricate and embarrassing questio[n]" whether a biography containing copyrighted letters was "a justifiable use of the original materials,
such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs." Id., at 344, 348. In determining whether the use was permitted,
said Justice Story, it was necessary to consider "the nature and objects of
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.... Much must, in such cases,
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determination can be made. This Court thus far has provided no guidance; although fair use issues twice before have
come to this Court, on each occasion the Court was equally
divided and no opinions issued. Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420
U. S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9
1956), aff'd, 356 u. s. 43 (1958).
Nor did Congress provide clear rules when it codified the
fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply inc·orporated a list
of "factors to be considered": the "purpose and character of
the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the "amount
and substantiality of the portion used," and the "effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." § 107. No particular weight was assigned to any
one of these, and the list was not intended to be exclusive.
The House and Senate reports explain that § 107 does no
more than give "statutory recognition" to the fair use doctrine; it was intended "to restate the present judicial doctrine
of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."
1976 House Report 66. See 1975 Senate Report 62; S. Rep.
No. 93-983, p. 116 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 32 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 61 (1966).
A
Despite this lack of clear standards, the fair use doctrine
plays a crucial role in the law of copyright. The purpose of
depend upon the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the
copies, and the degree in which the original authors may be injured
thereby." Id., at 34&-349.
Similar lists have been developed by later courts. E. g., Tennessee
Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA5), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 928 (1970); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135
F. 2d 73, 85 (CA6 1943); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (SD Cal. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P .
F . Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, 43 (SDNY 1934); Hill v. Whalen &
Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (SDNY 1914).
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copyright protection, in the words of the Constitution, is to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an
incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219
(1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards
the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127-128 (1932); see
H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1909).
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of
Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to promote. A clear example is the scholar or researcher whose
own work depends on the ability to refer to and to quote the
work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could create a
new work if he were first required to repeat the research of
every author who had gone before him. 30 The scholar, like
the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain with each
copyright owner for permission to quote from or refer to
prior works. But there is a crucial difference between the
ordinary user and the scholar. When the ordinary user decides that the owner's price is too high, and forgoes use of the
work, only the individual user is harmed. When the scholar
forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own work
suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to knowledge. The scholar's work, in other words, produces external
benefits from which we all profit. In such a case, the fair use
30
"The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our
predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself."' Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945).

I
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doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at the first author's
expense-to permit the second author to make limited use of
the first author's work for the public good. See Latman Fair
Use Study 31; Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982).
A similar subsidy may be appropriate in a range of areas
other than pure scholarship. The situations in which fair use
is most commonly recognized are listed in§ 107 itself; fair use
may be found when a work is used "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship,
or research." The House and Senate reports expand on this
list somewhat, 31 and other examples may be found in the case
law. 32 Each of these uses, however, reflects a common
theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's
work. 33 The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works
~~Quoting from the Register's 1961 Report, the Senate and House reports give examples of possible fair uses:
"quotation of excerpts in a revi.ew or criticism for purposes of illustration or
comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for
illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody of
some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located
in the scene of an event being recorded." 1975 Senate Report 61-62; 1976
House Report 65.
32
E. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.,
626 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1980) (comparative advertising).
33
Professor Seltzer has characterized these lists of uses as "reflect[ing]
what in fact the subject matter of fair use has in the history of its adjudication consisted in: it has always had to do with the use by a second author of
a first author's work." L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright
24 (1978) (emphasis removed). He distinguishes "the mere reproduction
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be

.-
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to be used for "socially laudable purposes." See Copyright
Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975
House Hearings 2051, 2055. We are aware of no case in
which the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole
benefit of the user has been held to be fair use. 34
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that every productive use is a fair use. A finding of fair use still must depend
on the facts of the individual case, and on whether, under the
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect the user to bargain
with the copyright owner for use of the work. The fair use
doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created
by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create,
and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly
will reduce the creative ability of others. 35 The inquiry is
called the 'ordinary' use of it." When copies are made for "ordinary'' use
of the work, "ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered , not
notions of fair use." Ibid. (emphasis in original). See also M. Nimmer,
Copyright § 13. 05[A][1] (1982) ("Use of a work in each of the foregoing contexts either necessarily or usually involves its use in a derivative work").
34
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), involved the photocopying of scientific journal articles; the Court of Claims
stressed that the libraries performing the copying were "devoted solely to
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge," 203 Ct. Cl., at
91, 487 F. 2d, at 1354, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if
such library photocopying were stopped," id., at 95, 487 F. 2d, at 1356.
Whether the Williams & Wilkins court was right or wrong in concluding
that these copying practices were fair use, we doubt that the court would
have reached the same result if it had not believed the practices at issue
had such serious consequences for the progress of science.
The issue of library copying is now covered by § 108 of the 1976 Act.
That section, which Congress regarded as "authoriz[ing] certain photocopying practices which may not qualify as a fair use," 1975 Senate Report
67; 1976 House Report 74, permits the making of copies only for "private
study, scholarship, or research." § 108(d)(1) and (e)(1).
36
In the words of Lord Mansfield: "[W]e must take care to guard against
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have
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necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situations that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules.
But when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its
original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of fair use generally does not apply. There is no need
to provide the ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the author's expense.
The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is
an ordinary rather than a productive use of the Studios' copyrighted works. The District Court found that "Betamax
owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original.
They add nothing of their own." 480 F. Supp., at 453. Although applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR recording, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material
broadcast free over the public airwaves, we think Sony's argument misconceives the nature of copyright. Copyright
gives the author a right to limit or even cut off access to his
work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932).
A VTR recording creates no public benefits sufficient to justify limiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the
copyright owner's choice to make the work available over the
public airwaves. Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the
copyright owner the exclusive right to control the performance and the reproduction of his work, and the fact that he
has licensed a single television performance is irrelevant to
the existence of his right to control its reproduction. Although a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this
fact is equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public library may not be copied any more freely than a book that is
purchased.
employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts be retarded." Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361 n. (b), 102
Eng. Rep. 139, 140 n. (K.B. 1785). See Register's Supplementary Report
13.
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It may seem tempting to stretch the doctrine of fair use so

as to permit unfettered use of this new technology in order to
increase access to television programming. But such an extension would risk eroding the very basis of copyright law, by
depriving authors of control over their works and consequently of their incentive to create. 36 Even in the context of
highly productive educational uses, Congress has avoided
this temptation; in passing the 1976 Act, Congress made
clear that off-the-air videotaping was to be permitted only in
very limited situations. See 1976 House Report 71; 1975
Senate Report 64. And, the Senate report adds, "[t]he committee does not intend to suggest ... that off-the-air recording for convenience would under any circumstances, be considered 'fair use.'" I d., at 66. We cannot disregard these
admonitions.
B

We recognize that there are situations where permitting
even an unproductive use would have no effect on the au36
This point was brought home repeatedly by the Register of Copyrights. Mentioning the "multitude of technological developments" since
passage of the 1909 Act, including "remarkable developments in the use of
video tape," Register's Supplementary Report xiv-xv, the Register
cautioned:
"I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in
communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author's
copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commercial interests who wish to use the author's works for private gain. An
equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the
public welfare who fully recognize ... 'that the real heart of civilization
.. . owes its existence to the author'; ironically, in seeking to make the author's works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions,
they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nurtures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting
demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the fundamental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing
the author's exclusive rights to him for a limited time." Id ., at xv; see
1975 House Hearings 117 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights).
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thor's incentive to create, that is, where the use would not
affect the value of, or the market for, the author's work.
Photocopying a newspaper clipping to send to a friend may be
one example; copying a quotation to pin on one's bulletin
board may be another. In each of these cases, the effect on
the author can truly be said to be de minimis. Thus, even
though these uses provide no benefit to the public at large, no
purpose is served by preserving the author's monopoly.
Courts should move with caution, however, in depriving
authors of protection from unproductive "ordinary'' uses.
Even in the case of a productive use, § 107(4) requires consideration of "the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work" (emphasis added). "[A]
particular use which may seem to have little or no economic
impact on the author's rights today can assume tremendous
importance in times to come." Register's Supplementary
Report 14. Although such a use may seem harmless when
viewed in isolation, "[i]solated instances of minor infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate
a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." 1975
Senate Report 65.
We conclude that, at least when the proposed use is an unproductive one, a copyright owner need produce only evidence of a potential for harm. Infringement then will be
found, unless the user can demonstrate affirmatively that
permitting the use would have no tendency to harm the market for or the value of the copyrighted work. See 3 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 13.05[E][4][c], at 13-84 (1982); Gordon, 82
Colum. L. Rev., at 1626. 37 This burden may be difficult for
37
During the copyright law revision process, Congress considered proposals to include in the statute provisions allocating the burden of proof on
the issue of fair use as between the copyright owner or the user. The
Register of Copyrights recommended against enacting such a rule, Register's Supplementary Report 28, and the 1966 and 1967 House reports
stated that "any special statutory provision placing the burden of proving
fair use on one side or the other would be unfair and undesirable." H. R
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the user to meet, and indeed may prove impossible in an area
where the effect of a new technology is speculative. But any
lesser burden would present the "real danger . . . of confining the scope of an author's rights on the basis of the present
technology so that, as the years go by, his copyright loses
much of its value because of unforeseen technical advances."
Register's Supplementary Report 14. When the proposed
use is one that creates no benefit to the public at large, the
copyright owner should not be forced to bear this risk.
The Studios have identified a number of ways in which
VTR recording could damage their copyrights. VTR recording could reduce their ability to market their works in
motion picture theaters and through the rental or sale of prerecorded videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce their
rerun audience, and consequently the license fees available to
them for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers may be
willing to pay for only "live" viewing audiences, if they believe VTR viewers will delete commercials or if rating services are unable to measure VTR use; if this is the case, VTR
recording could reduce the license fees the Studios are able to
charge even for first-run showings. Library-building raises
at least the potential for each of the types of harm identified
by the Studios, and time-shifting raises the potential for substantial harm as well. 38
Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66 (1966); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th
Cong. , 1st Sess., p. 37 (1967). Although this statement did not appear in
the 1974 Senate report, S. Rep. No. 93-983, or the reports on the 1976 Act,
the Register informed Congress that "its interpretation presumably remain[ed] valid," and that "rigid rules involving legal presumptions and burdens of proof should not be laid out in the statute." Register's Second
Supplementary Report, ch. II, at 23 and 29. As with other aspects of the
fair use doctrine, Congress left burden of proof questions to the courts.
38
A VTR owner who has taped a favorite motion picture for repeated
viewing is less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same motion picture, watch a televised rerun, or pay to see the picture at a theater. Although time-shifting may not replace theater or rerun viewing or the pur-
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Although the District Court found no likelihood of harm
from VTR use, 480 F. Supp., at 468, we conclude that it applied an incorrect substantive standard and misallocated the
burden of proof.. The District Court reasoned that the Studios had failed to prove that library-building would occur "to
any significant extent," id., at 467; that the Studios' prerecorded videodiscs could compete with VTR recordings and
were "arguably ... more desirable," ibid.; that it was "not
clear that movie audiences will decrease," id., at 468; and
that the practice of deleting commercials "may be too tedious" for many viewers, id., at 468. To the extent any decrease in advertising revenues would occur, the court coneluded that the Studios had "marketing alternatives at hand
to recoup some of that predicted loss." I d., at 452. Because the Studios' prediction of harm was "based on so many
assumptions and on a system of marketing which is rapidly
changing," the court was "hesitant to identify 'probable effects' of home-use copying." I d., at 452.
The District Court's reluctance to engage in prediction in
this area is understandable, but, in our view, the court was
mistaken in concluding that the Studios should bear the risk
created by this uncertainty. The Studios have demonchase of prerecorded tapes or discs, it may well replace rental usage; a
VTR user who has recorded a first-run motion picture for later viewing will
have no need to rent a copy when he wants to see it. Both library-builders
and time-shifters may avoid commercials; the library builder may use the
pause control to record without them, and all users may fast-forward
through commercials on playback.
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting and
librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works.
See 480 F. Supp., at 440. The District Court's findings also show substantial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both parties submitted surveys showing that the average Betamax user owns between 25 and
32 tapes. The Studios' survey showed that at least 40% of users had more
than 10 tapes in a "library"; Sony's survey showed that more than 40% of
users planned to view their tapes more than once; and both parties' surveys
showed that commercials were avoided at least 25% of the time. See id.,
at 438-439 .
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strated a potential for harm, which has not been and could
not be refuted at this early stage of technological development. While the Studios' evidence is speculative at present,
we cannot deny the Studios copyright protection on the basis
that a new technology that may result in substantial harm
has not done so yet.
· If a business were to tape the Studios' works off the air,
duplicate the tapes, and sell or rent them to members of the
public for home viewing, it would undoubtedly be liable for
infringement of the Studios' copyright. From the Studios'
perspective, the consequences of home VTR recording are no
different. The only distinction is that home VTR users do
not record for commercial advantage; the commercial benefit
accrues to the manufacturers and distributors of the
Betamax. We next discuss whether these manufacturers
and distributors can be held contributorily liable when the
product they sell is used to infringe.

v
It is well established that liability for copyright infringement can be imposed on persons other than those who actually carry out the infringing activity. Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911); 3 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A] (1982); see Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 160, n. 11 (1975); Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). Although the
liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner ... is an infringer of the copyright," 17 U. S. C.
§ 501(a), the House and Senate reports demonstrate that
Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory
infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report

61.39
39

This intent is further manifested by several provisions of the 1976 Act
that exempt from liability persons who, while not participating directly in
any infringing activity, could otherwise be charged with contributory in-
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The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement, however, is not well-defined. One of the few attempts at definition appears in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971). The
Gershwin court stated that "one who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
'contributory' infringer." ld., at 1162 (footnote omitted).
While we have no quarrel with this general statement, it does
not resolve this case; the District Court and the Court of Appeals, both purporting to apply it, reached diametrically opposed results.
A

In absolving Sony from liability, the District Court reasoned that Sony had no direct involvement with individual
Betamax users, did not participate in any off-the-air copying,
and did not know that such copying was an infringement of
the Studios' copyright. 480 F. Supp., at 460. We agree
with the Gershwin court that contributory liability may be
imposed even when there has been no direct contact between
the defendant and the infringer. The defendant in Gershwin
was a concert promoter operating through local concert associations that it sponsored; it had no contact with the infringing performers themselves. 443 F. 2d, at 1162-1163; see
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at
160, n. 11. Moreover, a finding of contributory infringement
has never depended on actual knowledge of particular instances of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant
have reason to know that infringement is taking place. 443
fringement. See § 108(f)(1) (library not liable "for the unsupervised use of
reproducing equipment located on its premises," provided that certain
warnings are posted); § 110(6) ("governmental body'' or "nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization" not liable for infringing performance by
concessionaire "in
·
fair
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F. 2d, at 1162; see Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v.
Mark-FiRecords, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966). 40 In
the so-called "dance hall" cases, in which questions of contributory infringement arise with some frequency, proprietors of entertainment establishments routinely are held liable for unauthorized performances on their premises, even
when they have no knowledge that copyrighted works are
being performed. In effect, the proprietors in these cases
are charged with constructive knowledge of performances
taking place on their premises. 41
40
In Screen Gems, on which the Gershwin court relied, the court held
that liability could be imposed on a shipper of unauthorized "bootleg"
records and a radio station that broadcast advertisements of the records,
provided they lmew or should have lmown that the records were infringing. The court concluded that the records' low price and the manner in
which they were marketed could support a finding of "constructive lmowledge" even if actual lmowledge were not shown.
41
E. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing &
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977); Dreamland Ball Room,
Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA71929); M. Witmark &
Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Mass.
1960); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 157;
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198-199 (1931); 3 M.
Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A], p. 12-35 (1982).
Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the defendant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities, see,
e. g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304, 307
(CA21963); K.ECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74
(WD Mo. 1977), but this notion is to some extent fictional; the defendant
cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play copyrighted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into the performers' contract. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d, at 1214-1215; KECA Music,
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp., at 75; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (WD La. 1942). Congress expressly rejected a proposal to exempt proprietors from this type of liability under the
1976 Act. See 1975 Senate Report 141-142; 1976 House Report 159-160;
1975 House Hearings 1812-1813 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights); id., at 1813 (colloquy between. Rep. Pattison and Barbara
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Nor is it necessary that the defendant be aware that the
infringing activity violates the copyright laws. Section
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory
damages when an infringer proves he "was not aware and
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright," but the statute establishes no
general exemption for those who believe their infringing activities are legal. Moreover, such an exemption would be
meaningless in a case such as this, in which prospective relief
is sought; once a court has established that the copying at
issue is infringement, the defendants are necessarily aware of
that fact for the future. It is undisputed in this case that
Sony had reason to know the Betamax would be used by
some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air. See 480
F. Supp., at 459, 460.
The District Court also concluded that Sony had not
caused, induced, or contributed materially to the infringing
activities of Betamax owners. 480 F. Supp., at 460. In a
case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly;
it does not depend on evidence that particular Betamax owners relied on particular advertisements. In an analogous
case decided just last Term, the Court approved a lower
court conclusion that liability for contributory trademark infringement could be imposed on a manufacturer who "suggested, even by implication" that a retailer use the manufacturer's goods to infringe the trademark of another. Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844,
851 (1982); see id., at 860 (concurring opinion). We think
this standard is equally appropriate in the copyright context.
The District Court found that Sony has advertised the
Betamax as suitable for off-the-air recording of "favorite
shows," "novels for television," and "classic movies," 480 F.
Supp., at 436, with no visible warning that such recording
could constitute copyright infringement. Without the aid of
Ringer).
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the Betamax or some other VTR, it would not be possible today for home television viewers to infringe copyright by recording off-the-air. Off-the-air recording is not only a foreseeable use for the Betamax, but indeed is its intended use.
Under the circumstances, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Sony has induced and materially contributed to the
infringing conduct of Betamax owners. 42
B
Sony urges us to hold that the manufacturer or seller of a
product used to infringe is absolved from liablity whenever
the product can be put to any substantial noninfringing use.
Brief for Petitioners 41-42. The District Court so held, borrowing the "staple article of commerce" doctrine governing
liability for contributory infringement of patents. See 35
U. S. C. § 271. 43 We cannot agree that this technical doc42

Our conclusion respecting contributory infringement does not include
the retailer defendants, see n. 2, supra. The District Court found that one
of the retailer defendants had assisted in the advertising campaign for the
Betamax, but made no other findings respecting their knowledge of the
Betamax's intended uses. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals
that, at least on this record, the retailers "are sufficiently engaged in the
enterprise to be held accountable," 659 F. 2d, at 976; this is an issue that
may be pursued on remand. In contrast, the advertising agency employed
to promote the Betamax was far more actively engaged in the advertising
campaign, and petitioners have not argued that its liability differs in any
way from that of Sony Corporation and Sony Corporation of America.
43
The "staple article of commerce" doctrine protects those who manufacture products incorporated into or used with patented inventions-for example, the paper and ink used with patented printing machines, Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), or the dry ice used with patented refrigeration systems, Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27
(1931). Because a patent-holder has the right to control the use of the patented item as well as its manufacture, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 509-510 (1917); 35 U. S. C. 271(a),
such protection is necessary to prevent patent-holders from extending
their monopolies by suppressing competition in unpatented components
and supplies suitable for use with the patented item. See Dawson Chemi-
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trine of patent law, based on concerns largely irrelevant to
the field of copyright, see generally Dawson Chemical Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187-199 (1980), should be
imported wholesale into copyright law. Despite their common constitutional source, the development of patent and
copyright protections has not been parallel and this Court has
borrowed patent concepts in copyright cases sparingly in the
past. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339,
345-346 (1908).

The District Court was understandably concerned that if liability for contributory infringement were imposed on the
manufacturer or seller of every product used to infringe-a
typewriter, a camera, a photocopying machine-the "wheels
of commerce" would be blocked. A similar concern was expressed in Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62
(1911), this Court's only prior decision in the area of contributory copyright infringement.
The products sold in Kalem were films of the story of a
copyrighted book, and the seller was held liable on the
ground that use of the films in infringing exhibitions "was the
most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and
the one for which especially they were made." Id., at 63. 44
In this case, of course, the Betamax has noninfringing uses 45
cal Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 197-198 (1980). The doctrine
of contributory patent infringement has been the subject of attention by
the courts and by Congress, see id., at 202-212, and has been codified since
1952, 66 Stat. 792, but was never mentioned during the copyright law revision process as having any relevance to contributory copyright
infringement.
44
The making of the films was not itself an infringement under the 1909
Act, see 222 U. S., at 62, but the exhibitions violated the copyright owner's
right to dramatize his work. Ibid.
46
Noninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that
have never been protected by copyright, recording works that have entered the public domain, recording with permission of the copyright owner,
and, of course, any recording that qualifies as fair use. See, e. g.,
Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 809 (ND Cal. 1979) (use of
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while the films manufactured in Kalem perhaps did not. But
the existence of noninfringing uses does not absolve the manufacturer of a product whose "most conspicuous purpose" is
to infringe. When copyright infringement is the product's
primary use and, as the Court of Appeals put it, a major
"source of the product's consumer appeal," 659 F. 2d, at 975,
the manufacturer profits directly from the infringing activity
and has a financial interest in its continuation. Even though
the manufacturer itself makes no unauthorized copies, it
"reap[s] the benefit of countless violations" by others. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing &
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213, 1215 (CA11977).

c
The Court of Appeals concluded that Sony should be held
liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that "[v]ideotape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the
primary purpose of reproducing television programming,"
and "[v]irtually all television programming is copyrighted
material." 659 F. 2d, at 975. While we agree with the first
of these propositions, 46 the second is problematic. The parties and their amici have argued vigorously about both the
amount of television programming that is covered by copyright and the amount for which permission to copy has been
given. The proportion of VTR recording that is infringing is
primarily a question of fact, 47 and the District Court specifihome VTR for market research studies).
46
Although VTRs also may be used to watch prerecorded video cassettes
and to make home motion pictures, these uses do not require a tuner such
as the Betamax contains. See n. 3, supra. The Studios do not object to
Sony's sale of VTRs without tuners. Brief for Respondents 5, n. 9. In
considering the noninfringing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses
that would remain possible without the Betamax's built-in tuner should not
be taken into account.
47
Sony asserts that much or most television broadcasting is available for
home recording because (1) no copyright owners other than the Studios
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cally declined to make findings on the "percentage of legal
versus illegal home-use recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
In light of our view of the law, resolution of this factual question is essential. We therefore remand for further consideration by the District Court.
VI
The Court of Appeals, having found Sony liable, remanded
for the District Court to reconsider the propriety of injunctive or other relief. Because of our disposition of the issue of
liability, we, too, do not decide what remedy would be appropriate if liability were found. We concur, however, in the
Court of Appeals' suggestion that some form of limited injunction, or an award of damages or continuing royalties in
lieu of injunctive relief, may well be an appropriate means of
balancing the equities in this case. 48 Although we express no
view on the merits of any particular proposal, we are certain
have brought infringement actions, and (2) much televised material is ineligible for copyright protection because videotapes of the broadcasts are not
kept. The first of these assertions is irrelevant; Sony's liability does not
turn on the fact that only two copyright owners thus far have brought suit.
The amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of
the television market as a whole. Sony's second assertion is based on a
faulty premise; the Copyright Office permits audiovisual works transmitted by television to be registered by deposit of sample frames plus a description of the work. See 37 CFR §§ 202.20(c)(2)(ii) and 202.21(g) (1982).
Moreover, although an infringement action cannot be brought unless the
work is registered, 17 U. S. C. § 411(a), registration is not a condition of
copyright protection. § 408(a). Copying an unregistered work is still infringement. Cf. § 506(a) (liability for criminal copyright infringement; not
conditioned on prior registration).
48
Other Nations have imposed royalties on the manufacturers of products used to infringe copyright. See, e. g., Copyright Laws and Treaties
of the World (UNESCO/BNA 1982) (English translation), reprinting Federal Act On Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related
Rights (Austria), § 42(5)-(7), and An Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights (Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 53(5). A study produced for the Commission of European Communities has recommended
that these requirements "serve as a pattern" for the European community.
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that, if Sony is found liable in this case, the District Court
will be able to fashion appropriate relief. The District Court
may conclude, of course, that a continuing royalty or other
equitable relief is not feasible in this case. The Studios then
would be relegated to statutory damages for proven instances of infringement. But the difficulty of fashioning relief, and the possibility that complete relief may be unavailable, cannot affect our interpretation of the statute.
Like so many other problems created by the interaction of
copyright law with a new technology, "[t]here can be no
really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here,
until Congress acts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 167 (THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting).
But in the absence of a congressional solution, courts cannot
avoid difficult problems by refusing to apply the law. We
must "take the Copyright Act ... as we find it," Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 401-402 (1968), and
"do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright principles ... until the Congress legislates." Id., at 404 (dissenting opinion).
VII
Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that home VTR recording for personal use is an infringement of copyright, its
judgment is affirmed. In all other respects, the judgment is
vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. No costs are allowed.

It is so ordered.

A. Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community 135 (1978). While
these royalty systems ordinarily depend on the existence of authors' collecting societies, see id., at 119, 136, such collecting societies are a familiar
part of our copyright law. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1979). Fashioning relief
of this sort, of course, might require bringing other copyright owners into
court through certification of a class or otherwise.
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
The introduction of the home videotape recorder (VTR)
upon the market has enabled millions of Americans to make
recordings of television programs in their own homes, for future and repeated viewing at their own convenience. While
this practice has proved highly popular with owners of television sets and VTRs, it understandably has distressed the
holders of copyrights in the recorded programs. The result
is the present litigation, raising the questions whether the
home recording of television programs is an infringement of
copyright, and, if so, whether the manufacturers and distributors of VTRs are liable as contributory infringers. We
have little doubt that these questions ultimately and definitively will be resolved by Congress; our task in the interim is
to resolve them under existing copyright law.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN

I

In 1976, respondents Universal City Studios, Inc., and
Walt Disney Productions (the Studios) brought this copyright
infringement action 1 against petitioners Sony Corporation
1

The Studios also alleged misrepresentation under § 43(a) of the TradeMark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a), and unfair compe-
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and Sony Corporation of America (Sony), the manufacturers
and distributors of the Betamax VTR. 2 The Studios sought
damages, profits, and a wide-ranging injunction against further sales or use of the Betamax or Betamax tapes.
The Betamax, like other VTRs, is capable of recording
television broadcasts off the air on videotape cassettes, and
playing them back at a later time. 3 Two types of Betamax
usage are at issue here. 4 The first is "time-shifting," in
which the user records a program in order to watch it at a
later time, and then records over it after a single viewing.
The second is "library-building," in which the user records a
program to keep for repeated viewing over a longer term.
tition and intentional interference with business relationships under state
law. App. 4. These claims are not before us.
2
Also named as defendants were a number of retailers that sell the
Betamax (Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.; Associated Dry Goods Corporation; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Camera Corporation); the advertising agency employed by Sony Corporation of America to promote the Betamax (Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc.); and William
Griffiths, an individual Betamax user. With the exception of Griffiths,
these defendants are also petitioners here. Except where indicated, we
refer to the petitioners collectively as "Sony."
3
The Betamax has three primary components: a tuner that receives
television ("RF") signals broadcast over the airwaves; an RF adapter that
converts the RF signals into audio-video signals; and a recorder that
records the audio-video signals on magnetic tape. Sony also manufactures
VTRs without built-in tuners; these are capable of playing back prerecorded tapes and recording home movies on videotape, but cannot record
off the air. Since the Betamax has its own tuner, it can be used to record
off one channel while another channel is being watched.
The Betamax is available with a number of auxiliary features, including a
timer, a pause control, and a fast-forward control; these features permit
Betamax owners to record programs without being present, to avoid (if
they are present) recording commercial messages, and to skip over commercials while playing back the recording. Videotape is reusable; the user
erases it by taping over the prior recording.
'This case involves only the home recording for home use of television
programs broadcast free over the airwaves. No issues are raised concerning cable or pay television, or the sharing or trading of tapes.
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Sony's advertisements, at various times, have suggested that
Betamax users "record favorite shows" or "build a library."
Sony's Betamax advertising has never contained warnings
about copyright infringement, although a warning appears in
the Betamax operating instructions.
The Studios produce copyrighted "movies" and other
works that they release to theaters and license for television
broadcast. The Studios also rent and sell their works on film
and on prerecorded videotapes and videodiscs. License fees
for television broadcasts are set according to audience ratings, compiled by rating services that do not measure playback of videotapes. The Studios claim that VTR recording
of their works may decrease their revenue from licensing
their works to television and from marketing them in other
ways.
After a five-week trial, the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, in a detailed opinion,
ruled that home VTR recording did not infringe the Studios'
copyrights under either the Act of March 4, 1909 (1909 Act),
35 Stat. 1075, as amended (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C.
§ 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)), or the Copyright Revision Act of 1976
(1976 Act), 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed.,
Supp. V). 5 The District Court also held that even if home
VTR recording were an infringement, Sony could not be held
liable under theories of direct infrin ement, contributory infringement, or vicarious iability. Finally, the District
Court concluded tllafai1lnjUnction against sales of the
Betamax would be inappropriate even if Sony were liable
under one of those theories. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979).
5
The Studios introduced evidence at trial of 32 individual instances in
which their copyrighted works were recorded on Betamax VTRs. Two of
these instances occurred after January 1, 1978, the primary effective date
of the 1976 Act; all others occurred while the 1909 Act was still effective.
Our analysis focuses primarily on the 1976 Act, but, as we show infra, the
legal principles governing copyright protection for these works under the
two Acts are the same.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed in virtually ~11 rj1liec~. 659 F. 2d 963 (1981). It
held that the 1909 Act and t e 976 Act contained no implied
exemption for "home use" recording, that home use recording
was not "fair use," and that the use of the Betamax to record
the Studios' works therefore infringed their copyrights. The
Court of Appeals also held Son liable for contributory infri~nt, reasoning that ony knew an expecte t at the
Betamax would be used to record copyrighted material off
the air, and that Sony had induced caused or materiall contributed to the inffmgmg con uc .
he Court of Appeals
then ~eration of the question of relief,
suggesting that the District Court could consider awarding
damages or a continuing royalty in lieu of an injunction. I d.,
at 976.
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we
granted certiorari. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982).
II
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8,
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." This Nation's initial copyright statute was
passed by the First Congress. Entitled "An Act for the encouragement of learning," it gave an author "the sole right
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending"
his "map, chart, book or books" for a period of 14 years. Act
of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, as the technology available to authors for creating and preserving their
writings has changed, the law has changed with it. Through
many amendments, and through complete revisions in 1831,
1870, 1909, and 1976, 6 authors' rights have been expanded to
' Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 85-111,
16 Stat. 212-217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17
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provide protection to any "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression," including motion pictures and other audiovisual works. 17 U. S. C. § 102(a). 7
Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the owner of a copyright
a variety of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, 8 includU. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified as 17 U.S. C. § 101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V)).
7
Section 102(a) provides:
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
"(1) literary works;
"(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
"(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
"(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
"(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
"(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
"(7) sound recordings."
"Audiovisual works" are "works that consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." § 101, ~ 2.
"Motion pictures" are "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related
images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion,
together with accompanying sounds, if any." § 101, ~ 17. Most commercial television programs, if fixed on film or tape at the time of broadcast or
before, will qualify as "audiovisual works." Since the categories set forth
in § 102(a) are not mutually exclusive, a particular television program may
also qualify for protection as a dramatic, musical, or other type of work.
8
Section 106 provides:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
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ing the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords." 9 This grant is expressly made subject to
§§ 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limitations on the copyright owner's rights. The most important
of these sections, for our present purposes, is § 107; that section states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not
an infringement of copyright." 10

III
The 1976 Act, like its predecessors, 11 does not give the
copyright owner control over all possible uses of his work.
lending;
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly. "
9
A "phonorecord" is a reproduction of sounds other than sounds accompanying an audiovisual work, while a "copy" is a reproduction of a work
in any form other than a phonorecord. § 101, ~~ 19, 7.
10
Section 107 provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include"(!) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."
The four factors listed in this section are intended to be "illustrative and
not limitative." § 101, ~ 14.
11
The 1976 Act was the product of a revision effort lasting more than 20
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If the work is put to some use not enumerated in § 106, the
use is not an infringement. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 393-395 (1968). Thus, before considering whether home videotaping comes within the scope of
the fair use exemption, we first must inquire whether the
practice violates the exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords" granted by§ 106(1).
A
Although the word "copies" appears in the plural in
§ 106(1), it is clear that the making of even a single unauthorized copy is prohibited. The Senate and House reports
explain that "[t]he references to 'copies or phonorecords,' although in the plural, are intended here and throughout the
bill to include the singular (1 U. S. C. § 1)." 12 1975 Senate
years. Spurred by the recognition that "significant developments in technology and communications" had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate,
S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); see H. R. Rep. No.
94-1476, p. 47 (1976) (1976 House Report), Congress in 1955 authorized the
Copyright Office to prepare a series of studies on all aspects of the existing
copyright law. Thirty-four studies were prepared and presented to Congress. The Register of Copyrights drafted a comprehensive report with
recommendations, House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the
U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Register's 1961 Report), and general revision bills were introduced near the end
of the 88th Congress in 1964. H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964). The Register issued a second report in 1965, with revised recommendations. House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965) (Register's Supplementary Report).
Action on copyright revision was held up from 1967 to 1974 by a dispute on
cable television, see generally Second Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law:
1975 Revision Bill, ch. V, pp. 2-26 (Draft Oct.-Dec. 1975) (Register's Second Supplementary Report), but a compromise led to passage of the
present Act in 1976.
12
1 U. S. C. § 1 provides in relevant part:
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Report 58; 1976 House Report 61. The reports then describe the reproduction right established by § 106(1):
"[T]he right 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material
object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' As
under the present law, a copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial
part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or
simulation." 1975 Senate Report 58; 1976 House Report
61.
The making of even a single videotape recording at home falls
within this definition; the VTR user produces a material object from which the copyrighted work later can be perceived.
Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making
of a single copy for personal use, we must conclude that VTR
recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by
§ 106(1).
The 1976 Act and its accompanying reports specify in some
detail the situations in which a single copy of a copyrighted
work may be made. Section 108(a), for example, permits a
library or archives "to reproduce no more than one copy or
phonorecord of a work" for a patron, but only under certain
very limited conditions; an entire work, moreover, can be
copied only if it cannot be obtained elsewhere at a fair price. 13
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context
indicates otherwise . . . words importing the plural include the
singular.... "
13
The library photocopying provisions of § 108 do not excuse from liability any person who requests "a copy'' from a library if the requester's use
exceeds fair use. § 108(f)(2). Moreover, a library is absolved from liability for the unsupervised use of its copying equipment if the equipment
bears a notice informing users that "the making of a copy'' may violate the

81-1687-0PINION
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

9

§ 108(e); see also § 112(a) (broadcaster may "make no more

than one copy or phonorecord of a particular transmission
program," and only under certain conditions). In other respects, the making of single copies is permissible only within
the limited confines of the fair use doctrine. The Senate report, in a section headed "Single and multiple copying," notes
that the fair use doctrine would permit a teacher to make a
single copy of a work for his or her own use in the classroom,
but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such as a novel or
treatise. 1975 Senate Report 63-64; accord, 1976 House Report 68-69, 71. Other situations in which the making of a
single copy would be fair use are described in the House and
Senate reports. 14 But neither the statute nor its legislative
history suggests any .intent to create a general exemption for
single copies made for personal or private use.
Indeed, it appears that Congress considered and rejected
the possibility of a special private use exemption. The issue
was raised early in the copyright law revision process, in one
of the studies prepared for Congress under the supervision of
the Copyright Office. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted
Works (1958), reprinted in Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960) (Latman Fair Use Study).
This study found no reported cases supporting the existence
of an exemption for private use, although it noted that "the
purpose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the
copyright law. § 108(f)(1).
"For example, "the making of a single copy or phonorecord by an individual as a free service for a blind person" would be a fair use, as would "a
single copy reproduction of an excerpt from a copyrighted work by a calligrapher for a single client" or "a single reproduction of excerpts from a copyrighted work by a student calligrapher or teacher in a learning situation."
1975 Senate Report 66-67; see 1976 House Report 73-74. Application of
the fair use doctrine in these situations, of course, would be unnecessary if
the 1976 Act created a general exemption for the making of single copies.
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small amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general
principles of fair use in such a way as to deny liability." !d.,
at 12. After reviewing a number of foreign copyright laws
that contained explicit statutory exemptions for private or
personal use, id., at 25, Professor Latman outlined several
approaches that a revision bill could take to the general issue
of exemptions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of
particularized rules to cover specific situations, including
"the field of personal use." I d., at 33. 15
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copyrights recommended that the revised copyright statute simply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and exemptions to cover specific situations, 16 preferring to rely on
the judicial fair use doctrine to resolve new problems as they
arose. See Register's 1961 Report 25; Register's Supplementary Report 27-28.
The Register's approach was reflected in the first copyright revision bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1964.
Professor Latman made special mention of the "personal use" issue because the area was one that
"has become disturbed by recent developments . . . . Photoduplication
devices may make authors' and publishers' groups apprehensive. The
Copyright Charter recently approved by [the International Confederation
of Societies of Authors and Composers] emphasizes the concern of authors
over 'private' uses which, because of technological developments, are said
to be competing seriously with the author's economic interests." Latman
Fair Use Study 33-34.
16
The one exemption proposed by the Register, permitting libraries to
make single photocopies of out-of-print works and of excerpts that requesters certified were needed for research, met with opposition and was not
included in the bills initially introduced in Congress. See Register's 1961
Report 26; H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Register's
Supplementary Report 26. A library copying provision was restored to
the bill in 1969, after pressure from library associations. Register's Second Supplementary Report, ch. III, pp. 10-11; seeS. 543, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., § 108 (Comm. Print Dec. 10, 1969); 1975 Senate Report 48.
15
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These bills, like the 1976 Act, granted copyright owners the
exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, subject
only to the exceptions set out in later sections. H. R.
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 5(a) (1964). The primary exception was the fair use doctrine, id., § 6, containing
language virtually identical to § 107 of the 1976 Act. Although the copyright revision bills changed in many respects
from their first introduction in 1964 to final passage in 1976,
those portions of the bills did not change. 17 We can conclude
only that Congress, like the Register, intended to rely on the
fair use doctrine, not a per se exemption for private use, to
separate permissible copying from the impermissible. 18
17
The 1964 bills provided that the fair use of copyrighted material for
purposes "such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research" was not an infringement of copyright, and listed four
"factors to be considered" in determining whether a particular use was fair.
H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1964). Revised bills,
drafted by the Copyright Office in 1965, contained a fair use provision
merely mentioning the doctrine but not indicating its scope: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is
not an infringement of copyright." H. R. 4347/S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 107 (1965). The House Judiciary Committee restored the provision to its earlier wording, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pp.
5, 58 (1966), and the language adopted by the Committee remained in the
bill in later Congresses. See H. R. 2512/S, 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 107 (1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., § 107 (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1973); H. R.
2223/S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1975). With a few additions by
the House Judiciary Committee in 1976, see 1976 House Report 5; H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, p. 70 (1976), the same language appears in§ 107 of
the 1976 Act.
18
In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), decided
during the process of revising the copyright statutes, the Court of Claims
suggested that copying for personal use might be outside the scope of copyright protection under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that because
"hand copying" for personal use has always been regarded as permissible,
and because the practice of making personal copies continued after typewriters and photostat machines became available, the making of personal

'

.
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When Congress intended special treatment for private use,
moreover, it said so explicitly. One such explicit statement
appears in § 106 itself. The copyright owner's exclusive
right to perform a copyrighted work, unlike the right to reproduce the work in copies, is limited. Section 106(4) grants
a copyright owner the exclusive right to perform the work
"publicly," but does not restrict private performances by others. A motion picture is "performed" whenever its images
are shown or its sounds are made audible. § 101, ~ 18. Like
"sing[ing] a copyrighted lyric in the shower," Twentieth Cencopies by any other means should be permissible as well. I d., at 84-88,
487 F. 2d, at 1350-1352.
There appear to us to be several flaws in this reasoning. First, it is by
no means clear that the making of a "hand copy" of an entire work is permissible; the most that can be said is that there are no reported cases on
the subject, possibly because no copyright owner ever has thought it
worthwhile to sue. See Latman Fair Use Study 11-12; 3 M. Nimmer,
Copyright § 13.05[E][4][a] (1982). At least one early treatise asserted
that infringement would result "if an individual made copies for his personal use, even in his own handwriting, as there is no rule of law excepting
manuscript copies from the law ofinfringment." A. Weil, American Copyright Law § 1066 (1917). Second, hand copying or even copying by typewriter is self-limiting. The drudgery involved in making hand copies ordinarily ensures that only necessary and fairly small portions of a work are
taken; it is unlikely that any user would make a hand copy as a substitute
for one tl\at could be purchased. The harm to the copyright owner from
hand copying thus is minimal. The recent advent of inexpensive and
readily available copying machines, however, has changed the dimensions
of the problem dramatically. See Register's Second Supplementary Report ch. III, p. 3; Hearings on H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 194 (1975) (1975 House Hearings) (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 234 (statement of Robert W.
Cairns); id., at 250 (remarks of Rep. Danielson); id., at 354 (testimony of
Irwin Karp); id., at 467 (testimony of Rondo Cameron); id., at 1795 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights). Thus, "[t]he supposition that there is no tort involved in a scholar copying a copyrighted text by
hand does not much advance the question of machine copying." B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 101-102 (1967).

81-1687-0PINION
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

13

tury Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 (1975), watching television at home with one's family and friends is now
considered a performance. 1975 Senate Report 59-60; 1976
House Report 63. 19 Home television viewing nevertheless
does not infringe any copyright-but only because § 106(4)
contains the word "publicly." 20 See generally 1975 Senate
Report 60-61; 1976 House Report 63--64; Register's 1961 Report 29--30. No such distinction between public and private
uses appears in § 106(1)'s prohibition on the making of
copies. 21
Similarly, an explicit reference to private use appears in
§ 108. Under that section, a library can make a copy for a
patron only for specific types of private uses: "private study,
scholarship, or research." 22 § 108(d)(l) and (e)(1); see also 37
19

In a trio of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390,
398 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
415 U. S. 394, 403-405 (1974); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151 (1975), this Court held that the reception of a radio or
television broadcast was not a "performance" under the 1909 Act. .The
Court's "narrow construction" of the word "perform" was "completely
overturned by the [1976 Act] and its broad definition of 'perform' in section
101." 1976 House Report 87.
20
A work is performed "publicly" if it takes place "at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." § 101,
1\23(1).
21
One purpose of the exemption for private performances was to permit
the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes. The Register noted in
1961 that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not believe the private use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by
copyright." Register's 1961 Report 30 (emphasis added). Significantly,
the Register did not suggest that the private making of a reproduction of a
televised motion picture would be permitted by the copyright law. The
Register later reminded Congress that "[i]n general the concept of 'performance' must be distinguished sharply from the reproduction of copies."
Register's Supplementary Report 22.
22
During hearings on this provision, Representative Danielson inquired
whether it would apply to works of fiction such as "Gone With the Wind,"
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CFR § 201.14(b) (1982). Limits also are imposed on the extent of the copying and the type of institution that may make
copies, and the exemption expressly is made inapplicable to
motion pictures and certain other types of works. § 108(h).
These limitations would be wholly superfluous if an entire
copy of any work could be made by any person for private
use. 23
B
The District Court in this case nevertheless concluded that
the 1976 Act contained an implied exemption for "home-use
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 444-446. The court relied primarily on the legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the
1909 Act. That amendment addressed the specific problem
of commercial piracy of sound recordings. Act of Oct. 15,
1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amendment). The House report on
the 1971 Amendment, in a section entitled "Home Recording," contained the following statement:
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use and
or whether it was limited to "strictly technical types of information." The
uncontradicted response was that it would apply only in "general terms of
science . .. [and] the useful arts." 1975 House Hearings 251 (testimony of
Robert W. Cairns); cf. id., at 300 (statement of Harry Rosenfield) ("We are
not asking ... for the right to copy 'Gone With the Wind' ").
23
The House and Senate reports' mention of situations in which copies
for private use would be permissible under the fair use doctrine-for example, the making of a free copy for a blind person, 1975 Senate Report 66;
1975 Senate Report 73, or the "recordings of performances by music students for purposes of analysis and criticism," 1975 Senate Report 63would of course be superfluous as well. See n. 14, supra.
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with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing
commercially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers
would be in no different position from that of the owners
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the
past 20 years." H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7 (1971)
(1971 House Report).
Similar statements were made during House hearings on the
bill 24 and on the House floor, 25 although not in the Senate pro24
The following exchange took place during the testimony of Barbara
Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights:
"[Rep.] Biester. . .. I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own
home. My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set. ... [T]his legislation, of
course, would not point to his activities, would it?
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' I have
spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question
is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' The answer I have
given and will give again is that this is something you cannot control. You
simply cannot control it. My own opinion, whether this is philosophical
dogma or not, is that sooner or later there is going to be a crunch here.
But that is not what this legislation is addressed to, and I do not see the
crunch coming in the immediate future. . . . I do not see anybody going
into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or forcing legislation
that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.''
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23 (1971)
(1971 House Hearings).
26
Shortly before passage of the bill, a colloquy took place between Representative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee that produced the bill, and Representative Kazen, who was not on the committee:
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes.
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to record off of a program which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used
it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not
be included under the penalties of this bill?

81-1687-0PINION
16

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

ceedings. In concluding that these statements created a
general exemption for home recording, the District Court, in
our view, paid too little heed to the context in which the
statements were made, and failed to consider the limited purposes of the 1971 Amendment and the structure of the 1909
Act.
Unlike television broadcasts and other types of motion pictures, sound recordings were not protected by copyright
prior to passage of the 1971 Amendment. Although the underlying musical work could be copyrighted, the 1909 Act
provided no protection for a particular performer's rendition
of the work. Moreover, copyrighted musical works that had
been recorded for public distribution were subject to a "compulsory license": any person was free to record such a work
upon payment of a 2-cent royalty to the copyright owner.
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 107~1076. Although reproduction without
payment of the royalty was an infringement under the 1909
Act, damages were limited to three times the amount of the
unpaid royalty. § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081-1082; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F. 2d 260, 262-263, 265 (CA21957),
cert. denied, 355 U. S. 952 (1958). Notably, it was observed
that the practical effect of these provisions was to legalize
record piracy. See S. Rep. No. 92-72, p. 4 (1971); 1971
House Report 2.
In order to suppress this piracy, the 1971 Amendment extended copyright protection beyond the underlying work to
sound recordings themselves. Congress chose, however, to
provide only limited protection: owners of copyright in sound
recordings were given the exclusive right "[t]o reproduce
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gentleman raises the point.
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' Members will note
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for;
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be
fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is
made clear in the report." 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749 (1971) .

.•
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[their works] and distribute [them] to the public." 1971
Amendment, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17
U. S. C. § 1(f) (1976 ed.)). 26 This right was merely the right
of commercial distribution. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749
(1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen & Kastenmeier) ("the bill
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only").
Against this background, the statements regarding home
recording under the 1971 Amendment appear in a different
light. If home recording was "common and unrestrained"
under the 1909 Act, see 1971 House Report 7, it was because
sound recordings had no copyright protection and the owner
of a copyright in the underlying musical work could collect no
more than a 2-cent royalty plus 6 cents in damages for each
unauthorized use. With so little at stake, it is not surprising
that the Assistant Register "d[id] not see anybody going into
anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing." 1971
House Hearings 23.
But the references to home sound recording in the 1971
Amendment's legislative history do not demonstrate any congressional intent to create a generalized home use exemption
from copyright protection. Congress addressed only sound
recordings and merely recognized that the 1909 Act had been
unsuccessful in controlling home sound recording; the 1971
Amendment was addressed to a different problem, that of
commercial record piracy. To quote Assistant Register
26

The 1909 Act's grant of an exclusive right to "copy,"§ 1(a), was of no
assistance to the owner of a copyright in a sound recording, because a reproduction of a sound recording was technically considered not to be a
"copy." See 1971 House Hearings 18 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights); 1971 Amendment, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.)) ("For the purposes of [specified sections, not including § 1(a)], but not for any other purpose, a
reproduction of a [sound recording] shall be considered to be a copy
thereof"). This concept is carried forward into the 1976 Act, which
distinguishes between "copies" and "phonorecords." Seen. 9, supra.
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Ringer again, home use was "not what this legislation [was]
addressed to." 1971 House Hearings 22. 'l:7
While the 1971 Amendment merely narrowed the sound recordings loophole in prjor copyright law, motion pictures and
other audiovisual works have been accorded full copyright
protection since at least 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37
Stat. 488, and perhaps before, see Edison v. Lubin, 122 F.
240 (CA3 1903), app. dism'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904). Congress
continued this protection in the 1976 Act. Unlike the sound
recording rights created by the 1971 Amendment, the reproduction rights associated with motion pictures under
§ 106(1) are not limited to reproduction for public distribution; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work exists independently, and the "mere duplication of a copy may
constitute an infringement even if it is never distributed."
Register's Supplementary Report 16; see 1975 Senate Report
57; 1976 House Report 61. Moreover, the 1976 Act was intended as a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of copyright law. The reports accompanying the 1976 Act, unlike
the 1971 House report, contain no suggestion that home-use
recording is somehow outside the scope of this all-inclusive
statute. It was clearly the intent of Congress that no additional exemptions were to be implied. 28
During consideration of the 1976 Act, Congress, of course, was well
aware of the limited nature of the protection granted to sound recordings
under the 1971 Amendment. See 1975 House Hearings 113 (testimony of
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (1971 Amendment "created a
copyright in a sound recording ... but limited it to the particular situation
of so-called piracy"); id., at 1380 (letter from John Lorenz, Acting Librarian of Congress) (under 1971 Amendment "only the unauthorized reproduction and distribution to the public of copies of the sound recording is prohibited. Thus, the duplication of sound recordings for private, personal
use and the performance of sound recordings through broadcasting or
other means are outside the scope of the amendment").
28
Representative Kastenmeier, the principal House sponsor of the 1976
revision bill and chairman of the House subcommittee that produced it,
made this explicit on the opening day of the House hearings:
"[F]rom time to time, certain areas have not been covered in the bill. But
21
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We find in the 1976 Act no implied exemption to cover the
home taping of television programs, whether it be for single
copies, for private use, or for home use. Thus, taping a
copyrighted television program is infringement unless it is
permitted by the fair use exemption contained in § 107 of the
1976 Act.
IV
The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (CA2
1939); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA51980); Meeropol
v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434
U. S. 1013 (1978). Although courts have constructed lists of
factors to be considered in determining whether a particular
use is fair, 29 no fixed criteria have emerged by which that
is it not the case, this being a unified code, that the operation of the bill
does apply whether or not we specifically deal with a subject or not? ...
"Therefore, we can really not fail to deal with an issue. It will be dealt
with one way or the other. The code, title 17, will cover it. So we have
made a conscious decision even by omission. . . .
"By virtue of passing this bill, we will deal with every issue. Whether
we deal with it completely or not for the purpose of resolving the issues
involved is the only question, not whether it has dealt with the four corners
of the bill because the four corners of the bill will presume to deal with everything in copyright." 1975 House Hearings 115.
29
The precise phrase "fair use" apparently did not enter the case law
until 1869, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (CC
Mass.), but the doctrine itself found early expression in Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841). Justice Story was faced there
with the "intricate and embarrassing questio[n]" whether a biography containing copyrighted letters was "a justifiable use of the original materials,
such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs." Id., at 344, 348. In determining whether the use was permitted,
said Justice Story, it was necessary to consider "the nature and objects of
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work... . Much must, in such cases,
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determination can be made. This Court thus far has provided no guidance; although fair use issues twice before have
come to this Court, on each occasion the Court was equally
divided and no opinions issued. Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420
U. S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9
1956), aff'd, 356 U. S. 43 (1958).
Nor did Congress provide clear rules when it codified the
fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply incorporated a list
of "factors to be considered": the "purpose and character of
the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the "amount
and substantiality of the portion used," and the "effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." § 107. No particular weight was assigned to any
one of these, and the list was not intended to be exclusive.
The House and Senate reports explain that § 107 does no
more than give "statutory recognition" to the fair use doctrine; it was intended "to restate the present judicial doctrine
of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."
1976 House Report 66. See 1975 Senate Report 62; S. Rep.
No. 93-983, p. 116 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 32 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 61 (1966).
A
Despite this lack of clear standards, the fair use doctrine
plays a crucial role in the law of copyright. The purpose of
depend upon the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the
copies, and the degree in which the original authors may be injured
thereby." Id., at 348--349.
Similar lists have been developed by later courts. E. g., Tennessee
Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA5), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 928 (1970); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135
F. 2d 73, 85 (CA6 1943); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F . Supp. 348 (SD Cal. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P.
F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, 43 (SDNY 1934); Hill v. Whalen &
Martell , Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (SDNY 1914).
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copyright protection, in the words of the Constitution, is to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an
incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wei.:.
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219
(1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards
the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127-128 (1932); see
H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1909).
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of
Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to promote. A clear example is the scholar or researcher whose
own work depends on the ability to refer to and to quote the
work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could create a
new work if he were first required to repeat the research of
every author who had gone before him. 30 The scholar, like
the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain with each
copyright owner for permission to quote from or refer to
prior works. But there is a crucial difference between the
ordinary user and the scholar. When the ordinary user decides that the owner's price is too high, and forgoes use of the
work, only the individual user is harmed. When the scholar
forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own work
suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to knowledge. The scholar's work, in other words, produces external
benefits from which we all profit. In such a case, the fair use
30

"The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our
predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself."' Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945).
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doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at the first author's
expense-to permit the second author to make limited use of
the first author's work for the public good. See Latman Fair
Use Study 31; Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982).
A similar subsidy may be appropriate in a range of areas
other than pure scholarship. The situations in which fair use
is most commonly recognized are listed in§ 107 itself; fair use
may be found when a work is used "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship,
or research." The House and Senate reports expand on this
list somewhat, 31 and other examples may be found in the case
law. 32 Each of these uses, however, reflects a common
theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's
work. 33 The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works
Quoting from the Register's 1961 Report, the Senate and House reports give examples of possible fair uses:
"quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or
comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for
illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody of
some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located
in the scene of an event being recorded." 1975 Senate Report 61-62; 1976
House Report 65.
32
E. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.,
626 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1980) (comparative advertising).
33
Professor Seltzer has characterized these lists of uses as "reflect[ing]
what in fact the subject matter of fair use has in the history of its adjudication consisted in: it has always had to do with the use by a second author of
a first author's work." L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright
24 (1978) (emphasis removed). He distinguishes "the mere reproduction
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be
31
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to be used for "socially laudable purposes." See Copyright
Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975
House Hearings 2051, 2055. We are aware of no case in
which the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole
benefit of the user has been held to be fair use. 34
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that every productive use is a fair use. A finding of fair use still must depend
on the facts of the individual case, and on whether, under the
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect the user to bargain
with the copyright owner for use of the work. The fair use
doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created
by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create,
and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly
will reduce the creative ability of others. 35 The inquiry is
called the 'ordinary' use of it." When copies are made for "ordinary" use
of the work, "ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered, not
notions of fair use." Ibid. (emphasis in original). See also M. Nimmer,
Copyright § 13. 05[A][1] (1982) ("Use of a work in each of the foregoing contexts either necessarily or usually involves its use in a derivative work").
34
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), involved the photocopying of scientific journal articles; the Court of Claims
stressed that the libraries performing the copying were "devoted solely to
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge," 203 Ct. Cl., at
91, 487 F. 2d, at 1354, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if
such library photocopying were stopped," id., at 95, 487 F. 2d, at 1356.
Whether the Williams & Wilkins court was right or wrong in concluding
that these copying practices were fair use, we doubt that the court would
have reached the same result if it had not believed the practices at issue
had such serious consequences for the progress of science.
The issue of library copying is now covered by § 108 of the 1976 Act.
That section, which Congress regarded as "authoriz[ing] certain photocopying practices which may not qualify as a fair use," 1975 Senate Report
67; 1976 House Report 74, permits the making of copies only for "private
study, scholarship, or research." § 108(d)(1) and (e)(1).
36
In the words of Lord Mansfield: "[W]e must take care to guard against
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have
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necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situations that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules.
But when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its
original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of fair use generally does not apply. There is no need
to provide the ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the author's expense.
The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is
an ordinary rather than a productive use of the Studios' copyrighted works. The District Court found that "Betamax
owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original.
They add nothing of their own." 480 F. Supp., at 453. Although applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR recording, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material
broadcast free over the public airwaves, we think Sony's argument misconceives the nature of copyright. Copyright
gives the author a right to limit or even cut off access to his
work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932).
A VTR recording creates no public benefits sufficient to justify limiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the
copyright owner's choice to make the work available over the
public airwaves. Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the
copyright owner the exclusive right to control the performance and the reproduction of his work, and the fact that he
has licensed a single television performance is irrelevant to
the existence of his right to control its reproduction. Although a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this
fact is equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public library may not be copied any more freely than a book that is
purchased.
employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts be retarded." Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361 n. (b), 102
Eng. Rep. 139, 140 n. (b) (K.B. 1785). See Register's Supplementary Report 13.
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It may seem tempting to stretch the doctrine of fair use so
as to permit unfettered use of this new technology in order to
increase access to television programming. But such an extension would risk eroding the very basis of copyright law, by
depriving authors of control over their works and consequently of their incentive to create. 36 Even in the context of
highly productive educational uses, Congress has avoided
this temptation; in passing the 1976 Act, Congress made
clear that off-the-air videotaping was to be permitted only in
very limited situations. See 1976 House Report 71; 1975
Senate Report 64. And, the Senate report adds, "[t]he committee does not intend to suggest . . . that off-the-air recording for convenience would under any circumstances, be considered 'fair use.'" I d., at 66. We cannot disregard these
admonitions.
B

We recognize, nevertheless, that there are situations
where permitting even an unproductive use would have no
36

This point was brought home repeatedly by the Register of Copyrights. Mentioning the "multitude of technological developments" since
passage of the 1909 Act, including "remarkable developments in the use of
video tape," Register's Supplementary Report xiv-xv, the Register
cautioned:
"I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in
communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author's
copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commercial interests who wish to use the author's works for private gain. An
equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the
public welfare who fully recognize . . . 'that the real heart of civilization
... owes its existence to the author'; ironically, in seeking to make the author's works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions,
they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nurtures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting
demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the fundamental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing
the author's exclusive rights to him for a limited time." Id ., at xv; see
1975 House Hearings 117 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights).
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effect on the author's incentive to create, that is, where the
use would not affect the value of, or the market for, the author's work. Photocopying an old newspaper clipping to
send to a friend may be one example; copying a quotation to
pin on one's bulletin board may be another. In each of these
cases, the effect on the author can truly be said to be de
minimis. Thus, even though these uses provide no benefit to
the public at large, no purpose is served by preserving the
author's monopoly, and the use may be regarded as fair.
Courts should move with caution, however, in depriving
authors of protection from unproductive "ordinary" uses.
Even in the case of a productive use, § 107(4) requires consideration of "the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work" (emphasis added). "[A]
particular use which may seem to have little or no economic
impact on the author's rights today can assume tremendous
importance in times to come." Register's Supplementary
Report 14. Although. such a use may seem harmless when
viewed in isolation, "[i]solated instances of minor infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate
a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." 1975
Senate Report 65.
We conclude that, at least when the proposed use is an unproductive one, a copyright owner need rove only a potential for harm to the mar et
or
alue of the co 1g ed
work. See
. Nimmer, Copyright § 13.05[E][4][c], at
13:84 (1982). Proof of actual harm, or even probable harm,
may be impossible in an area where the effect of a new technology is speculative, and requiring such proof would present
the "real danger ... of confining the scope of an author's
rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as the
years go by, his copyright loses much of its value because of
unforeseen technical advances." Register's Supplementary
Report 14. I~ingement thus will be found if the copyright
o~er demonstrates a reasonable PQSSibw~ that harm ~ll
result from tlie proposed use. When the use is one t'hat ere-
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ates no benefit to the public at large, copyright protection
cannot be denied on the basis that a new technology that ~
result in harm has not done so yet.
The Studios have identified a number of ways in which
VTR recording could damage their copyrights. VTR recording could reduce their ability to market their works in
movie theaters and through the rental or sale of pre-recorded
videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce their rerun audience, and consequently the license fees available to them
for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers may be willing to pay for only "live" viewing audiences, if they believe
VTR viewers will delete commercials or if rating services are
unable to measure VTR use; if this is the case, VTR recording could reduce the license fees the Studios are able to
charge even for first-run showings. Library-building may
raise the potential for each of the types of harm identified by
the Studios, and time-shifting may raise the potential for substantial harm as well. 37
31
A VTR owner who has taped a favorite motion picture for repeated
viewing may be less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same motion
picture, watch a televised rerun, or pay to see the picture at a theater.
Although time-shifting may not replace theater or rerun viewing or the
purchase of prerecorded tapes or discs, it may well replace rental usage; a
VTR user who has recorded a first-run motion picture for later viewing will
have no need to rent a copy when he wants to see it. Both library-builders
and time-shifters may avoid commercials; the library builder may use the
pause control to record without them, and all users may fast-forward
through commercials on playback.
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting and
librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works.
See 480 F. Supp., at 440. The District Court's findings also show substantial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both parties submitted surveys showing that the average Betamax user owns between 25 and
32 tapes. The Studios' survey showed that at least 40% of users had more
than 10 tapes in a "library"; Sony's survey showed that more than 40% of
users planned to view their tapes more than once; and both parties' surveys
showed that commercials were avoided at least 25% of the time. See id.,
at 438-439.
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The District Court found that the Studios had suffered no
actual harm through VTR use, and that they were unable to
predict the point at which harm would occur. 480 F. Supp.,
at 451. Because the Studios' prediction of harm was "based
on so many assumptions and on a system of marketing which
is rapidly changing," the court was "hesitant to identify
'probable effects' of home-use copying." Id., at 452. The
District Court's reluctance to engage in prediction in this
area is understandable,. but we conclude that some degree of
prediction is required. As we have explained above, we do
not agree with the District Court that VTR recording would
be fair use even if some potential for harm were shown. Because the District Court made no specific findings regarding
the possibility of harm, we remand for reconsideration of this
issue.

v ~~

From the Stug~s' 2erspec~ve, the consequences of home
VTR recording are the same as if a business had taped the
Studios' works off the air, duplicated the tapes, and sold or
rented them to members of the public for home viewing.
The only: distin<;.t.ion is that home VTR users do not record for
commercial advantage; the commercial benefit accrues to the
manufacturers and distriliutors of the ~x. We next
discuss w ether these manufacturers and distributors can be
held contributorily liable if the product they sell is used to
infringe.
It is well established that liability for copyright infringement can be imposed on persons other than those who actually carry out the infringing activity. Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911); 3 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A] (1982); see Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 160, n. 11 (1975); Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). Although the
liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright

j
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owner ... is an infringer of the copyright," 17 U. S. C.
§ 501(a), the House and Senate reports demonstrate that
Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory
infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report

'-

61.38
The doctrine of contributory co~ight infr~ent, however, is not well-defi.nea:---One of the few attempts at definition appears in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971). The
Gershwin court stated that "one who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
'contributory' infringer." !d., at 1162 (footnote omitted).
While we have no quarrel with this general statement, it does
not resolve this case; the District Court and the Court of Appeals, both purporting to apply it, reached diametrically opposed results.
A

In absolving Sony from liability, the District Court reasoned that Sony had no direct involvement with individual
Betamax users, did not participate in any off-the-air copying,
and did not know that such copying was an infringement of
the Studios' copyright. 480 F. Supp., at 460. We agree
with the Gershwin court that contributo,.a liability may be
imposed even when there has been no direct contact between
the defendant and tlie fn.i'ringer. -rhe defendant in Gershwin
was a concert promoter operanng through local concert asso38

This intent is further manifested by several provisions of the 1976 Act
that exempt from liability persons who, while not participating directly in
any infringing activity, could otherwise be charged with contributory infringement. See § 108(f)(1) (library not liable "for the unsupervised use of
reproducing equipment located on its premises," provided that certain
warnings are posted); § 110(6) ("governmental body'' or "nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization" not liable for infringing performance by
concessionaire "in the course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair
or exhibition").
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ciations that it sponsored; it had no contact with the infringing performers themselves. 443 F. 2d, at 1162--1163; see
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at
160, n. 11. Moreover, a finding of contributory infringement
has never depended on actual knowledge of particular instances of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant
have reason to know that infringement 1s takin place. 443
F. ~d, at 1162; see Screen Gems- olumbia Music, Inc. v.
Mark-FiRecords, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966). 39 In
the so-called "dance hall" cases, in which questions of contributory infringement arise with some frequency, proprietors of entertainment establishments routinely are held liable for unauthorized performances on their premises, even
when they have no knowledge that copyrighted works are
being performed. In effect, the proprietors in these cases
are charged with c,onst..,ructive knowledge of performances
taking place on their premises. 40
In Screen Gems, on which the Gershwin court relied, the court held
that liability could be imposed on a shipper of unauthorized "bootleg"
records and a radio station that broadcast advertisements of the records,
provided they knew or should have known that the records were infringing. The court concluded that the records' low price and the manner in
which they were marketed could support a finding of "constructive knowledge" even if actual knowledge were not shown.
40
E. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing &
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977); Dreamland Ball Room,
Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA71929); M. Witmark &
Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Mass.
1960); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S., at 157;
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198-199 (1931); 3 M.
Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A], p. 12-35 (1982).
Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the defendant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities, see,
e. g., Shapiro , Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304, 307
(CA21963); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74
(WD Mo. 1977), but this notion is to some extent fictional; the defendant
cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play copy89

J
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Nor is it necessary that the defendant be aware that the
infringing activity violates the copyright laws. Section
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory ,
damages when an infringer proves he "was not aware and
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright," but the statute establishes no
general exemption for those who believe their infringing activities are legal. Moreover, such an exemption would be
meaningless in a case such as this, in which prospective relief
is sought; once a court has established that the copying at
issue is infringement, the defendants are necessarily aware of
that fact for the future. It is undisputed in this case that
Sony had reason to know tile Be£amax would 15e "iiSeaby
some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air. See 480
F. Supp., at 459, 460.
The District Court also concluded that Sony had not
caused, induced, or contributed materially to any infringing
activities of Betamax owners. 480 F. Supp., at 460. In a
case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly;
it does not depend on evidence a particular Betamax owners relied on particular advertisements. In an analogous
case decided just last Term, the Court approved a lower
court conclusion that liability for contributory trademark infringement could be imposed on a manufacturer who "suggested, even by implication" that a retailer use the manufac-

....--

righted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into the performers' contract. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d, at 1214-1215; KECA Music,
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp., at 75; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (WD La. 1942). Congress expressly rejected a proposal to exempt proprietors from this type of liability under the
1976 Act. See 1975 Senate Report 141-142; 1976 House Report 159-160;
1975 House Hearings 1812-1813 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights); id., at 1813 (colloquy between Rep. Pattison and Barbara
Ringer).

I
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turer's goods to infringe the trademark of another. Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844,
851 (1982); see id., at 860 (concurring opinion). We think
this standard is equally appropriate in the copyright context.
The District Court found that Sony has advertised the
Betamax as suitable for off-the-air recording of "favorite
shows," "novels for television," and "classic movies," 480 F.
Supp., at 436, with no visible warning that such recording
could constitute copyright infringement. Without the aid of
· the Betamax or some other VTR, it would not be possible today for home television viewers to infringe copyright by recording off-the-air. Off-the-air recording is not only a foreseeable use for the Betamax, but fnde'ed is its intended use.
Under the circumstances, we agree with the Court of Appeals that if off-the-air recording is an infringement of copyright, Sony has induced and materially contributed to the infringing conduct of Betamax owners. 41
B
Sony urges us to hold that the manufacturer or seller of a
product used to infringe is absolved from liability whenever
the product can be put to any substantial ninfringing use.
Brief for PetitiOners 1 . The District Court so held, borrowing the "staple article of commerce" doctrine governing
liability for contributory infringement of patents. See 35
U. S. C. §271. 42 We do not agree that this technical doctrine
Our conclusion respecting contributory infringement does not include
the retailer defendants, seen. 2, supra. The District Court found that one
of the retailer defendants had assisted in the advertising campaign for the
Betamax, but made no other findings respecting their knowledge of the
Betamax's intended uses. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals
that, at least on this record, the retailers "are sufficiently engaged in the
enterprise to be held accountable," 659 F . 2d, at 976; this is an issue that
may be pursued on remand. In contrast, the advertising agency employed
to promote the Betamax was far more actively engaged in the advertising
campaign, and petitioners have not argued .that its liability differs in any
way from that of Sony Corporation and Sony Corporation of America.
42
The "staple article of commerce" doctrine protects those who manufac41
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of patent law, based in part on considerations irrelevant to
the field of copyright, see generally Dawson Chemical Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187-199 (1980), should be
imported wholesale into copyright law. Despite their common constitutional source, the development of patent and
copyright protections has not been parallel and this Court has
borrowed patent concepts in copyright cases sparingly in the
past. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339,
34fh346 (1908).
We recognize, however, that many of the concerns underlying the "staple article of commerce" doctrine are present in
copyright law as well. As the District Court not~_d, if liability for contributory infringement were imposed on the manufacturer or seller of every product used to infringe-a typewriter, a camera, a photocopying machine-the "wheels of
commerce" would be blocked. 480 F. Supp., at 461; see also
Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62 (1911). The
copyright owner's monopoly would be used to prevent legitimate uses of the product, as well as infringing uses.
We therefore conclude that if a~fica~ion of the
product's use is noniili'ringin$, the manuractllrersimd sellers
cannofbe held contributorily liable for the product's infring-
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ture products incorporated into or used with patented inventions-for example, the paper and ink used with patented printing machines, Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), or the dry ice used with patented refrigeration systems, Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27
(1931). Because a patent-holder has the right to control the use of the patented item as well as its manufacture, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 509--510 (1917); 35 U. S. C. 271(a),
such protection is necessary to prevent patent-holders from extending
thedir mon.opoli~s bbly ;uppress~nhg chompetitiond .in unpaStentDed compCohnent~
E _ > ? a !II • ;(;;.,),
an supp 11es sUlta e 10r use Wit t e patente 1tem. ee awson emtcal Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 197-198 (1980). The doctrine ~ ~ ~~ .•
of contributory patent infringement has been the subject of attention by '-::
. - ~ -- -- ~
the courts and by Congress, see id., at 202-212, and has been codified since
~ ~__,h1952, 66 Stat. 792, but was never mentioned during the copyright law revi- ~ ;_ -~ ~~
sion process as having any relevance to contributory copyright
___ ~rz1 infringement.
~A..~ )
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ing uses. If virtually all of the product's use is to infringe,
however, contributory liability may be imposed. In such a
case, the copyright owner's monopoly would not be extended
beyond its proper bounds; the manufacturer of such a product
contributes to the infringing activities of others and profits
directly thereby, while providing no benefit to the public sufficient to justify the infringement.

c
The Court of Appeals concluded that Sony should be held
liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that "[v]ideotape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the
primary purpose of reproducing television programming,"
and "[v]irtually all television programming is copyrighted
material." 659 F. 2d, at 975. While we agree with the first
of these propositions, 43 the second is problematic. The key
question is not the amount of television ro ammingthatis
copyr1g ted, but rat er tlie amoun o TR usa e that is infr_!ngj~g.44 Moreover, t e parties and their amici have argued vigorously about both the amount of television programming that is covered by copyright and the amount for
which permission to copy has been given. The proportion of
VTR recording that is infring!ng is primarily a questi.Qn of
.faCt, 46 ana-the District Court specifically declined to make
43
Although VTRs also may be used to watch prerecorded video cassettes
and to make home motion pictures, these uses do not require a tuner such
as the Betamax contains. See n. 3, supra. The Studios do not object to
Sony's sale of VTRs without tuners. Brief for Respondents 5, n. 9. In
considering the noninfringing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses
that would remain possible without the Betamax's built-in tuner should not
be taken into account.
44
Noninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that
have never been protected by copyright, recording works that have entered the public domain, recording with permission of the copyright owner,
and, of course, any recording that qualifies as fair use. See, e. g.,
Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 809 (ND Cal. 1979) (use of
home VTR for market research studies).
46
Sony asserts that much or most television broadcasting is available for
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findings on the "percentage of legal versus illegal home-use
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. In light of our view of the
law, resolution of this factual question is essential. We
therefore remand for further consideration by the District
Court.
VI
The Court of Appeals, having found Sony liable, remanded
for the District Court to reconsider the propriety of injunctive or other relief. Because of our disposition of the issue of
liability, we, too, do not decide what remedy would be appropriate if liability were found. We concur, however, in the
Court of Appeals' suggestion that some form of limited injunction, or an award of damages or continuing royalties in
lieu of injunctive relief, may well be an appropriate means of
balancing the equities in this case. 46 Although we express no
home recording because (1) no copyright owners other than the Studios
have brought infringement actions, and (2) much televised material is ineligible for copyright protection because videotapes of the broadcasts are not
kept. The first of these assertions is irrelevant; Sony's liability does not
turn on the fact that only two copyright owners thus far have brought suit.
The amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of
the television market as a whole. Sony's second assertion is based on a
faulty premise; the Copyright Office permits audiovisual works transmitted by television to be registered by deposit of sample frames plus a description of the work. See 37 CFR §§ 202.20(c)(2)(ii) and 202.21(g) (1982).
Moreover, although an infringement action cannot be brought unless the
work is registered, 17 U. S. C. § 411(a), registration is not a condition of
copyright protection. § 408(a). Copying an unregistered work is still infringement. Cf. § 506(a) (liability for criminal copyright infringement; not
conditioned on prior registration).
44
0ther Nations have imposed royalties on the manufacturers of products used to infringe copyright. See, e. g., Copyright Laws and Treaties
of the World (UNESCO/BNA 1982) (English translation), reprinting Federal Act On Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related
Rights (Austria), § 42(5)-(7), and An Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights (Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 53(5). A study produced for the Commission of European Communities has recommended
that these requirements "serve as a pattern" for the European community.
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view on the merits of any particular proposal, we are certain
that, if Sony is found liable in this case, the District Court
will be able to fashion appropriate relief. The District Court
may conclude, of course, that a continuing royalty or other
equitable relief is not feasible in this case. The Studios then
would be relegated to statutory damages for proven instances of infringement. But the difficulty of fashioning relief, and the possibility that complete relief may be unavailable, cannot affect our interpretation of the statute.
Like so many other problems created by the interaction of
copyright law with a new technology, "[t]here can be no
really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here,
until Congress acts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 167 (THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting).
But in the absence of a congressional solution, courts cannot
avoid difficult problems by refusing to apply the law. We
must "take the Copyright Act ... as we find it," Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 401-402 (1968), and
"do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright principles ... until the Congress legislates." Id., at 404 (dissenting opinion).
VII
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. No costs are allowed.
It is so ordered.

A. Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community 135 (1978). While
these royalty systems ordinarily depend on the existence of authors' collecting societies, see id., at 119, 136, such collecting societies are a familiar
part of our copyright law. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1979). Fashioning relief
of this sort, of course, might require bringing other copyright owners into
court through certification of a class or otherwise.
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dissenting.
~
A restatement of the facts and judicial history of this case
/ /?" • "
is necessary, in my view, for a proper focus upon the issues. ~ P' ~
Respondents' position is hardly so "unprecedented," ante, at
2, in the copyright law, nor does it really embody a "gross
generalization," ante, at 17, or a "novel theory of liability,"
ante, at 18, and the like, as the Court, in belittling their
claims, describes the efforts of respondents.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

I
The introduction of the home videotape recorder (VTR)
upon the market has enabled millions of Americans to make
recordings of television programs in their homes, for future
and repeated viewing at their own convenience. While this
practice has proved highly popular with owners of television
sets and VTRs, it understandably has been a matter of concern for the holders of copyrights in the recorded programs.
A result is the present litigation, raising the issues whether
the home recording of a copyrighted television program is an
infringement of the copyright, and, if so, whether the manufacturers and distributors of VTRs are liable as contributory
infringers. I would hope that these questions ultimately will
be considered seriously and in depth by the Congress and be
resolved there, despite the fact that the Court's decision today provides little incentive for congressional action. Our
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task in the meantime, however, is to resolve these issues as
best we can in the light of ill-fitting existing copyright law.
It is no answer, of course, to say and stress, as the Court
does, this Court's "consistent deference to Congress" whenever "major technological innovations" appear. Ante, at 12.
Perhaps a better and more accurate description is that the
Court has tended to evade the hard issues when they arise in
the area of copyright law. I see no reason for the Court to
be particularly pleased with this tradition or to continue it.
Indeed, it is fairly clear from the legislative history of the
1976 Act that Congress meant to change the old pattern and
enact a statute that would cover new technologies, as well as
old.
II
In 1976, respondents Universal City Studios, Inc., and
Walt Disney Productions (Studios) brought this copyright infringement action in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California against, among others, petitioners Sony Corporation, a Japanese corporation, and Sony Corporation of America, a New York corporation, the manufacturer and distributor, respectively, of the Betamax VTR.
The Studios sought damages, profits, and a wide-ranging injunction against further sales or use of the Betamax or
Betamax tapes.
The Betamax, like other VTRs, presently is capable of recording television broadcasts off the air on videotape cassettes, and playing them back at a later time. 1 Two kinds of
The Betamax has three primary components: a tuner that receives television ("RF") signals broadcast over the airwaves; an adapter that converts the RF signals into audio-video signals; and a recorder that places
the audio-video signals on magnetic tape. Sony also manufactures VTRs
without built-in tuners; these are capable of playing back prerecorded
tapes and recording home movies on videotape, but cannot record off the
air. Since the Betamax has its own tuner, it can be used to record off one
channel while another channel is being watched.
The Betamax is available with auxiliary features, including a timer, a
pause control, and a fast-forward control; these allow Betamax owners to
1
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Betamax usage are at issue here. 2 The first is "time-shifting," whereby the user records a program in order to watch it
at a later time, and then records over it, and thereby erases
the program, after a single viewing. The second is "librarybuilding," in which the user records a program in order to
keep it for repeated viewing over a longer term. Sony's advertisements, at various times, have suggested that Betamax
users "record favorite shows" or "build a library." Sony's
Betamax advertising has never contained warnings about
copyright infringement, although a warning does appear in
the Betamax operating instructions.
The Studios produce copyrighted "movies" and other
works that they release to theaters and license for television
broadcast. They also rent and sell their works on film and
on prerecorded videotapes and videodiscs. License fees for
television broadcasts are set according to audience ratings,
compiled by rating services that do not measure any playbacks of videotapes. The Studios make the serious claim
that VTR recording may result in a decrease in their revenue from licensing their works to television and from marketing them in other ways.
Mter a 5-week trial, the District Court, with a detailed
opinion, ruled that home VTR recording did not infringe the
Studios' copyrights under either the Act of March 4, 1909
(1909 Act), 35 Stat. 1075, as amended (formerly codified as 17
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)), or the Copyright Revision Act
of 1976 (1976 Act), 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq.
(1982 ed.). 3 The District Court also held that even if home
record programs without being present, to avoid (if they are present) recording commercial messages, and to skip over commercials while playing
back the recording. Videotape is reusable; the user erases its record by
recording over it.
2
This case involves only the home recording for home use of television
programs broadcast free over the airwaves. No issue is raised concerning
cable or pay television, or the sharing or trading of tapes.
8
At the trial, the Studios proved 32 individual instances where their
copyrighted works were recorded on Betamax VTRs. Two of these in-
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VTR recording were an infringement, Sony could not be held
liable under theories of direct infringement, contributory infringement, or vicarious liability. Finally, the court concluded that an injunction against sales of the Betamax would
be inappropriate even if Sony were liable under one or more
of those theories. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed in virtually every respect. 659 F. 2d 963 (1981).
It held that the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act contained no implied exemption for "home use" recording, that such recording was not "fair use," and that the use of the Betamax to
record the Studios' copyrighted works infringed their copyrights. The Court of Appeals also held Sony liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that Sony knew and anticipated that the Betamax would be used to record copyrighted
material off the air, and that Sony, indeed, had induced,
caused, or materially contributed to the infringing conduct.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District
Court for appropriate relief; it suggested that the District
Court could consider the award of damages or a continuing
royalty in lieu of an injunction. I d., at 976.

III
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8,
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." This Nation's initial copyright statute was
passed by the First Congress. Entitled "An Act for the encouragement of learning," it gave an author "the sole right
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending"
stances occurred after January 1, 1978, the primary effective date of the
1976 Act; all the others occurred while the 1909 Act was still effective.
My analysis focuses primarily on the 1976 Act, but, as is shown below, the
principles governing copyright protection for these works are the same
under either Act.
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his "map, chart, book or books" for a period of 14 years. Act
of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, as the technology available to authors for creating and preserving their
writings has changed, the governing statute has changed
with it. By many amendments, and by complete revisions in
1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976, 4 authors' rights have been expanded to provide protection to any "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," including "motion pictures and other audiovisual works." 17
U. S. C. § 102(a). 5
• Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 85-111,
16 Stat. 212-217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified as 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1982 ed.).
5
Section 102(a) provides:
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
"(1) literary works;
"(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
"(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
"(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
"(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
"(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
"(7) sound recordings."
Definitions of terms used in § 102(a)(6) are provided by § 101:
"Audiovisual works" are "works that consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." And "motion pictures" are "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion,
together with accompanying sounds, if any." Most commercial television
programs, if fixed on film or tape at the time of broadcast or before, qualify
as "audiovisual works." Since the categories set forth in § 102(a) are not
mutually exclusive, a particular television program may also qualify for
protection as a dramatic, musical, or other type of work.
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Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the owner of a copyright
a variety of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, 6 including the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords." 7 This grant expressly is made subject to
§§ 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limitations on the copyright owner's rights. The most important
of these sections, for present purposes, is § 107; that section
states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an
infringement of copyright." 8
• Section 106 provides:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly."
'A ''phonorecord" is defined by § 101 as a reproduction of sounds other
than sounds accompanying an audiovisual work, while a "copy'' is a reproduction of a work in any form other than a phonorecord.
8
Section 107 provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
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The 1976 Act, like its predecessors, 9 does not give the
copyright owner full and complete control over all possible
uses of his work. If the work is put to some use not enumerated in § 106, the use is not an infringement. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 393-395
(1968). Thus, before considering whether home videotaping
comes within the scope of the fair use exemption, one first
must inquire whether the practice appears to violate the exclusive right, granted in the first instance by § 106(1), "to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords."
A
Although the word "copies" is in the plural in § 106(1),
there can be no question that under the Act the making of
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."
Section 101 makes it clear that the four factors listed in this section are
"illustrative and not limitative."
9
The 1976 Act was the product of a revision effort lasting more than 20
years. Spurred by the recognition that "significant developments in technology and communications" had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate, S.
Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 47 (1976),
Congress in 1955 authorized the Copyright Office to prepare a series of
studies on all aspects of the existing copyright law. Thirty-four studies
were prepared and presented to Congress. The Register of Copyrights
drafted a comprehensive report with recommendations, House Committee
on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Register's 1961 Report), and general revision
bills were introduced near the end of the 88th Congress in 1964. H. R.
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong. , 2d Sess. (1964). The Register issued a second
report in 1965, with revised recommendations. House Committee on the
Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright
Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong. , 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965) (Register's Supplementary Report). Action on copyright revision was delayed
from 1967 to 1974 by a dispute on cable television, see generally Second
Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1975 Revision Bill, ch. V, pp. 2-26 (Draft
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even a single unauthorized copy is prohibited. The Senate
and House Reports explain: "The references to 'copies or
phonorecords,' although in the plural, are intended here and
throughout the bill to include the singular (1 U. S. C. § 1)." 10
S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 58 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); H. R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 61 (1976) (1976 House Report). The
Reports then describe the reproduction right established by
§ 106(1):
"[T]he right 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material
object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.'
As under the present law, a copyrighted work would be
infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial
part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or
simulation." 1975 Senate Report 58; 1976 House Report
61.

The making of even a single videotape recording at home falls
within this definition; the VTR user produces a material object from which the copyrighted work later can be perceived.
Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making
of a single copy for personal use, I must conclude that VTR
recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by
§ 106(1).
The 1976 Act and its accompanying reports specify in some
detail the situations in which a single copy of a copyrighted
work may be made without infringement concerns. Section
108(a), for example, permits a library or archives "to reproOct.-Dec. 1975) (Register's Second Supplementary Report), but a compromise led to passage of the present Act in 1976.
10
1 U. S. C. § 1 provides in relevant part:
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . words importing the plural include the
singular.... "
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duce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work" for a
patron, but only under very limited conditions; an entire
work, moreover, can be copied only if it cannot be obtained
elsewhere at a fair price. 11 § 108(e); see also § 112(a) (broadcaster may "make no more than one copy or phonorecord of a
particular transmission program," and only under certain
conditions). In other respects, the making of single copies is
permissible only within the limited confines of the fair use
doctrine. The Senate report, in a section headed "Single and
multiple copying," notes that the fair use doctrine would permit a teacher to make a single copy of a work for use in the
classroom, but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such
as a novel or treatise. 1975 Senate Report 63-64; accord,
1976 House Report 68-{)9, 71. Other situations in which the
making of a single copy would be fair use are described in the
House and Senate reports. 12 But neither the statute nor its
legislative history suggests any intent to create a general exemption for a single copy made for personal or private use.
Indeed, it appears that Congress considered and rejected
the very possibility of a special private use exemption. The
issue was raised early in the revision process, in one of the
studies prepared for Congress under the supervision of the
Copyright Office. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works
The library photocopying provisions of § 108 do not excuse any person
who requests "a copy" from a library if the requester's use exceeds fair
use. § 108(f)(2). Moreover, a library is absolved from liability for the unsupervised use of its copying equipment provided that the equipment bears
a notice informing users that "the making of a copy'' may violate the copyright law. § 108(f)(1).
12
For example, "the making of a single copy or phonorecord by an individual as a free service for a blind person" would be a fair use, as would "a
single copy reproduction of an excerpt from a copyrighted work by a calligrapher for a single client" or "a single reproduction of excerpts from a copyrighted work by a student calligrapher or teacher in a learning situation."
1975 Senate Report 6&-67; see 1976 House Report 73-74. Application of
the fair use doctrine in these situations, of course, would be unnecessary if
the 1976 Act created a general exemption for the making of a single copy.
11
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(1958), reprinted in Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960) (Latman Fair Use Study). This
study found no reported case supporting the existence of an
exemption for private use, although it noted that "the purpose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the small
amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general principles of fair use in such a way as to deny liability." I d., at 12.
After reviewing a number of foreign copyright laws that contained explicit statutory exemptions for private or personal
use, id., at 25, Professor Latman outlined several approaches
that a revision bill could take to the general issue of exemptions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of particularized rules to cover specific situations, including "the field
of personal use." !d., at 33. 13
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copyrights recommended that the revised copyright statute simply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and exemptions to cover specific situations, 14 preferring, instead, to
13
Professor Latman made special mention of the "personal use" issue be·
cause the area was one that
"has become disturbed by recent developments . . . . Photoduplication
devices may make authors' and publishers' groups apprehensive. The
Copyright Charter recently approved by [the International Confederation
of Societies of Authors and Composers] emphasizes the concern of authors
over 'private' uses which, because of technological developments, are said
to be competing seriously with the author's economic interests." Latman
Fair Use Study 33--34.
14
The one exemption proposed by the Register, permitting a library to
make a single photocopy of an out-of-print work and of excerpts that a requester certified were needed for research, met with opposition and was
not included in the bills initially introduced in Congress. See Register's
1961 Report 26; H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Register's Supplementary Report 26. A library copying provision was restored
to the bill in 1969, after pressure from library associations. Register's
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rely on the judge-made fair use doctrine to resolve new problems as they arose. See Register's 1961 Report 25; Register's Supplementary Report 27-28.
The Register's approach was reflected in the first copyright revision bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1964.
These bills, like the 1976 Act, granted the copyright owner
the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, subject only to the exceptions set out in later sections. H. R.
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., §5(a) (1964). The primary exception was fair use, § 6, containing language virtually identical to § 107 of the 1976 Act. Although the copyright revision bills underwent change in many respects from
their first introduction in 1964 to their final passage in 1976,
these portions of the bills did not change. 16 I can conclude only that Congress, like the Register, intended to rely
on the fair use doctrine, and not on a per se exemption for
private use, to separate permissible copying from the
Second Supplementary Report, ch. III, pp. 10-11; seeS. 543, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., § 108 (Comm. Print Dec. 10, 1969); 1975 Senate Report 48.
'"The 1964 bills provided that the fair use of copyrighted material for
purposes "such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research" was not an infringement of copyright, and listed four
"factors to be considered" in determining whether any other particular use
was fair. H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1964). Revised
bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1965, contained a fair use provision
merely mentioning the doctrine but not indicating its scope: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is
not an infringement of copyright." H. R. 4347/S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 107 (1965). The House Judiciary Committee restored the provision to its earlier wording, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5,
58 (1966), and the language adopted by the Committee remained in the bill
in later Congresses. See H. R. 2512/S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107
(1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., § 107 (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1973); H. R.
2223/S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1975). With a few additions by
the House Judiciary Committee in 1976, see 1976 House Report 5; H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, p. 70 (1976), the same language appears in§ 107 of
the 1976 Act.
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impermissible. 16
When Congress intended special and protective treatment
for private use, moreover, it said so explicitly. One such explicit statement appears in § 106 itself. The copyright own8
' In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), decided
during the process of the revision of the copyright statutes, the Court of
Claims suggested that copying for personal use might be outside the scope
of copyright protection under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that because "hand copying" for personal use has always been regarded as permissible, and because the practice of making personal copies continued after
typewriters and photostat machines were developed, the making of personal copies by means other than hand copying should be permissible as
well. /d., at 84-88, 487 F. 2d, at 1350-1352.
There appear to me to be several flaws in this reasoning. First, it is
by no means clear that the making of a "hand copy'' of an entire work is
permissible; the most that can be said is that there is no reported case
on the subject, possibly because no copyright owner ever thought it worthwhile to sue. See Latman Fair Use Study 11-12; 3M. Nimmer, Copyright
§ 13.05[E][4][a] (1982). At least one early treatise asserted that infringement would result ''if an individual made copies for his personal use, even
in his own handwriting, as there is no rule of law excepting manuscript
copies from the law of infringment." A. Well, American Copyright Law
§ 1066 (1917). Second, hand copying or even copying by typewriter is selflimiting. The drudgery involved in making hand copies ordinarily ensures
that only necessary and fairly small portions of a work are taken; it is unlikely that any user would make a hand copy as a substitute for one that
could be purchased. The harm to the copyright owner from hand copying
thus is minimal. The recent advent of inexpensive and readily available
copying machines, however, has changed the dimensions of the problem.
See Register's Second Supplementary Report ch. III, p. 3; Hearings on
H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 194 (1975) (1975 House Hearings) (remarks of Rep. Danielson);
id., at 234 (statement of Robert W. Cairns); id., at 250 (remarks of Rep.
Danielson); id., at 354 (testimony of Irwin Karp); id., at 467 (testimony of
Rondo Cameron); id., at 1795 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights). Thus, "[t]he supposition that there is no tort involved in a
scholar copying a copyrighted text by hand does not much advance the
question of machine copying." B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 101-102 (1967).
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er's exclusive right to perform a copyrighted work, in contrast to his right to reproduce the work in copies, is limited.
Section 106(4) grants a copyright owner the exclusive right to
perform the work "publicly," but does not afford the owner
protection with respect to private performances by others.
A motion picture is "performed" whenever its images are
shown or its sounds are made audible. § 101. Like "sing[ing] a copyrighted lyric in the shower," Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 (1975), watching
television at home with one's family and friends is now considered a performance. 1975 Senate Report 5~0; 1976
House Report 63. 17 Home television viewing nevertheless
does not infringe any copyright-but only because § 106(4)
contains the word "publicly." 18 See generally 1975 Senate
Report 60-61; 1976 House Report 63--64; Register's 1961 Report 29-30. No such distinction between public and private
uses appears in § 106(1)'s prohibition on the making of
copies. 19
In a trio of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390,
398 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
415 U. S. 394, 403-405 (1974); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U. S. 151 (1975), this Court had held that the reception of a
radio or television broadcast was not a "perfonnance" under the 1909 Act.
The Court's "narrow construction" of the word ''perfonn" was "completely
overturned by the [1976 Act] and its broad definition of 'perfonn' in section
101." 1976 House Report 87.
18
A work is perfonned "publicly" if it takes place "at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
nonnal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." § 101.
19
One purpose of the exemption for private perfonnances was to permit
the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes. The Register noted in
1961 that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not believe the private use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by
copyright." Register's 1961 Report 30 (emphasis added). The Register
did not suggest that the private making of a reproduction of a televised
motion picture would be permitted by the copyright law. The Register
later reminded Congress that "[i]n general the concept of 'perfonnance'
17
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Similarly, an explicit reference to private use appears in
§ 108. Under that section, a library can make a copy for a
patron only for specific types of private use: "private study,
scholarship, or research."~ §§ 108(d)(1) and (e)(l); see 37
CFR §201.14(b) (1982). Limits also are imposed on the extent of the copying and the type of institution that may make
copies, and the exemption expressly is made inapplicable to
motion pictures and certain other types of works. § 108(h).
These limitations would be wholly superfluous if an entire
copy of any work could be made by any person for private
use. 21
B
The District Court in this case nevertheless concluded that
the 1976 Act contained an implied exemption for "home-use
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 444 446. The court relied primarily on the legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the
1909 Act, a reliance that this Court today does not duplicate.
Ante, at 11, n. 11. That amendment, however, was addressed to the specific problem of commercial piracy of sound
recordings. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amendment). The House Report on the 1971 Amendment, in a section entitled "Home Recording," contains the following
statement:
must be distinguished sharply from the reproduction of copies." Register's Supplementary Report 22.
00
During hearings on this provision, Representative Danielson inquired
whether it would apply to works of fiction such as "Gone With the Wind,"
or whether it was limited to "strictly technical types of information." The
uncontradicted response was that it would apply only in "general terms of
science . . . [and] the useful arts." 1975 House Hearings 251 (testimony of
Robert W. Cairns); cf. id., at 300 (statement of Harry Rosenfield) (''We are
not asking . . . for the right to copy 'Gone With the Wind'").
21
The mention in the Senate and House Reports of situations in which
copies for private use would be permissible under the fair use doctrine-for
example, the making of a free copy for a blind person, 1975 Senate Report
66; 1975 House Report 73, or the "recordings of performances by music students for purposes of analysis and criticism," 1975 Senate Report 63would be superfluous as well. See n. 12, supra.

81-1687-DISSENT
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

15

"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use
and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it. This practice is common and
unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers would be in no different position from that of the
owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions
over the past 20 years." H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7
(1971) (1971 House Report).
Similar statements were made during House hearings on the
bill 22 and on the House floor, 23 although not in the Senate pro22
The following exchange took place during the testimony of Barbara
Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights:
"[Rep.] Biester. . .. I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own
home: My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set.... [T]his legislation, of
course, would not point to his activities, would it?
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' I have
spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question
is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' The answer I have
given and will give again is that this is something you cannot control. You
simply cannot control it. My own opinion, whether this is philosophical
dogma or not, is that sooner or later there is going to be a crunch here.
But that is not what this legislation is addressed to, and I do not see the
crunch coming in the immediate future .... I do not see anybody going
into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or forcing legislation that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.''
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23 (1971)
(1971 House Hearings).
28
Shortly before passage of the bill, a colloquy took place between Representative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee that pro-
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ceedings. In concluding that these statements created a
general exemption for home recording, the District Court, in
my view, paid too little heed to the context in which the
statements were made, and failed to consider the limited purpose of the 1971 Amendment and the structure of the 1909
Act.
Unlike television broadcasts and other types of motion pictures, sound recordings were not protected by copyright
prior to the passage of the 1971 Amendment. Although the
underlying musical work could be copyrighted, the 1909 Act
provided no protection for a particular performer's rendition
of the work. Moreover, copyrighted musical works that had
been recorded for public distribution were subject to a "compulsory license": any person was free to record such a work
upon payment of a 2-cent royalty to the copyright owner.
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075-1076. While reproduction without payment of the royalty was an infringement under the 1909 Act,
damages were limited to three times the amount of the unpaid royalty. § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081-1082; Shapiro, Bernstein
& Co. v. Goody, 248 F. 2d 260, 262-263, 265 (CA2 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U. S. 952 (1958). It was observed that the pracduced the bill, and Representative Kazen, who was not on the committee:
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes.
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to record off of a program which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used
it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not
be included under the penalties of this bill?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gentleman raises the point.
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' Members will note
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for;
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be
fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is
made clear in the report." 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749 (1971).
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tical effect of these provisions was to legalize record piracy.
See S. Rep. No. 92-72, p. 4 (1971); 1971 House Report 2.
In order to suppress this piracy, the 1971 Amendment extended copyright protection beyond the underlying work and
to the sound recordings themselves. Congress chose, however, to provide only limited protection: owners of copyright
in sound recordings were given the exclusive right "[t]o reproduce [their works] and distribute [them] to the public."
1971 Amendment, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17
U. S. C. § 1(f) (1976 ed.)). 24 This right was merely the right
of commercial distribution. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34748--34749
(1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen & Kastenmeier) ("the bill
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only").
Against this background, the statements regarding home
recording under the 1971 Amendment appear in a very different light. If home recording was "common and unrestrained" under the 1909 Act, see 1971 House Report 7, it
was because sound recordings had no copyright protection
and the owner of a copyright in the underlying musical work
could collect no more than a 2-cent royalty plus 6 cents in
damages for each unauthorized use. With so little at stake,
it is not at all surprising that the Assistant Register "d[id]
not see anybody going into anyone's home and preventing
this sort of thing." 1971 House Hearings 23.
But the references to home sound recording in the 1971
Amendment's legislative history demonstrate no congres24
The 1909 Act's grant of an exclusive right to "copy,"§ 1(a), was of no
assistance to the owner of a copyright in a sound recording, because areproduction of a sound recording was technically considered not to be a
"copy." See 1971 House Hearings 18 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights); 1971 Amendment, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.)) ("For the purposes of [specified sections, not including § 1(a)], but not for any other purpose, a
reproduction of a [sound recording] shall be considered to be a copy
thereof"). This concept is carried forward into the 1976 Act, which
distinguishes between "copies" and "phonorecords." Seen. 7, supra.
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sional intent to create a generalized home use exemption
from copyright protection. Congress, having recognized
that the 1909 Act had been unsuccessful in controlling home
sound recording, addressed only the specific problem of commercial record piracy. To quote Assistant Register Ringer
again, home use was "not what this legislation [was] addressed to." 1971 House Hearings 22. 25
While the 1971 Amendment narrowed the sound recordings loophole in then existing copyright law, motion pictures
and other audiovisual works have been accorded full copyright protection since at least 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912,
37 Stat. 488, and perhaps before, see Edison v. Lubin, 122 F.
240 (CA3 1903), app. dism'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904). Congress
continued this protection in the 1976 Act. Unlike the sound
recording rights created by the 1971 Amendment, the reproduction rights associated with motion pictures under
§ 106(1) are not limited to reproduction for public distribution; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work exists independently, and the "mere duplication of a copy may
constitute an infringement even if it is never distributed."
Register's Supplementary Report 16; see 1975 Senate Report
57 and 1976 House Report 61. Moreover, the 1976 Act was
intended as a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of copyright law. The reports accompanying the 1976 Act, unlike
the 1971 House Report, contain no suggestion that home-use
recording is somehow outside the scope of this all-inclusive
211

During consideration of the 1976 Act, Congress, of course, was well
aware of the limited nature of the protection granted to sound recordings
under the 1971 Amendment. See 1975 House Hearings 113 (testimony of
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (1971 Amendment "created a
copyright in a sound recording .. . but limited it to the particular situation
of so-called piracy''); id., at 1380 (letter from John Lorenz, Acting Librarian of Congress) (under 1971 Amendment "only the unauthorized reproduction and distribution to the public of copies of the sound recording is prohibited. Thus, the duplication of sound recordings for private, personal
use and the performance of sound recordings through broadcasting or
other means are outside the scope of the amendment").

-
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statute. It was clearly the intent of Congress that no additional exemptions were to be implied. 26
I therefore find in the 1976 Act no implied exemption to
cover the home taping of television programs, whether it be
for a single copy, for private use, or for home use. Taping a
copyrighted television program is infringement unless it is
permitted by the fair use exemption contained in § 107 of the
1976 Act. I now turn to that issue.
IV
Fair Use
The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (CA2
1939); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA51980); Meeropol
v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434
U. S. 1013 (1978). Although courts have constructed lists of
factors to be considered in determining whether a particular
use is fair, 27 no fixed criteria have emerged by which that
Representative Kastenmeier, the principal House sponsor of the 1976
revision bill and chainnan of the House subcommittee that produced it,
made this explicit on the opening day of the House hearings:
"[F]rom time to time, certain areas have not been covered in the bill.
But is it not the case, this being a unified code, that the operation of the bill
does apply whether or not we specifically deal with a subject or not? ...
"Therefore, we can really not fail to deal with an issue. It will be dealt
with one way or the other. The code, title 17, will cover it. So we have
made a conscious decision even by omission. . . .
"By virtue of passing this bill, we will deal with every issue. Whether
we deal with it completely or not for the purpose of resolving the issues
involved is the only question, not whether it has dealt with the four corners
of the bill because the four corners of the bill will presume to deal with everything in copyright." 1975 House Hearings 115.
27
The precise phrase "fair use" apparently did not enter the case law
until 1869, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (CC
Mass.), but the doctrine itself found early expression in Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841). Justice Story was faced there
211

81-1687-DISSENT
20

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

determination can be made. This Court thus far has provided no guidance; although fair use issues have come here
twice, on each occasion the Court was equally divided and
no opinion was forthcoming. Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420
U. S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9
1956), aff'd sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U. S. 43
(1958).

Nor did Congress provide clear rules when it codified the
fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply incorporated a list
of factors "to be considered": the "purpose and character of
the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the "amount
and substantiality of the portion used," and, perhaps the
most important, the "effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work" (emphasis supplied). § 107. No particular weight, however, was assigned
to any of these, and the list was not intended to be exclusive.
The House and Senate Reports explain that § 107 does no
more than give "statutory recognition" to the fair use doctrine; it was intended "to restate the present judicial doctrine
with the "intricate and embarrassing questio[n]" whether a biography containing copyrighted letters was "a justifiable use of the original materials,
such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs." I d., at 344, 348. In determining whether the use was permitted, it
was necessary, said Justice Story, to consider "the nature and objects of
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work. . . . Much must, in such
cases, depend upon the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the
copies, and the degree in which the original authors may be injured
thereby." Id., at 348-349.
Similar lists were compiled by later courts. E. g., Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA5), cert. denied, 398
U. S. 928 (1970); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F. 2d 73,
85 (CA6 1943); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
137 F. Supp. 348 (SD Cal. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier
& $on Co., 26 U. S. P. Q. 40, 43 (SDNY 1934); Hill v. Whalen & Martell,
Inc., 220 F . 359, 360 (SDNY 1914).
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of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."
1976 House Report 66. See 1975 Senate Report 62; S. Rep.
No. 93-983, p. 116 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 32 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
61 (1966).
A
Despite this absence of clear standards, the fair use doctrine plays a crucial role in the law of copyright. The purpose of copyright protection, in the words of the Constitution, is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an
incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219
(1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards
the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127-128 (1932); see
H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909).
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of
Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to promote. An obvious example is the researcher or scholar
whose own work depends on the ability to refer to and to
quote the work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could
create a new work if he were first required to repeat the research of every author who had gone before him. 28 The
scholar, like the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain with each copyright owner for permission to quote from
"The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our
predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself.' " Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945).
28
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or refer to prior works. But there is a crucial difference between the scholar and the ordinary user. When the ordinary
user decides that the owner's price is too high, and forgoes
use of the work, only the individual is the loser. When the
scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own
work suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to
knowledge. The scholar's work, in other words, produces
external benefits from which everyone profits. In such a
case, the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at
the first author's expense-to permit the second author to
make limited use of the first author's work for the public
good. See Latman Fair Use Study 31; Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case
and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982).
A similar subsidy may be appropriate in a range of areas
other than pure scholarship. The situations in which fair use
is most commonly recognized are listed in§ 107 itself; fair use
may be found when a work is used "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship,
or research." The House and Senate Reports expand on this
list somewhat, 29 and other examples may be found in the case
law. 30 Each of these uses, however, reflects a common
21

Quoting from the Register's 1961 Report, the Senate and House Reports give examples of possible fair uses:
"'quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration
or comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work,
for illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody
of some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located
in the scene of an event being recorded.'" 1975 Senate Report 61-62; 1976
House Report 65.
80
See, e. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers,
Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1980) (comparative advertising).
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theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's
work. 31 The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works
to be used for "socially laudable purposes." See Copyright
Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975
House Hearings 2051, 2055. I am aware of no case in which
the reproduction of a coyprighted work for the sole benefit of
the user has been held to be fair use. 32
I do not suggest, of course, that every productive use is a
fair use. A finding of fair use still must depend on the facts
of the individual case, and on whether, under the circumstances, it is reasonable to expect the user to bargain with
the copyright owner for use of the work. The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by
the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create,
81
Professor Seltzer has characterized these lists of uses as ''reflect[ing]
what in fact the subject matter of fair use has in the history of its adjudication consisted in: it has always had to do with the use by a second author of
a first author's work." L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright
24 (1978) (emphasis removed). He distinguishes "the mere reproduction
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be
called the 'ordinary' use of it." When copies are made for "ordinary'' use
of the work, "ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered, not
notions of fair use" (emphasis in original). Ibid. See also M. Nimmer,
Copyright§ 13.05[A][1] (1982) ("Use of a work in each of the foregoing contexts either necessarily or usually involves its use in a derivative work").
82
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), involved the photocopying of scientific journal articles; the Court of Claims
stressed that the libraries performing the copying were "devoted solely to
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge," 203 Ct. Cl., at
91, 487 F. 2d, at 1354, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if
such library photocopying were stopped. " ld., at 95, 487 F. 2d, at 1356.
The issue of library copying is now covered by § 108 of the 1976 Act.
That section, which Congress regarded as "authoriz[ing] certain photocopying practices which may not qualify as a fair use," 1975 Senate Report
67; 1976 House Report 74, permits the making of copies only for "private
study, scholarship, or research." § 108(d)(l) and (e)(1).
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and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly
will reduce the creative ability of others. 33 The inquiry is
necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situations that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules.
But when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its
original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of fair use usually does not apply. There is then no
need whatsoever to provide the ordinary user with a fair use
subsidy at the author's expense.
The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is
an ordinary rather than a productive use of the Studios' copyrighted works. The District Court found that "Betamax
owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original.
They add nothing of their own." 480 F. Supp., at 453. Although applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR recording, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material
broadcast free over the public airwaves, I think Sony's argument misconceives the nature of copyright. Copyright gives
the author a right to limit or even to cut off access to his
work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932).
A VTR recording creates no public benefit sufficient to justify limiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the
copyright owner's choice to make the work available over the
airwaves. Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the copyright
owner the exclusive right to control the performance and the
reproduction of his work, and the fact that he has licensed a
single television performance is really irrelevant to the existence of his right to control its reproduction. Although a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this fact is
In the words of Lord Mansfield: "[W]e must take care to guard against
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have
employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts be retarded." Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361 n. (b), 102
Eng. Rep. 139, 140 n. (b) (K. B. 1785). See Register's Supplementary
Report 13.
33
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equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public library
may not be copied any more freely than a book that is
purchased.
It may be tempting, as, in my view, the Court today is
tempted, to stretch the doctrine of fair use so as to permit
unfettered use of this new technology in order to increase access to television programming. But such an extension risks
eroding the very basis of copyright law, by depriving authors
of control over their works and consequently of their incentive to create. 34 Even in the context of highly productive
educational uses, Congress has avoided this temptation; in
passing the 1976 Act, Congress made it clear that off-the-air
videotaping was to be permitted only in very limited situations. See 1976 House Report 71; 1975 Senate Report 64.
And, the Senate report adds, "[t]he committee does not intend to suggest ... that off-the-air recording for convenience
would under any circumstances, be considered 'fair use."'
I d., at 66. I cannot disregard these admonitions.
114
This point was brought home repeatedly by the Register of Copyrights. Mentioning the "multitude of technological developments" since
passage of the 1909 Act, including "remarkable developments in the use
of video tape," Register's Supplementary Report xiv-xv, the Register
cautioned:
"I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in
communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author's
copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commercial interests who wish to use the author's works for private gain. An
equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the
public welfare who fully recognize . . . 'that the real heart of civilization
.. . owes its existence to the author'; ironically, in seeking to make the author's works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions,
they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nurtures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting
demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the fundamental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing
the author's exclusive rights to him for a limited time." Id., at xv; see
1975 House Hearings 117 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights).
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I recognize, nevertheless, that there are situations where
permitting even an unproductive use would have no effect on
the author's incentive to create, that is, where the use would
not affect the value of, or the market for, the author's work.
Photocopying an old newspaper clipping to send to a friend
may be an example; pinning a quotation on one's bulletin
board may be another. In each of these cases, the effect on
the author is truly de minimis. Thus, even though these
uses provide no benefit to the public at large, no purpose is
served by preserving the author's monopoly, and the use may
be regarded as fair.
Courts should move with caution, however, in depriving
authors of protection from unproductive "ordinary'' uses.
As has been noted above, even in the case of a productive
use, § 107(4) requires consideration of "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work" (emphasis added). "[A] particular use which may
seem to have little or no economic impact on the author's
rights today can assume tremendous importance in times to
come." Register's Supplementary Report 14. Although
such a use may seem harmless when viewed in isolation,
"[i]solated instances of minor infringements, when multiplied
many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." 1975 Senate Report 65.
I therefore conclude that, at least when the proposed use is
an unproductive one, a copyright owner need prove only a potential for harm to the market for or the value of the copyrighted work. See 3M. Nimmer, Copyright§ 13.05[E][4][c],
p. 1~ (1982). Proof of actual harm, or even probable
harm, may be impossible in an area where the effect of a new
technology is speculative, and requiring such proof would
present the "real danger . . . of confining the scope of an author's rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as
the years go by, his copyright loses much of its value because
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of unforeseen technical advances." Register's Supplementary Report 14. Infringement thus would be found if the
copyright owner demonstrates a reasonable possibility that
harm will result from the proposed use. When the use is one
that creates no benefit to the public at large, copyright protection should not be denied on the basis that a new technology that may result in harm has not yet done so.
The Studios have identified a number of ways in which
VTR recording could damage their copyrights. VTR recording could reduce their ability to market their works in
movie theaters and through the rental or sale of pre-recorded
videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce their rerun audience, and consequently the license fees available to them
for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers may be willing to pay for only "live" viewing audiences, if they believe
VTR viewers will delete commercials or if rating services are
unable to measure VTR use; if this is the case, VTR recording could reduce the license fees the Studios are able to
charge even for first-run showings. Library-building may
raise the potential for each of the types of harm identified by
the Studios, and time-shifting may raise the potential for substantial harm as well. 85
36

A VTR owner who has taped a favorite movie for repeated viewing

will be less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same movie, watch a

televised rerun, or pay to see the movie at a theater. Although time-shifting may not replace theater or rerun viewing or the purchase of prerecorded tapes or discs, it may well replace rental usage; a VTR user who has
recorded a first-run movie for later viewing will have no need to rent a
copy when he wants to see it. Both library-builders and time-shifters may
avoid commercials; the library builder may use the pause control to record
without them, and all users may fast-forward through commercials on
playback.
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting and
librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works.
See 480 F. Supp., at 440. The District Court's findings also show substantial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both sides submitted
surveys showing that the average Betamax user owns between 25 and 32
tapes. The Studios' survey showed that at least 40% of users had more
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Although the District Court found no likelihood of hann
from VTR use, 480 F. Supp., at 468, I conclude that it applied an incorrect substantive standard and misallocated the
burden of proof. The District Court reasoned that the Studios had failed to prove that library-building would occur "to
any significant extent," id., at 467; that the Studios' prerecorded videodiscs could compete with VTR recordings and
were "arguably ... more desirable," ibid; that it was "not
clear that movie audiences will decrease," id., at 468; and
that the practice of deleting commercials "may be too tedious" for many viewers, ibid. To the extent any decrease
in advertising revenues would occur, the court concluded that
the Studios had "marketing alternatives at hand to recoup
some of that predicted loss." I d., at 452. Because the Studios' prediction of hann was "based on so many assumptions
and on a system of marketing which is rapidly changing," the
court was "hesitant to identify 'probable effects' of home-use
copying." Ibid.
The District Court's reluctance to engage in prediction in
this area is understandable, but, in my view, the court was
mistaken in concluding that the Studios should bear the risk
created by this uncertainty. The Studios have demonstrated a potential for hann, which has not been, and could
not be, refuted at this early stage of technological
development.
The District Court's analysis of hann, moreover, failed to
consider the effect of VTR recording on "the potential market for or the value of the copyrighted work," as required by
§ 107(4). 36 The requirement that a putatively infringing use
than 10 tapes in a "library"; Sony's survey showed that more than 40% of
users planned to view their tapes more than once; and both sides' surveys
showed that commercials were avoided at least 25% of the time. I d., at
438-439.
36
Concern over the impact of a use upon ''potential" markets is to be
found in cases decided both before and after § 107 lent Congress' imprimatur to the judicially-created doctrine of fair use. See, e. g., Iowa State
University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
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of a copyrighted work, to be "fair," must not impair a "potential" market for the work has two implications. First, an infringer cannot prevail merely by demonstrating that the
copyright holder suffered no net harm from the infringer's action. Indeed, even a showing that the infringement has resulted in a net benefit to the copyright holder will not suffice.
Rather, the infringer must demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright holder's ability to demand compensation
from (or to deny access to) any group who would otherwise be
willing to pay to see or hear the copyrighted work. Second,
the fact that a given market for a copyrighted work would not
be available to the copyright holder were it not for the infringer's activities does not permit the infringer to exploit
that market without compensating the copyright holder.
See Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F. 2d 57 (CA2 1980).
In this case, the Studios and their amici demonstrate that
the advent of the the VTR technology created a potential
market for their copyrighted programs. That market consists of those persons who find it impossible or inconvenient
to watch the programs at the time they are broadcast, and
who wish to watch them at other times. These persons are
willing to pay for the privilege of watching copyrighted work
at their convenience, as is evidenced by the fact that they are
willing to pay for VTRs and tapes; undoubtedly, most also
621 F. 2d 57, 60 (CA21980) ("the effect of the use on the copyright holder's
potential market for the work"); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1070
(CA2 1977) ("A key issue in fair use cases is whether the defendant's work
tends to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of plaintiff's work"), cert.
denied, 434 U. S. 1013 (1978); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,
203 Ct. Cl. 74, 88, 487 F. 2d 1345, 1352 (1973) ("the effect of the use on a
copyright owner's potential market for and value of his work"), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975); Encyclopaedia Britannica
Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1173 (WDNY 1982)
("[T]he concern here must be focused on a copyrighted work's potential
market. It is perfectly possible that plaintiffs' profits would have been
greater, but for the kind of videotaping in question") (emphasis in original).
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would be willing to pay some kind of royalty to copyright
holders. The Studios correctly argue that they have been
deprived of the ability to exploit this sizable market.
It is thus apparent from the record and from the findings of
the District Court that time-shifting does have a substantial
adverse effect upon the "potential market for" the Studios'
copyrighted works. Accordingly, even under the formulation of the fair use doctrine advanced by Sony, time-shifting
cannot be deemed a fair use.

v
Contributory Infringement
From the Studios' perspective, the consequences of home
VTR recording are the same as if a business had taped the
Studios' works off the air, duplicated the tapes, and sold or
rented them to members of the public for home viewing.
The distinction is that home VTR users do not record for
commercial advantage; the commercial benefit accrues to the
manufacturers and distributors of the Betamax. I thus must
proceed to discuss whether these manufacturers and distributors can be held contributorily liable if the product they sell
is used to infringe.
It is well established that liability for copyright infringement can be imposed on persons other than those who actually carry out the infringing activity. Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911); 3 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A] (1982); see Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 160, n. 11 (1975); Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). Although the
liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner ... is an infringer of the copyright," 17 U. S. C.
§ 501(a), the House and Senate Reports demonstrate that
Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory
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infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report
61.37
The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement, however, is not well-defined. One of the few attempts at definition appears in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971). In that
case the Second Circuit stated that "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held
liable as a 'contributory' infringer." Id., at 1162 (footnote
omitted). While I have no quarrel with this general statement, it does not easily resolve the present case; the District
Court and the Court of Appeals, both purporting to apply it,
reached diametrically opposite results.
A
In absolving Sony from liability, the District Court reasoned that Sony had no direct involvement with individual
Betamax users, did not participate in any off-the-air copying,
and did not know that such copying was an infringement of
the Studios' copyright. 480 F. Supp., at 460. I agree with
the Gershwin court that contributory liability may be imposed even when there has been no direct contact between
the defendant and the infringer. The defendant in Gershwin
was a concert promoter operating through local concert associations that it sponsored; it had no contact with the infringing performers themselves. 443 F. 2d, at 1162-1163. See
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at
87
This intent is manifested further by provisions of the 1976 Act that
exempt from liability persons who, while not participating directly in any
infringing activity, could otherwise be charged with contributory infringement. See § 108(f)(1) (library not liable "for the unsupervised use of reproducing equipment located on its premises," provided that certain
warnings are posted); § 110(6) ("governmental body'' or "nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization" not liable for infringing performance by
concessionaire "in the course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair
or exhibition").
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160, n. 11. Moreover, a finding of contributory infringement
has never depended on actual knowledge of particular instances of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant
have reason to know that infringement is taking place. 443
F. 2d, at 1162; see Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v.
Mark-FiRecords, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966). 38 In
the so-called "dance hall" cases, in which questions of contributory infringement arise with some frequency, proprietors of entertainment establishments routinely are held liable for unauthorized performances on their premises, even
when they have no knowledge that copyrighted works are
being performed. In effect, the proprietors in those cases
are charged with constructive knowledge of the
performances. 89
38
In Screen Gems, on which the Gershwin court relied, the court held
that liability could be imposed on a shipper of unauthorized "bootleg"
records and a radio station that broadcast advertisements of the records,
provided they knew or should have known that the records were infringing. The court concluded that the records' low price and the manner in
which the records were marketed could support a finding of "constructive
knowledge" even if actual knowledge were not shown.
38
See, e. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing &
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977); Dreamland Ball Room,
Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA71929); M. Witmark &
Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Mass.
1960); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 157;
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198-199 (1931); 3 M.
Nimmer, Copyright§ 12.04[A], pp. 12-35 (1982).
Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the defendant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities, see,
e. g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304, 307
(CA21963); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74
(WD Mo. 1977). This notion, however, is to some extent fictional; the defendant cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play
copyrighted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into the
performers' contract. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d, at 1214--1215; KECA Music,
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp., at 75; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (WD La. 1942). Congress expressly re-

81-1687-DISSENT
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

33

Nor is it necessary that the defendant be aware that the
infringing activity violates the copyright laws. Section
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory
damages when an infringer proves he "was not aware and
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright," but the statute establishes no
general exemption for those who believe their infringing activities are legal. Moreover, such an exemption would be
meaningless in a case such as this, in which prospective relief
is sought; once a court has established that the copying at
issue is infringement, the defendants are necessarily aware of
that fact for the future. It is undisputed in this case that
Sony had reason to know the Betarnax would be used by
some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air. See 480
F. Supp., at 459, 460.
The District Court also concluded that Sony had not
caused, induced, or contributed materially to any infringing
activities of Betamax owners. 480 F. Supp., at 460. In a
case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly;
it does not depend on evidence that particular Betamax owners relied on particular advertisements. In an analogous
case decided just two Terms ago, this Court approved a
lower court's conclusion that liability for contributory trademark infringement could be imposed on a manufacturer who
"suggested, even by implication" that a retailer use the manufacturer's goods to infringe the trademark of another.
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456
jected a proposal to exempt proprietors from this type of liability under the
1976 Act. See 1975 Senate Report 141-142; 1976 House Report 159-160;
1975 House Hearings 1812-1813 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights); id. , at 1813 (colloquy between Rep. Pattison and Barbara
Ringer).
The Court's attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground of "control, " ante, at 18, is unpersuasive. The direct infringer ordinarily is not
employed by the person held liable; instead, he is an independent contractor. Neither is he always an agent of the person held liable; Screen Gems
makes this apparent.
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U. S. 844, 851 (1982); see id., at 860 (concurring opinion). I
think this standard is equally appropriate in the copyright
context.
The District Court found that Sony has advertised the
Betamax as suitable for off-the-air recording of "favorite
shows," "novels for television," and "classic movies," 480 F.
Supp., at 436, with no visible warning that such recording
could constitute copyright infringement. It is only with the
aid of the Betamax or some other VTR, that it is possible today for home television viewers to infringe copyright by recording off-the-air. Off-the-air recording is not only a foreseeable use for the Betamax, but indeed is its intended use.
Under the circumstances, I agree with the Court of Appeals
that if off-the-air recording is an infringement of copyright,
Sony has induced and materially contributed to the infringing
conduct of Betamax owners. 40
B

Sony argues that the manufacturer or seller of a product
used to infringe is absolved from liability whenever the product can be put to any substantial noninfringing use. Brief
for Petitioners 41-42. The District Court so held, borrowing
the "staple article of commerce" doctrine governing liability
for contributory infringement of patents. See 35 U. S. C.
§ 271. 41 This Court today is much less positive. See ante, at
"'My conclusion respecting contributory infringement does not include
the retailer defendants. The District Court found that one of the retailer
defendants had assisted in the advertising campaign for the Betamax, but
made no other findings respecting their knowledge of the Betamax's intended uses. I cannot agree with the Court of Appeals, at least on this
record, that the retailers "are sufficiently engaged in the enterprise to be
held accountable," 659 F. 2d, at 976. In contrast, the advertising agency
employed to promote the Betamax was far more actively engaged in the
advertising campaign, and petitioners have not argued that its liability differs in any way from that of Sony Corporation and Sony Corporation of
America.
41
The "staple article of commerce" doctrine protects those who manufacture products incorporated into or used with patented inventions-for ex-
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I do not agree that this technical judge-made doctrine of
patent law, based in part on considerations irrelevant to the
field of copyright, see generally Dawson Chemical Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187-199 (1980), should be
imported wholesale into copyright law. Despite their common constitutional source, see U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8,
patent and copyright protections have not developed in a parallel fashion, and this Court in copyright cases in the past has
borrowed patent concepts only sparingly. See BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345-346 (1908).
I recognize, however, that many of the concerns underlying the "staple article of commerce" doctrine are present in
copyright law as well. As the District Court noted, if liability for contributory infringement were imposed on the manufacture.r or seller of every product used to infringe-a typewriter, a camera, a photocopying machine-the "wheels of
commerce" would be blocked. 480 F. Supp., at 461; see also
Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S., at 62.
I therefore conclude that if a significant portion of the
product's use is noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers
cannot be held contributorily liable for the product's infringing uses. See ante, at 22. If virtually all of the product's
use, however, is to infringe, contributory liability may be im22.

ample, the paper and ink used with patented printing machines, Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), or the dry ice used with patented refrigeration systems, Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27
(1931). Because a patent-holder has the right to control the use of the patented item as well as its manufacture, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 509-510 (1917); 35 U. S. C. 271(a),
such protection for the manufacturer of the incorporated product is necessary to prevent patent-holders from extending their monopolies by suppressing competition in unpatented components and supplies suitable for
use with the patented item. See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 448 U. S. 176, 197-198 (1980). The doctrine of contributory patent
infringement has been the subject of attention by the courts and by Congress, see id., at 202-212, and has been codified since 1952, 66 Stat. 792,
but was never mentioned during the copyright law revision process as having any relevance to contributory copyright infringement.
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posed; if no one would buy the product for noninfringing purposes alone, it is clear that the manufacturer is purposely
profiting from the infringement, and that liability is appropriately imposed. In such a case, the copyright owner's monopoly would not be extended beyond its proper bounds; the
manufacturer of such a product contributes to the infringing
activities of others and profits directly thereby, while providing no benefit to the public sufficient to justify the
infringement.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Sony should be held
liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that "[v]ideotape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the
primary purpose of reproducing television programming,"
and "[v]irtually all television programming is copyrighted
material." 659 F. 2d, at 975. While I agree with the first of
these propositions, 42 the second, for me, is problematic. The
key question is not the amount of television programming
that is copyrighted, but rather the amount of VTR usage that
is infringing. 43 Moreover, the parties and their amici have
argued vigorously about both the amount of television programming that is covered by copyright and the amount for
which permission to copy has been given. The proportion of
VTR recording that is infringing is ultimately a question of
42
Although VTRs also may be used to watch prerecorded video cassettes
and to make home motion pictures, these uses do not require a tuner such
as the Betamax contains. See n. 1, supra. The Studios do not object to
Sony's sale of VTRs without tuners. Brief for Respondents 5, n. 9. In
considering the noninfringing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses
that would remain possible without the Betamax's built-in tuner should not
be taken into account.
43
Noninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that
are not protected by copyright, recording works that have entered the
public domain, recording with permission of the copyright owner, and, of
course, any recording that qualifies as fair use. See, e. g., Bruzzone v.
Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S. P. Q. 809 (ND Cal. 1979) (use of home VTR
for market research studies).
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fact, 44 and the District Court specifically declined to make
findings on the "percentage of legal versus illegal home-use
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. In light of my view of the
law, resolution of this factual question is essential. I therefore would remand the case for further consideration of this
by the District Court.
VI
The Court has adopted an approach very different from the
one I have outlined. It is my view that the Court's approach
alters dramatically the doctrines of fair use and contributory
infringement as they have been developed by Congress and
the courts. Should Congress choose to respond to the
Court's decision, the old doctrines can be resurrected. As it
stands, however, the decision today erodes much of the coherence that these doctrines have struggled to achieve.
The Court's disposition of the case turns on its conclusion
that time-shifting is a fair use. Because both parties agree
that time-shifting is the primary use of VTRs, that conclusion, if correct, would settle the issue of Sony's liability under
almost any definition of contributory infringement. The
Court concludes that time-shifting is fair use for two reasons.
Each is seriously flawed .
.. Sony asserts that much or most television broadcasting is available for
home recording because (1) no copyright owner other than the Studios has
brought an infringement action, and (2) much televised material is ineligible for copyright protection because videotapes of the broadcasts are not
kept. The first of these assertions is irrelevant; Sony's liability does not
turn on the fact that only two copyright owners thus far have brought suit.
The amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of
the television market as a whole. Sony's second assertion is based on a
faulty premise; the Copyright Office permits audiovisual works transmitted by television to be registered by deposit of sample frames plus a description of the work. See 37 CFR §§ 202.20(c)(2)(ii) and 202.21(g) (1982).
Moreover, although an infringement action cannot be brought unless the
work is registered, 17 U. S. C. § 411(a), registration is not a condition of
copyright protection. § 408(a). Copying an unregistered work still may
be infringement. Cf. § 506(a) (liability for criminal copyright infringement; not conditioned on prior registration).
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The Court's first reason for concluding that time-shifting is
fair use is its claim that many copyright holders have no objection to time-shifting, and that "respondents have no right
to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing it for
their programs." Ante, at 23. The Court explains that a
finding of contributory infringement would "inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of
their audience that is available only through time-shifting."
Ante, at 26. Such reasoning, however, simply confuses the
question of liability with the difficulty of fashioning an appropriate remedy. It may be that an injunction prohibiting the
sale of VTRs would harm the interests of copyright holders
who have no objection to others making copies of their programs. But such concerns should and would be taken into
account in fashioning an appropriate remedy once liability has
been found. Remedies may well be available that would not
interfere with authorized time-shifting at all. The Court of
Appeals mentioned the possibility of a royalty payment that
would allow VTR sales and time-shifting to continue unabated, and the parties may be able to devise other narrowly
tailored remedies once liability is found. Sony may be able,
for example, to build a VTR that enables broadcasters to
scramble the signal of individual programs and "jam" the unauthorized recording of them. Even were an appropriate
remedy not available at this time, the Court should not misconstrue copyright holders' rights in a manner that prevents enforcement of them when, through development of
better techniques, an appropriate remedy becomes
available. 45
46
Even if concern with remedy were appropriate at the liability stage,
the Court's use of the District Court's findings is somewhat cavalier. The
Court relies heavily on testimony by representatives of professional sports
leagues to the effect that they have no objection to VTR recording. The
Court never states, however, whether the sports leagues are copyright
holders, and if so, whether they have exclusive copyrights to sports broadcasts. Of course, one who does not hold an exclusive copyright does not
have authority to consent to copying.
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The Court's second stated reason for finding that Sony is
not liable for contributory infringement is its conclusion that
even unauthorized time-shifting is fair use. Ante, at 28.
This conclusion is even more troubling. The Court begins by
suggesting that the fair use doctrine operates as a general
"equitable rule of reason."
That interpretation
mischaracterizes the doctrine, and simply ignores the language of the statute. Section 107 establishes the fair use
doctrine "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship, or research." These are
all productive uses. It is true that the legislative history
states repeatedly that the doctrine must be applied flexibly
on a case-by-case basis, but those references were only in the
context of productive uses. Such a limitation on fair use
comports with its purpose, which is to facilitate the creation
of new works. There is no indication that the fair use doctrine has any application for purely personal consumption on
Assuming that the various sports leagues do have exclusive copyrights
in some of their broadcasts, the amount of authorized time-shifting still
would not be overwhelming. Sony's own survey indicated that only 7.3
percent of all Betamax use is to record sports events of all kinds. Def.
Exh. OT, Table 20. Because Sony's witnesses did not represent all forms
of sports events, moreover, this figure provides only a tenuous basis for
this Court to engage in fact-finding of its own.
The only witness at trial who was clearly an exclusive copyright owner
and who expressed no objection to unauthorized time-shifting was the
owner of the copyright in Mister Rogers' Neighborhood. But the Court
cites no evidence in the record to the effect that anyone makes VTR copies
of that program. The simple fact is that the District Court made no findings on the amount of authorized time-shifting that takes place. The
Court seems to recognize this gap in its reasoning, and phrases its argument as a hypothetical. The Court states: "If there are millions of owners
of VTR's who make copies of televised sports events, religious broadcasts,
and educational programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice," the sale of VTR's
"should not be stifled" in order to protect respondent's copyrights. Ante,
at 26 (emphasis supplied). Given that the Court seems to recognize that
its argument depends on findings that have not been made, it seems that a
remand is inescapable.
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the scale involved in this case, 46 and the Court's application of
it here deprives fair use of the major cohesive force that has
guided evolution of the doctrine in the past.
Having bypassed the initial hurdle for establishing that a
use is fair, the Court then purports to apply to time-shifting
the factors explicitly stated in the statute. The first of the
four statutory factors is "the purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes." § 107(1). The Court
confidently describes time-shifting as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. It is clear, however, that personal use of
programs that have been copied without permission is not the
type of nonprofit activity that § 107(1) envisions. For fair
use purposes, nonprofit activity refers to a productive endeavor the primary benefit of which does not accrue to the
individual actor involved. Time-shifting, in contrast, involves none of the humanitarian impulse that § 107(1) seeks to
encourage. It is likewise something of a mischaracterization
of time-shifting to describe it as noncommercial in the sense
that that term is used in the statute. As one commentator
has observed, time-shifting is noncommercial in the same
sense that stealing jewelry and wearing it-instead of reselling it-is noncommercial. 47 Pur~ly consumptive uses are
certainly not what the fair use doctrine was designed to protect, and the awkwardness of applying the statutory language to time-shifting only makes clearer that fair use was
designed to apply to uses that are productive.
As has been explained, some uses of time-shifting, such as copying
an old newspaper clipping for a friend, are fair use because of their de
minimis effect on the copyright holder. The scale of copying involved in
this case, of course, is of an entirely different magnitude, precluding application of such an exception.
47
Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing before Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 1250 (1982) (memorandum of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe).
46
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The next two statutory factors are all but ignored by the
Court-though certainly not because they have no applicability. The second factor-"the nature of the copyrighted
work"-strongly supports the view that time-shifting is an
infringing use. The rationale guiding application of this factor is that certain types of works, typically those involving
"more of diligence than of originality or inventiveness," New
York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 217, 221 (NJ 1977), require less copyright protection
than other original works. Thus, for example, informational
works, such as news reports, that readily lend themselves to
productive use by others, are less protected than creative
works of entertainment. Sony's own surveys indicate that
entertainment shows account for more than 80 percent of the
programs recorded by Betamax owners. 48
The third statutory factor-"the amount and substantiality
of the portion used"-is even more devastating to the Court's
interpretation. It is undisputed that virtually all VTR owners record entire works, see 480 F. Supp., at 454, thereby
creating an exact substitute for the copyrighted original.
Fair use is intended to allow individuals engaged in productive uses to copy small portions of original works that will facilitate their own productive endeavors. Time-shifting
bears no resemblance to such activity, and the complete
duplication that it involves might alone be sufficient to preclude a finding of fair use. It is little wonder that the Court
has chosen to ignore this aspect of the statute. 49
48

See A Survey of Betamax Owners, R. 2353, Def. Exh. OT, Table 20,
cited in Brief for Respondents 52.
49
The Court's one oblique acknowledgement of this third factor, ante, at
29, seems to suggest that the fact that time-shifting involves copying complete works is not very significant because the viewers already have been
asked to watch the initial broadcast free. This suggestion misses the
point. As has been noted, a book borrowed from a public library may not
be copied any more freely than one that has been purchased. An invitation to view a showing is completely different from an invitation to copy a
copyrighted work.
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The fourth factor requires an evaluation of "the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." This is the factor upon which the Court has
focused, but once again, the Court has misread the statute.
As mentioned above, the statute requires a court to consider
the effect of the use on the potential market for the copyrighted work. The Court has struggled mightily to show
that VTR use has not reduced the value of the Studios' copyrighted works in their present markets. Even if true, that
showing only begins the proper inquiry. The development
of the VTR has created a new market for the works produced
by the Studios. That market consists of those persons who
desire to view television programs at times other than when
they are broadcast, and who therefore purchase VTR recorders to enable them to time-shift. 50 Because time-shifting of
the Studios' copyrighted works involves the copying of them,
however, the Studios are entitled to share in the benefits of
that new market that currently go to Sony through Betamax
sales. Respondents therefore can show harm from VTR use
simply by showing that the value of their copyrights would
increase if they were compensated for the copies that are
used in the new market. The existence of this effect is selfevident.
Because of the Court's conclusion concerning the legality of
time-shifting, it never addresses the amount ofnoninfringing
use that is required. Thus, it is difficult to discuss how the
Court's test for contributory infringement would operate in
practice under a proper analysis of time-shifting. One aspect of the test as it is formulated by the Court, however,
particularly deserves comment. The Court explains that a
The Court implicitly has recognized that this market is very significant. The central concern underlying the Court's entire opinion is that
there is a large audience who would like very much to be able to view programs at times other than when they are broadcast. Ante, at 26. The
Court simply misses the implication of its own concerns.
110
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manufacturer of a product is not liable for contributory infringement as long as the product is "capable of substantial
noninfringing uses." Ante, at 22 (emphasis supplied). Such
a definition essentially eviscerates the concept of contributory infringement. Only the most unimaginative manufacturer would be unable to demonstrate that a image-duplicating product is "capable" of substantial noninfringing uses.
Surely Congress desires to prevent the manufacture of products that are used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights;
the fact that noninfringing uses exist presumably would have
little bearing on that desire.
More importantly, the rationale for the Court's narrow
standard of contributory infringment reveals that, once
again, the Court has confused the issue of liability with that
of remedy. The Court finds that a narrow definition of contributory infringement is necessary in order to protect "the
rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated
areas of commerce." Ante, at 22. But application of the
contributory infringement doctrine need create such a concern only if the remedy attendant upon a finding of liability
were an injunction against the manufacture of the product in
question. The issue of an appropriate remedy is not before
the Court at this time, but it seems likely that an injunction is
not the remedy that would be ordered. It is unfortunate
that the Court has allowed its concern over a remedy to infect
its analysis of liability.
VII
The Court of Appeals, having found Sony liable, remanded
for the District Court to consider the propriety of injunctive
or other relief. Because of my conclusion as to the issue of
liability, I, too, would not decide here what remedy would be
appropriate if liability were found. I concur, however, in
the Court of Appeals' suggestion that an award of damages,
or continuing royalties, or even some form of limited injunction, may well be an appropriate means of balancing the equi-
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ties in this case. 51 Although I express no view on the merits
of any particular proposal, I am certain that, if Sony were
found liable in this case, the District Court would be able to
fashion appropriate relief. The District Court might conclude, of course, that a continuing royalty or other equitable
relief is not feasible. The Studios then would be relegated to
statutory damages for proved instances of infringement.
But the difficulty of fashioning relief, and the possibility that
complete relief may be unavailable, should not affect our interpretation of the statute.
Like so many other problems created by the interaction of
copyright law with a new technology, "[t]here can be no
really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here,
until Congress acts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U. S., at 167 (dissenting opinion). But in the absence of a congressional solution, courts cannot avoid difficult
problems by refusing to apply the law. We must "take the
Copyright Act ... as we find it," Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 401-402 (1968), and "do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright principles . . .
until the Congress legislates." I d., at 404 (dissenting
opinion).
Other Nations have imposed royalties on the manufacturers of products used to infringe copyright. See, e. g., Copyright Laws and Treaties
of the World (UNESCO/BNA 1982) (English translation), reprinting Federal Act On Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related
Rights (Austria), § 42(5}-(7), and An Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights (Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 53(5). A study produced for the Commission of European Communities has recommended
that these requirements "serve as a pattern" for the European community.
A. Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community 135 (1978). While
these royalty systems ordinarily depend on the existence of authors' collecting societies, see id., at 119, 136, such collecting societies are a familiar
part of our copyright law. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc ., 441 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1979). Fashioning relief
of this sort, of course, might require bringing other copyright owners into
court through certification of a class or otherwise.
"
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL
joins, dissenting.
A restatement of the facts and judicial history of this case
is necessary, in my view, for a proper focus upon the issues.
Respondents' position is hardly so "unprecedented," ante, at
2, in the copyright law, nor does it really embody a "gross
generalization," ante, at 17, or a "novel theory of liability,"
ante, at 18, and the like, as the Court, in belittling their
claims, describes the efforts of respondents.
I
The introduction of the home videotape recorder (VTR)
upon the market has enabled millions of Americans to make
recordings of television programs in their homes, for future
and repeated viewing at their own convenience. While this
practice has proved highly popular with owners of television
sets and VTRs, it understandably has been a matter of concern for the holders of copyrights in the recorded programs.
A result is the present litigation, raising the issues whether
the home recording of a copyrighted television program is an
infringement of the copyright, and, if so, whether the manufacturers and distributors of VTRs are liable as contributory
infringers. I would hope that these questions ultimately will
be considered seriously and in depth by the Congress and be
resolved there, despite the fact that the Court's decision to-
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day provides little incentive for congressional action. Our
task in the meantime, however, is to resolve these issues as
best we can in the light of ill-fitting existing copyright law.
It is no answer, of course, to say and stress, as the Court
does, this Court's "consistent deference to Congress" whenever "major technological innovations" appear. Ante, at 12.
Perhaps a better and more accurate description is that the
Court has tended to evade the hard issues when they arise in
the area of copyright law. I see no reason for the Court to
be particularly pleased with this tradition or to continue it.
Indeed, it is fairly clear from the legislative history of the
1976 Act that Congress meant to change the old pattern and
enact a statute that would cover new technologies, as well as
oldr
II
In 1976, respondents Universal City Studios, Inc., and
Walt Disney Productions (Studios) brought this copyright infringement action in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California against, among others, petitioners Sony Corporation, a Japanese corporation, and Sony Corporation of America, a New York corporation, the manufacturer and distributor, respectively, of the Betamax VTR.
The Studios sought damages, profits, and a wide-ranging injunction against further sales or use of the Betamax or
Betamax tapes.
The Betamax, like other VTRs, presently is capable of recording television broadcasts off the air on videotape cassettes, and playing them back at a later time.' Two kinds of
1
The Betamax has three primary components: a tuner that receives television ("RF") signals broadcast over the airwaves; an adapter that converts the RF signals into audio-video signals; and a recorder that places
the audio-video signals on magnetic tape. Sony also manufactures VTRs
without built-in tuners; these are capable of playing back prerecorded
tapes and recording home movies on videotape, but cannot record off the
air. Since the Betamax has its own tuner, it can be used to record off one
channel while another channel is being watched.
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Betamax usage are at issue here. 2 The first is "time-shifting," whereby the user records a program in order to watch it
at a later time, and then records over it, and thereby erases
the program, after a single viewing. The second is "librarybuilding," in which the user records a program in order to
keep it for repeated viewing over a longer term. Sony's advertisements, at various times, have suggested that Betamax
users "record favorite shows" or "build a library." Sony's
Betamax advertising has never contained warnings about
copyright infringement, although a warning does appear in
the Betamax operating instructions.
The Studios produce copyrighted "movies" and other
works that they release to theaters and license for television
broadcast. They also rent and sell their works on film and
on prerecorded videotapes and videodiscs. License fees for
television broadcasts are set according to audience ratings,
compiled by rating services that do not measure any playbacks of videotapes. The Studios make the serious claim
that VTR recording may result in a decrease in their revenue from licensing their works to television and from marketing them in other ways.
After a 5-week trial, the District Court, with a detailed
opinion, ruled that home VTR recording did not infringe the
Studios' copyrights under either the Act of March 4, 1909
(1909 Act), 35 Stat. 1075, as amended (formerly codified as 17
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)), or the Copyright Revision Act
of 1976 (1976 Act), 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq.
The Betamax is available with auxiliary features, including a timer, a
pause control, and a fast-forward control; these allow Betamax owners to
record programs without being present, to avoid (if they are present) recording commercial messages, and to skip over commercials while playing
back the recording. Videotape is reusable; the user erases its record by
recording over it.
2
This case involves only the home recording for home use of television
programs broadcast free over the airwaves. No issue is raised concerning
cable or pay television, or the sharing or trading of tapes.
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(1982 ed.). 3 The District Court also held that even if home
VTR recording were an infringement, Sony could not be held
liable under theories of direct infringement, contributory infringement, or vicarious liability. Finally, the court concluded that an injunction against sales of the Betamax would
be inappropriate even if Sony were liable under one or more
of those theories. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed in virtually every respect. 659 F. 2d 963 (1981).
It held that the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act contained no implied exemption for "home use" recording, that such recording was not "fair use," and that the use of the Betamax to
record the Studios' copyrighted works infringed their copyrights. The Court of Appeals also held Sony liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that Sony knew and anticipated that the Betamax would be used to record copyrighted
material off the air, and that Sony, indeed, had induced,
caused, or materially contributed to the infringing conduct.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District
Court for appropriate relief; it suggested that the District
Court could consider the award of damages or a continuing
royalty in lieu of an injunction. I d., at 976.

III
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8,
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." This Nation's initial copyright statute was
passed by the First Congress. Entitled "An Act for the encouragement of learning," it gave an author "the sole right
At the trial, the Studios proved 32 individual instances where their
copyrighted works were recorded on Betamax VTRs. Two of these instances occurred after January 1, 1978, the primary effective date of the
1976 Act; all the others occurred while the 1909 Act was still effective.
My analysis focuses primarily on the 1976 Act, but the principles governing copyright protection for these works are the same under either Act.
8
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and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending"
his "map, chart, book or books" for a period of 14 years. Act
of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, as the technology available to authors for creating and preserving their
writings has changed, the governing statute has changed
with it. By many amendments, and by complete revisions in
1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976, 4 authors' rights have been expanded to provide protection to any "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," including "motion pictures and other audiovisual works." 17
U. S. C. § 102(a). 5
• Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 8&-111,
16 Stat. 212-217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909,35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17
U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified as 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1982 ed.).
~Section 102(a) provides:
"Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
"(1) literary works;
"(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
"(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
"(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
"(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
"(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
"(7) sound recordings."
Definitions of terms used in § 102(a)(6) are provided by § 101:
"Audiovisual works" are "works that consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." And "motion pictures" are "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion,
together with accompanying sounds, if any." Most commercial television
programs, if fixed on film or tape at the time of broadcast or before, qualify
as "audiovisual works." Since the categories set forth in § 102(a) are not
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Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the owner of a copyright
a variety of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, 6 including the right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords." 7 This grant expressly is made subject to
§§ 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limitations on the copyright owner's rights. The most important
of these sections, for present purposes, is § 107; that section
states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an
infringement of copyright." 8
mutually exclusive, a particular television program may also qualify for
protection as a dramatic, musical, or other type of work.
6
Section 106 provides:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly."
' A "phonorecord" is defined by § 101 as a reproduction of sounds other
than sounds accompanying an audiovisual work, while a "copy" is a reproduction of a work in any form other than a phonorecord.
8
Section 107 provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
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The 1976 Act, like its predecessors, 9 does not give the
copyright owner full and complete control over all possible
uses of his work. If the work is put to some use not enumerated in § 106, the use is not an infringement. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 393-395
(1968). Thus, before considering whether home videotaping
comes within the scope of the fair use exemption, one first
must inquire whether the practice appears to violate the exclusive right, granted in the first instance by § 106(1), "to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords."
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."
Section 101 makes it clear that the four factors listed in .this section are
"illustrative and not limitative."
9
The 1976 Act was the product of a revision effort lasting more than 20
years. Spurred by the recognition that "significant developments in technology and communications" had rendered the 1909 Act inadequate, S.
Rep. No. 94-473, p. 47 (1975); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 47 (1976),
Congress in 1955 authorized the Copyright Office to prepare a series of
studies on all aspects of the existing copyright law. Thirty-four studies
were prepared and presented to Congress. The Register of Copyrights
drafted a comprehensive report with recommendations, House Committee
on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Comm. Print 1961) (Register's 1961 Report), and general revision
bills were introduced near the end of the 88th Congress in 1964. H. R.
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The Register issued a second
report in 1965, with revised recommendations. House Committee on the
Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright
Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965) (Register's Supplementary Report). Action on copyright revision was delayed
from 1967 to 1974 by a dispute on cable television, see generally Second
Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1975 Revision Bill, ch. V, pp. 2-26 (Draft
Oct.-Dec. 1975) (Register's Second Supplementary Report), but a compromise led to passage of the present Act in 1976.
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A
Although the word "copies" is in the plural in § 106(1),
there can be no question that under the Act the making of
even a single unauthorized copy is prohibited. The Senate
and House Reports explain: "The references to 'copies or
phonorecords,' although in the plural, are intended here and
throughout the bill to include the singular (1 U. S. C. § 1)." 10
S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 58 (1975) (1975 Senate Report); H. R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 61 (1976) (1976 House Report). The
Reports then describe the reproduction right established by
§ 106(1):
"[T]he right 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material
object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.'
As under the present law, a copyrighted work would be
infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial
part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or
simulation." 1975 Senate Report 58; 1976 House Report
61.

The making of even a single videotape recording at home falls
within this definition; the VTR user produces a material object from which the copyrighted work later can be perceived.
Unless Congress intended a special exemption for the making
of a single copy for personal use, I must conclude that VTR
recording is contrary to the exclusive rights granted by
§ 106(1).
The 1976 Act and its accompanying reports specify in some
detail the situations in which a single copy of a copyrighted
1 U. S. C. § 1 provides in relevant part:
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . words importing the plural include the
singular.... "
10
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work may be made without infringement concerns. Section
108(a), for example, permits a library or archives "to reproduce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work" for a
patron, but only under very limited conditions; an entire
work, moreover, can be copied only if it cannot be obtained
elsewhere at a fair price. 11 § 108(e); see also § 112(a) (broadcaster may "make no more than one copy or phonorecord of a
particular transmission program," and only under certain
conditions). In other respects, the making of single copies is
permissible only within the limited confines of the fair use
doctrine. The Senate report, in a section headed "Single and
multiple copying," notes that the fair use doctrine would permit a teacher to make a single copy of a work for use in the
classroom, but only if the work was not a "sizable" one such
as a novel or treatise. 1975 Senate Report 63-64; accord,
1976 House Report 6~9, 71. Other situations in which the
making of a single copy would be fair use are described in the
House and Senate reports. 12 But neither the statute nor its
legislative history suggests any intent to create a general exemption for a single copy made for personal or private use.
Indeed, it appears that Congress considered and rejected
the very possibility of a special private use exemption. The
issue was raised early in the revision process, in one of the
11
The library photocopying provisions of § 108 do not excuse any person
who requests "a copy" from a library if the requester's use exceeds fair
use. § 108(f)(2). Moreover, a library is absolved from liability for the unsupervised use of its copying equipment provided that the equipment bears
a notice informing users that "the making of a copy" may violate the copyright law. § 108(f)(1).
12
For example, "the making of a single copy or phonorecord by an individual as a free service for a blind person" would be a fair use, as would "a
single copy reproduction of an excerpt from a copyrighted work by a calligrapher for a single client" or "a single reproduction of excerpts from a copyrighted work by a student calligrapher or teacher in a learning situation."
1975 Senate Report 66--67; see 1976 House Report 73-74. Application of
the fair use doctrine in these situations, of course, would be unnecessary if
the 1976 Act created a general exemption for the making of a single copy.
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studies prepared for Congress under the supervision of the
Copyright Office. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works
(1958), reprinted in Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960) (Latman Fair Use Study). This
study found no reported case supporting the existence of an
exemption for private use, although it noted that "the purpose and nature of a private use, and in some cases the small
amount taken, might lead a court to apply the general principles of fair use in such a way as to deny liability." I d., at 12.
After reviewing a number of foreign copyright laws that contained explicit statutory exemptions for private or personal
use, id., at 25, Professor Latman outlined several approaches
that a revision bill could take to the general issue of exemptions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of particularized rules to cover specific situations, including "the field
of personal use." Id., at 33. 13
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copyrights recommended that the revised copyright statute simply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and exemptions to cover specific situations, 14 preferring, instead, to
13
Professor Latman made special mention of the "personal use" issue because the area was one that
"has become disturbed by recent developments . . . . Photoduplication
devices may make authors' and publishers' groups apprehensive. The
Copyright Charter recently approved by [the International Confederation
of Societies of Authors and Composers] emphasizes the concern of authors
over 'private' uses which, because of technological developments, are said
to be competing seriously with the author's economic interests." Latman
Fair Use Study 33-34.
"The one exemption proposed by the Register, permitting a library to
make a single photocopy of an out-of-print work and of excerpts that a requester certified were needed for research, met with opposition and was
not included in the bills initially introduced in Congress. See Register's
1961 Report 26; H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Regis-
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rely on the judge-made fair use doctrine to resolve new problems as they arose. See Register's 1961 Report 25; Register's Supplementary Report 27-28.
The Register's approach was reflected in the first copyright revision bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1964.
These bills, like the 1976 Act, granted the copyright owner
the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, subject only to the exceptions set out in later sections. H. R.
11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 5(a) (1964). The primary exception was fair use, § 6, containing language virtually identical to § 107 of the 1976 Act. Although the copyright revision bills underwent change in many respects from
their first introduction in 1964 to their final passage in 1976,
these portions of the bills did not change. 15 I can conclude only that Congress, like the Register, intended to rely
on the fair use doctrine, and not on a per se exemption for
ter's Supplementary Report 26. A library copying provision was restored
to the bill in 1969, after pressure from library associations. Register's
Second Supplementary Report, ch. III, pp. 10-11; see S. 543, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., § 108 (Comm. Print Dec. 10, 1969); 1975 Senate Report 48.
15
The 1964 bills provided that the fair use of copyrighted material for
purposes "such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research" was not an infringement of copyright, and listed four
"factors to be considered" in determining whether any other particular use
was fair. H. R. 11947/S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., §6 (1964). Revised
bills, drafted by the Copyright Office in 1965, contained a fair use provision
merely mentioning the doctrine but not indicating its scope: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is
not an infringement of copyright." H. R. 4347/S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 107 (1965). The House Judiciary Committee restored the provision to its earlier wording, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5,
58 (1966), and the language adopted by the Committee remained in the bill
in later Congresses. See H. R. 2512/S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107
(1967); S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., § 107 (1971); S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1973); H. R.
2223/S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107 (1975). With a few additions by
the House Judiciary Committee in 1976, see 1976 House Report 5; H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, p. 70 (1976), the same language appears in§ 107 of
the 1976 Act.
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private use, to separate permissible copying from the
impermissible.'6
When Congress intended special and protective treatment
for private use, moreover, it said so explicitly. One such ex16
In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), decided
during the process of the revision of the copyright statutes, the Court of
Claims suggested that copying for personal use might be outside the scope
of copyright protection under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that because ''hand copying" for personal use has always been regarded as permissible, and because the practice of making personal copies continued after
typewriters and photostat machines were developed, the making of personal copies by means other than hand copying should be permissible as
well. Id., at 84--88, 487 F. 2d, at 1350-1352.
There appear to me to be several flaws in this reasoning. First, it is
by no means clear that the making of a "hand copy" of an entire work is
permissible; the most that can be said is that there is no reported case
on the subject, possibly because no copyright owner ever thought it worthwhile to sue. See Latman Fair Use Study 11-12; 3M. Nimmer, Copyright
§ 13.05[E][4][a] (1982). At least one early treatise asserted that infringement would result ''if an individual made copies for his personal use, even
in his own handwriting, as there is no rule of law excepting manuscript
copies from the law ofinfringment." A. Weil, American Copyright Law
§ 1066 (1917). Second, hand copying or even copying by typewriter is selflimiting. The drudgery involved in making hand copies ordinarily ensures
that only necessary and fairly small portions of a work are taken; it is unlikely that any user would make a hand copy as a substitute for one that
could be purchased. The harm to the copyright owner from hand copying
thus is minimal. The recent advent of inexpens.ive and readily available
copying machines, however, has changed the dimensions of the problem.
See Register's Second Supplementary Report ch. III, p. 3; Hearings on
H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 194 (1975) (1975 House Hearings) (remarks of Rep. Danielson);
id., at 234 (statement of Robert W. Cairns); id., at 250 (remarks of Rep.
Danielson); id., at 354 (testimony of Irwin Karp); id., at 467 (testimony of
Rondo Cameron); id., at 1795 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights). Thus, "[t]he supposition that there is no tort involved in a
scholar copying a copyrighted text by hand does not much advance the
question of machine copying." B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 101-102 (1967).
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plicit statement appears in § 106 itself. The copyright owner's exclusive right to perform a copyrighted work, in contrast to his right to reproduce the work in copies, is limited.
Section 106(4) grants a copyright owner the exclusive right to
perform the work "publicly," but does not afford the owner
protection with respect to private performances by others.
A motion picture is "performed" whenever its images are
shown or its sounds are made audible. § 101. Like "sing[ing] a copyrighted lyric in the shower," Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 (1975), watching
television at home with one's family and friends is now considered a performance. 1975 Senate Report 59-60; 1976
House Report 63. 17 Home television viewing nevertheless
does not infringe any copyright-but only because § 106(4)
contains the word "publicly." 18 See generally 1975 Senate
Report 60-61; 1976 House Report 63--64; Register's 1961 Report 29--30. No such distinction between public and private
uses appears in § 106(1)'s prohibition on the making of
copies. 19
17
In a trio of cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390,
398 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
415 U. S. 394, 403-405 (1974); and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U. S. 151 (1975), this Court had held that the reception of a
radio or television broadcast was not a "performance" under the 1909 Act.
The Court's "narrow construction" of the word "perform" was "completely
overturned by the [1976 Act] and its broad definition of 'perform' in section
101." 1976 House Report 87.
18
A work is performed "publicly" if it takes place "at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered." § 101.
19
One purpose of the exemption for private performances was to permit
the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes. The Register noted in
1961 that "[n]ew technical devices will probably make it practical in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not believe the private use of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by
copyright." Register's 1961 Report 30 (emphasis added). The Register
did not suggest that the private making of a reproduction of a televised
motion picture would be permitted by the copyright law. The Register
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Similarly, an explicit reference to private use appears in
§ 108. Under that section, a library can make a copy for a
patron only for specific types of private use: "private study,
scholarship, or research." 20 §§ 108(d)(1) and (e)(l); see 37
CFR §201.14(b) (1982). Limits also are imposed on the extent of the copying and the type of institution that may make
copies, and the exemption expressly is made inapplicable to
motion pictures and certain other types of works. § 108(h).
These limitations would be wholly superfluous if an entire
copy of any work could be made by any person for private
use. 21
B

The District Court in this case nevertheless concluded that
the 1976 Act contained an implied exemption for "home-use
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 444 446. The court relied primarily on the legislative history of a 1971 amendment to the
1909 Act, a reliance that this Court today does not duplicate.
Ante, at 11, n. 11. That amendment, however, was addressed to the specific problem of commercial piracy of sound
recordings. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amendment). The House Report on the 1971 Amendment, in a seclater reminded Congress that "[i]n general the concept of 'performance'
must be distinguished sharply from the reproduction of copies." Register's Supplementary Report 22.
20
During hearings on this provision, Representative Danielson inquired
whether it would apply to works of fiction such as "Gone With the Wind,"
or whether it was limited to "strictly technical types of information." The
uncontradicted response was that it would apply only in "general terms of
science ... [and] the useful arts." 1975 House Hearings 251 (testimony of
Robert W. Cairns); cf. id., at 300 (statement of Harry Rosenfield) ("We are
not asking . .. for the right to copy 'Gone With the Wind' ").
21
The mention in the Senate and House Reports of situations in which
copies for private use would be permissible under the fair use doctrine-for
example, the making of a free copy for a blind person, 1975 Senate Report
66; 1975 House Report 73, or the "recordings of performances by music students for purposes of analysis and criticism," 1975 Senate Report 63would be superfluous as well. See n. 12, supra.

.
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tion entitled "Home Recording," contains the following
statement:
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use
and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it. This practice is common and
unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers would be in no different position from that of the
owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions
over the past 20 years." H. R. Rep. No. 92-487, p. 7
(1971) (1971 House Report).
Similar statements were made during House hearings on the
bill 22 and on the House floor, 28 although not in the Senate pro22

The following exchange took place during the testimony of Barbara
Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights:
"[Rep.] Biester. . .. I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own
home. My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set.... [T]his legislation, of
course, would not point to his activities, would it?
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.' I have
spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question
is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?' The answer I have
given and will give again is that this is something you cannot control. You
simply cannot control it. My own opinion, whether this is philosophical
dogma or not, is that sooner or later there is going to be a crunch here.
But that is not what this legislation is addressed to, and I do not see the
crunch coming in the immediate future. . . . I do not see anybody going
into anyone's home and preventing this sort of thing, or forcing legislation that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.''
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23 (1971)
(1971 House Hearings).

81-1687-DISSENT
16

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

ceedings. In concluding that these statements created a
general exemption for home recording, the District Court, in
my view, paid too little heed to the context in which the
statements were made, and failed to consider the limited purpose of the 1971 Amendment and the structure of the 1909
Act.
Unlike television broadcasts and other types of motion pictures, sound recordings were not protected by copyright
prior to the passage of the 1971 Amendment. Although the
underlying musical work could be copyrighted, the 1909 Act
provided no protection for a particular performer's rendition
of the work. Moreover, copyrighted musical works that had
been recorded for public distribution were subject to a "compulsory license": any person was free to record such a work
upon payment of a 2-cent royalty to the copyright owner.
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075-1076. While reproduction without payment of the royalty was an infringement under the 1909 Act,
damages were limited to three times the amount of the unpaid royalty. § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1081-1082; Shapiro, Bernstein
& Co. v. Goody, 248 F. 2d 260, 262-263,265 (CA21957), cert.
denied, 355 U. S. 952 (1958). It was observed that the pracza Shortly before passage of the bill, a colloquy took place between Representative Kastenmeier, chairman of the House subcommittee that produced the bill, and Representative Kazen, who was not on the committee:
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes.
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to record off of a program which comes through the air on the radio or television, and then used
it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this use would not
be included under the penalties of this bill?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I am glad the gentleman raises the point.
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,' Members will note
that under the bill the same practice which prevails today is called for;
namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be
fair use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is
made clear in the report." 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34749 (1971).
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tical effect of these provisions was to legalize record piracy.
See S. Rep. No. 92-72, p. 4 (1971); 1971 House Report 2.
In order to suppress this piracy, the 1971 Amendment extended copyright protection beyond the underlying work and
to the sound recordings themselves. Congress chose, however, to provide only limited protection: owners of copyright
in sound recordings were given the exclusive right "[t]o reproduce [their works] and distribute [them] to the public."
1971 Amendment, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17
U. S. C. § 1(f) (1976 ed.)). 24 This right was merely the right
of commercial distribution. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34748-34 749
(1971) (colloquy of Reps. Kazen & Kastenmeier) ("the bill
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only").
Against this background, the statements regarding home
recording under the 1971 Amendment appear in a very different light. If home recording was "common and unrestrained" under the 1909 Act, see 1971 House Report 7, it
was because sound recordings had no copyright protection
and the owner of a copyright in the underlying musical work
could collect no more than a 2-cent royalty plus 6 cents in
damages for each unauthorized use. With so little at stake,
it is not at all surprising that the Assistant Register "d[id]
not see anybody going into anyone's home and preventing
this sort of thing." 1971 House Hearings 23.
But the references to home sound recording in the 1971
Amendment's legislative history demonstrate no congres24

The 1909 Act's grant of an exclusive right to "copy,"§ 1(a), was of no
assistance to the owner of a copyright in a sound recording, because a reproduction of a sound recording was technically considered not to be a
"copy." See 1971 House Hearings 18 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights); 1971 Amendment, § 1(e), 85 Stat. 391 (formerly codified as 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.)) ("For the purposes of [specified sections, not including § 1(a)], but not for any other purpose, a
reproduction of a [sound recording] shall be considered to be a copy
thereof"). This concept is carried forward into the 1976 Act, which
distinguishes between "copies" and "phonorecords." Seen. 7, supra.
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sional intent to create a generalized home use exemption
from copyright protection. Congress, having recognized
that the 1909 Act had been unsuccessful in controlling home
sound recording, addressed only the specific problem of commercial record piracy. To quote Assistant Register Ringer
again, home use was "not what this legislation [was] addressed to." 1971 House Hearings 22. 25
While the 1971 Amendment narrowed the sound recordings loophole in then existing copyright law, motion pictures
and other audiovisual works have been accorded full copyright protection since at least 1912, see Act of Aug. 24, 1912,
37 Stat. 488, and perhaps before, see Edison v. Lubin, 122 F.
240 (CA3 1903), app. dism'd, 195 U. S. 625 (1904). Congress
continued this protection in the 1976 Act. Unlike the sound
recording rights created by the 1971 Amendment, the reproduction rights associated with motion pictures under
§ 106(1) are not limited to reproduction for public distribution; the copyright owner's right to reproduce the work exists independently, and the "mere duplication of a copy may
constitute an infringement even if it is never distributed."
Register's Supplementary Report 16; see 1975 Senate Report
57 and 1976 House Report 61. Moreover, the 1976 Act was
intended as a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of copyright law. The reports accompanying the 1976 Act, unlike
the 1971 House Report, contain no suggestion that home-use
recording is somehow outside the scope of this all-inclusive
:IS During consideration of the 1976 Act, Congress, of course, was well
aware of the limited nature of the protection granted to sound recordings
under the 1971 Amendment. See 1975 House Hearings 113 (testimony of
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (1971 Amendment "created a
copyright in a sound recording ... but limited it to the particular situation
of so-called piracy''); id., at 1380 (letter from John Lorenz, Acting Librarian of Congress) (under 1971 Amendment "only the unauthorized reproduction and distribution to the public of copies of the sound recording is prohibited. Thus, the duplication of sound recordings for private, personal
use and the performance of sound recordings through broadcasting or
other means are outside the scope of the amendment").
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statute. It was clearly the intent of Congress that no additional exemptions were to be implied. 26
I therefore find in the 1976 Act no implied exemption to
cover the home taping of television programs, whether it be
for a single copy, for private use, or for home use. Taping a
copyrighted television program is infringement unless it is
permitted by the fair use exemption contained in § 107 of the
1976 Act. I now turn to that issue.
IV
Fair Use
The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (CA2
1939); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA51980); Meeropol
v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434
U. S. 1013 (1978). Although courts have constructed lists of
factors to be considered in determining whether a particular
use is fair, 27 no fixed criteria have emerged by which that
211
Representative Kastenmeier, the principal House sponsor of the 1976
revision bill and chairman of the House subcommittee that produced it,
made this explicit on the opening day of the House hearings:
"[F]rom time to time, certain areas have not been covered in the bill.
But is it not the case, this being a unified code, that the operation of the bill
does apply whether or not we specifically deal with a subject or not? ...
"Therefore, we can really not fail to deal with an issue. It will be dealt
with one way or the other. The code, title 17, will cover it. So we have
made a conscious decision even by omission. . . .
"By virtue of passing this bill, we will deal with every issue. Whether
we deal with it completely or not for the purpose of resolving the issues
involved is the only question, not whether it has dealt with the four corners
of the bill because the four corners of the bill will presume to deal with everything in copyright." 1975 House Hearings 115.
Z7 The precise phrase "fair use" apparently did not enter the case law
until 1869, see Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (CC
Mass.), but the doctrine itself found early expression in Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841). Justice Story was faced there
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determination can be made. This Court thus far has provided no guidance; although fair use issues have come here
twice, on each occasion the Court was equally divided and
no opinion was forthcoming. Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420
U. S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F. 2d 532 (CA9
1956), aff'd sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U. S. 43
(1958).
Nor did Congress provide definitive rules when it codified
the fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act; it simply incorporated a
list of factors "to be considered": the "purpose and character
of the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the
"amount and substantiality of the portion used," and, perhaps
the most important, the "effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work" (emphasis supplied). § 107. No particular weight, however, was assigned
to any of these, and the list was not intended to be exclusive.
The House and Senate Reports explain that § 107 does no
more than give "statutory recognition" to the fair use doctrine; it was intended "to restate the present judicial doctrine
with the "intricate and embarrassing questio[n]" whether a biography containing copyrighted letters was "a justifiable use of the original materials,
such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs." I d., at 344, 348. In determining whether the use was permitted, it
was necessary, said Justice Story, to consider "the nature and objects of
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work. . . . Much must, in such
cases, depend upon the nature of the new work, the value and extent of the
copies, and the degree in which the original authors may be injured
thereby." Id., at 348-349.
Similar lists were compiled by later courts. See, e. g., Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA5), cert. denied,
398 U. S. 928 (1970); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F. 2d
73, 85 (CA61943); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
137 F. Supp. 348 (SD Cal. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier
& Son Co., 26 U. S. P. Q. 40, 43 (SDNY 1934); Hill v. Whalen & Martell,
Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (SDNY 1914).
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of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."
1976 House Report 66. See 1975 Senate Report 62; S. Rep.
No. 93-983, p. 116 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 32 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
61 (1966).
A
Despite this absence of clear standards, the fair use doctrine plays a crucial role in the law of copyright. The purpose of copyright protection, in the words of the Constitution, is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the
exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an
incentive to create, and that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and the useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219
(1954). The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards
the individual author in order to benefit the public. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127-128 (1932); see
H. R. Rep. Nu. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909).
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of
Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to promote. An obvious example is the researcher or scholar
whose own work depends on the ability to refer to and to
quote the work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could
create a new work if he were first required to repeat the research of every author who had gone before him. 28 The
scholar, like the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain with each copyright owner for permission to quote from
or refer to prior works. But there is a crucial difference be"The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our
predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself."' Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945).
28
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tween the scholar and the ordinary user. When the ordinary
user decides that the owner's price is too high, and forgoes
use of the work, only the individual is the loser. When the
scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own
work suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to
knowledge. The scholar's work, in other words, produces
external benefits from which everyone profits. In such a
case, the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at
the first author's expense-to permit the second author to
make limited use of the first author's work for the public
good. See Latman Fair Use Study 31; Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case
and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1630 (1982).
A similar subsidy may be appropriate in a range of areas
other than pure scholarship. The situations in which fair use
is most commonly recognized are listed in § 107 itself; fair use
may be found when a work is used "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship,
or research." The House and Senate Reports expand on this
list somewhat, 29 and other examples may be found in the case
law. 80 Each of these uses, however, reflects a common
theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added benQuoting from the Register's 1961 Report, the Senate and House Reports give examples of possible fair uses:
" 'quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration
or comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work,
for illustration or clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody
of some of the content of the work parodied; summary of an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a
teacher or student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located
in the scene of an event being recorded.'" 1975 Senate Report 61~2; 1976
House Report 65.
80
See, e. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers ,
Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1980) (comparative advertising).
29
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efit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's
work. 81 The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works
to be used for "socially laudable purposes." See Copyright
Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in 1975
House Hearings 2051, 2055. I am aware of no case in which
the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole benefit of
the user has been held to be fair use. 32
I do not suggest, of course, that every productive use is a
fair use. A finding of fair use still must depend on the facts
of the individual case, and on whether, under the circumstances, it is reasonable to expect the user to bargain with
the copyright owner for use of the work. The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by
the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create,
and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly
81
Professor Seltzer has characterized these lists of uses as "reflect[ing]
what in fact the subject matter of fair use has in the history of its adjudication consisted in: it has always had to do with the use by a second author of
a first author's work." L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright
24 (1978) (emphasis removed). He distinguishes "the mere reproduction
of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be
called the 'ordinary' use of it." When copies are made for "ordinary'' use
of the work, "ordinary infringement has customarily been triggered, not
notions of fair use" (emphasis in original). Ibid. See also M. Nimmer,
Copyright§ 13.05[A][1] (1982) ("Use of a work in each of the foregoing contexts either necessarily or usually involves its use in a derivative work").
82
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 487 F. 2d
1345 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975), involved the photocopying of scientific journal articles; the Court of Claims
stressed that the libraries performing the copying were "devoted solely to
the advancement and dissemination of medical knowledge," 203 Ct. Cl. , at
91 , 487 F. 2d, at 1354, and that "medical science would be seriously hurt if
such library photocopying were stopped." ld., at 95, 487 F. 2d, at 1356.
The issue of library copying is now covered by § 108 of the 1976 Act.
That section, which Congress regarded as "authoriz[ing] certain photocopying practices which may not qualify as a fair use," 1975 Senate Report
67; 1976 House Report 74, permits the making of copies only for "private
study, scholarship, or research." §§ 108(d)(1) and (e)(1).

81-1687-DISSENT
24

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

will reduce the creative ability of others. 33 The inquiry is
necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situations that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules.
But when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its
original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of fair use usually does not apply. There is then no
need whatsoever to provide the ordinary user with a fair use
subsidy at the author's expense.
The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is
an ordinary rather than a productive use of the Studios' copyrighted works. The District Court found that "Betamax
owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original.
They add nothing of their own." 480 F. Supp., at 453. Although applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR recording, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material
broadcast free over the public airwaves, I think Sony's argument misconceives the nature of copyright. Copyright gives
the author a right to limit or even to cut off access to his
work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932).
A VTR recording creates no public benefit sufficient to justify limiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the
copyright owner's choice to make the work available over the
airwaves. Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants the copyright
owner the exclusive right to control the performance and the
reproduction of his work, and the fact that he has licensed a
single television performance is really irrelevant to the existence of his right to control its reproduction. Although a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this fact is
equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public library
33
In the words of Lord Mansfield: "[W]e must take care to guard against
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have
employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts be retarded." Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361 n. (b), 102
Eng. Rep. 139, 140 n. (b) (K. B. 1785). See Register's Supplementary
Report 13.
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may not be copied any more freely than a book that is
purchased.
It may be tempting, as, in my view, the Court today is
tempted, to stretch the doctrine of fair use so as to permit
unfettered use of this new technology in order to increase access to television programming. But such an extension risks
eroding the very basis of copyright law, by depriving authors
of control over their works and consequently of their incentive to create. 34 Even in the context of highly productive
educational uses, Congress has avoided this temptation; in
passing the 1976 Act, Congress made it clear that off-the-air
videotaping was to be permitted only in very limited situations. See 1976 House Report 71; 1975 Senate Report 64.
And, the Senate report adds, "[t]he committee does not intend to suggest ... that off-the-air recording for convenience
would under any circumstances, be considered 'fair use.'"
I d., at 66. I cannot disregard these admonitions.
84
This point was brought home repeatedly by the Register of Copyrights. Mentioning the "multitude of technological developments" since
passage of the 1909 Act, including "remarkable developments in the use
of video tape," Register's Supplementary Report xiv-xv, the Register
cautioned:
"I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in
communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author's
copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commercial interests who wish to use the author's works for private gain. An
equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the
public welfare who fully recognize . . . 'that the real heart of civilization
. . . owes its existence to the author'; ironically, in seeking to make the author's works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions,
they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nurtures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting
demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the fundamental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing
the author's exclusive rights to him for a limited time." Id., at xv; see
1975 House Hearings 117 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights).

81-1687-DISSENT
26

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

B

I recognize, nevertheless, that there are situations where
permitting even an unproductive use would have no effect on
the author's incentive to create, that is, where the use would
not affect the value of, or the market for, the author's work.
Photocopying an old newspaper clipping to send to a friend
may be an example; pinning a quotation on one's bulletin
board may be another. In each of these cases, the effect on
the author is truly de minimis. Thus, even though these
uses provide no benefit to the public at large, no purpose is
served by preserving the author's monopoly, and the use may
be regarded as fair.
Courts should move with caution, however, in depriving
authors of protection from unproductive "ordinary'' uses.
As has been noted above, even in the case of a productive
use, § 107(4) requires consideration of "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work" (emphasis added). "[A] particular use which may
seem to· have little or no economic impact on the author's
rights today can assume tremendous importance in times to
come." Register's Supplementary Report 14. Although
such a use may seem harmless when viewed in isolation,
"[i]solated instances of minor infringements, when multiplied
many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." 1975 Senate Report 65.
I therefore conclude that, at least when the proposed use is
an unproductive one, a copyright owner need prove only a potential for harm to the market for or the value of the copyrighted work. See 3M. Nimmer, Copyright§ 13.05[E][4][c],
p. 13-84 (1982). Proof of actual harm, or even probable
harm, may be impossible in an area where the effect of a new
technology is speculative, and requiring such proof would
present the "real danger ... of confining the scope of an author's rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as
the years go by, his copyright loses much of its value because
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of unforeseen technical advances." Register's Supplementary Report 14. Infringement thus would be found if the
copyright owner demonstrates a reasonable possibility that
harm will result from the proposed use. When the use is one
that creates no benefit to the public at large, copyright protection should not be denied on the basis that a new technology that may result in harm has not yet done so.
The Studios have identified a number of ways in which
VTR recording could damage their copyrights. VTR recording could reduce their ability to market their works in
movie theaters and through the rental or sale of pre-recorded
videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce their rerun audience, and consequently the license fees available to them
for repeated showings. Moreover, advertisers may be willing to pay for only "live" viewing audiences, if they believe
VTR viewers will delete commercials or if rating services are
unable to measure VTR use; if this is the case, VTR recording could reduce the license fees the Studios are able to
charge even for first-run showings. Library-building may
raise the potential for each of the types of harm identified by
the Studios, and time-shifting may raise the potential for substantial harm as well. 35
36
A VTR owner who has taped a favorite movie for repeated viewing
will be less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same movie, watch a
televised rerun, or pay to see the movie at a theater. Although time-shifting may not replace theater or rerun viewing or the purchase of prerecorded tapes or discs, it may well replace rental usage; a VTR user who has
recorded a first-run movie for later viewing will have no need to rent a
copy when he wants to see it. Both library-builders and time-shifters may
avoid commercials; the library builder may use the pause control to record
without them, and all users may fast-forward through commercials on
playback.
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting and
librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works.
See 480 F. Supp., at 440. The District Court's findings also show substantial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both sides submitted
surveys showing that the average Betamax user owns between 25 and 32
tapes. The Studios' survey showed that at least 40% of users had more

'
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Although the District Court found no likelihood of harm
from VTR use, 480 F. Supp., at 468, I conclude that it applied an incorrect substantive standard and misallocated the
burden of proof. The District Court reasoned that the Studios had failed to prove that library-building would occur "to
any significant extent," id., at 467; that the Studios' prerecorded videodiscs could compete with VTR recordings and
were "arguably ... more desirable," ibid; that it was "not
clear that movie audiences will decrease," id., at 468; and
that the practice of deleting commercials "may be too tedious" for many viewers, ibid. To the extent any decrease
in advertising revenues would occur, the court concluded that
the Studios had "marketing alternatives at hand to recoup
some of that predicted loss." I d., at 452. Because the Studios' prediction of harm was "based on so many assumptions
and on a system of marketing which is rapidly changing," the
court was "hesitant to identify 'probable effects' of home-use
copying." Ibid.
The District Court's reluctance to engage in prediction in
this area is understandable, but, in my view, the court was
mistaken in concluding that the Studios should bear the risk
created by this uncertainty. The Studios have demonstrated a potential for harm, which has not been, and could
not be, refuted at this early stage of technological
development.
The District Court's analysis of harm, moreover, failed to
consider the effect of VTR recording on "the potential market for or the value of the copyrighted work," as required by
§ 107(4). 36 The requirement that a putatively infringing use
than 10 tapes in a "library"; Sony's survey showed that more than 40% of
users planned to view their tapes more than once; and both sides' surveys
showed that commercials were avoided at least 25% of the time. Id., at
438-439.
36
Concern over the impact of a use upon "potential" markets is to be
found in cases decided both before and after § 107 lent Congress' imprimatur to the judicially-created doctrine of fair use. See, e. g., Iowa State
University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,

81-1687-DISSENT
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

29

of a copyrighted work, to be "fair," must not impair a "potential" market for the work has two implications. First, an infringer cannot prevail merely by demonstrating that the
copyright holder suffered no net harm from the infringer's action. Indeed, even a showing that the infringement has resulted in a net benefit to the copyright holder will not suffice.
Rather, the infringer must demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright holder's ability to demand compensation
from (or to deny access to) any group who would otherwise be
willing to pay to see or hear the copyrighted work. Second,
the fact that a given market for a copyrighted work would not
be available to the copyright holder were it not for the infringer's activities does not permit the infringer to exploit
that market without compensating the copyright holder.
See Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F. 2d 57 (CA2 1980).
In this case, the Studios and their amici demonstrate that
the advent of the the VTR technology created a potential
market for their copyrighted programs. That market consists of those persons who find it impossible or inconvenient
to watch the programs at the time they are broadcast, and
who wish to watch them at other times. These persons are
willing to pay for the privilege of watching copyrighted work
at their convenience, as is evidenced by the fact that they are
willing to pay for VTRs and tapes; undoubtedly, most also
621 F. 2d 57, 60 (CA21980) ("the effect of the use on the copyright holder's
potential market for the work"); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F . 2d 1061, 1070
(CA2 1977) ("A key issue in fair use cases is whether the defendant's work
tends to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of plaintiff's work"), cert.
denied, 434 U. S. 1013 (1978); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,
203 Ct. Cl. 74, 88, 487 F. 2d 1345, 1352 (1973) ("the effect of the use on a
copyright owner's potential market for and value of his work"), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975); Encyclopaedia Britannica
Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1173 (WDNY 1982)
("[T]he concern here must be focused on a copyrighted work's potential
market. It is perfectly possible that plaintiffs' profits would have been
greater, but for the kind of videotaping in question") (emphasis in original).
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would be willing to pay some kind of royalty to copyright
holders. The Studios correctly argue that they have been
deprived of the ability to exploit this sizable market.
It is thus apparent from the record and from the findings of
the District Court that time-shifting does have a substantial
adverse effect upon the "potential market for" the Studios'
copyrighted works. Accordingly, even under the formulation of the fair use doctrine advanced by Sony, time-shifting
cannot be deemed a fair use.

v
Contributory Infringement
From the Studios' perspective, the consequences of home
VTR recording are the same as if a business had taped the
Studios' works off the air, duplicated the tapes, and sold or
rented them to members of the public for home viewing.
The distinction is that home VTR users do not record for
commercial advantage; the commercial benefit accrues to the
manufacturer and distributors of the Betamax. I thus must
proceed to discuss whether the manufacturer and distributors can be held contributorily liable if the product they sell is
used to infringe.
It is well established that liability for copyright infringement can be imposed on persons other than those who actually carry out the infringing activity. Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911); 3 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A] (1982); see Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 160, n. 11 (1975); Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). Although the
liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner ... is an infringer of the copyright," 17 U. S. C.
§ 501(a), the House and Senate Reports demonstrate that
Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory

81-1687-DISSENT
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

31

infringement. 1975 Senate Report 57; 1976 House Report
61.37
The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement, however, is not well-defined. One of the few attempts at definition appears in Gershurin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971). In that
case the Second Circuit stated that "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held
liable as a 'contributory' infringer." ld., at 1162 (footnote
omitted). While I have no quarrel with this general statement, it does not easily resolve the present case; the District
Court and the Court of Appeals, both purporting to apply it,
reached diametrically opposite results.
A
In absolving Sony from liability, the District Court reasoned that Sony had no direct involvement with individual
Betamax users, did not participate in any off-the-air copying,
and did not know that such copying was an infringement of
the Studios' copyright. 480 F. Supp., at 460. I agree with
the Gershurin court that contributory liability may be imposed even when there has been no direct contact between
the defendant and the infringer. The defendant in Gershurin
was a concert promoter operating through local concert associations that it sponsored; it had no contact with the infringing performers themselves. 443 F. 2d, at 1162-1163. See
also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at
37
This intent is manifested further by provisions of the 1976 Act that
exempt from liability persons who, while not participating directly in any
infringing activity, could otherwise be charged with contributory infringement. See § 108(f)(1) (library not liable "for the unsupervised use of reproducing equipment located on its premises," provided that certain
warnings are posted); § 110(6) ("governmental body" or "nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization" not liable for infringing performance by
concessionaire "in the course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair
or exhibition").
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160, n. 11. Moreover, a finding of contributory infringement
has never depended on actual knowledge of particular instances of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant
have reason to know that infringement is taking place. 443
F. 2d, at 1162; see Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v.
Mark-FiRecords, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966). 38 In
the so-called "dance hall" cases, in which questions of contributory infringement arise with some frequency, proprietors of entertainment establishments routinely are held liable for unauthorized performances on their premises, even
when they have no knowledge that copyrighted works are
being performed. In effect, the proprietors in those cases
are charged with constructive knowledge of the
performances. 39
88
In Screen Gems, on which the Gershwin court relied, the court held
that liability could be imposed on a shipper of unauthorized "bootleg"
records and a radio station that broadcast advertisements of the records,
provided they knew or should have known that the records were infringing. The court concluded that the records' low price and the manner in
which the records were marketed could support a finding of "constructive
knowledge" even if actual knowledge were not shown.
89
See, e. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing &
Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977); Dreamland Ball Room,
Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA71929); M. Witmark &
Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Mass.
1960); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S., at 157;
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 198-199 (1931); 3 M.
Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A], pp. 12-35 (1982).
Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the defendant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities, see,
e. g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304, 307
(CA21963); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74
(WD Mo. 1977). This notion, however, is to some extent fictional; the defendant cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play
copyrighted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into the
performers' contract. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F. 2d, at 1214-1215; KECA Music,
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp., at 75; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649 (WD La. 1942). Congress expressly re-
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Nor is it necessary that the defendant be aware that the
infringing activity violates the copyright laws. Section
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory
damages when an infringer proves he "was not aware and
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright," but the statute establishes no
general exemption for those who believe their infringing activities are legal. Moreover, such an exemption would be
meaningless in a case such as this, in which prospective relief
is sought; once a court has established that the copying at
issue is infringement, the defendants are necessarily aware of
that fact for the future. It is undisputed in this case that
Sony had reason to know the Betamax would be used by
some owners to tape copyrighted works off the air. See 480
F. Supp., at 459-460.
The District Court also concluded that Sony had not
caused, induced, or contributed materially to any infringing
activities of Betamax owners. 480 F. Supp., at 460. In a
case of this kind, however, causation can be shown indirectly;
it does not depend on evidence that particular Betamax owners relied on particular advertisements. In an analogous
case decided just two Terms ago, this Court approved a
lower court's conclusion that liability for contributory trademark infringement could be imposed on a manufacturer who
"suggested, even by implication" that a retailer use the manufacturer's goods to infringe the trademark of another.
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456
jected a proposal to exempt proprietors from this type of liability under the
1976 Act. See 1975 Senate Report 141-142; 1976 House Report 159-160;
1975 House Hearings 1812-1813 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights); id., at 1813 (colloquy between Rep. Pattison and Barbara
Ringer).
The Court's attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground of "control," ante, at 18, is obviously unpersuasive. The direct infringer ordinarily is not employed by the person held liable; instead, he is an independent contractor. Neither is he always an agent of the person held liable;
Screen Gems makes this apparent.
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U. S. 844, 851 (1982); see id., at 860 (concurring opinion). I
think this standard is equally appropriate in the copyright
context.
The District Court found that Sony has advertised the
Betamax as suitable for off-the-air recording of "favorite
shows," "novels for television," and "classic movies," 480 F.
Supp., at 436, with no visible warning that such recording
could constitute copyright infringement. It is only with the
aid of the Betamax or some other VTR, that it is possible today for home television viewers to infringe copyright by recording off-the-air. Off-the-air recording is not only a foreseeable use for the Betamax, but indeed is its intended use.
Under the circumstances, I agree with the Court of Appeals
that if off-the-air recording is an infringement of copyright,
Sony has induced and materially contributed to the infringing
conduct of Betamax owners ..w
B

Sony argues that the manufacturer or seller of a product
used to infringe is absolved from liability whenever the product can be put to any substantial noninfringing use. Brief
for Petitioners 41-42. The District Court so held, borrowing
the "staple article of commerce" doctrine governing liability
for contributory infringement of patents. See 35 U. S. C.
40
My conclusion respecting contributory infringement does not include
the retailer defendants. The District Court found that one of the retailer
defendants had assisted in the advertising campaign for the Betamax, but
made no other findings respecting their knowledge of the Betamax's intended uses. I do not agree with the Court of Appeals, at least on this
record, that the retailers "are sufficiently engaged in the enterprise to be
held accountable," 659 F. 2d, at 976. In contrast, the advertising agency
employed to promote the Betamax was far more actively engaged in the
advertising campaign, and petitioners have not argued that the agency's
liability differs in any way from that of Sony Corporation and Sony Corporation of America.
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§ 271. 41 This Court today is much less positive.

See ante, at
22. I do not agree that this technical judge-made doctrine of
patent law, based in part on considerations irrelevant to the
field of copyright, see generally Dawson Chemical Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187-199 (1980), should be
imported wholesale into copyright law. Despite their common constitutional source, see U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8,
patent and copyright protections have not developed in a parallel fashion, and this Court in copyright cases in the past has
borrowed patent concepts only sparingly. See BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345-346 (1908).
I recognize, however, that many of the concerns underlying the "staple article of commerce" doctrine are present in
copyright law as well. As the District Court noted, if liability for contributory infringement were imposed on the manufacturer or seller of every product used to infringe-a typewriter, a camera, a photocopying machine-the "wheels of
commerce" would be blocked. 480 F. Supp., at 461; see also
Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S., at 62.
I therefore conclude that if a significant portion of the
product's use is noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers
41
The "staple article of commerce" doctrine protects those who manufacture products incorporated into or used with patented inventions-for example, the paper and ink used with patented printing machines, Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), or the dry ice used with patented refrigeration systems, Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27
(1931). Because a patent-holder has the right to control the use of the patented item as well as its manufacture, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 50~10 (1917); 35 U. S. C. 271(a),
such protection for the manufacturer of the incorporated product is necessary to prevent patent-holders from extending their monopolies by suppressing competition in unpatented components and supplies suitable for
use with the patented item. See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 448 U. S. 176, 197-198 (1980). The doctrine of contributory patent
infringement has been the subject of attention by the courts and by Congress, see id., at 202-212, and has been codified since 1952, 66 Stat. 792,
but was never mentioned during the copyright law revision process as having any relevance to contributory copyright infringement.
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cannot be held contributorily liable for the product's infringing uses. See ante, at 22. If virtually all of the product's
use, however, is to infringe, contributory liability may be imposed; if no one would buy the product for noninfringing purposes alone, it is clear that the manufacturer is purposely
profiting from the infringement, and that liability is appropriately imposed. In such a case, the copyright owner's monopoly would not be extended beyond its proper bounds; the
manufacturer of such a product contributes to the infringing
activities of others and profits directly thereby, while providing no benefit to the public sufficient to justify the
infringement.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Sony should be held
liable for contributory infringement, reasoning that "[v]ideotape recorders are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the
primary purpose of reproducing television programming,"
and "[ v]irtually all television programming is copyrighted
material." 659 F. 2d, at 975. While I agree with the first of
these propositions, 42 the second, for me, is problematic. The
key question is not the amount of television programming
that is copyrighted, but rather the amount of VTR usage that
is infringing. 43 Moreover, the parties and their amici have
argued vigorously about both the amount of television programming that is covered by copyright and the amount for
42

Although VTRs also may be used to watch prerecorded video cassettes
and to make home motion pictures, these uses do not require a tuner such
as the Betamax contains. See n. 1, supra. The Studios do not object to
Sony's sale of VTRs without tuners. Brief for Respondents 5, n. 9. In
considering the noninfringing uses of the Betamax, therefore, those uses
that would remain possible without the Betamax's built-in tuner should not
be taken into account.
43
Noninfringing uses would include, for example, recording works that
are not protected by copyright, recording works that have entered the
public domain, recording with permission of the copyright owner, and, of
course, any recording that qualifies as fair use. See, e. g., Bruzzone v.
Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S. P. Q. 809 (ND Cal. 1979) (use of home VTR
for market research studies).
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which permission to copy has been given. The proportion of
VTR recording that is infringing is ultimately a question of
fact, 44 and the District Court specifically declined to make
findings on the "percentage of legal versus illegal home-use
recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468. In light of my view of the
law, resolution of this factual question is essential. I therefore would remand the case for further consideration of this
by the District Court.
VI
The Court has adopted an approach very different from the
one I have outlined. It is my view that the Court's approach
alters dramatically the doctrines of fair use and contributory
infringement as they have been developed by Congress and
the courts. Should Congress choose to respond to the
Court's decision, the old doctrines can be resurrected. As it
stands, howev~r, the decision today erodes much of the coherence that these doctrines have struggled to achieve.
The Court's disposition of the case turns on its conclusion
that time-shifting is a fair use. Because both parties agree
that time-shifting is the primary use of VTRs, that conclusion, if correct, would settle the issue of Sony's liability under
almost any definition of contributory infringement. The
" Sony asserts that much or most television broadcasting is available for
home recording because (1) no copyright owner other than the Studios has
brought an infringement action, and (2) much televised material is ineligible for copyright protection because videotapes of the broadcasts are not
kept. The first of these assertions is irrelevant; Sony's liability does not
turn on the fact that only two copyright owners thus far have brought suit.
The amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of
the television market as a whole. Sony's second assertion is based on a
faulty premise; the Copyright Office permits audiovisual works transmitted by television to be registered by deposit of sample frames plus a description of the work. See 37 CFR §§ 202.20(c)(2)(ii) and 202.21(g) (1982).
Moreover, although an infringement action cannot be brought unless the
work is registered, 17 U. S. C. § 411(a), registration is not a condition of
copyright protection. § 408(a). Copying an unregistered work still may
be infringement. Cf. § 506(a) (liability for criminal copyright infringement; not conditioned on prior registration).
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Court concludes that time-shifting is fair use for two reasons.
Each is seriously flawed.
The Court's first reason for concluding that time-shifting is
fair use is its claim that many copyright holders have no objection to time-shifting, and that "respondents have no right
to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing it for
their programs." Ante, at 23. The Court explains that a
finding of contributory infringement would "inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of
their audience that is available only through time-shifting."
Ante, at 26. Such reasoning, however, simply confuses the
question of liability with the difficulty of fashioning an appropriate remedy. It may be that an injunction prohibiting the
sale of VTRs would harm the interests of copyright holders
who have no objection to others making copies of their programs. But such concerns should and would be taken into
account in fashioning an appropriate remedy once liability has
been found. Remedies may well be available that would not
interfere with authorized time-shifting at all. The Court of
Appeals mentioned the possibility of a royalty payment that
would allow VTR sales and time-shifting to continue unabated, and the parties may be able to devise other narrowly
tailored remedies. Sony may be able, for example, to build a
VTR that enables broadcasters to scramble the signal of individual programs and "jam" the unauthorized recording of
them. Even were an appropriate remedy not available at
this time, the Court should not misconstrue copyright holders' rights in a manner that prevents enforcement of them
when, through development of better techniques, an appropriate remedy becomes available. 45
45
Even if concern with remedy were appropriate at the liability stage,
the Court's use of the District Court's findings is somewhat cavalier. The
Court relies heavily on testimony by representatives of professional sports
leagues to the effect that they have no objection to VTR recording. The
Court never states, however, whether the sports leagues are copyright
holders, and if so, whether they have exclusive copyrights to sports broad-
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The Court's second stated reason for finding that Sony is
not liable for contributory infringement is its conclusion that
even unauthorized time-shifting is fair use. Ante, at 28.
This conclusion is even more troubling. The Court begins by
suggesting that the fair use doctrine operates as a general
"equitable rule of reason." That interpretation misharacterizes the doctrine, and simply ignores the language of
the statute. Section 107 establishes the fair use doctrine
"for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, ... scholarship, or research." These are all productive uses. It is true that the legislative history states repeatedly that the doctrine must be applied flexibly on a caseby-case basis, but those references were only in the context
of productive uses. Such a limitation on fair use comports
with its purpose, which is to facilitate the creation of new
casts. Of course, one who does not hold an exclusive copyright does not
have authority to consent to copying.
Assuming that the various sports leagues do have exclusive copyrights
in some of their broadcasts, the amount of authorized time-shifting still
would not be overwhelming. Sony's own survey indicated that only 7.3
percent of all Betamax use is to record sports events of all kinds. Def.
Exh. OT, Table 20. Because Sony's witnesses did not represent all forms
of sports events, moreover, this figure provides only a tenuous basis for
this Court to engage in fact-finding of its own.
The only witness at trial who was clearly an exclusive copyright owner
and who expressed no objection to unauthorized time-shifting was the
owner of the copyright in Mister Rogers' Neighborhood. But the Court
cites no evidence in the record to the effect that anyone makes VTR copies
of that program. The simple fact is that the District Court made no findings on the amount of authorized time-shifting that takes place. The
Court seems to recognize this gap in its reasoning, and phrases its argument as a hypothetical. The Court states: "If there are millions of owners
of VTR's who make copies of televised sports events, religious broadcasts,
and educational programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice," the sale of VTR's
"should not be stifled" in order to protect respondent's copyrights. Ante,
at 26 (emphasis supplied). Given that the Court seems to recognize that
its argument depends on findings that have not been made, it seems that a
remand is inescapable.
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works. There is no indication that the fair use doctrine has
any application for purely personal consumption on the scale
involved in this case, 46 and the Court's application of it here
deprives fair use of the major cohesive force that has guided
evolution of the doctrine in the past.
Having bypassed the initial hurdle for establishing that a
use is fair, the Court then purports to apply to time-shifting
the four factors explicitly stated in the statute. The first is
"the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes." § 107(1). The Court confidently describes
time-shifting as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. It is
clear, however, that personal use of programs that have been
copied without permission is not what § 107(1) protects. The
intent of the section is to encourage users to engage in activities the primary benefit of which accrues to others. Timeshifting involves no such humanitarian impulse. It is likewise something of a mischaracterization of time-shifting to
describe it as noncommercial in the sense that that term is
used in the statute. As one commentator has observed, .
time-shifting is noncommercial in the same sense that stealing jewelry and wearing it-instead of reselling it-is noncommercial. 47 Purely consumptive uses are certainly not
what the fair use doctrine was designed to protect, and the
awkwardness of applying the statutory language to timeshifting only makes clearer that fair use was designed to protect only uses that are productive.
As has been explained, some uses of time-shifting, such as copying
an old newspaper clipping for a friend, are fair use because of their de
minimis effect on the copyright holder. The scale of copying involved in
this case, of course, is of an entirely different magnitude, precluding application of such an exception.
7
' Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing before Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 1250 (1982) (memorandum of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe).
46
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The next two statutory factors are all but ignored by the
Court-though certainly not because they have no applicability. The second factor-"the nature of the copyrighted
work"-strongly supports the view that time-shifting is an
infringing use. The rationale guiding application of this factor is that certain types of works, typically those involving
"more of diligence than of originality or inventiveness," New
York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 217, 221 (NJ 1977), require less copyright protection
than other original works. Thus, for example, informational
works, such as news reports, that readily lend themselves to
productive use by others, are less protected than creative
works of entertainment. Sony's own surveys indicate that
entertainment shows account for more than 80 percent of the
programs recorded by Betamax owners. 48
The third statutory factor-"the amount and substantiality
of the portion used"-is even more devastating to the Court's
interpretation. It is undisputed that virtually all VTR owners record entire works, see 480 F. Supp., at 454, thereby
creating an exact substitute for the copyrighted original.
Fair use is intended to allow individuals engaged in productive uses to copy small portions of original works that will facilitate their own productive endeavors. Time-shifting
bears no resemblance to such activity, and the complete
duplication that it involves might alone be sufficient to preclude a finding of fair use. It is little wonder that the Court
has chosen to ignore this statutory factor. 49
48

See A Survey of Betamax Owners, R. 2353, Def. Exh. OT, Table 20,
cited in Brief for Respondents 52.
49
The Court's one oblique acknowledgement of this third factor, ante, at
29, seems to suggest that the fact that time-shifting involves copying complete works is not very significant because the viewers already have been
asked to watch the initial broadcast free. This suggestion misses the
point. As has been noted, a book borrowed from a public library may not
be copied any more freely than one that has been purchased. An invitation to view a showing is completely different from an invitation to copy a
copyrighted work.
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The fourth factor requires an evaluation of "the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." This is the factor upon which the Court focuses, but once again, the Court has misread the statute.
As mentioned above, the statute requires a court to consider
the effect of the use on the potential market for the copyrighted work. The Court has struggled mightily to show
that VTR use has not reduced the value of the Studios' copyrighted works in their present markets. Even if true, that
showing only begins the proper inquiry. The development
of the VTR has created a new market for the works produced
by the Studios. That market consists of those persons who
desire to view television programs at times other than when
they are broadcast, and who therefore purchase VTR recorders to enable them to time-shift. 50 Because time-shifting of
the Studios' copyrighted works involves the copying of them,
however, the Studios are entitled to share in the benefits of
that new market. Those benefits currently go to Sony
through Betamax sales. Respondents therefore can show
harm from VTR use simply by showing that the value of their
copyrights would increase if they were compensated for the
copies that are used in the new market. The existence of
this effect is self-evident.
Because of the Court's conclusion concerning the legality of
time-shifting, it never addresses the amount of noninfringing
use that a manufacturer must show to absolve itself from liability as a contributory infringer. Thus, it is difficult to discuss how the Court's test for contributory infringement
would operate in practice under a proper analysis of timeshifting. One aspect of the test as it is formulated by the
The Court implicitly has recognized that this market is very significant. The central concern underlying the Court's entire opinion is that
there is a large audience who would like very much to be able to view programs at times other than when they are broadcast. Ante, at 26. The
Court simply misses the implication of its own concerns.
50
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Court, however, particularly deserves comment. The Court
explains that a manufacturer of a product is not liable for contributory infringement as long as the product is "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses." Ante, at 22 (emphasis supplied). Such a definition essentially eviscerates the concept
of contributory infringement. Only the most unimaginative
manufacturer would be unable to demonstrate that a imageduplicating product is "capable" of substantial noninfringing
uses. Surely Congress desired to prevent the sale of products that are used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights;
the fact that noninfringing uses exist presumably would have
little bearing on that desire.
More importantly, the rationale for the Court's narrow
standard of contributory infringment reveals that, once
again, the Court has confused the issue of liability with that
of remedy. The Court finds that a narrow definition of contributory infringement is necessary in order to protect "the
rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated
areas of commerce." Ante, at 22. But application of the
contributory infringement doctrine implicates such rights
only if the remedy attendant upon a finding of liability were
an injunction against the manufacture of the product in question. The issue of an appropriate remedy is not before the
Court at this time, but it seems likely that a broad injunction
is not the remedy that would be ordered. It is unfortunate
that the Court has allowed its concern over a remedy to infect
its analysis of liability.
VII
The Court of Appeals, having found Sony liable, remanded
for the District Court to consider the propriety of injunctive
or other relief. Because of my conclusion as to the issue of
liability, I, too, would not decide here what remedy would be
appropriate if liability were found. I concur, however, in
the Court of Appeals' suggestion that an award of damages,
or continuing royalties, or even some form of limited injunction, may well be an appropriate means of balancing the equi-
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ties in this case. 51 Although I express no view on the merits
of any particular proposal, I am certain that, if Sony were
found liable in this case, the District Court would be able to
fashion appropriate relief. The District Court might conclude, of course, that a continuing royalty or other equitable
relief is not feasible. The Studios then would be relegated to
statutory damages for proved instances of infringement.
But the difficulty of fashioning relief, and the possibility that
complete relief may be unavailable, should not affect our interpretation of the statute.
Like so many other problems created by the interaction of
copyright law with a new technology, "[t]here can be no
really satisfactory solution to the problem presented here,
until Congress acts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U. S., at 167 (dissenting opinion). But in the absence of a congressional solution, courts cannot avoid difficult
problems by refusing to apply the law. We must "take the
Copyright Act ... as we find it," Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 401-402 (1968), and "do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright principles . . .
until the Congress legislates." I d., at 404 (dissenting
opinion).
Other Nations have imposed royalties on the manufacturers of products used to infringe copyright. See, e. g., Copyright Laws and Treaties
of the World (UNESCO/BNA 1982) (English translation), reprinting Federal Act On Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related
Rights (Austria), § 42(5)-(7), and An Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights (Federal Republic of Germany), Art. 53(5). A study produced for the Commission of European Communities has recommended
that these requirements "serve as a pattern" for the European community.
A. Dietz, Copyright Law in the European Community 135 (1978). While
these royalty systems ordinarily depend on the existence of authors' collecting societies, see id., at 119, 136, such collecting societies are a familiar
part of our copyright law. See generally Broadcast Music , Inc . v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, ~ (1979). Fashioning relief
of this sort, of course, might require bringing other copyright owners into
court through certification of a class or otherwise.
51
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contributory infringers. The validity of that holding depends on whether the primary use of that sort of equipment
is an infringing use. The District Court found that the primary t!_Se of the video tape recording equipment involved in
this case w~r "home use recording." Its explanation of
that use 2 makes it clear that it satisfies three critical criteria:
(1) the alleged infringer did not make more than one copy of
any copyrighted work; (2) he made no public performance or
other public use of the copy; and (3) he made no commercial
use of it. In my opinion, conduct that meets these three conditions is not prohibited by the statute. Before commenting
specifically on the home use of video tape recorders, however, I shall briefly review a series of other innovations that
led to revisions in the statutory protection Congress has provided for the authors of original compositions pursuant to Article I, clause 8 of the Constitution. This history reveals a
" 'Home-use' recording as used in this opinion is the operation of the
Betamax in a private home to record a program for subsequent home viewing. The progt:ams involved in this lawsuit are broadcast free to the public
over public ai~aves. The court heard extensive testimony from defendant William Griffiths and four non-defendant individuals about this activity, and the court's declaration of non-infringement is limited to this home
use-situation.
"It is important to note the limits of this holding. Neither pay nor cable
television stations are plaintiffs in this suit and no defendant recorded the
signals from either. The court is not ruling on tape swapping, organized
or informal. The court is not ruling no tape duplication within the home or
outside, by individuals, groups or corporations. Nor is the court ruling on
off-the-air recording for use outside the home. e. g., by teachers for classrooms, corporations for employees, etc. No defendant engaged in any of
these activities and the facts necessary to determine their legality are not
before this court.
"The ramifications of this new technology are greater than the boundaries of this lawsuit. A court ·reviewing the limited claims of specified parties in a particular factual setting cannot and should not undertake the role
of a government commission or legislative body exploring and evaluating
all the uses and consequences of the videotape recorder." App. to Pet. for
Cert. 5&--56 .
2

.-

81-1687-MEMORANDUM
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

3

remarkable consistency in the way that two themes have reoccurred. First, the Court has repeatedly declined to extend copyright protection until after Congress has evaluated
the new development and enacted amendatory legislation;
second, no interested party has ever seriously suggested that
a penalty, or any form of statutory liability, should be imposed upon an individual for making a single copy of any
copyrighted work for his own private use. 3
I

Long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909,
35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to copyrights in this country is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. (8 Peters) 591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies
for infringement "are only those prescribed by Congress."
Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889).
In 1831 Congress extended copyright protection to musical
compositions. 4 Stat. 436. This extension did not, of
course, interfere with the individual's right to play or sing
copyrighted songs for his own gratification, even though he
thereby made an "intrinsic use" of the copyrighted material. 4
3

Both of these themes are reflected in the press release issued by one of
the respondents after its victo~peals in this case-:- It
stated, m part:
"Millions of families in the United States and around the world are now
involved in videotaping programming in their own homes for their own private use. We have no intention, in this or any other litigation, of pursuing
individuals ~£}~erfere witfi tli~raetice. "Wetn'Sfin~n 1976, more than five years ago, when
there were relatively few tape recorders in homes. Since that time we
have come to realize that the interests of all concerned can be better accommodated by passage of new laws." Excerpt from statement by E.
Cardon Walker, Chairman of Walt Disney Productions, on November 2,
1981.
."Singing for one's own gratification without intending thereby to represent anything, or to amuse any one else, would not, I think, be either a
representation or performance, according to the ordinary meaning of those
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The copyright statute has never required a license "to sing a
copyrighted lyric in the shower." Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 155.
The development and marketing of .elayer pianos and perforated rolls of music at the turn of the century gave rise to
litigation raising the question whether the use of such rolls
infringed the copyrights owned by composers and music publishers. The sale of well over a million rolls in 1902 made it
evident that the economic issue was significant. Adopting a
construction of the pre-1909 version of the Copyright Act
that, as Justice Holmes acknowledged, gave to the music
"copyright less scope than its rational significance", the
Court held that the piano rolls were not co ies of copyrighted
s~within the meanin[_of the Act.
White- mith usic
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (see Holmes, J.,
concurring, at 19). Quoting from an English case considering a similar question, the Court noted that the copyright on
the sheet music did not involve any exclusive right "to the
performance in private of the music indicated by such
sheets", id., at 13. The Court assumed that Congress was
aware of the prevailing view, reflected in an international
convention to which the United States was not a party, that
"the manufacture and sale of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the [copyrighted music] are not considered
as constituting musical infringement." Id., at 14-15. It
held that the policy considerations at stake '"properly addressed themselves to the legislative, and not to the judicial,
branch of the government." I d., at 18. The following year
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1909.
When the 1909 Act was passed, the Librarian of Congress,
Dr. Herbert Putnam, was following a practice of allowing sinterms, nor would the fact of some other person being in the room at the
time of such singing make it so . ... " Wall v. Taylor, 11 Q.E.D. 102,
106-107 (1883) (Brett, M.R.).
We quoted that passage with approval in Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. A iken, 422 U. S. 151, 155 n. 4.
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gle copies of copyrighted works to be made at the Library. 5
Presumably Congress was familiar with this practice. Even
though the 1909 Act might have been construed literally to
prescribe the practice, no one seems to have ever challenged
the activity of individuals who merely made single copies for
their own use. The matter did not seem to merit serious attention until innovations in copying techniques made it relatively easy to reproduce entire articles or to make multiple
copies. When the National Institute of Health and the Nationa! Library of Medicine adopted the practice of photocopying entire articles from medical journals ~d ~p~ them
to re~tigation did ensue. Wil1Uiinsand Wilkins
V. United States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. i973Yaffirmed by an
equally divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975).
In that litigation it was expressly ~ed that the making
of a single copy of a copyrighted article by a scholar for his
own use was immune from liability-even if literally covered
by the statute-and that it was the development of the capacity to make photocopies that made the issue significant. 6 In
5
That practice was described at page 6 in the 1913 edition of the Library
of Congress Rules and Practice governing the use and issue of books as
follows:
"Photo-duplicates of books, newspapers, maps, etc., can be furnished at a
reasonable rate by means of the photostat, installed in the Chief Clerk's
Office. Apply to the Chief Clerk for a schedule of charges."
Dr. Putnam, of course, made an important contribution to the drafting of
the 1909 statute. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 213.
6
"Some forms of ~ying, at the very _least of portions of a work, ~e
univers~y deemed immune from liability, although the very words are reproducea m more than de minimis <ltiantity. Furthermore, it is almost
unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a handwritten copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own use, and in the era before photoduplication it was not uncommon (and not seriously questioned) that he could have
his secretary make a typed copy for his personal use and files. These customary facts of copyright-life are amon our 'vens. The issuewenow
have 1s the comp ex one o w ether photocopying, m he form done by NIH
and NLM, should be accorded the same treatment-not the ministerial
lexicographic task of deciding that photoduplication necessarily involves
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his brief in this Qourt, the Solicitor General of the United
States stated: 7
"The congressional understanding, as well as the longg
standing library custom, is that the making of a single
copy of an~ article for private use is a fai!:._,use, even
if the copy is made purely for personal pleasure."
The brief appended the following footnote at that point:
"'Anyone may copy copyrighted materials for purposeu
of private study and review.' Cohen, 'Fair Use in the
Law of Copyright,' ASCAP, Copyright Law Symposium
(No. 6, 1955), 43, 58.'' 8
The issue, however, was not resolved by the litigation
which terminated in 1975, but rather was later addressed by
Congress when it revised the Copyright Act in the following
year. In § 108 of the 1976 revision, Congress e~~~ a sn.~
Cial statutory exemption for library co ng.
a exemption twice raws an exp ic1t 1stinction between the reproduction of multiple copies and the "reproduction or
distribution of a single copy.'' 9 Nothing in that amendment
'copying' (as of course it does in dictionary terms)." 487 F. 2d at 1350.
7
See Brief for the United States, No. 73-1279, October Term, 1974, pp.
20-21.
8
I d., at 21, n. 30. Earlier in his brief, the Solicitor General had stated:
"Prior to the 1909 Copyright Act, the exclusive rights granted to the author of a published work did not include the right to copy the work.
Harper v. Shoppell, 26 Fed. 519 (C.Ct., S. D. N. Y.). The 1909 Act reorganized the provisions of the prior law, but was not intended to expand its
coverage (H.Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 4).
"It was assumed, both before and after the enactment of the Copyright (
Act of 1909, that the exclusive rights of the copyright owner did not include
the right to control the copying of the copyrighted material for personal
use." Id., at 16-17, n. 26.
~
9
§ 108 provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement of copyright for a library or archives, or any of its employees acting
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implies that Congress intended to proscribe the reproduction
of "no more than one copy" for an individual's private noncommercial use.
A similar sequence of events followed the development of
technology that made it possible to retransmit television programs by cable orb microwave systems. ln1960, United
Artists Television, Inc., the owner of a number of copyrights
on motion pictures, sought to enjoin the operator of a community antenna television system (CATV) from intercepting and
retransmitting signals carrying its copyrighted productions.
The Court held that the CATV operator did not "perform"
within the scope of their employment, to reproduce no more than one copy
or phonorecord of a work, or to distribute such copy or phonorecord, under
the conditions specified by this section, if(1) the reproduction or distribution is made without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage;
(2) the collections of the library or archives are (i) open to the public, or
(ii) available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives
or with the institution of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing
research in a specialized field; and
(3) the reproduction or distribution of the work includes a notice of
copyright.
"(g) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section extend to the isolated and unrelated reproduction or distribution of a single
copy or phonorecord of the same material on separate occasions, but do not
extend to cases where the library or archives, or its employee(!) is aware or has substantial reason to believe that it is engaging in the
related or concerted reproduction or distribution of multiple copies or phonorecords of the same material, whether made on one occasion or over a
period of time, and whether intended for aggregate use by one or more individuals or for separate use by the individual members of a group; or
(2) engages in the systematic reproduction or distribution of single or
multiple copies of phonorecords of material described in subsection (d);
Provided, That nothing in this cause prevents a library or archives from
participating in interlibrary arrangements that do not have, as their purpose or effect that the library or archives receiving such copies or phonorecords for distribution does so in such aggregate quantities as to substitute for a subscription to or purchase of such work."

,•
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the copyrighted works in the "manner envisioned by the Congress that enacted the law in 1909." Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 395 (1968). Although the
Court was sharply divided on the question whether that was
a fair reading of the statutory language, there was complete
agreement on the proposition that Congress was far better
equipped than the Court to fashion a fair resolution of the
problems presented by the sophisticated techn
·
1opments that had occurred in recent ye
The Fortnightly case was followe y Tele rom ter Co
v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394, in which the Cou cons1d
the
iluted the
copyright holders' argument that ATV syst
commercial value of the market for 1censed television programs. Recognizing that the retransmissions by CATV systems would au ent the size of the otential audience for a
broadcast-much as would the v1 eo tape recording of programs for later home viewing-the Court concluded:
"These shifts in current business and commercial relationships, while of significance with respect to the organization and growth of the communications industry,
simply cannot be controlled by means of litigation based
'

....

-

-------

10
"We have been invited by the Solicitor General in an amicus curiae
brief to render a compromise decision in this case that would, it is said,
accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, communications, and antitrust policy. We decline the invitation. That job is for
C~ss." [footnotes omitted] 392 U. S. at 401.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas wrote:
"Our major object, I suggest, sh~to do as little damage as possible to
traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until the
Congress legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the interested parties face." Id., at 404.
At the end of his opinion, he added:
"The task of caring for CATV is one for the Congress. Our ax, being a
rule of law, must cut straight, sharp, and deep; and perhaps this is a situation that calls for the compromise of theory and for the architectural improvisation which only legislation can accomplish." Id., at 408.
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on copyright legislation enacted more than half a century
ago, when neither broadcast television nor CATV was
yet conceived. Detailed regulation of these relationships, and any ultimate resolution of the many sensitive
and important problems in this field, must be left to Congress." !d., at 414.
In due course Congress did enact legislation that regulates
the complex relationships among copyright holders, commercial television stations, and CATV system operators in a comprehensive and detailed way that could not possibly have
been fashioned by a court. 11
The technological change that most close! parallels the innovatio t at gave nse to IS 'ti at10n was t e development
of the au 10 ape recorder. That device made it simple for
any individUal to make copies of c5>mig_!lte~ s~gs played on
the radio. Because the practice that became known as "record piracy" became so widespread, the recording industry
persuaded Con ess to enact a special statute extending
copyr1g protection to soun reco 1 s.
egis ative
history of e oun
ecor ·n'lg men ment of 1971, 85 Stat.
391, makes it perfectly clear that Congress did not then be11
The statutory provisions themselves, see 17 U. S. C. § 111, are much
too long to quote in full, but their complexity is indicated in the following
paragraph from Judge Markey's opinion in Eastern Microwave, Inc. v.
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982):
"Under the congressionally mandated scheme, television broadcast stations like WOR-TV continue to pay license or royalty fees directly to copyright owners like Doubleday, while CATV systems pay license fees under
their compulsory licenses to the United States Copyright Office in accord
with formulae provided in 17 U. S. C. § 111(d)(2)(B). The fees paid by
CATV systems are distributed to copyright owners like Doubleday by
Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Tribunal), as provided for in 17 U. S. C.
§ 111(d)(5). The Congressional scheme thus provided for compensation
from CATV systems to copyright owners measured by the number of cable
viewers or potential viewers, and placed the responsibility for payment of
that compensation on the CATV systems." (footnotes omitted)

I
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lieve that t~ single copy of a copyrighted song for private use was an infringement, and did not intend to proscribe
that sort o okl-\'1·tttt.fi..--...
The ouse Repo s unambiguous:
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention
of the Committee to restrain the home recorain , from
broa casts or rom tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recordin is for rivate use and
with no purpose of repr ucmg or ot erwise ca italizing
com,!Eercia y on I .
IS prac Ice IS common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers
would be in no different position from that of the owners
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the
past 20 years." H. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
7, reprinted in [1971] U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News,
pp. 1566, 1572.
This subject had been expressly considered during the
House Committee hearings. As the District Court noted in
this case, Representative Beister of Pennsylvania engaged in
the following dialogue about off-the-air recording with Ms.
Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Register of Copyrights:
"Mr. Beister. I do not know that I can add very much
to the questions which you have been asked so far.
"I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own
home.
"My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little
set.
"Now, he may retrieve in addition something else onto
his recording, but nonetheless, he does retrieve the basic

~

·~
trz.-v_ lef 7 I
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sound, and this legislation, of course, would not point to
his activities, would it?
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it
would not.'
"I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question is usually asked: 'What
about the home recorders?'
"The answer I have given and will give again is that
this is something you cannot control. You simply cannot control it." Hearings on S. 646 before the Subcomm. No.3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 22 (June 9 and 10, 1971).
That this was the opinion of the sponsors of the legislation is
confirmed by the following colloquy when the 1971 amendment was being discussed on the floor of the House of
Representatives.
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes.
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to
record off of a program which comes through the air on
the radio or television, and then used it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this would not be
included under the penalties of this bill?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I
am glad the gentleman raises the point.
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,'
Members will note that under the bill the same practice
which prevails today is called for; namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be fair
use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is made clear in the report." 117 Cong.
Rec. 34, 748 (1971) (emphasis added). 12
12

Representative Kastenmeier's views of whether the copyright laws
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In its periodic revisions of the copyright laws, •Cong;,ess
has confronted one technological innovation after another,
but it has never ex ressed any specific intent to treat the reproduction of a copyrighte work as an 1 m emen 1 ese
three c
s e e:
t e user rna e no more than one
copy; (2) he made ~~c~e of the copy; and (3) he made
no commercial use of it. -what is perhaps most remarkable
a~ew of legislative responses to technological
changes in the copyright field is the complete absence of any
specific consideration of the problems generated by the
development of the video tape recorder. Is there reason to
believe Congress intended the non-commercial, home use of
such recorders to have different legal consequences than the
private use of audio tape recorders? Congress has never expressed any such intent. Moreover, an examination of the
statutory langua~ is entirely consistent with the conclusion
thaT such nome use should not be regarded as an infringement unless and until Congress expressly so directs.
prohibit home taping do not appear to have changed significantly over the
past decade. In hearings held in 1982, after the Court of Appeals' decision
in this case, he engaged in the following colloquy with a representative of
the National Music Publishers Association:
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Thank you, Mr. Baumgarten. Do I take it as your
legal opinion as part of this panel that some 30 or 40 million people in their
homes producing billions of works are now and have been infringing copyright laws?
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes.
"Mr. Kastenmeier. They are all infringers?
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes.
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Subject in all respects to whatever the law"Mr. Baumgarten. Whatever relief the court considers appropriate. I
think we saw at the ninth circuit that that would be fashioned in an equitable amount.
"Mr. Kastenmeier. There would be a lot of Americans who I think
would be chagrined to learn that that is the case." Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice
of House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4783 et al. , 97th Cong. , 2d
Sess. , at 540.
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II
The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control
over all possible uses of his copyrighted work. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it
conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by
the statute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U. S. 151, 154-155. In order to determine whether the
copying of a television program constitutes an infringement,
it is therefore necessary to examine the s:e_ecific exclusi_ye
ri\ht~nted to the owner of a copyright.
ection 106 of the Act provides:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyr~hted work in copies or
phonorecorcrs;
'
~) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly."
It is immediately apparent that subparagraphs (2) and (3)
have no application to the home use of videotape recorders,
although they, of course, would preclude the commercial
exploitation of taped copies, and subparagraph (3) would appear to prohibit trading or lending of copies. Subparagraphs

#I
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(4) and (5) both explicitly apply to motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, but both of those sections merely grant
the right "to perform" or "to display the copyrighted work
publicly." Thus, the only sub aragraph that is eve
guably applicable is the first. It gives the owner the exclusive
riglif"to reproduce t hecopyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." (Emphasis added). Although the use of the plural word "copies" obviously encompasses the singular as well,
see 1 U. S. C. § 1, the fact that Congress did select the plural
form repeatedly, not only in the Act itself, but also in the
Committee Reports, does tend to identify the problem that
they were most concerned about-namely the reproduction
of a copyrighted work for commercial purposes which, of
course, would normally be in multiple copies. 13
What is especially significant about the text of § 106 is that
it pr.2_Yides ~basis_for distinguishing between the taping of a
copyright~d song broadcast over ffie ra<lio and the taping...of a
copyr"ighted television program. If the House Committee
eY( -5 I tJ tiJ /IA4
Report on the 19 1 amen ment was correct in expressing the
opinion that the private use of an audio tape recorder is not ~~~
infringement, 14 that opinion applies equally to the private use ~-~.~
of a video tape recorder. 15
~L---"

#I

}:>~f-

3
' We have also tended to speak in the plural.
Thus, in Bobs Merrill Co.
v. Strauss, 210 U. S. 339 (1908), the Court referred to the author's "right
to multiply copies of his work" id., at 347, to the "exclusive right to the
multiplication of the copies" ibid; to the copyright owner's "right to multiply and sell his production" id., at 350; and to the main purpose of the statute "to secure the right of multiplying copies of the work" id., at 351; and to
"this right of multiplication." Ibid.
" Contrary to the opinion expressed in the House Committee Report,
Professor Nimmer takes the rather surprising position that audio home recording for private use does violate the statute. He argues, inter alia,
that the Committee Report is simply wrong:
"Although the House report offers the opinion that home recording does
not infringe the copyright in underlying works, this statement is nothing
more than the House's view in 1971 of the meaning of the 1909 Act. The
[Footnote 15 is on p. 15}

~~rv
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It is not necessary, however, to insist upon a literalist
reading of§ 106 in order to interpret the statute in light of its
historic purpose-to prohibit unfair commercial exploitation
of the monopoly rights granted to the author, composer, or
publisher. 16 For the definition of the exclusive rights in § 106
is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 through
118." Those sections describe a variety of uses of copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright notwithstanding the provisions of § 106. 17 One of the more illuobservation does not have the force of a statement of legislative intent."
Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the
Betamax Myth, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1505, 1509-1510 (1982).
Later he added:
"No one has claimed that the pre-1971 copyright statutes contained any
provision other than the doctrine of fair use for exempting home recording
from copyright infringement of the musical works thereby produced.
Since the House report states that the purpose of the Amendment is to extend the same protection to sound recordings, it is clear that the Amendment did not create a new exemption for home recording. The most one
can fairly attribute to the House report, then, is an opinion that home re16 Even Professor Nimmer, the scholar taking the most extreme position
concerning the scope of copyright protection for sound recordings, see n.
14, ante, agrees with this proposition:
"Although the Betamax case involved video home recording, the finding of
contributory infringement and the imposition of a continuing royalty would
apply equally well to the manufacturers and sellers of audio home recording equipment." !d., at 1526.
16
"An author who possesses an unlimited copyright may preclude others
from copying his creation for commercial purposes without permission. In
other words, to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and
artistic creation, Congress may guarantee to authors and inventors a reward in the form of control over the sale or commercial use of copies of
their works. " Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546, 555.
17
Thus, for example, § 110 provides in part:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not infringements of copyright:
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or dis-
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minating of those sections
legislative
endorsement of the doctrine "fair use."
The 1909 Act did not hav a 11fair use" pr ision. Moreover, that Act's compendiu of exclusive ghts-"to print,
reprint, publish, copy, and v
opyrighted work" 18was plainly broad enough to encompass the making of a single
copy for purely private use. Yet the statute was never so
construed. The courts simply refused to read the statute literally in every situation. When Congress amended the statute in 1976, it indicated that it "intended to restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or
enlarge it in any way." House Report No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66. Congress therefore codified § 107 in
a form that does not set forth categorical defenses, such as
for example those found in the provisions of the RobinsonPatman Act. Rather, it identifies factors that enable the
Court to apply a "rule of reason" analysis to particular claims
of infringement. 19 It is that sort of analysis-rather than any
belief that an infringing act has been neutralized by an affirplay of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public;"
And § 111(a) provides, in part:
"The secondary transmission of a primary transmission embodying a performance or display of a work is not an infringement of copyright if(1) the secondary transmission is not made by a cable system, and consists entirely of the relaying, by the management of a hotel, apartment
house, or similar establishment, of signals transmitted by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, within the local
service area of such station, to the private lodgings of guests or residents
of such establishment, and no direct charge is made to see or hear the secondary transmission;"
17 u. s. c. § 111.
18
Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075.
19
The essence of the section is captured in these comments from the
House Report on the fair use section:
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doc-
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mative defense-that would defeat a suggestion that singing
a copyrighted song in the shower is an infringing use.
The f~ buttresses the historic understanding that jt i~ecourts' role to ush the copyr1g mo opoly toftSlogi~ai e~eme. In de ·ng the coverage o the
1976 ct, Congressnas asked the courts to continue to exercise judgment, restraint, and common sense.

III
It would be most surprising if the 1976 Congress would
have considered it reasonable to prohibit the purely private
home use of a video tape recorder. Three powerful considerations support this conclusion.
First is the fact that the allegedly unlawful activity takes
trine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question
must be decided on its own facts ....
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be consideredthe purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this factor
includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not intended to
be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of
copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as under the present
law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other
factors in fair use decisions ....
General intention behind the provision
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply.
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." House Report
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 65--{i6.

(2;.J. ~. ~
v-~

~
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place entirely within the privacy of the home. It would
plainly be unconstitutional toprohibit a person from singing a
copyrighted song in the shower or jotting down a copyrighted
poem he hears over the radio. Special constitutional values
are implicated whenever the government seeks to regulate
such an activity. 20 Those values would surely be weighed
carefully by Congress before adopting a statute that so intrusively regulates noncommercial conduct within the home.
This con~cy is magnified by the nature of the
activity at issue in this case. A television program is
beamed into the living rooms of millions of viewers at no
charge; the alleged infringer uses a timer and a Betamax simply to watch it at a more convenient time. It is unlikely that
the average citizen-or the average Representative-would
see any moral or economic distinction between watching the
program "live" and watching it later with the assistance of a
new technology. Surely the citizen should be entitled to
more notice than this statute has provided before such a distinction is made the basis for a judicial determination that he
has trampled on the federally protected rights of the owner of
21
the copyri ,
1 vited him to view the program freely.
My s ond conce relates to the most common response to

-----=-----

"Whate
ay be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at
the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565-566 (1969).
21
My interpretation of the statute does not draw any distinction between
making a single copy in the home for private noncommercial "time-shifting"
purposes and making such a copy for "librarying" purposes. No such distinction was drawn in the legislative history of the 1971 Amendments, or in
the language or history of the 1976 Act. Concededly, rampant librarying
for home reviewing might have more effect on some broadcasters' ability to
exploit their product commercially than simple time-shifting. Yet nothing
in the record before us demonstrates that such librarying is more likely to
occur in the television context than in the audiotape context, or that it is
20
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the first-the admission that, of course, no one, wo!;!ld eyer
pro§.ecute .lh_e i!.!,hijn1il~ng a single .c..opy a( home. See
respon.§.e TmPiies that Congress intended
n. 3,
to prohibit certain c u t, eXpecl~tion
wou not e e orced a ain t tlie prima
iol tor' a ll for the
purpose of al o n lawsuits against any cor orati_g.n that
supp 1es
e technologtca means for
IS conduct.
We
should no£ hgh£rystr'etch an ambiguous statute on the assumption that Congress intended to make behavior that is
engaged in by millions of citizens into a violation of federal
law, all the while intending the violation to go unpunished.
Such laws have an enormous potential to breed disrespect for
fundamental societal institutions. Congress should not be assumed to create them on the sly.
It is significant that the Act does not purport to create
"safe" violations. It plainly provides that every act of infringement-even if performed in complete good faith-gives
rise to a minimum statutory liability of $100. 22 That command cannot simply be transformed into a matter of indifference because the copyright owners do not intend to collect
the heavy tribute that is their due.
The problem of remedying the supposed violation by the
primary infringer leads directly to my third concern: the
problem of remedying the supposed contributory infringement. As I have noted, the respondents do not seek a dec-

supra:-=Tl:\is

presently having any effect on broadcaster revenues. Of course, if widespread economic damage is shown likely, Congress may well conclude that
some sort of response, such as a tape tax, is necessary. I would be astonished, however, if that corrective action took the form of a pronouncement
that noncommercial librarying for personal use in the home is an infringement of copyright.
22
Section 504(c)(2) provides, in part:
"In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in
its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not
less than $100."
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laration that home taping violates the law for the purpose of
collecting $100 from the home taper. Rather, they seek such
a declaration in order to obtain relief from petitioner, an alleged contributory infringer. Even if we assume, as therespondents suggest, that a finding that home use violates the
copyright law gives rise to remedies against the petitioner,
one surely must wonder about what those remedies are.
In their complaint, respondents pray for an injunction
against the further manufacture or sale of video cassette recorders. They do so despite the fact that they have suffered
no tangible harm. 23 They claim the injunction is required by
the potential future impact of this innovation. Surely that
impact can be more precisely gauged by legislators than by
this Court, on this record.
Not surprisingly, neither scholars nor the Court of Appeals
take the prayer for an injunction against manufacture and
sale very seriously. Instead, it is widely suggested that a
trial court, exercising equitable powers, can establish a "compulsory licensing" system. The details of such a system are
never spelled out clearly. It would, of necessity, require
every manufacturer of videocassette recorders and every
manufacturer of videocassettes to be joined as defendants in
a single lawsuit and assessed some arbitrary tax on their
"Plaintiffs admitted that at the time of trial, no existing contract, license or advantageous business relationship of either Universal or Disney
had been injured, interfered with or disrupted by the sale or use of Betamax and Betamax tapes or by any other activity of any defendant. This
includes without limitation plaintiffs' theatrical, television, 8 or 16 mm, and
video-disc products.
"In addition, plaintiffs conceded that neither the sale nor the use of
Betamax and Betamax tapes had by the time of trial caused Universal or
Disney any measurable monetary damage, economic loss or revenue loss.
1978 was a very successful year for both Universal and Disney. It was
Disney's eleventh consecutive year of increased profit and the most profitable year in history for Universal Pictures' Theatrical Division.
Universal's television revenues had increased steadily over the three years
prior to trial and Disney received its highest television income in 1978."
Opinion of District Court, Pet. for Cert. 50.
28
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sales. The proceeds of the "equitable excise tax" would then
have to be allocated by the court-equitably, to be sureamong the untold numbers of copyright holders who license
works for broadcast over the public airwaves. Each would
join as a co-plaintiff. Nielsen would be appointed as a special
master.
There should be a strong presumption against the judicial
creation of elaborate remedial structures that supplement
specific remedies established by Congress. Indeed, in two
recent unanimous opinions we effectively endorsed such a
presumption. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union of America, 451 U. S. 77 (1981), we stated:
"In almost any statutory scheme, there may be a need
for judicial interpretation of ambiguous or incomplete
prov1s1ons. But the authority to construe a statute is
fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a
new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congres has
decided not to adopt." Id ., at 97.
And in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U. S. 630 (1981), we concluded:
"The policy questions presented by petitioner's
claimed right ... are far-reaching. In declining to provide [that] right ... , we neither reject the validity of
those arguments nor adopt the views of those opposing. . . . Rather, we recognize that, regardless of the
merits of the conflicting arguments, this is a matter for
Congress, not the courts, to resolve.
"The range of factors to be weighed in deciding
whether a right to contribution should exist demonstrates the inappropriateness of judicial resolution of this
complex issue. Ascertaining what is 'fair' in this setting
calls for inquiry into the entire spectrum of antitrust
law, not simply the elements of a particular case or category of cases. ~' Id., at 647.
We concluded that case with a quotation from Diamond v.
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Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980):
"The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the
kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which in our democratic system is the business of
elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the
contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to
the political branches of the Government, the Congress
and the Executive, and not to the courts."
IV
It must be emphasized how narrow the issue presented in
this case is. The individual defendant, William Griffiths, did
not sell his tapes to other people. He did not rent them out
to other people. He did not trade them with other people.
He did not lend them to other people. He did not make
copies of them. He did not play them publicly. All he did
was record, in his home, programs that were broadcast to the
public at large.
Respondents argue that an abstract theoretician's view of
the copyright monopoly allows them to control the way William Griffiths watches television. In the name of that
abstract vision, they ask the federal courts to establish a bureaucracy more complex than anything Congress has established in the field of copyright to date, in order that they may
levy an excise tax on a burgeoning new industry.
The issue posed by this innovative new technology is similar to the question that was presented by the development of
player pianos, sophisticated copying machines, cable television systems and audio tape recorders. In each of those situations Congress, rather than the Court, has made the policy
decisions that are required to accommodate the competing interests of all parties. A similar course should be followed
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here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed .

.·

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1687

SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS,
INC., ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[November - , 1983]

JuSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners manufacture and sell home video tape recorders. Repondents own the copyrights on some of the television programs that are broadcast on the public airwaves.
Some members of the general public use video tape recorders
sold by petitioners to record some of these broadcasts, as
well as a large number of other broadcasts. The question
presented is whether the sale of petitioners' copying equipment to the general public violates any of the rights conferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act.
Respondents commenced this copyright infringment action
against petitioners in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California in 1976. Respondents alleged
that some individuals had used Betamax video tape recorders
(VTR's) to record some of respondents' copyrighted works
which had been exhibited on commercially sponsored television and contended that these individuals had thereby
infringed respondents' copyrights. Respondents further
maintained that petitioners were liable for the copyright
infringment allegedly committed by Betamax consumers because of petitioners' marketing of the Betamax VTR's. 1 Re'The respondents also asserted causes of action under state law and
§ 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a).
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spondents sought no relief against any Betamax consumer.
Instead, they sought money damages and an equitable accounting of profits from petitioners, as well as an injunction
against the manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's.
After a lengthy trial, the District Court denied respondents all the relief they sought and entered judgment for petitioners. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's
judgment on respondent's copyright claim, holding petitioners liable for contributory infringment and ordering the District Court to fashion appropriate relief. 659 F. 2d 963
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1116 (1982); since
we had not completed our study of the case last Term, we ordered reargument,-- U. S. - - (1983). We now reverse.
An explanation of our rejection of respondents' unprecedented attempt to impose copyright liability upon the distributors of copying equipment requires a quite detailed recitation of the findings of the District Court. In summary, those
findings reveal that the average member of the public uses a
VTR principally to record a program he cannot view as it is
being televised and then to watch it once at a later time.
This practice, known as "time-shifting," enlarges the television viewing audience. For that reason, a significant
amount of television programming may be used in this manner without objection from the owners of the copyrights on
the programs. For the same reason, even the two respondents in this case, who do assert objections to time-shifting in
this litigation, were unable to prove that the practice has impaired the commercial value of their copyrights or has created any likelihood of future harm. Given these findings,
there is no basis in the Copyright Act upon which respondents can hold petitioners liable for distributing VTR's to the
general public. The Court of Appeals' holding that respondents are entitled to enjoin the distribution of VTR's, to collect
These claims are not before this Court.
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royalties on the sale of such equipment, or to obtain other relief, if affirmed, would enlarge the scope of respondents' statutory monopolies to encompass control over an article of commerce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such
an expansion of the copyright privilege is beyond the limits of
the grants authorized by Congress.
I
The two respondents in this action, Universal Studios, Inc.
and Walt Disney Productions, produce and hold the copyrights on a substantial number of motion pictures and other
audiovisual works. In the current marketplace, they can
exploit their rights in these works in a number of ways: by
authorizing theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited
showings on cable and network television, by selling syndication rights for repeated airings on local television stations,
and marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or videodiscs. Some works are suitable for exploitation through all
of these avenues, while the market for other works is more
limited.
Petitioner Sony manufactures millions of Betamax video
tape recorders and markets these devices through numerous
retail establishments, some of which are also petitioners in
this action. 2 Sony's Betamax VTR is a mechanism consisting of three basic components: (1) a tuner, which receives
electromagnetic signals transmitted over the television band
of the public airwaves and separates them into audio and visual signals; (2) a recorder, which records such signals on a
2
The four retailers are Carter, Hawley, Hales, Stores, Inc.; Associated
Dry Goods Corp.; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Camera Corp. The principal defendants are Sony Corporation, the manufacturer of the equipment, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sony Corporation
of America. The advertising agency of Doyle, Dane, Burnbock, Inc., also
involved in marketing the Betamax, is also a petitioner. An individual
VTR user, Willis Griffiths, was named as a defendant in the District Court,
but respondent sought no relief against him. Griffiths is not a petitioner.
For convenience, we shall refer to petitioners collectively as Sony.
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magnetic tape; and (3) an adapter, which converts the audio
and visual signals on the tape into a composite signal that can
be received by a television set.
Several capabilities of the machine are noteworthy. The
separate tuner in the Betamax enables it to record a broadcast off one station while the television set is tuned to another
channel, permitting the viewer, for example, to watch two
simultaneous news broadcasts by watching one "live" and recording the other for later viewing. Tapes may be reused,
and programs that have been recorded may be erased either
before or after viewing. A timer in the Betamax can be used
to activate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined
times, enabling an intended viewer to record programs that
are transmitted when he or she is not at home. Thus a person may watch a program at home in the evening even
though it was broadcast while the viewer was at work during
the afternoon. The Betamax is also equipped with a pause
button and a fast-forward control. The pause button, when
depressed, deactivates the recorder until it is released, thus
enabling a viewer to omit a commercial advertisement from
the recording, provided, of course, that the viewer is present
when the program is recorded. The fast forward control enables the viewer of a previously recorded program to run the
tape rapidly when a segment he or she does not desire to see
is being played back on the television screen.
The respondents and Sony both conducted surveys of the
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred owners during a sample period in 1978. Although there were
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the
primary use of the machine for most owners was "time-shifting,"-the practice of recording a program to view it once at
a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Time-shifting enables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss because they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or
are viewing a program on another station at the time of a
broadcast that they desire to watch. Both surveys also
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showed, however, that a substantial number of interviewees
had accumulated libraries of tapes. 3 Sony's survey indicated that over 80% of the interviewees watched at least as
much regular television as they had before owning a
Betamax. 4 Respondents offered no evidence of decreased
television viewing by Betamax owners. 5
3
As evidence of how a VTR may be used, respondents offered the testimony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual defendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summarized his testimony as follows:
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax,
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) but
also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however,
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing
them.
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept.
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Earhart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any
Universal film in his library.
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy debate.'' 480 F. Supp., at 436--437.
Four other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity.
• The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys as
follows:
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their machines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. Defendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine to record programs they otherwise would have missed.
"When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their library, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further
viewing.'' 480 F. Supp., at 438.
5
"81.9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2%
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Sony introduced considerable evidence describing television programs that could be copied without objection from
any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, religious, and educational programming. For example, their
survey indicated that 7.3% of all Betamax use is to record
sports events, and representatives of professional baseball,
football, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no objection to the recording of their televised events for home
use. 6
Respondents offered opinion evidence concerning the future impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commercial value of their copyrights. The District Court found,
however, that they had failed to prove any likelihood of future harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting. Id., at
469.

The District Court's Decision
The lengthy trial of the case in the District Court concerned the private, home use of VTR's for recording programs broadcast on the public airwaves without charge to the
viewer. 7 No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to other
persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for public performances, or the copying of programs transmitted on pay or cable television systems was raised. See 480 F. Supp. 429,
432-433, 442 (1979).
The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was
a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyreported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480
F. Supp., at 439.
• See Def. Exh. OT, Table 20; Tr. 2447-2450, 2480, 248&-2487, 25152516, 2530-2534.
7
The trial also briefly touched upon demonstrations of the Betamax by
the retailer petitioners which were alleged to be infringments by respondents. The District Court held against respondents on this claim, 480 F .
Supp., at 45&-457, the Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, 659 F . 2d, at
976, and respondents did not cross-petition on this issue.
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right infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material
was broadcast free to the public at large, the noncommercial
character of the use, and the private character of the activity
conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest
in increasing access to television programming, an interest
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through the
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 480 F.
Supp., at 454. 8 Even when an entire copyrighted work was
recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair use
"because there is no accompanying reduction in the market
for 'plaintiff's original work."' Ibid.
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a contributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use. The District Court noted that Sony
had no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who
recorded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement,
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement:
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the
United States copyright laws." !d., at 436.
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive
knowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine
would be used to record copyrighted programs, but found
that Sony merely sold a "product capable of a variety of
The court also found that this "access is not just a matter of convenience, as plaintiffs have suggested. Access has been limited not simply
by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access to the better program has also been limited by the competitive practice of counterprogramming." 480 F. Supp., at 454.
8
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uses, some of them allegedly infringing." I d., at 461. It
reasoned:
"Selling a staple article of commerce e. g., a typewriter, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine
technically contributes to any infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial management.
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers of staple items were held liable as contributory infringers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some
purchasers on some occasions would use their product
for a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of
first impression, to be an infringement." Ibid.
Finally, the District Court discussed the respondents'
prayer for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an
injunction either preventing the future sale of Betamax machines, or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable
of recording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated
that it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument enabling the infringement were sued by the copyright holders,"
and that the request for relief in this case "is unique." 480
F. Supp., at 465.
It concluded that an injunction was wholly inappropriate
because any possible harm to respondents was outweighed by
the fact that "the Betamax could still legally be used to
record noncopyrighted material or material whose owners
consented to the copying. An injunction would deprive the
public of the ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing
off-the-air recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
The Court of Appeals' Decision
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment on respondents' copyright claim. It did not set aside
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any of the District Court's findings of fact. Rather, it concluded as a matter of law that the home use of a VTR was not
a fair use because it was not a "productive use." 9 It therefore held that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any
harm to the potential market for the copyrighted works, but
then observed that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect
of mass reproduction made possible by VTR's would tend to
diminish the potential market for respondents' works. 659
F. 2d, at 974.
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Appeals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce
such as tape recorders or photocopying machines. It noted
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise· copyright problems." Id., at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the primary purpose of reproducing television programming" and
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material.
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use
even if some copyright owners elect not to enforce their
rights.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's reliance on Sony's lack of knowledge that home use constituted
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defining the remedies for infringement applied also to the nonstatutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his damages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct.
It held that Sony was chargeable with knowledge of the
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of
copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use"
or "the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid.
"Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is reproduced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case
precludes an application of fair use." 659 F. 2d, at 971-972.
9
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On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the District Court should reconsider its determination that an injunction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring
to "the analogous photocopying area," suggested that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory license may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976.
II
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that:
"The Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.
"The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127, Chief Justice
Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly granted by Congress, 'The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferriqg the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public
of the products of his creative genius." United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158.
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress
that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the
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limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their
work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly. 10
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to significant changes in technology. 11 Indeed, it
10
In its report accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in 1909, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives explained this balance:
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in
his writings, ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing
to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.

"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions:
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit
the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
11
Thus, for example, the development and marketing of player pianos
and perforated roles of music, see White Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908), preceded the enactment of the Copyright
Act of 1909; innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision of the
Copyright law; the development of the technology that made it possible to
retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems, see
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968), and Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974) , prompted the enactment of the
complex provisions set forth in 17 U. S. C. § 111 (d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5)
after years of detailed congressional study, see Eastern Microwave, Inc. v.
Doubleday Sports, Inc ., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982).
By enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391,
Congress also provided the solution to the "record piracy" problems that
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was the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the
printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. 12 Repeatedly, as new developments have
occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary.
Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of
1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to
copyrights is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S.
(8 Peters) 591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringement "are only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson
v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889).
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance
is a recurring theme. See, e. g., Teleprompter Corp. v.
CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968); Williams and Wilkins v. United
States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affirmed by an equally
divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908). Sound policy,
as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market
for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
had been created by the development of the audio tape recorder. Sony
argues that the legislative history of that Act, see especially H. Rep. No.
487, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7, indicates that Congress did not intend to
prohibit the private home use of either audio or video tape recording equipment. In view of our disposition of the contributory infringement issue,
we express no opinion on that question.
12
"Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the
printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws.
The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected
with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the other. Successive ages
have drawn different balances among the interest of the writer in the control and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the
publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dissemination of ideas."
Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of
Copyright vii-viii (1967).

81-1687-0PINION
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

13

authority and the institutional ability to accomodate fully the
varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly
marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the
scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which
never contemplated such a calculus of interests. In doing so,
we are guided by Justice Stewart's exposition of the correct
approach to ambiguities in the law of copyright:
"The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory
monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good. 'The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.'
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127. See Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-242. When technological change
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright
Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose."
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151,
156 (footnotes omitted).
Copyright protection "subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17
U. S. C. § 102(a). This protection has never accorded the
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his

81-1687-0PINION
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

14

work. 13 Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright
holder "exclusive" rights to use and to authorize the use of his
work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the
copyrighted work in copies. . I d., § 106. 14 All reproductions
of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of
the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a "fair use;"
the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to
such a use. Compare id., § 106 with id., § 107.
3

See, e. g., White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S.
1, 19 (1908); cf. Deep South Packing Co. v. Lathram Corp., 406 U. S. 518,
530-531 (1972). While the law has never recognized an author's right to
absolute control of his work, the natural tendency of legal rights to express
themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of all else is particularly pronounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the
copyright and the patent. See e. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 156-158 (1948) (copyright owners claiming right to tie
license of one film to license of another under copyright law); Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106 (1932) (copyright owner claiming copyright
renders it immune from state taxation of copyright royalties); HobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 349-351 (1908) (copyright owner
claiming that a right to fix resale price of his works within the scope of his
copyright); International Business Machines v. United States, 298 U. S.
131 (1936) (patentees claiming right to tie sale of unpatented article to lease
of patented device).
14
Section 106 of the Act provides:
" 'Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly."
'
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"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute,
"is an infringer of the copyright." I d., § 501(a). Conversely, anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to
use the copyrighted work in a way specified in the statute or
who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the
copyright with respect to such use.
The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with
a potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his
work, including an injunction to restrain the infringer from
violating his rights, the impoundment and destruction of all
reproductions of his work made in violation of his rights, a
recovery of his actual damages and any additional profits realized by the infringer or a recovery of statutory damages,
and attorneys fees. I d., §§ 502-505. 15
The two respondents in this case do not seek relief against
the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copyrights. Moreover, this is not a class action on behalf of all
copyright owners who license their works for television
broadcast, and respondents have no right to invoke whatever
rights other copyright holders may have to bring infringement actions based on Betamax copying of their works. 16 As
16
Moreover, anyone who willfully infringes the copyright to reproduce a
motion picture for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain is subject to criminal penalties of one year imprisonment and a $25,000
fine for the first offense and two years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for
each subsequent offense, 17 U. S. C. § 506(a), and the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime are forfeited upon conviction, id., § 506(b).
16
In this regard, we reject respondent's attempt to cast this action as
comparable to a class action because of the positions taken by amici with
copyright interests and their attempt to treat the statements made by
amici as evidence in this case. See Brief for Respondent, at 1, and n. 1, 6,
52, 53 and n. 116. The stated desires of amici concerning the outcome of
this or any litigation are no substitute for a class action, are not evidence in
the case, and do not influence our decision; we examine an amicus curiae
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was made clear by their own evidence, the copying of the respondents' programs represents a small portion of the total
use ofVTR's. It is, however, the taping of respondents own
copyrighted programs that provides them with standing to
charge Sony with contributory infringement. To prevail,
they have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax
have infringed their copyrights and that Sony should be held
responsible for that infringement.

III
'The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable
for infringment committed by another. In contrast, the Patent Act expressly brands anyone who "actively induces
infringment of a patent" as an infringer, 35 U. S. C. § 271(b),
and further imposes liability on certain individuals labeled
"contributory" infringers, id., §271(c). The absence of such
express language in the copyright statute does not preclude
the imposition of liability for copyright infringments on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. 17 For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually
brief solely for whatever aid it provides in analyzing the legal questions before us.
17
As the District Court correctly observed, however, "the lines between
direct infringement, contributory infringment, and vicarious liability are
not clearly drawn .... " 480 F. Supp. 457-458. The lack of clarity in this
area may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an infringer is not merely
one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but
also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright owner.
We note the parties' statements that the questions of petitioners' liability under the "doctrines" of "direct infringement" and "vicarious liability''
are not nominally before this Court. Compare Respondents' Brief, at 9, n.
22, 41, n. 90 with Petitioners' Reply Brief, at 1, n. 2. We also observe,
however, that reasoned analysis of respondents' unprecedented contributory infringement claim necessarily entails consideration of arguments and
caselaw which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed
the parties to a large extent rely upon such arguments and authority in
support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory
infringement.

81-1687-0PINION
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

17

all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another.
Such circumstances were plainly present in Kalem Co. v.
Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55 (1911), the copyright decision
of this Court on which respondents place their principal reliance. In Kalem, the Court held that the producer of an unauthorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book Ben
Hur was liable for his sale of the motion picture to jobbers,
who in turn arranged for the commercial exhibition of the
film. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained:
"The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the one for which
especially they were made. If the defendant did not
contribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so
except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on
principles recognized in every part of the law." 222
U.S., at 63.
The use for which the item sold in Kalem had been "especially" made was, of course, to display the performance that
had already been recorded upon it. The producer had personally appropriated the copyright owner's protected work
and, as the owner of the tangible medium of expression upon
which the protected work was recorded, authorized that use
by his sale of the film to jobbers. But that use of the film
was not his to authorize: the copyright owner possessed the
exclusive right to authorize public performances of his work.
Further, the producer personally advertised the unauthorized public performances, dispelling any possible doubt
as to the use of the film which he had authorized.
Respondents argue that Kalem stands for the proposition
that supplying the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity and encouraging that activity through adverstisement are
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sufficient to establish liability for copyright infringement.
This argument rests on a gross generalization that cannot
withstand scrutiny. The producer in Kalem did not merely
provide the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity; the
producer supplied the work itself, albeit in a new medium of
expression. Petitioners in the instant case do not supply
Betamax consumers with respondents' works; respondents
do. Petitioners supply a piece of equipment that is generally
capable of copying the entire range of programs that may be
televised: those that are uncopyrighted, those that are copyrighted but may be copied without objection from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright holder would prefer not to have copied. The Betamax can be used to make
authorized or unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, but
the range of its potential use is much broader than the particular infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem.
Kalem does not support respondents' novel theory of
liability.
Justice Holmes stated that the producer had "contributed"
to the infringement of the copyright, and the label "contributory infringement" has been applied in a number of lower
court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship between the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at
the time the infringing conduct occured. In such cases, as in
other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liablity is
manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a position
to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright
owner. 18 This case, however, plainly does not fall in that cat8

The so-called "dance hall cases," Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554 F. 2d 1213 (CAl 1977)
(racetrack retained infringer to supply music to paying customers); KECA
MUSIC, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F . Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977)
(cocktail lounge hired musicians to supply music to paying customers);
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA7
1929) (dance hall hired orchestra to supply music to paying customers) are
often contrasted with the so-called landlord-tenant cases, in which land'
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egory. The only contact between Sony and the users of the
Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at the moment of sale. The District Court expressly found that "no
lords who leased premises to a direct infringer for a fixed rental and did not
participate directly in any infringing activity were found not to be liable for
contributory infringement. E . g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F. 2d 686 (CA2
1938).
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304 (CA2
1963) the owner of twenty-three chain stores retained the direct infringer
to run its record departments. The relationship was structured as a licensing arrangement, so that the defendant bore none of the business risk
of running the department. Instead, it received 10% or 12% of the direct
infringer's gross receipts. The Court of Appeals concluded:
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the employer-employee model, than to the landlord-tenant model. On the particular facts before us, ... Green's relationship to its infringing licensee, as
well as its strong concern for the financial success of the phonograph record
concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 'bootleg'
records.
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully
the conduct of its concessionaire; our judgment will simply encourage it to
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively exercised." I d., at 308 (emphasis in original).
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc .,
443 F . 2d 1159 (CA2 1971), the direct infringers retained the contributory
infringer to manage their performances. The contributory infringer
would contact each direct infringer, obtain the titles of the musical compositions to be performed, print the programs, and then sell the programs to
its own local organizations for distribution at the time of the direct infringement. Id., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the contributory infringer had actual knowledge that the artists it was managing were
performing copyrighted works, was in a position to police the infringing
conduct of the artists, and derived substantial benefit from the actions of
the primary infringers. Id., at 1163.
In Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-FiRecords , Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 399 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), the direct infringer manufactured and sold
bootleg records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the District
Court held that the infringer's advertising agency, the radio stations that
advertised the infringer's works, and the service agency that boxed and
mailed the infringing goods could all be held liable, if at trial it could be
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employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct contact
with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted works
off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460. And it further found
that "there was no evidence that any of the copies made by
Griffiths or the other individual witnesses in this suit were
influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] advertisements."
lbid. 19
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this
case, it must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment
with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory.
The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship
between patent law and copyright law. 20
demonstrated that they knew or should have known that they were dealing
in illegal goods.
19
The broad verbal formulae which have been used to describe ordinary
claims of contributory infringement, see, e. g. , Gershwin Publishing Corp.
v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (CA2 1971)
("[O)ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer."); see also, Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories, Inc ., 456 U. S. 844, 851 (1982), cannot reasonably be applied literally in the context of respondents' unprecedented copyright
claim. Manufacturers and distributors of numerous devices undoubtably
have constructive knowledge that their products may be used by some of
their customers to violate the rights of others. Such distributors would
neatly fit the wording of these formulae, but imposing liability on them
merely for marketing the devices that were misused by their customers
would represent a radical extension of traditional notions of legal responsibility. Indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that the sale of "cameras or photocopying machines" would "not even remotely raise copyright
problems. " 659 F . 2d, at 975.
20
E. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106, 131 (1932); Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Grigg, 33 U. S. 591, 657-{)58 (1834). The two areas of

-
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In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly defined by statute. 21 The prohibition against contributory infringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component especially made for use in connection with a particular patent.
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may
object to the sale of a product that might be used in connection with other patents. Moreover, the Act expressly provides that the sale of a "staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not
contributory infringement.
When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated
entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by

-

the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution
which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one
area to the other. See generally, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 217-218
(1954); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345 (1908).
21
35 U. S. C. § 271 provides:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement."

-
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the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated. A
finding of contributory infringement does not, of course, remove the article from the market altogether; it does, however, give the patentee effective control over the sale of that
item. Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is normally the functional equivalent of holding that the disputed
article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee. 22
For that reason, in contributory infringement cases arising
under the patent laws the Court has always recognized the
critical importance of not allowing the patentee to extend his
monopoly beyond the limits of his specific grant. These
cases deny the patentee any right to control the distribution
of unpatented articles unless they are "unsuited for any commercial noninfringing use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm
& Hass Co., 448 U. S. 176, 198 (1980). Unless a commodity
"has no use except through practice of the patented method,"
ibid, the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution
constitutes contributory infringment. "To form the basis for
contributory infringement the item must almost be uniquely
suited as a component of the patented invention." P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals § 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale
of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also
adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the
seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the
wheels of commerce." Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1,
48 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture PatIt seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon
all copyright owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this
case, the exclusive right to distribute VTR's simply because they may be
used to infringe copyrights. That, however, is the logical implication of
their claim. The request for an injunction below indicates that respondents
seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband. Their suggestion in this
Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory
license would be an acceptable remedy merely indicates that respondents,
for their part, would be willing to license their claimed monopoly interest in
VTR's to petitioners in return for a royalty.
22
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ents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517
(1917).
Although there are substantial differences between the
patent and copyright laws, there is no reason to grant the
copyright holder any broader right to bar noninfringing activities than the patent holder. Indeed, the copyright holder
should have a lesser right, for by precluding noninfringing
uses he may not only block the wheels of commerce, but also
might impose an unjustified tax on the free marketplace of
ideas and interfere with the opportunities of other copyright
holders to authorize exploitation of the devices for their own
purposes.
Under our cases, as well as the text of the Patent Code,
the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.
IV
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that question, we need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the district court a significant number of them would be non-infringing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not
give precise content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so
both (A) because respondents have no right to prevent other
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and
(B) because the District Court's factual findings reveal that
even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents'
programs is legitimate fair use.
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A. Authorized Time Shifting

Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television programming their combined market share is small. The exact percentage is not specified, but it is well below 10%. 23 If they
were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would have a
significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of
the remaining 90% of the programming in the Nation. No
doubt, many other producers share respondents' concern
about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying.
Nevertheless the findings of the District Court make it clear
that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing audience and
that many producers are willing to allow private time-shifting
to continue, at least for an experimental time period. 24
The District Court found:
"Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of
copyrighted material constituted infringement, the Betamax could still legally be used to record noncopyrighted
material or material whose owners consented to the
copying. An injunction would deprive the public of the
ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing off-theair recording.
The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial consisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syndicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on commercial television stations was under 5%. See Tr. 532-533, 549-550.
24
The District Court did not make any explicit findings with regard to
how much broadcasting is wholly uncopyrighted. The record does include
testimony that at least one movie-My Man Godfrey-falls within that category, Tr. 2300-2301, and certain broadcasts produced by the federal government are also uncopyrighted. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. Cf. Schappner
v. Foley, 667 F . 2d 102 (CADC 1981) (explaining distinction between work
produced by the government and work commissioned by the government).
To the extent such broadcasting is now significant, it further bolsters our
conclusion. Moreover, since copyright protection is not perpetual, the
number of audiovisual works in the public domain necessarily increases
each year.
23
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"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, religious, educational and other programming. This included testimony from representatives of the Offices of
the Commissioners of the National Football, Basketball,
Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the Executive Director of National Religious Broadcasters and
various educational communications agencies. Plaintiffs
attack the weight of the testimony offered and also contend that an injunction is warranted because infringing
uses outweigh noninfringing uses."
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use recording might be, an injunction which
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
Although the District Court made these statements in the
context of considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the
statements constitute a finding that the evidence concerning
"sports, religious, educational, and other programming" was
sufficient to establish a significant quantity of broadcasting
whose copying is now authorized, and a significant potential
for future authorized copying. That finding is amply supported by the record. In addition to the religious and sports
officials identified explicitly by the District Court, 25 two items
in the record deserve specific mention.
See Tr. 2447-2450 (Alexander Hadden, Major League Baseball); Tr.
2480, 2486-2487 (Jay Moyer, National Football League); Tr. 2515-2516
(David Stern, National Basketball Association); Tr. 2530-2534 (Gilbert
Stein, National Hockey League); Tr. 2543-2552 (Thomas Hansen, National
Collegiate Athletic Association); Tr. 2565-2572 (Benjamin Armstrong, National Religious Broadcasters). Those officials were authorized to be the
official spokespersons for their respective institutions in this litigation.
Tr. 2432, 2479, 2509-2510, 2530, 2538, 2563. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
30(b)(6).
25
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First is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station manager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles
affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He explained and authenticated the station's published guide .to its
programs. 26 For each program, the guide tells whether unlimited home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized
subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure within seven
days), or home taping is not authorized at all. The Spring
1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs. Sixty-two
of those programs or 58% authorize some home taping.
Twenty-one of them or almost 20% authorize unrestricted
home taping. ?:1
Second is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the
corporation that produces and owns the copyright on Mr.
Rogers' Neighborhood. The program is carried by more
public television stations than any other program. Its audience numbers over 3,000,000 families a day. He testified
that he had absolutely no objection to home taping for noncommercial use and expressed the opinion that it is a real
service to families to be able to record children's programs
and to show them at appropriate times. 28
Tr. 2863-2902; Def. Exh. PI.
See also Tr. 2833-2844 (similar testimony by executive director of New
Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority). Cf. Tr. 2592-2605 (testimony by
chief of New York Education Department's Bureau of Mass Communications approving home taping for educational purposes).
28
"Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
'Neighborhood' at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all
of this new technology that allows people to tape the 'Neighborhood' offthe-air, and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's what I
produce, that they then become much more active in the programming of
their family's television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being
programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always
been 'You are an important person just the way you are. You can make
healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life,
26

Z7
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If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible should not be stifled simply because the equipment is
used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions
of respondents' works. The respondents do not represent a
class composed of all copyright holders. Yet a finding of contributory infringement would inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of their audience
that is available only through time-shifting.
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders may welcome the practice of time-shifting does not mean that respondents should be deemed to have granted a license to copy
their programs. Third party conduct would be wholly irrelevant in an action for direct infringement of respondents'
copyrights. But in an action for contributory infringement
against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder
may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his
programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the outcome. In this case, the record
makes it perfectly clear that there are many important producers of national and local television programs who find
nothing objectionable about the enlargement in the size of the
television audience that results from the practice of timeshifting for private home use. 29 The seller of the equipment
in a healthy way, is important." T. R. 2920-2921. See also Def. Exh. PI,
p. 85.
29
It may be rare for large numbers of copyright owners to authorize
duplication of their works without demanding a fee from the copier. In
the context of public broadcasting, however, the user of the copyrighted
work is not required to pay a fee for access to the underlying work. The
traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon the television medium-commercially sponsored free public broadcast over the public airwaves-is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the
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that expands those producers' audiences cannot be a contributory infringer if, as is true in this case, it has had no direct involvement with any infringing activity.
B. Unauthorized Time-Shifting
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not necessarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not
an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 154-155.
Moreover, the definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of the
present Act is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107
through 118." Those sections describe a variety of uses of
copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright
notwithstanding the provisions of § 106." The most pertinent in this case is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the
doctrine of "fair use." 30
value of displaying the works will be received in the form of advertising
revenues.
In the context of television programming, some producers evidently believe that permitting home viewers to make copies of their works off the air
actually enhances the value of their copyrights. Irrespective of their reasons for authorizing the practice, they do so, and in significant enough
numbers to create a substantial market for a non-infringing use of the Sony
VTR's. No one could dispute the legitimacy of that market if the producers had authorized home taping of their programs in exchange for a license
fee paid directly by the home user. The legitimacy of that market is not
compromised simply because these producers have authorized home taping
of their programs without demanding a fee from the home user. The copyright law does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the use of
his works, and as this record clearly demonstrates, the owner of a copyright may well have economic or noneconomic reasons for permitting certain kinds of copying to occur without receiving direct compensation from
the copier. It is not the role of the courts to tell copyright holders the best
way for them to exploit their copyrights: even if respondents' competitors
were ill-advised in authorizing home videotaping, that would not change
the fact that they have created a substantial market for a paradigmatic
non-infringing use of petitioners' product.
30
The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, did not have a "fair use" provision. Although that Act's compendium of exclusive rights "to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" was broad enough to

'.
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That section identifies various factors 31 that enable a Court
to apply an "equitable rule of reason" analysis to particular
claims of infringement. 32 Although not conclusive, the first
encompass virtually all potential interactions with a copyrighted work, the
statute was never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the
statute literally in every situation. When Congress amended the statute
in 1976, it indicated that it ''intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House
Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66.
81
Section 107 provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107.
32
The nature of the section is explained in these comments from the
House Report on the fair use section:
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question
must be decided on its own facts ....
General intention behind the provision
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply.
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H. Rep. No.
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factor requires that "the commercial or nonprofit character of
an activity" be weighed in any fair use decision. 33 If the
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or
profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court's findings plainly establish
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. Moreover, when one
considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual
work, see 17 U. S. C. § 107(2), and that timeshifting merely
enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that
the entire work is reproduced, see id., at § 107(3), does not
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair
use.
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Congress has also directed us to consider "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." I d., at§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copying for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to
obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have.
But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not
be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would
94-1476, pp. 65--66.
33
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered-'the purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this
factor includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as
under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions. " H. Rep. No.
94-1476, p. 66.
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merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing
benefit. 34
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market
for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will result.
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood
may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose,
the likelihood must be demonstrated.
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with
regard to home time-shifting. The District Court described
respondents' evidence as follows:
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the
trial that the time-shifting without librarying would result in 'not a great deal of harm.' Plaintiffs' greatest
concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of important
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.'
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible
34

Cf. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as Study
No. 14 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 30 (1960):
"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm
from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat
lex."
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boundaries' are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost
control over his program.'" 480 F. Supp., at 467.
Later in its opinion, the District Court observed:
"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of harm hinge on speculation about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a
measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant
level of imprecision involved in the calculations." I d., at
469. 35
There was no need for the District Court to say much about
past harm. "Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual harm to
their copyrights has occurred to date." I d., at 451.
On the question of potential future harm from time-shifting, the District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the
evidence. It rejected respondents' "fear that persons
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be measured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will
decrease," by observing that current measurement technology allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. I d., at
466. 36 It rejected respondents' prediction "that live televiSee also 480 F. Supp., at 451:
"It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs' argument is more complicated
and speculative than was the plaintiff's in Williams & Wilkins. . . . Here,
plaintiffs ask the court to find harm based on many more assumptions ....
As is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, some of these assumptions are
based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that they are to
some extent inconsistent and illogical."
36
"There was testimony at trial, however, that Nielsen Ratings has already developed the ability to measure when a Betamax in a sample home
is recording the program. Thus, the Betamax will be measured as a part
of the live audience. The later diary can augment that measurement with
information about subsequent viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 466.
In a separate section, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion
that the commercial attractiveness of television broadcasts would be diminished because Betamax owners would use the pause button or fast-forward
control to avoid viewing advertisements:
35
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sion or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch
Betamax tapes as an alternative," with the observation that
"[t]here is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption."
Ibid. 37 It rejected respondents' "fear that time-shifting will
reduce audiences for telecast reruns," and concluded instead
that "given current market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 38 And it declared that
respondents' suggestion "that theater or film rental exhibition of a program will suffer because of time-shift recording
of that program" "lacks merit." 480 F. Supp., at 467. 39
"It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while recording. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward
and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For
most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As defendants' survey showed, 92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and
only 25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers will have
to make the same kinds of judgments they do now about whether persons
viewing televised programs actually watch the advertisements which interrupt them." Id., at 468.
37
"Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies when they would
otherwise be watching television or going to the movie theater. There is
no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax
owners will play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish
to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey does not
show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on television viewing or
theater attendance." Ibid.
38
"The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept.
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original televised material and that the more people there are in this original audience,
the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices,
including the success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, the
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs
can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There is no survey
within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is comprised of persons who have not seen the program. In any event, if ratings
can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given
market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid.
39
"This suggestion lacks merit. By definition, time-shift recording entails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape when
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After completing that review, the District Court restated
its overall conclusion several times, in several different ways.
"Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal." Ibid. "The audience benefits from the time-shifting
capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more persons to view their broadcasts." Ibid. "No likelihood of
harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there
had been no actual harm to date." Id., at 468-469. "Testimony at trial suggested that Betamax may require adjustments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even a
likelihood of harm." I d., at 469. "Television production by
plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has ever been, and,
in five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial picture." Ibid.
The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact
that to the extent time-shifting expands public access to
freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal benefits. Earlier this year, in Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, - - U. S. - - , - - - - - , n.
12 (1983), we acknowledged the public interest in making
television broadcasting more available. Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But it supports an interpretation of
the concept of "fair use" that requires the copyright holder to
demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may condemn
a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law.
the later theater run begins. Of course, plaintiffs may fear that the
Betamax will keep the tapes long enough to satisfy all their interest in the
program and will, therefore , not patronize later theater exhibitions. To
the extent this practice involves librarying, it is addressed in section V.C.,
infra. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the
public interest in later theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures will be reduced any more by Betamax recording than it already is by the television
broadcast of the film. " 480 F. Supp. , at 467.
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When these factors are all weighed in the "rule of reason"
balance, we must conclude that this record amply supports
the District Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair
use. In light of the findings of the District Court regarding
the state of the empirical data, it is clear that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the statute as presently written bars such conduct. 40
40

The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in any "equitable rule of reason" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be
"productive." It therefore concluded that copying a television program
merely to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that
he would otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could
never be fair use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous.
Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a sensitive balancing of interests. The distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be
wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor
certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting
a poker game, the question is not simply two-dimensional. For one thing,
it is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern material with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well
have a broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for commercial harm. Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to
fair use than copying a motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are
fungible. Copying for commercial gain has a much weaker claim to fair
use than copying for personal enrichment. But the notion of social "productivity" cannot be a complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who
copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher
who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his
specialty. Or a legislator w.ho copies for the sake of broadening her understanding of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies
a news program to help make a decision on how to vote.
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind person is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to entertain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statu-

/
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In summary, the record and findings of the District Court
lead us to two conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television
would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by
private viewers. And second, respondents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of,
their copyrighted works. The Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Sony's sale of such
equipment to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondent's copyrights.

v
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the
power to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972).
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that
the elected representatives of the millions of people who
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible.
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this
new technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that
have not yet been written. Applying the copyright statute,
as it now reads, to the facts as they have been developed in
tory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the economic consequences of copying.
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this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.

It is so ordered.
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JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners manufacture and sell home video tape recorders. Repondents own the copyrights on some of the television programs that are broadcast on the public airwaves.
Some members of the general public use video tape recorders
sold by petitioners to record some of these broadcasts, as
well as a large number of other broadcasts. The question
presented is whether the sale of petitioners' copying equipment to the general public violates any of the rights conferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act.
Respondents commenced this copyright infringment action
against petitioners in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California in 1976. Respondents alleged
that some individuals had used Betamax video tape recorders
(VTR's) to record some of respondents' copyrighted works
which had been exhibited on commercially sponsored television and contended that these individuals had thereby
infringed respondents' copyrights. Respondents further
maintained that petitioners were liable for the copyright
infringment allegedly committed by Betamax consumers because of petitioners' marketing of the Betamax VTR's. 1 Re1

The respondents also asserted causes of action under state law and

§ 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a).
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spondents sought no relief against any Betamax consumer.
Instead, they sought money damages and an equitable accounting of profits from petitioners, as well as an injunction
against the manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's.
After a lengthy trial, the District Court denied respondents all the relief they sought and entered judgment for petitioners. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's
judgment on respondent's copyright claim, holding petitioners liable for contributory infringment and ordering the District Court to fashion appropriate relief. 659 F. 2d 963
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1116 (1982); since
we had not completed our study of the case last Term, we ordered reargument,-- U. S. - - (1983). We now reverse.
An explanation of our rejection of respondents' unprecedented attempt to impose copyright liability upon the distributors of copying equipment requires a quite detailed recitation of the findings of the District Court. In summary, those
findings reveal that the average member of the public uses a
VTR principally to record a program he cannot view as it is
being televised and then to watch it once at a later time.
This practice, known as "time-shifting," enlarges the television viewing audience. For that reason, a significant
amount of television programming may be used in this manner without objection from the owners of the copyrights on
the programs. For the same reason, even the two respondents in this case, who do assert objections to time-shifting in
this litigation, were unable to prove that the practice has impaired the commercial value of their copyrights or has created any likelihood of future harm. Given these findings,
there is no basis in the Copyright Act upon which respondents can hold petitioners liable for distributing VTR's to the
general public. The Court of Appeals' holding that respondents are entitled to enjoin the distribution of VTR's, to collect
These claims are not before this Court.
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royalties on the sale of such equipment, or to obtain other relief, if affirmed, would enlarge the scope of respondents' statutory monopolies to encompass control over an article of commerce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such
an expansion of the copyright privilege is beyond the limits of
the grants authorized by Congress.
I
The two respondents in this action, Universal Studios, Inc.
and Walt Disney Productions, produce and hold the copyrights on a substantial number of motion pictures and other
audiovisual works. In the current marketplace, they can
exploit their rights in these works in a number of ways: by
authorizing theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited
showings on cable and network television, by selling syndication rights for repeated airings on local television stations,
and marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or videodiscs. Some works are suitable for exploitation through all
of these avenues, while the market for other works is more
limited.
Petitioner Sony manufactures millions of Betamax video
tape recorders and markets these devices through numerous
retail establishments, some of which are also petitioners in
this action. 2 Sony's Betamax VTR is a mechanism consisting of three basic components: (1) a tuner, which receives
electromagnetic signals transmitted over the television band
of the public airwaves and separates them into audio and visual signals; (2) a recorder, which records such signals on a
2
The four retailers are Carter, Hawley, Hales, Stores, Inc.; Associated
Dry Goods Corp.; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Camera Corp. The principal defendants are Sony Corporation, the manufacturer of the equipment, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sony Corporation
of America. The advertising agency of Doyle, Dane, Burn bock, Inc., also
involved in marketing the Betamax, is also a petitioner. An individual
VTR user, Willis Griffiths, was named as a defendant in the District Court,
but respondent sought no relief against him. Griffiths is not a petitioner.
For convenience, we shall refer to petitioners collectively as Sony.
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magnetic tape; and (3) an adapter, which converts the audio
and visual signals on the tape into a composite signal that can
be received by a television set.
Several capabilities of the machine are noteworthy. The
separate tuner in the Betamax enables it to record a broadcast off one station while the television set is tuned to another
channel, permitting the viewer, for example, to watch two
simultaneous news broadcasts by watching one "live" and recording the other for later viewing. Tapes may be reused,
and programs that have been recorded may be erased either
before or after viewing. A timer in the Betamax can be used
to activate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined
times, enabling an intended viewer to record programs that
are transmitted when he or she is not at home. Thus a person may watch a program at home in the evening even
though it was broadcast while the viewer was at work during
the afternoon. The Betamax is also equipped with a pause
button and a fast-forward control. The pause button, when
depressed, deactivates the recorder until it is released, thus
enabling a viewer to omit a commercial advertisement from
the recording, provided, of course, that the viewer is present
when the program is recorded. The fast forward control enables the viewer of a previously recorded program to run the
tape rapidly when a segment he or she does not desire to see
is being played back on the television screen.
The respondents and Sony both conducted surveys of the
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred owners during a sample period in 1978. Although there were
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the
primary use of the machine for most owners was "time-shifting,"-the practice of recording a program to view it once at
a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Time-shifting enables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss because they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or
are viewing a program on another station at the time of a
broadcast that they desire to watch. Both surveys also
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showed, however, that a substantial number of interviewees
had accumulated libraries of tapes. 3 Sony's survey indicated that over 80% of the interviewees watched at least as
much regular television as they had before owning a
Betamax. 4 Respondents offered no evidence of decreased
television viewing by Betamax owners. 5
As evidence of how a VTR may be used, respondents offered the testimony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual defendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summarized his testimony as follows:
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax,
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) but
also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however,
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing
them.
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept.
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Earhart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any
Universal film in his library.
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy debate.'' 480 F. Supp., at 436-437.
Four other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity.
'The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys as
follows:
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their machines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. Defendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine to record programs they otherwise would have missed.
"When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their library, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further
viewing.'' 480 F. Supp., at 438.
5
"81.9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2%
3
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Sony introduced considerable evidence describing television programs that could be copied without objection from
any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, religious, and educational programming. For example, their
survey indicated that 7.3% of all Betamax use is to record
sports events, and representatives of professional baseball,
football, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no objection to the recording of their televised events for home
use. 6
Respondents offered opinion evidence concerning the future impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commercial value of their copyrights. The District Court found,
however, that they had failed to prove any likelihood of future harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting. ld., at
469.

The District Court's Decision
The lengthy trial of the case in the District Court concerned the private, home use of VTR's for recording programs broadcast on the public airwaves without charge to the
viewer. 7 No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to other
persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for public performances, or the copying of programs transmitted on pay orcable television systems was raised. See 480 F. Supp. 429,
432-433, 442 (1979).
The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was
a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyreported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480
F. Supp., at 439.
6
See Def. Exh. OT, Table 20; Tr. 2447-2450, 2480, 2486-2487, 251&2516, 2530-2534.
7
The trial also briefly touched upon demonstrations of the Betamax by
the retailer petitioners which were alleged to be infringments by respondents. The District Court held against respondents on this claim, 480 F.
Supp. , at 456-457, the Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, 659 F . 2d, at
976, and respondents did not cross-petition on this issue.
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right infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material
was broadcast free to the public at large, the noncommercial
character of the use, and the private character of the activity
conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest
in increasing access to television programming, an interest
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through the
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 480 F.
Supp., at 454. 8 Even when an entire copyrighted work was
recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair use
"because there is no accompanying reduction in the market
for 'plaintiff's original work.'" Ibid.
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a contributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use. The District Court noted that Sony
had no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who
recorded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement,
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement:
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the
United States copyright laws." !d., at 436.
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive
knowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine
would be used to record copyrighted programs, but found
that Sony merely sold a "product capable of a variety of
8
The court also found that this "access is not just a matter of convenience, as plaintiffs have suggested. Access has been limited not simply
by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access to the better program has also been limited by the competitive practice of counterprogramming." 480 F. Supp., at 454.
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uses, some of them allegedly infringing." Id., at 461. It
reasoned:
"Selling a staple article of commerce e. g., a typewriter, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine
technically contributes to any infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial management.
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers of staple items were held liable as contributory infringers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some
purchasers on some occasions would use their product
for a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of
first impression, to be an infringement." Ibid.
Finally, the District Court discussed the respondents'
prayer for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an
injunction either preventing the future sale of Betamax machines, or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable
of recording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated
that it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument enabling the infringement were sued by the copyright holders,"
and that the request for relief in this case "is unique." 480
F. Supp., at 465.
It concluded that an injunction was wholly inappropriate
because any possible harm to respondents was outweighed by
the fact that "the Betamax could still legally be used to
record noncopyrighted material or material whose owners
consented to the copying. An injunction would deprive the
public of the ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing
off-the-air recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
The Court of Appeals' Decision
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment on respondents' copyright claim. It did not set aside
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any of the District Court's findings of fact. Rather, it concluded as a matter of law that the home use of a VTR was not
a fair use because it was not a "productive use." 9 It therefore held that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any
harm to the potential market for the copyrighted works, but
then observed that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect
of mass reproduction made possible by VTR's would tend to
diminish the potential market for respondents' works. 659
F. 2d, at 974.
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Appeals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce
such as tape recorders or photocopying machines. It noted
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise copyright problems." Id., at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the primary purpose of reproducing television programming" and
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material.
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use
even if some copyright owners elect not to enforce their
rights.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's reliance on Sony's lack of knowledge that home use constituted
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defining the remedies for infringement applied also to the nonstatutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his damages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct.
It held that Sony was chargeable with knowledge of the
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of
copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use"
or "the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid.
' "Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is reproduced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case
precludes an application of fair use." 659 F. 2d, at 971-972.
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On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the District Court should reconsider its determination that an injunction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring
to "the analogous photocopying area," suggested that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory license may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976.
II

Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that:
"The Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.
"The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127, Chief Justice
Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly granted by Congress, 'The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public
of the products of his creative genius." United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158.
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress
that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the
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limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their
work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly. 10
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to significant changes in technology. 11 Indeed, it
10
In its report accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in 1909, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives explained this balance:
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in
his writings, ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing
to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.

"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions:
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit
the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
11
Thus, for example, the development and marketing of player pianos
and perforated roles of music, see White Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908), preceded the enactment of the Copyright
Act of 1909; innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision of the
Copyright law; the development of the technology that made it possible to
retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems, see
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968), and Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974), prompted the enactment of the
complex provisions set forth in 17 U. S. C. § 111 (d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5)
after years of detailed congressional study, see Eastern Microwave, Inc. v.
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982).
By enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391,
Congress also provided the solution to the "record piracy" problems that
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was the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the
printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. 12 Repeatedly, as new developments have
occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary.
Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of
1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to
copyrights is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S.
(8 Peters) 591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringement "are only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson
v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889).
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance
is a recurring theme. See, e. g., Teleprompter Corp. v.
CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968); Williams and Wilkins v. United
States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affirmed by an equally
divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908). Sound policy,
as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market
for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
had been created by the development of the audio tape recorder. Sony
argues that the legislative history of that Act, see especially H. Rep. No.
487, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7, indicates that Congress did not intend to
prohibit the private home use of either audio or video tape recording equipment. In view of our disposition of the contributory infringement issue,
we express no opinion on that question.
12
"Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the
printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws.
The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected
with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the other. Successive ages
have drawn different balances among the interest of the writer in the control and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the
publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dissemination of ideas."
Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of
Copyright vii-viii (1967).

81-1687-0PINION
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

13

authority and the institutional ability to accomodate fully the
varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly
marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the
scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which
never contemplated such a calculus of interests. In doing so,
we are guided by Justice Stewart's exposition of the correct
approach to ambiguities in the law of copyright:
"The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory
monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good. 'The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.'
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127. See Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-242. When technological change
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright
Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose."
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151,
156 (footnotes omitted).
Copyright protection "subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17
U. S. C. § 102(a). This protection has never accorded the
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his
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work. 13 Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright
holder "exclusive" rights to use and to authorize the use of his
work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the
copyrighted work in copies. I d., § 106. 14 All reproductions
of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of
the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a "fair use;"
the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to
such a use. Compare id., § 106 with id., § 107.
8

See, e. g., White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S.
1, 19 (1908); cf. Deep South Packing Co. v. Lathram Corp., 406 U. S. 518,
530-531 (1972). While the law has never recognized an author's right to
absolute control of his work, the natural tendency of legal rights to express
themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of all else is particularly pronounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the
copyright and the patent. See e. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 156-158 (1948) (copyright owners claiming right to tie
license of one film to license of another under copyright law); Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106 (1932) (copyright owner claiming copyright
renders it immune from state taxation of copyright royalties); BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 349-351 (1908) (copyright owner
claiming that a right to fix resale price of his works within the scope of his
copyright); International Business Machines v. United States, 298 U. S.
131 (1936) (patentees claiming right to tie sale of unpatented article to lease
of patented device).
14
Section 106 of the Act provides:
"'Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly."
'
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"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute,
"is an infringer of the copyright." Id., §501(a). Conversely, anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to
use the copyrighted work in a way specified in the statute or
who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the
copyright with respect to such use.
The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with
a potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his
work, including an injunction to restrain the infringer from
violating his rights, the impoundment and destruction of all
reproductions of his work made in violation of his rights, a
recovery of his actual damages and any additional profits realized by the infringer or a recovery of statutory damages,
and attorneys fees. I d., §§ 502--505. 15
The two respondents in this case do not seek relief against
the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copyrights. Moreover, this is not a class action on behalf of all
copyright owners who license their works for television
broadcast, and respondents have no right to invoke whatever
rights other copyright holders may have to bring infringement actions based on Betamax copying of their works. 16 As
16
Moreover, anyone who willfully infringes the copyright to reproduce a
motion picture for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain is subject to criminal penalties of one year imprisonment and a $25,000
fine for the first offense and two years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for
each subsequent offense, 17 U. S. C. § 506(a), and the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime are forfeited upon conviction, id., § 506(b).
16
In this regard, we reject respondent's attempt to cast this action as
comparable to a class action because of the positions taken by amici with
copyright interests and their attempt to treat the statements made by
amici as evidence in this case. See Brief for Respondent, at 1, and n. 1, 6,
52, 53 and n. 116. The stated desires of amici concerning the outcome of
this or any litigation are no substitute for a class action, are not evidence in
the case, and do not influence our decision; we examine an amicus curiae
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was made clear by their own evidence, the copying of the respondents' programs represents a small portion of the total
use of VTR's. It is, however, the taping of respondents own
copyrighted programs that provides them with standing to
charge Sony with contributory infringement. To prevail,
they have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax
have infringed their copyrights and that Sony should be held
responsible for that infringement.

III
The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable
for infringment committed by another. In contrast, the Patent Act expressly brands anyone who "actively induces
infringment of a patent" as an infringer, 35 U. S. C. § 271(b),
and further imposes liability on certain individuals labeled
"contributory" infringers, id., §271(c). The absence of such
express language in the copyright statute does not preclude
the imposition of liability for copyright infringments on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. 17 For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually
brief solely for whatever aid it provides in analyzing the legal questions before us.
17
As the District Court correctly observed, however, "the lines between
direct infringement, contributory infringment, and vicarious liability are
not clearly drawn . ... " 480 F. Supp. 457-458. The lack of clarity in this
area may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an infringer is not merely
one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but
also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright owner.
We note the parties' statements that the questions of petitioners' liability under the "doctrines" of "direct infringement" and "vicarious liability''
are not nominally before this Court. Compare Respondents' Brief, at 9, n.
22, 41, n. 90 with Petitioners' Reply Brief, at 1, n. 2. We also observe,
however, that reasoned analysis of respondents' unprecedented contributory infringement claim necessarily entails consideration of arguments and
caselaw which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed
the parties to a large extent rely upon such arguments and authority in
support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory
infringement.

81-1687-0PINION
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

17

all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another.
Such circumstances were plainly present in Kalem Co. v.
Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55 (1911), the copyright decision
of this Court on which respondents place their principal reliance. In Kalem, the Court held that the producer of an unauthorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book Ben
Hur was liable for his sale of the motion picture to jobbers,
who in turn arranged for the commercial exhibition of the
film. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained:
"The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the one for which
especially they were made. If the defendant did not
contribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so
except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on
principles recognized in every part of the law." 222
U.S., at 63.
The use for which the item sold in Kalem had been "especially" made was, of course, to display the performance that
had already been recorded upon it. The producer had personally appropriated the copyright owner's protected work
and, as the owner of the tangible medium of expression upon
which the protected work was recorded, authorized that use
by his sale of the film to jobbers. But that use of the film
was not his to authorize: the copyright owner possessed the
exclusive right to authorize public performances of his work.
Further, the producer personally advertised the unauthorized public performances, dispelling any possible doubt
as to the use of the film which he had authorized.
Respondents argue that Kalem stands for the proposition
that supplying the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity and encouraging that activity through adverstisement are
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sufficient to establish liability for copyright infringement.
This argument rests on a gross generalization that cannot
withstand scrutiny. The producer in Kalem did not merely
provide the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity; the
producer supplied the work itself, albeit in a new medium of
expression. Petitioners in the instant case do not supply
Betamax consumers with respondents' works; respondents
do. Petitioners supply a piece of equipment that is generally
capable of copying the entire range of programs that may be
televised: those that are uncopyrighted, those that are copyrighted but may be copied without objection from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright holder would prefer not to have copied. The Betamax can be used to make
authorized or unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, but
the range of its potential use is much broader than the particular infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem.
Kalem does not support respondents' novel theory of
liability.
Justice Holmes stated that the producer had "contributed"
to the infringement of the copyright, and the label "contributory infringement" has been applied in a number of lower
court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship between the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at
the time the infringing conduct occured. In such cases, as in
other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liablity is
manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a position
to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright
owner. 18 This case, however, plainly does not fall in that cat18
The so-called "dance hall cases," Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554 F. 2d 1213 (CAl 1977)
(racetrack retained infringer to supply music to paying customers); KECA
MUSIC, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977)
(cocktail lounge hired musicians to supply music to paying customers);
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA7
1929) (dance hall hired orchestra to supply music to paying customers) are
often contrasted with the so-called landlord-tenant cases, in which land-
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egory. The only contact between Sony and the users of the
Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at the moment of sale. The District Court expressly found that "no
lords who leased premises to a direct infringer for a fixed rental and did not
participate directly in any infringing activity were found not to be liable for
contributory infringement. E. g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F. 2d 686 (CA2
1938).
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304 (CA2
1963) the owner of twenty-three chain stores retained the direct infringer
to run its record departments. The relationship was structured as a licensing arrangement, so that the defendant bore none of the business risk
of running the department. Instead, it received 10% or 12% of the direct
infringer's gross receipts. The Court of Appeals concluded:
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the employer-employee model, than to the landlord-tenant model. On the particular facts before us, ' . . . Green's relationship to its infringing licensee, as
well as its strong concern for the financial success of the phonograph record
concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 'bootleg'
records.
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully
the conduct of its concessionaire; our judgment will simply encourage it to
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively exercised." Id., at 308 (emphasis in original).
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,
443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971), the direct infringers retained the contributory
infringer to manage their performances. The contributory infringer
would contact each direct infringer, obtain the titles of the musical compositions to be performed, print the programs, and then sell the programs to
its own local organizations for distribution at the time of the direct infringement. Id ., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the contributory infringer had actual knowledge that the artists it was managing were
performing copyrighted works, was in a position to police the infringing
conduct of the artists, and derived substantial benefit from the actions of
the primary infringers. I d., at 1163.
In Screen Gems-Columbia Music , Inc . v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 399 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), the direct infringer manufactured and sold
bootleg records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the District
Court held that the infringer's advertising agency, the radio stations that
advertised the infringer's works, and the service agency that boxed and
mailed the infringing goods could all be held liable, if at trial it could be
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employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct contact
with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted works
off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460. And it further found
that "there was no evidence that any of the copies made by
Griffiths or the other individual witnesses in this suit were
influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] advertisements."
lbid. 19
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this
case, it must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment
with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory.
The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship
between patent law and copyright law. 20
demonstrated that they knew or should have known that they were dealing
in illegal goods.
'"The broad verbal formulae which have been used to describe ordinary
claims of contributory infringement, see, e. g., Gershwin Publishing Corp.
v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (CA2 1971)
("[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer."); see also, Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 851 (1982), cannot reasonably be applied literally in the context of respondents' unprecedented copyright
claim. Manufacturers and distributors of numerous devices undoubtably
have constructive knowledge that their products may be used by some of
their customers to violate the rights of others. Such distributors would
neatly fit the wording of these formulae, but imposing liability on them
merely for marketing the devices that were misused by their customers
would represent a radical extension of traditional notions of legal responsibility. Indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that the sale of "cameras or photocopying machines" would "not even remotely raise copyright
problems." 659 F. 2d, at 975.
20
E. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106, 131 (1932); Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Grigg, 33 U. S. 591, 657--{)58 (1834). The two areas of
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In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly defined by statute. 21 The prohibition against contributory in. fringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component especially made for use in connection with a particular patent.
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may
object to the sale of a product that might be used in connection with other patents. Moreover, the Act expressly provides that the sale of a "staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not
contributory infringement.
When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated
entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by
the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution
which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one
area to the other. See generally, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 217-218
(1954); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345 (1908).
21
35 U. S. C. § 271 provides:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement."

-
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the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated. A
finding of contributory infringement does not, of course, remove the article from the market altogether; it does, however, give the patentee effective control over the sale of that
item. Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is normally the functional equivalent of holding that the disputed
article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee. 22
For that reason, in contributory infringement cases arising
under the patent laws the Court has always recognized the
critical importance of not allowing the patentee to extend his
monopoly beyond the limits of his specific grant. These
cases deny the patentee any right to control the distribution
of unpatented articles unless they are "unsuited for any commercial noninfringing use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm
& Hass Co., 448 U. S. 176, 198 (1980). Unless a commodity
"has no use except through practice of the patented method,"
ibid, the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution
constitutes contributory infringment. "To form the basis for
contributory infringement the item must almost be uniquely
suited as a component of the patented invention." P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals§ 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale
of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also
adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the
seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the
wheels of commerce." Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1,
48 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Pat22

1t seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon
all copyright owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this
case, the exclusive right to distribute VTR's simply because they may be
used to infringe copyrights. That, however, is the logical implication of
their claim. The request for an injunction below indicates that respondents
seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband. Their suggestion in this
Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory
license would be an acceptable remedy merely indicates that respondents,
for their part, would be willing to license their claimed monopoly interest in
VTR's to petitioners in return for a royalty.
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ents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517
(1917).
Although there are substantial differences between the
patent and copyright laws, there is no reason to grant the
copyright holder any broader right to bar noninfringing activities than the patent holder. Indeed, the copyright holder
should have a lesser right, for by precluding noninfringing
uses he may not only block the wheels of commerce, but also
might impose an unjustified tax on the free marketplace of
ideas and interfere with the opportunities of other copyright
holders to authorize exploitation of the devices for their own
purposes.
Under our cases, as well as the text of the Patent Code,
the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.
IV
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that question, we need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the district court a significant number of them would be non-infringing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not
give precise content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so
both (A) because respondents have no right to prevent other
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and
(B) because the District Court's factual findings reveal that
even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents'
programs is legitimate fair use.
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A. Authorized Time Shifting
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television programming their combined market share is small. The exact percentage is not specified, but it is well below 10%. 23 If they
were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would have a
significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of
the remaining 90% of the programming in the Nation. No
doubt, many other producers share respondents' concern
about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying.
Nevertheless the findings of the District Court make it clear
that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing audience and
that many producers are willing to allow private time-shifting
to continue, at least for an experimental time period. 24
The District Court found:
"Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of
copyrighted material constituted infringement, the Betamax could still legally be used to record noncopyrighted
material or material whose owners consented to the
copying. An injunction would deprive the public of the
ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing off-theair recording.
23
The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial consisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syndicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on commercial television stations was under 5%. See Tr. 532-533, 549-550.
"' The District Court did not make any explicit findings with regard to
how much broadcasting is wholly uncopyrighted. The record does include
testimony that at least one movie-My Man Godfrey-falls within that category, Tr. 2300-2301, and certain broadcasts produced by the federal government are also uncopyrighted. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. Cf. Schappner
v. Foley, 667 F. 2d 102 (CADC 1981) (explaining distinction between work
produced by the government and work commissioned by the government).
To the extent such broadcasting is now significant, it further bolsters our
conclusion. Moreover, since copyright protection is not perpetual, the
number of audiovisual works in the public domain necessarily increases
each year.
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"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, religious, educational and other programming. This included testimony from representatives of the Offices of
the Commissioners of the Nation:al Football, Basketball,
Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the Executive Director of National Religious Broadcasters and
various educational communications agencies. Plaintiffs
attack the weight of the testimony offered and also contend that an injunction is warranted because infringing
uses outweigh noninfringing uses."
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use recording might be, an injunction which
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
Although the District Court made these statements in the
context of considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the
statements constitute a finding that the evidence concerning
"sports, religious, educational, and other programming" was
sufficient to establish a significant quantity of broadcasting
whose copying is now authorized, and a significant potential
for future authorized copying. That finding is amply supported by the record. In addition to the religious and sports
officials identified explicitly by the District Court, 25 two items
in the record deserve specific mention.
See Tr. 2447- 2450 (Alexander Hadden, Major League Baseball); Tr.
2480, 2486-2487 (Jay Moyer, National Football League); Tr. 2515-2516
(David Stern, National Basketball Association); Tr. 2530-2534 (Gilbert
Stein, National Hockey League); Tr. 2543-2552 (Thomas Hansen, National
Collegiate Athletic Association); Tr. 2565-2572 (Benjamin Armstrong, National Religious Broadcasters). Those officials were authorized to be the
official spokespersons for their respective institutions in this litigation.
Tr. 2432, 2479, 2509-2510, 2530, 2538, 2563. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
30(b)(6).
20
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First is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station manager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles
affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He explained and authenticated the station's published guide to its
programs. 26 For each program, the guide tells whether unlimited home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized
subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure within seven
days), or home taping is not authorized at all. The Spring
1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs. Sixty-two
of those programs or 58% authorize some home taping.
Twenty-one of them or almost 20% authorize unrestricted
home taping. T1
Second is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the
corporation that produces and owns the copyright on Mr.
Rogers' Neighborhood. The program is carried by more
public television stations than any other program. Its audience numbers over 3,000,000 families a day. He testified
that he had absolutely no objection to home taping for noncommercial use and expressed the opinion that it is a real
service to families to be able to record children's programs
and to show them at appropriate times. 28
Tr. 2863-2902; Def. Exh. PI.
See also Tr. 2833-2844 (similar testimony by executive director of New
Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority). Cf. Tr. 2592-2605 (testimony by
chief of New York Education Department's Bureau of Mass Communications approving home taping for educational purposes).
28
"Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
'Neighborhood' at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all
of this new technology that allows people to tape the 'Neighborhood' offthe-air, and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's what I
produce, that they then become much more active in the programming of
their family's television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being
programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always
been 'You are an important person just the way you are. You can make
healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life,
211
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If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible should not be stifled simply because the equipment is
used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions
of respondents' works. The respondents do not represent a
class composed of all copyright holders. Yet a finding of contributory infringement would inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of their audience
that is available only through time-shifting.
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders may welcome the practice of time-shifting does not mean that respondents should be deemed to have granted a license to copy
their programs. Third party conduct would be wholly irrelevant in an action for direct infringement of respondents'
copyrights. But in an action for contributory infringement
against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder
may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his
programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the outcome. In this case, the record
makes it perfectly clear that there are many important producers of national and local television programs who find
nothing objectionable about the enlargement in the size of the
television audience that results from the practice of timeshifting for private home use. 29 The seller of the equipment
in a healthy way, is important." T. R. 2920-2921.
p. 85.

See also Def. Exh. PI,

It may be rare for large numbers of copyright owners to authorize
duplication of their works without demanding a fee from the copier. In
the context of public broadcasting, however, the user of the copyrighted
work is not required to pay a fee for access to the underlying work. The
traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon the television medium---<!ommercially sponsored free public broadcast over the public airwaves-is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the
29
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that expands those producers' audiences cannot be a contributory infringer if, as is true in this case, it has had no direct involvement with any infringing activity.
B. Unauthorized Time-Shifting
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not necessarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not
an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 154-155.
Moreover, the definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of the
present Act is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107
through 118." Those sections describe a variety of uses of
copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright
notwithstanding the provisions of § 106." The most pertinent in this case is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the
doctrine of "fair use." 30
value of displaying the works will be received in the form of advertising
revenues.
In the context of television programming, some producers evidently believe that permitting home viewers to make copies of their works off the air
actually enhances the value of their copyrights. Irrespective of their reasons for authorizing the practice, they do so, and in significant enough
numbers to create a substantial market for a non-infringing use of the Sony
VTR's. No one could dispute the legitimacy of that market if the producers had authorized home taping of their programs in exchange for a license
fee paid directly by the home user. The legitimacy of that market is not
compromised simply because these producers have authorized home taping
of their programs without demanding a fee from the home user. The copyright law does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the use of
his works, and as this record clearly demonstrates, the owner of a copyright may well have economic or noneconomic reasons for permitting certain kinds of copying to occur without receiving direct compensation from
the copier. It is not the role of the courts to tell copyright holders the best
way for them to exploit their copyrights: even if respondents' competitors
were ill-advised in authorizing home videotaping, that would not change
the fact that they have created a substantial market for a paradigmatic
non-infringing use of petitioners' product.
00
The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, did not have a "fair use" provision. Although that Act's compendium of exclusive rights "to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" was broad enough to
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That section identifies various factors 31 that enable a Court
to apply an "equitable rule of reason" analysis to particular
claims of infringement. 32 Although not conclusive, the first
encompass virtually all potential interactions with a copyrighted work, the
statute was never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the
statute literally in every situation. When Congress amended the statute
in 1976, it indicated that it ''intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House
Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66.
31
Section 107 provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107.
32
The nature of the section is explained in these comments from the
House Report on the fair use section:
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question
must be decided on its own facts. . . .
General intention behind the provision
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply.
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H. Rep. No.
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factor requires that "the commercial or nonprofit character of
an activity" be weighed in any fair use decision. 33 If the
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or
profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court's findings plainly establish
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. Moreover, when one
considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual
work, see 17 U. S. C. § 107(2), and that timeshifting merely
enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that
the entire work is reproduced, see id., at § 107(3), does not
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair
use.
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Congress has also directed us to consider "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." !d., at§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copying for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to
obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have.
But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not
be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would
94-1476, pp. 65-66.

"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered-'the purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this
factor includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as
under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions." H. Rep. No.
33

94-1476, p. 66.
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merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing
benefit. 34
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market
for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will result.
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood
may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose,
the likelihood must be demonstrated.
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with
regard to home time-shifting. The District Court described
respondents' evidence as follows:
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the
trial that the time-shifting without librarying would result in 'not a great deal of harm.' Plaintiffs' greatest
concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of important
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.'
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible
.. Cf. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as Study
No. 14 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 30 (1960):
"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm
from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat
lex."
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boundaries' are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost
control over his program."' 480 F. Supp., at 467.
Later in its opinion, the District Court observed:
"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of harm hinge on speculation about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a
measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant
level of imprecision involved in the calculations." I d. , at
469. 35
There was no need for the District Court to say much about
past harm. "Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual harm to
their copyrights has occurred to date." Id., at 451.
On the question of potential future harm from time-shifting, the District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the
evidence. It rejected respondents' "fear that persons
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be measured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will
decrease," by observing that current measurement technology allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. I d., at
466. 36 It rejected respondents' prediction "that live televiSee also 480 F. Supp., at 451:
"It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs' argument is more complicated
and speculative than was the plaintiff's in Williams & Wilkins. . . . Here,
plaintiffs ask the court to find harm based on many more assumptions ....
As is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, some of these assumptions are
based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that they are to
some extent inconsistent and illogical."
36
"There was testimony at trial, however, that Nielsen Ratings has already developed the ability to measure when a Betamax in a sample home
is recording the program. Thus, the Betamax will be measured as a part
of the live audience. The later diary can augment that measurement with
information about subsequent viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 466.
In a separate section, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion
that the commercial attractiveness of television broadcasts would be diminished because Betamax owners would use the pause button or fast-forward
control to avoid viewing advertisements:
36
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sion or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch
Betamax tapes as an alternative," with the observation that
"[t]here is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption."
Ibid. 37 It rejected respondents' "fear that time-shifting will
reduce audiences for telecast reruns," and concluded instead
that "given current market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 38 And it declared that
respondents' suggestion "that theater or film rental exhibition of a program will suffer because of time-shift recording
of that program" "lacks merit." 480 F. Supp., at 467. 39
"It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while recording. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward
and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For
most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As defendants' survey showed, 92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and
only 25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers will have
to make the same kinds of judgments they do now about whether persons
viewing televised programs actually watch the advertisements which interrupt them." Id., at 468.
87
"Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies when they would
otherwise be watching television or going to the movie theater. There is
no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax
owners will play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish
to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey does not
show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on television viewing or
theater attendance." Ibid.
38
"The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept.
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original televised material and that the more people there are in this original audience,
the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices,
including the success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, the
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs
can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There is no survey
within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is comprised of persons who have not seen the program. In any event, if ratings
can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given
market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid.
39
"This suggestion lacks merit. By definition, time-shift recording entails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape when
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After completing that review, the District Court restated
its overall conclusion several times, in several different ways.
"Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal." Ibid. "The audience benefits from the time-shifting
capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more persons to view their broadcasts." Ibid. "No likelihood of
harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there
had been no actual harm to date." I d., at 468-469. "Testimony at trial suggested that Betamax may require adjustments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even a
likelihood of harm." I d., at 469. "Television production by
plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has ever been, and,
in five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial picture." Ibid.
The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact
that to the extent time-shifting expands public access to
freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal benefits. Earlier this year, in Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, - - U. S. - - , - - - - - , n.
12 (1983), we acknowledged the public interest in making
television broadcasting more available. Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But it supports an interpretation of
the concept of "fair use" that requires the copyright holder to
demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may condemn
a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law.
the later theater run begins. Of course, plaintiffs may fear that the
Betamax will keep the tapes long enough to satisfy all their interest in the
program and will, therefore, not patronize later theater exhibitions. To
the extent this practice involves librarying, it is addressed in section V.C.,
infra. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the
public interest in later theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures will be reduced any more by Betamax recording than it already is by the television
broadcast of the film." 480 F. Supp., at 467.

81-1687-0PINION
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

35

When these factors are all weighed in the "rule of reason"
balance, we must conclude that this record amply supports
the District Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair
use. In light of the findings of the District Court regarding
the state of the empirical data, it is clear that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the statute as presently written bars such conduct. 40
40

The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in any "equitable rule of reason" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be
"productive." It therefore concluded that copying a television program
merely to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that
he would otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could
never be fair use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous.
Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a sensitive balancing of interests. The distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be
wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor
certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting
a poker game, the question is not simply two-dimensional. For one thing,
it is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern material with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well
have a broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for commercial harm. Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to
fair use than copying a motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are
fungible. Copying for commercial gain has a much weaker claim to fair
use than copying for personal enrichment. But the notion of social "productivity" cannot be a complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who
copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher
who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his
specialty. Or a legislator w.ho copies for the sake of broadening her understanding of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies
a news program to help make a decision on how to vote.
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind person is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to entertain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statu-

/
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In summary, the record and findings of the District Court
lead us to two conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television
would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by
private viewers. And second, respondents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of,
their copyrighted works. The Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Sony's sale of such
equipment to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondent's copyrights.

v
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the
power to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972).
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that
the elected representatives of the millions of people who
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible.
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this
new technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that
have not yet been written. Applying the copyright statute,
as it now reads, to the facts as they have been developed in
tory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the economic consequences of copying.
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this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.
It is so ordered.
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Memorandum of JUSTICE STEVENS.
Petitioners (Sony) have manufactured and sold several million home video tape recorders to members of the general
public in recent years. Respondents are owners of copyrighted motion picture films and television programs. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
Sony guilty of the nonstatutory tort of contributory infringement, and it ordered the District Court to fashion appropriate relief: an injunction against the further sale of the equipment, an award of damages, or a continuing royalty pursuant
to "a judicially created compulsory license." 659 F. 2d 963,
976, n. 18 (1981).
The Court of Appeals' holding raises at least three questions of copyright law that this Court has never previously
confronted: (1) whether the act of making a single copy of
copyrighted work for a private, noncommercial use ever constitutes copyright infringement; (2) whether the manufacturer of copying equipment may be held liable for contributory infringement for advertising and selling the equipment
to the general public; and (3) whether a judicially imposed
continuing royalty is a permissible form of relief for contributory infringment.
We granted certiorari to address these important ques-
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tions. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982). Because certain ultimate
facts found by the District Court are dispositive of the contributory infringement issue, we need decide only that question. In brief, the critical facts are these: the principal use of
the video tape recorder is to enable its owner to view a program he would otherwise miss; this practice, known as "timeshifting," enlarges the television viewing audience. For that
reason, a significant number of producers of television programs have no objection to the copying of their program for
private home viewing. For the same reason, even the two
respondents in this case, who do object to time shifting, were
unable to prove that the practice has caused them any actual
harm or creates any likelihood of future harm.
Thus, for two independent and sufficient reasons the sale
of VTR's to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondents' copyrights. First, respondents have no right to object to the use of VTR's to copy
programs produced by others, or to interfere with the sale of
equipment that makes such copying possible. Second, since
there is an admitted public interest in increasing access to
television programming, and since the practice of time-shifting for private home use involves neither a commercial
exploitation of respondents' copyrights nor any diminution in
the value of the monopolies granted to them, it is a non-infringing fair use of copyrighted programs. The sale of
equipment that is primarily used for that purpose is plainly
not contributory infringement. 1
The questions of direct infringement are relevant only to the extent
they bear on the question of contributory infringement. For respondents
have disavowed the existence of any genuine controversy with the individual user of the Betamax. In a press release issued by one of the respondents after its victory in the Court of Appeals in this case, it stated, in part:
"Millions of families in the United States and around the world are now
involved in videotaping programming in their own homes for their own private use. We have no intention, in this or any other litigation, of pursuing
individuals to interfere with this practice.
1
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Although the two grounds of decision are relatively
straightforward, the importance of the case makes it appropriate to set forth the facts and the relevant legal history in
some detail.
I
Sony manufactures the Betamax video tape recorder, a
piece of equipment having three components: (1) a tuner,
which receives electromagnetic signals transmitted over the
airwaves and separates them into audio and visual signals; (2)
a recorder, which records such signals on magnetic tapes; and
(3) an adapter, which converts the audio and visual signals on
the tape back into a composite signal that can be received by
a television set. At the time of trial, the Betamax was marketed in four models, at retail prices ranging from about $875
to $1,000. Sony also sold tapes of various sizes, the longest
being a three-hour tape that sold for about $21.00. Tapes
may be reused, and programs that have been recorded on
tape may be erased either before or after viewing. The
Betamax can be used with different kinds of television sets
and is capable of recording one show while the set is off, or is
tuned to another show. Thus, for example, a viewer could
see two simultaneous news telecasts by watching one and recording the second for later viewing.
The Betamax is equipped with three devices that affect its
utility-a timer, a pause button, and a fast-forward control.
The timer can activiate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined times and thus makes it possible to record programs that are broadcast when the owner is not at home.
The pause button allows the owner to deactivate the recorder
"We first initiated this case in 1976, more than five years ago, when
there were relatively few tape recorders in homes. Since that time we
have come to realize that the interests of all concerned can be better accommodated by passage of new laws." Excerpt from statement by E.
Cardon Walker, Chairman of Walt Disney Productions, on November 2,
1981, quoted in App. to Br. for Petitioners, p. 2.

.•

....•
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temporarily; thus, if he is watching a program while the machine is recording, he may omit a commercial advertisement
by depressing the pause button. The fast-forward control
enables the viewer of a recorded program to run the tape rapidly when a segment he does not desire to see is on the
screen.
The trial of the case in the District Court concerned only
the private, home use of VTR's. 2 See 480 F. Supp. 429,
432-433 (1979). No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to
other persons, the use of tapes for public performances, or
the copying of programs broadcast on cable television systems was raised. All of the evidence related to programs
that had been broadcast to the public at large.
Both plaintiffs and defendants conducted surveys of the
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred own2

The District Court explained:
" 'Home-use' recording as used in this opinion is the operation of the
Betamax in a private home to record a program for subsequent home viewing. The programs involved in this lawsuit are broadcast free to the public
over public airwaves. The court heard extensive testimony from defendant William Griffiths and four non-defendant individuals about this activity, and the court's declaration of non-infringement is limited to this home
use-situation.
"It is important to note the limits of this holding. Neither pay nor cable
television stations are plaintiffs in this suit and no defendant recorded the
signals from either. The court is not ruling on tape swapping, organized
or informal. The court is not ruling no tape duplication within the home or
outside, by individuals, groups or corporations. Nor is the court ruling on
off-the-air recording for use outside the home. e. g., by teachers for classrooms, corporations for employees, etc. No defendant engaged in any of
these activities and the facts necessary to determine their legality are not
before this court.
"The ramifications of this new technology are greater than the boundaries of this lawsuit. A court reviewing the limited claims of specified parties in a particular factual setting cannot and should not undertake the role
of a government commission or legislative body exploring and evaluating
all the uses and consequences of the videotape recorder." 480 F. Supp., at
442.
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ers during a sample period in 1978. Although there were
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the
primary use of the machine for most owners was for "timeshifting," i. e., to record programs they otherwise would
have missed. Both surveys also showed, however, that a
substantial number of interviewees had accumulated libraries
of cassettes. 3 Defendants' survey indicated that over 80
percent of the interviewees watched the same amount or
more regular television as they had before owning a Betamax. 4 Plaintiffs offered no evidence of decreased television
viewing by Betamax owners. 5
a The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys
as follows:
"Plaintiffs' survey found that the average number of cassettes owned by
the interviewees was 31. 73. 63.9% of plaintiffs' interviewees had less than
five cassettes with movies on them and 81.1% had less than five cassettes
with television programs on them. Defendants' interviewees reported an
average of 25.21 cassettes with material recorded off-the-air.
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their machines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. Defendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine to record programs they otherwise would have missed.
"When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their library, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further
viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 438.
• "81.9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2%
reported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480
F. Supp., at 439.
• As evidence of how a VTR may be used, plaintiffs offered the testimony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual defendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summarized his testimony as follows:
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths brought his Betamax,
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) but
also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however,
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Defendants introduced considerable evidence describing
television programs that could be copied without objection
from any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports,
religious, and educational programming. For example, their
survey indicated that 7. 3 percent of all Betamax use is to
record professional sports events, and representatives of professional baseball, football, basketball, and hockey testified
that they had no objection to the recording of their televised
events for home use. 6
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing
them.
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept.
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Earhart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any
Universal film in his library.
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy debate.'' 480 F. Supp., at 43&-437.
Three other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity.
6
Alexander Hadden, the General Counsel for the Commissioner of
Baseball, after describing the national telecasts of professional baseball
games, testified:
"Q Can you tell us whether Major League Baseball has any objection to
off-the-air recording by a Betamax owner in the privacy of his home for his
own personal use of any of the nationally-telecast baseball games which you
have previously described?
"A I believe we would have no objection to that limited usage of the recordings of such programs.
"Q So am I correct, then that if a Betamax owner were to record one of
the Monday evening or Saturday afternoon nationally-telecast baseball
games and thereafter replayed the tape for his own enjoyment or that of
his family Major League Baseball would have no objection to such usage?
"A I know of none.
"Q And would your answer be the same if I asked you the same question

81-1687-MEMORANDUM
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

7

Each of the plaintiffs proved that it owns a large inventory
of copyrighted programs and motion pictures. They also
proved that even after a motion picture has been exhibited in
the theater market and over network television, the commercial value of the copyright is not exhausted because many
programs are later televised over local stations, or sold or
rented to the public on prerecorded cassettes or discs. Finally, plaintiffs offered opinion evidence concerning the future impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commercial value of their copyrights. The District Court found,
however, that they had failed to prove any such actual or prospective harm.
"Plaintiffs admitted that at the time of trial, no existing contract, license or advantageous business relationship of either Universal or Disney had been injured, interfered with or disrupted by the sale or use of Betamax
and Betamax tapes or by any other activity of any defendant. This includes without limitation plaintiffs' theatrical, television, 8 or 16 mm, and video-disc products.
"In addition, plaintiffs conceded that neither the sale
nor the use of Betamax and Betamax tapes had by the
time of trial caused Universal or Disney any measurable
monetary damage,. economic loss or revenue loss. 1978
was a very successful year for both Universal and Diswith respect to the Allstar game?
"A Yes.
"Q The League championship series?
"A Yes.
"Q And the World Series?
"A Yes." Tr. 2444-2447.
On cross-examination, he added:
"A The subject matter of the matter is not one that has been widely discussed within baseball, but I have consulted with a significant number of
people on the subject, and people who are entitled to have an informed
judgment on the matter, and they have concurred in what I have testified
to." /d., 2447-2448.
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ney. It was Disney's eleventh consecutive year of increased profit and the most profitable year in history for
Universal Pictures' Theatrical Division. Universal's
television revenues had increased steadily over the three
years prior to trial and Disney received its highest television income in 1978." Id., at 439-440.
With regard to the impact of time-shifting-the primary use
of the Betamax-the District Court expressly found that the
practice was more likely to benefit the plaintiffs than to harm
them:
"Plaintiffs fear that time-shifting will reduce audiences
for telecast reruns. The underlying assumptions here
are particularly difficult to accept. Plaintiffs explain
that the Betamax increases access to the original televised material and that the more people there are in this
original audience, the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices, including the
success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today,
the larger the audience for the original telecast, the
higher the price plaintiffs can demand from broadcasters
for rerun rights. There is no survey within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is comprised of persons who have not seen the program. In
any event, if ratings can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given current market
practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm
them.
"The audience benefits from the time-shifting capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters,
and advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for
more persons to view their broadcasts." I d., at 466,
467 .

.

~
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Summarizing his findings concerning the probable impact
of Betamax sales on the commercial exploitation of respondents' copyrights, the District Court stated:
"Testimony at trial suggested that Betamax may require
adjustments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even a likelihood of harm. Nor did the testimony
invoke concern that denial of monopoly power over
home-use recording would significantly dissuade authors
and producers from creating audiovisual material for
television.
"In so ruling, this court does not minimize plaintiff's
concerns. The new technology of videotape recording
does bring uncertainty and change which, quite naturally, induce fear. History, however, shows that this
fear may be misplaced. As Lewis Wasserman, Chairman of MCA, observed at trial:
"'[P]eople that have constantly forecast the doom
of a particular industry in the entertainment industry have historically been wrong. . . . They forecast the doom of radio stations when television developed on the horizon. Radio stations are more
profitable today than they have ever been.'
"Television production by plaintiffs today is more profitable
than it has ever been, and, in five weeks of trial, there was no
concrete evidence to suggest that the Betamax will change the
studios' financial picture. Id., at 469 (emphasis added).
Largely because of plaintiffs' inability to prove even a likelihood of harm, the District Court concluded that noncommercial home use recording of materiaL broadcast over the
public airwaves was a fair use of copyrighted works and did
not constitute copyright infringement. It found that conclusion supported by the fact that the material was broadcast
free to the public at large, by the noncommercial character of
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the use, and by the private character of the activity conducted entirely within the home. 7 Moreover, the court
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest
in increasing access to television programming, an interest
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through the
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 8
Even when an entire copyrighted work was recorded, the
District Court regarded the copying as fair use "because
there is no accompanying reduction in the market for 'plaintiff's original work."' 480 F. Supp., at 454.
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a contributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was considered infringement. The District Court noted that Sony had
no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who recorded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement,
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement:
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the
United States copyright laws." Id., at 436.
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive
knowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine
7

"Because the use occurs within private homes, enforcement of a prohibition would be highly intrusive and practically impossible. Such intrusion
is . particularly unwarranted when plaintiffs themselves choose to beam
their programs into these homes." 480 F. Supp., at 454.
8
480 F. Supp., at 454. The court also found that this "access is not just
a matter of convenience, as plainitffs have suggested. Access has been
limited not simply by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access
to the better program has also been limited by the competitive practice of
counterprogramming." Ibid.
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would be used to record copyrighted programs, but given the
unprecedented character of the issue, concluded that Sony
"could not know what copyright law required." I d., at 460.
More importantly, the court found that Sony merely sold a
"product capable of a variety of uses, some of them allegedly
infringing." I d., at 461. It reasoned:
"Selling a staple article of commerce-e. g., a typewriter, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machinetechnically contributes to any infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial management.
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers
of staple items were held liable as contributory infringers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some purchasers on some occasions would use their product for a
purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of first
impression, to be an infringement." Ibid.
Finally, the District Court discussed the plaintiffs' prayer
for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an injunction either preventing the future sale of Betamax machines,
or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable of recording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated that
it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument enabling the
infringement were sued by the copyright holders," and that
the request for relief in this case "is unique." 480 F. Supp.,
at 465.
In rejecting this request, the District Court first noted
that the Betamax was a product that was used "for purposes
where no infringement would be alleged (e. g., recording material which is not copyrighted or where permission to record
is given)," ibid., and that many uses of the machine would in-
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volve no harm to any copyright. The most obvious example
was the copying of material which was erased before it was
ever watched, but, as noted above, the court also explained
in detail why the practice of time-shifting would not cause
any harm. After also discussing the speculative character of
plaintiffs' proof concerning the possible consequences of the
practice of librarying and the practice of using a fast-forward
button to avoid viewing advertisements, 9 the court noted
that any possible harm was outweighed by the fact that "the
Betamax could still legally be used to record noncopyrighted
material or material whose owners consented to the copying.
An injunction would deprive the public of the ability to use
the Betamax for this noninfringing off-the-air recording."
480 F. Supp., at 468.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It did not set aside any of
the District Court's findings of fact. It concluded as a matter of law that the home use of a VTR was not a fair use because it was not a "productive use." 10 It therefore held that
it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any harm to the potential market for the copyrighted works, but then observed
that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect of mass reproduction made possible by VTR's would tend to diminish
the potential market for respondents' works. 659 F. 2d, at
974.
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Appeals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce
such as a tape recorder or a photocopying machine. It noted
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise copyright problems." Id., at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the pri• The District Court noted that defendants' evidence had indicated that
"92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and only 25% of the
owners fast-forward through them. 480 F. Supp., at 468.
10
"Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is reproduced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case
precludes an application of fair use." 659 F . 2d, at 971-972.
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mary purpose of reproducing television programming" and
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material.
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use
even if some copyright owners elected not to enforce their
rights.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's reliance on Sony's lack of knowledge that home use constituted
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defining the remedies for infringement applied also to the nonstatutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his damages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct. 11
It held that Sony was chargeable with knowledge of the
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of
copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use"
or "the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid.
On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the District Court should reconsider its determination that an injunction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring
to "the analagous photocopying area," suggested that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory license may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976.
II

Dean Warren's foreword to a notable series of lectures on
copyright law provides an equally appropriate background
for our consideration of whether Sony should be deemed a
contributory infringer of respondents' copyrights:
11

Section 504(c)(2) provides, in part:
"In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in
its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not
less than $100."
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"The protection of property in the products of the mind
has long presented the challenging problem of balancing
several important and competing social interests. Although the number of writers and inventors among us is
small, their contribution to the intellectual and material
advancement of society is unique and indispensable.
The importance of that contribution was early recognized in the Constitution, in the grant of power to Congress 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.' (U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8.) It is
significant, perhaps, that 'Authors and Inventors' are
the only callings thus singled out for such special attention, and it is also significant that the need for balancing
the interest of the creator and the interests of society is
emphasized in this constitutional language, which refers
to the creator's 'exclusive Right' to his creation, but recognizes the public interest by restricting the duration of
such rights to 'limited Times.'
"Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the printing press and had its early beginnings
in the British censorship laws. The fortunes of the law
of copyright have always been closely connected with
freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the
other. Successive ages have drawn different balances
among the interest of the writer in the control and
exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dissemination of ideas.'' 12
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to significant changes in technology. Repeatedly,
12

Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967) [hereafter Kaplan].
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as such developments have occurred in this country, it has
been the Congress that fashioned the new rules that new
technology made necessary. Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to copyrights in this country is
wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. (8 Peters)
591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringement "are
only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889).
The development and marketing of player pianos and perforated rolls of music at the turn of the century gave rise to
litigation raising the question whether the use of such rolls
infringed the copyrights owned by composers and music publishers. The sale of well over a million rolls in 1902 made it
evident that the economic issue was significant. Adopting a
construction of the pre-1909 version of the Copyright Act
that, as Justice Holmes acknowledged, gave to the music
"copyright less scope than its rational significance," the
Court held that the piano rolls were not copies of copyrighted
songs within the meaning of the Act. White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (see Holmes, J.,
concurring, at 19). Quoting from an English case considering a similar question, the Court noted that the copyright on
the sheet music did not involve any exclusive right "to the
performance in private of the music indicated by such
sheets", id., at 13. The Court assumed that Congress was
aware of the prevailing view, reflected in an international
convention to which the United States was not a party, that
"the manufacture and sale of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the [copyrighted music] are not considered
as constituting musical infringement." ld., at 14-15. It
held that the policy considerations at stake "properly addressed themselves to the legislative, and not to the judicial,
branch of the government." I d., at 18. The following year
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1909.
When the 1909 Act was passed, the Librarian of Congress,
Dr. Herbert Putnam, was following a practice of allowing sin-
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gle copies of copyrighted works to be made at the Library.
Even though the 1909 Act might have been construed literally to prescribe the practice, the activity went unchallenged
for decades. The matter did not seem to merit serious attention until innovations in copying techniques made it relatively
easy to reproduce entire articles or to make multiple copies.
When the National Institute of Health and the National Library of Medicine adopted the practice of photocopying entire
articles from medical journals and supplying them to researchers, litigation did ensue. The courts, however, declined to hold that the development of the new technology
had changed the traditional understanding. Williams and
Wilkins v. United States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affirmed by an equally divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975).
The problem posed by the new technology was resolved by
Congress when it revised the Copyright Act in the following
year. In § 108 of the 1976 revision, Congress enacted a special statutory exemption for library copying, distinguishing
between the reproduction of multiple copies and the reproduction or distribution of a single copy.
A similar sequence of events followed the development of
technology that made it possible to retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems. In 1960, United
Artists Television, Inc., the owner of a number of copyrights
on motion pictures, sought to enjoin the operator of a community antenna television system (CATV) from intercepting and
retransmitting signals carrying its copyrighted productions.
The Court held that the CATV operator did not "perform"
the copyrighted works in the "manner envisioned by the Congress that enacted the law in 1909." Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 395 (1968). Although the
Court was sharply divided on the question whether that was
a fair reading of the statutory language, there was complete
agreement on the proposition that Congress was far better
equipped than the Court to fashion a fair resolution of the
problems presented by the sophisticated technological devel-
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opments that had occurred in recent years. 13
The Fortnightly case was followed by Teleprompter Corp.
v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394, in which the Court considered the
copyright holders' argument that CATV systems diluted the
commercial value of the market for licensed television programs. Recognizing that the retransmissions by CATV systems would augment the size of the potential audience for a
broadcast-much as would the video tape recording of programs for later home viewing-the Court concluded:
"These shifts in current business and commercial relationships, while of significance with respect to the organization and growth of the communications industry,
simply cannot be controlled by means of litigation based
on copyright legislation enacted more than half a century
ago, when neither broadcast television nor CATV was
yet conceived. Detailed regulation of these relationships, and any ultimate resolution of the many sensitive
and important problems in this field, must be left to Congress." /d., at 414.
In due course Congress did enact legislation that regulates
the complex relationships among copyright holders, commer'""We have been invited by the Solicitor General in an amicus curiae
brief to render a compromise decision in this case that would, it is said,
accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, communications, and antitrust policy. We decline the invitation. That job is for
Congress." [footnotes omitted] 392 U. S. at 401.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas wrote:
"Our major object, I suggest, should be to do as little damage as possible to
traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until the
Congress legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the interested parties face." !d., at 404.
At the end of his opinion, he added:
"The task of caring for CATV is one for the Congress. Our ax, being a
rule of law, must cut straight, sharp, and deep; and perhaps this is a situation that calls for the compromise of theory and for the architectural improvisation which only legislation can accomplish." I d., at 408.

·"
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cial television stations, and CATV system operators in a comprehensive and detailed way that could not possibly have
been fashioned by a court. 14
This history of deference to Congress when major new
technology dramatically changes the market for copyrighted
material must inform our judgment in this important respect.
A refusal by this Court to embark on a novel lawmaking task
will merely allow Congress to fashion the controlling rules for
the future.
III
Whereas most novel problems of copyright law require a
reexamination of the delicate compromise between the copyright owner's commercial interest in the legitimate exploitation of his statutory monopoly and the public interest in access to ideas and information, the contributory infringement
issue presented by this case implicates a third interest that
demands separate recognition: the economic interest in the
manufacture and sale of an article of commerce that is capable of substantial noninfringing contributions to the public
good.
Neither the 1909 Copyright Act nor the 1976 Copyright
'The statutory provisions themselves, see 17 U.S. C. § 111, are much
too long to quote in full, but their complexity is indicated in the following
paragraph from Judge Markey's opinion in Eastern Microwave, Inc. v.
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982):
"Under the congressionally mandated scheme, television broadcast stations like WOR-TV continue to pay license or royalty fees directly to copyright owners like Doubleday, while CATV systems pay license fees under
their compulsory licenses to the United States Copyright Office in accord
with formulae provided in 17 U. S. C. § 111(d)(2)(B). The fees paid by
CATV systems are distributed to copyright owners like Doubleday by
Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Tribunal), as provided for in 17 U. S. C.
§ 111(d)(5). The Congressional scheme thus provided for compensation
from CATV systems to copyright owners measured by the number of cable
viewers or potential viewers, and placed the responsibility for payment of
that compensation on the CATV systems." (footnotes omitted)
1
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Act mentions the doctrine of contributory infringement. 16
From the absence of any explicit discussion, we may infer
that Congress did not intend any significant change in the judicially-created doctrine of contributory infringement.
The lower courts have generally applied the doctrine to
two categories of persons having a relationship with a direct
infringer at the time of the direct infringement. One group
includes persons who employ the direct infringer to engage in
the activity that proves infringing and who fail to exercise
their power to
ervise and control the acts. 16 The other
mclu es persons wh articipate .ftif'ee~s agents of the direct infringer in the infringing enterprise. 17 Sony clearly fits
neither of these molds; its only contact with the witnesses in
this case was at the moment of sale. The District Court expressly found that "no employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI
had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing
activity or direct contact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted works off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460.
And it further found that "there was no evidence that any of
the copies made by Griffiths or the other individual witnesses
in this suit were influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] advertisements." Ibid.
The only case in which this Court has held anyone liable for
contributory infringement was Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,
222 U. S. 55 (1911). In that case the holder of the copyright
in the book Ben Hur sued Kalem, the producer and distribu15
The doctrine is mentioned briefly in the legislative history of the 1976
Act:
"Use of the phrase 'to authorize' [in § 106's list of exclusive rights] is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers.
For example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if he engages in the business of renting it
to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance." 1975 Senate
Report 57; 1976 House Report 61.
16
[Case cites to be added].
17
[Case cites to be added].
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tor of an unauthorized film dramatization of the book. The
Court upheld a finding that the public exhibition of the film
by Kalem's customers was a direct infringement of copyright,
and that the sale of the plagarized film was a contributory infringement. Speaking through Justice Holmes, the Court
explained:
"But again it is said that the defendant did not produce
the representations, but merely sold the films to jobbers,
and on that ground ought not to be held. In some cases
where an ordinary article of commerce is sold nice questions may arise as to the point at which the seller becomes an accomplice in a subsequent illegal use by the
buyer. It has been held that mere indifferent supposition or knowledge on the part of the seller that the ·buyer
of spiritous liquor is contemplating such unlawful use is
not enough to connect him with the possible unlawful
consequences, Graves v. Johnson, 179 Massachusetts,
53, but that if the sale was made with a view to the illegal resale the price could not be recovered. Graves v.
Johnson, 156 Massachusetts, 211. But no such niceties
are involved here. The defendant not only expected but
invoked by advertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the
one for which especially they were made. If the defendant did not contribute to the infringement it is impossible
to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on principles recognized in every part of the law."
222 U. S., at 62-63.
The commodity sold in Kalem was the completed copy of a
particular copyrighted work. The use for which it had been
"especially'' made was the direct infringement of the plaintiff's copyright. In contrast, the Betamax is a piece of equipment that is generally capable of copying any program that
may be televised-those that are uncopyrighted, those that

.·
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are copyrighted but which may be copied without any objection from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright
holder would prefer not to have copied. Like a camera, it
may make authorized or unauthorized reproductions, but the
range of its potential use is much broader than the particular
infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem. In
order to consider whether the unlawful use of a Betamax is
sufficiently per~sive to justify excluding it from the market, it is useful to consider more generally how the balance
among competing values has been struck in the most closely
related area of the law-patent law.
The Constitutional predicates for the copyright statute and
the patent statute are one and the same. "To promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U. S. Const.,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright is designed to provide authors with a sufficient incentive to stimulate their creative
activity without unnecessarily curtailing the countervailing
public interest in the free exchange of thought. 18 The mo8
' "Copyright law wants to give any necessary support and encouragement to the creation and dissemination of fresh signals or messages to stir
human intelligence and sensibilities: it recognizes the importance of these
excitations for the development of individuals and society. Especially is
copyright directed to those kinds of signals which are in their nature 'fragile'-so easy of replication that incentive to produce would be quashed by
the prospect of rampant reproduction by freeloaders. To these signals
copyright affords what I have called 'headstart,' that is, a group of rights
amounting to a qualified monopoly running for a limited time.

"The headstart conferred should be moderate in all its dimensions.
Magnify the headstart and you may conceivably run the risk of attracting
too much of the nation's energy into the copyright-protected sectors of the
economy. But more serious is the danger of hobbling unduly the reception
and enjoyment of the signals by their potential audience, or of clogging the
utilization of the signals by other authors in the creation of further or improved signals for additional audiences." Kaplan 74-75.
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nopoly privilege does not necessarily encompass all possible
rewards that might logically flow from the grant 19 particularly if the rewards are more fairly attributable to the expansion of the market brought about by technological advances
that are unrelated to an author's creativity. 20 The public interest in allowing these advances to evolve in a free commercial market is strongly implicated when a copyright owner
seeks to enjoin the distribution of an article of commerce.
In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly defined by statute. 21 The prohibition against contributory in9

See, e. g., White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S.
1; Holmes J ., concurring, at 19, supra. In Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp. , 406 U. S. 518, 530, we wrote:
"Moreover, we must consider petitioner's claim in light of this Nation's
historical antipathy to monopoly and of repeated congressional efforts to
preserve and foster competition. As this Court recently said without
dissent:
"[I]n rewarding useful invention, the 'rights and welfare of the
community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.'
Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 329 (1859). To that end the prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when
the patent has issued the limitations of its exercise are equally
strictly enforced.' Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S.
225, 230 (1964).
"It follows that we should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument
for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere inference from
ambiguous statutory language. We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the
area of public use narrower, than courts had previously thought. "
~ "The general problem for the near future is after all a happy one, that
of dealing with a rapidly expanding market for copyrighted works-and it
is not impertinent to remind the contestants that this condition has been
largely brought about by independent scientific invention owing little to
any of the copyrighted factions .'' Kaplan 110.
21
35 U. S. C. § 271 provides:
'

.~
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fringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component especially made for use in connection with a particular patent.
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may
object to the ·sale of a product that might be used to infringe a
variety of other patents.
In contributory infringement cases arising under the patent laws the Court has recognized the critical importance of
not allowing the patentee to extend his monopoly beyond the
limits of his specific grant. These cases deny the patentee
any right to control the distribution of unpatented articles
unless they are "unsuited for any commercial noninfringing
use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448
U. S. 176, 198. Unless a commodity "has no use except
through practice of the patented method," ibid, the patentee
has no right to claim that its distribution constitutes contributory infringment. "To form the basis for contributory
infringement the item must almost be uniquely suited as a
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement."
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component of the patented invention." P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals § 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also adapted
to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a
contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels
of commerce." Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 48
(1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517 (1917).
Although there are substantial differences between the
patent and copyright laws, there is no reason to grant the
copyright holder any broader right to bar noninfringing activities than the patent holder. Indeed, arguably, the copyright holder should have a lesser right, for by precluding
noninfringing uses he may not only block the wheels of commerce, but also impose an unjustified tax on the free marketplace of ideas. There should be no finding of contributory
infringement for the seller of a staple article of commerce
that is used to infringe, unless the seller directly participates
in, or directly induces, an act of infringement. An article is a
staple article of commerce if it is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, if we apply the patent
law rule, it need merely be capable of significant noninfringing uses.
IV
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that question, we need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the district court a significant number of them would be non-infringing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not
give precise content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: pri-
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vate, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so
both because respondents have no right to prevent other
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and
because the district court's factual findings reveal that the respondents failed to prove that even unauthorized home timeshifting is not legitimate fair use. We therefore need not analyze commercial use, public use, or home library-building,
all of which would raise additional complicating issues.
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television programming their combined market share is small. The exact percentage is not specified, but it is obviously well below 10 percent. 22 If they prevail, the outcome of this litigation will
have a significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of the remaining 90 percent of the programming in the
Nation. No doubt, many other producers share respondents' concern about the possible consequences of unrestricted
copying, but the findings of the District Court make it perfectly clear that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing
audience and that many producers are perfectly willing to
allow private time-shifting to continue, at least for an experimental trial period.
If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of
televised sports events, and if the proprietors of those programs find the practice unobjectionable, the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible is, at
the very least, presumptively lawful. The respondents are
not litigating on behalf of a class composed of all copyright
holders. They do not, for example, represent any of the
owners of religious television stations, who testified that they
22
The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial consisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syndicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on commercial television stations was under 5 percent. See Record 532-533,

549-550.

81-1687-MEMORANDUM
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

26

had no objection to home use video taping of their copyrighted programs. 23 Yet the relief authorized by the Court
of Appeals-whether a judicially-fashioned royalty on the
sale of Betamax machines or an injunction against sale on the
open market-would inevitably affect the portion of the audience for such programs that can only participate by means of
time-shifting.
The District Court's findings do not set forth the precise
percentage of all programming that is available for copying
without any objection. The findings do make it clear, however, that the aggregate of educational, religious, sports and
uncopyrighted programming is sufficiently substantial to
support a significant market for VTR's, even if it is assumed
that all other copying may properly be characterized as infringing. Moreover, those findings, as well as other studies,
plainly demonstrate that time-shifting actually enhances the
size of most television audiences. 24 Under the test of contributory infringement developed in the patent cases, and
codified by Congress in the Patent Code, these lawful uses
are adequate to justify the District Court's finding that the
VTR is a staple article of commerce.
With regard to authorized copying, the District Court
stated:
"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, reli23

Record cites to be added.
In a special staff study for the Federal Communications Commission
made in February 1980, the following conclusion was stated unequivocally:
"Clearly, the principal use of the VCR is for time-shift purposes. Because both major rating services-A.C. Nielsen and Arbitron-now include an indication of VCR use, this time-shift phenomenon should actually
be an asset to the networks and broadcasters. Shows which would have
been missed can now be recorded for later viewing. Because rating services are prepared to report such time-shifting, broadcasters should actually
be helped by this consumer convenience. An audience that was previously
unavailable to them is now viewing, and the viewing is properly attributed
in audience reports." Id ., at 61-62.
24
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gious, educational and other programming. This included testimony from the representatives of the Offices
of the Commissioners of the National Football, Basketball, Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the
Executive Director of National Religious Broadcasters
and various educational communications agencies.
Plaintiffs attack the weight of the testimony offered and
also contend that an injunction is warranted because infringing uses outweigh noninfringing uses.
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use recording might be, an injunction which
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders have no objection to copying that may constitute infringement does not
mean that respondents are judicially deemed to have granted
a license to copy their programs. Third party conduct would
be wholly irrelevant in an action for direct infringement of respondents' copyrights. But in an action for contributory infringement against the seller of copying equipment, a plaintiff copyright holder may not prevail unless he speaks for
virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the outcome. In this case, although others plainly share the respondents' concerns, the record makes it perfectly clear that
there are many important producers of national and local
television programs who find nothing objectionable about the
enlargement in the size of the television audience that results
from the practice of time-shifting for private home use. The
seller of the equipment that expands those producers' audiences cannot be a contributory infringer where, as here, it
has had no direct involvement with any infringing activity.

v
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are under
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some circumstances not infringing. An unlicensed use of the
copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with one of
the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S.
151, 154-155. As amended in 1976, the Act grants the
owner of a copyright five specific exclusive rights.
Section 106 of the Act provides:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to display the copyrighted work publicly."
The types of home time-shifting at issue in this case do not
in any way threaten the exclusive rights embodied in
subparagraphs (2) through (5). We are not concerned with
preparation of derivative works, transfers of copies from one
person to another, public performance, or public display.
All that is at issue is the preparation of a single copy in the
home that is to be erased after a single, noncommercial viewing. A simple reading of the statute might suggest that the
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plain language of subparagraph (1) does not even apply to
such conduct-the paragraph speaks of "copies," not a single
copy. The legislative history demonstrates, however, that
the act of making a single copy is not wholly outside the scope
of the Act's analysis: "The references to 'copies or phonorecords,' although in the plural, are intended here and throughout the bill to include the singular." 1975 Senate Report 58;
1976 House Report 61.
On the other hand, the fact that home time-shifting falls
within the scope of subparagraph (1) does not resolve the
question whether home time shifting constitutes infringement. For the definition of the exclusive rights in § 106 is
prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 through 118."
Those sections describe a variety of uses of copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright notwithstanding the provisions of § 106." 25 The most pertinent in this
25

Thus, for example, § 110 provides in part:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not infringements of copyright:
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance
or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on
a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes, unless(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the
public;"
And § 111(a) provides, in part:
"The secondary transmission of a primary transmission embodying a performance or display of a work is not an infringement of copyright if(1) the secondary transmission is not made by a cable system,
and consists entirely of the relaying, by the management of a hotel, apartment house, or similar establishment, of signals transmitted by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, within the local service area of such station, to
the private lodgings of guests or residents of such establishment,
and no direct charge is made to see or hear the secondary
transmission;"
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case is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the doctrine of
"fair use."
The 1909 Act did not have a "fair use" provision. Moreover, that Act's compendium of exclusive rights-"to print,
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" 26was plainly broad enough to encompass virtually all potential
interactions with a copyrighted work. Yet the statute was
never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the
statute literally in every situation.
When Congress
amended the statute in 1976, it indicated that it "intended to
restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House Report
No. 94-1476, 94th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 66. Congress therefore codified § 107 in a form that identifies various factors
that enable a Court to apply a "rule of reason" analysis to
particular claims of infringement. 'l:l
17 u. s. c. § 111.
Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075.
27
The essence of the section is captured in these comments from the
House Report on the fair use section:
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question
must be decided on its own facts ....
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered'the purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this factor
includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not intended to
be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of
copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as under the present
law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other
factors in fair use decisions. . . .
General intention behind the provision
'The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply.
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circum26
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Three different factors lead to the conclusion that, under a
"rule of reason" analysis, the respondents failed to carry
their burden of proving in this case that home time shifting is
not fair use. Those factors are (A) their complete failure to
show that home time shifting would harm the potential market for, or the value of, any identifiable copyrighted material,
(B) the legislative history tending to show that Congress understood such activity to be fair use, and (C) the profoundly
disturbing policy implications of a finding that home time
shifting is not fair use.
A

The flexible character of the fair use doctrine "precludes
the formulation of exact rules." H. Rep. No. 94-1476, pp.
65-Q6. Nevertheless, in exercising the judgment required
by this "rule of reason," we must be especially responsive to
the language of § 107 identifying factors that Congress believed might be relevant to most fair use analyses. 28 One facstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H. Rep. No.
94-1476, pp. 65-66.
28
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, ibncluding such use by reproductin in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infrigement of copyright.
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factor to be considered shall include"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
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tor is particularly important: "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." The
purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. If a use has no demonstrable effect upon the potential
market for, or value of, the copyrighted work, prohibiting
such a use would not affect the author's incentive to create
the work in the first place. It would merely inhibit access to
ideas without any countervailing benefit.
Of course, every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright. But noncommercial
uses are a different matter. Any plaintiff seeking to challenge the noncommercial use of a copyrighted work should,
as a threshold matter, prove either that the particular use is
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would be
more likely than not that some non-minimal damage would
result to the potential market for, or the value of, his particular copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will result.
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood
may be presumed. But if it is for purely private purposes,
however, it must be demonstrated.
In this case, respondents failed to carry that burden with
regard to home time-shifting. The district court explicitly
found to the contrary. See 480 F. Supp., at 466; supra, at
- - - - - The nature of the evidence was described by
the court as follows:
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107. 13-14.
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trial that the time-shifting without libraiying would result in 'not a great deal of harm.' Plaintiffs' greatest
concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of important
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.'
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible
boundaries' are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost
control over his program.'
"These 'nuances,' 'perceptions,' and 'points of philosophy' are understandable, though not always logical.
They do not, however, justify an injunction. Harm
from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal."
480 F. Supp., at 467 (emphasis added).
The District Court's findings that respondents "did not establish even a likelihood of harm" and offered "no concrete evidence to suggest that the Betamax will change the studios'
financial picture," id., at 469, are amply supported by the
record.
B

The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act does not
expressly focus on the question whether use of the Betamax
for home time-shifting is "fair use.'' That history does, however, contain two clues that strongly support the conclusion
that Congress assumed that such private use was entirely
legitimate.
The first clues came early in the process that constituted
the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law that resulted in the Sound Recording Amendments of 1971 and ultimately the 1976 Copyright Act. Under the 1909 Act, there
was no provision covering motion pictures. In 1912, the Act
was amended to include them within its scope, but the 1909
Act was not well suited to deal with them. In 1937, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had responded by declaring that the unauthorized projection of a documentary
motion picture on a movie screen constituted the making of a
"copy" and was therefore infringing. Patterson v. Century
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Productions, 93 F. 2d 489 (1937). A study prepared for Congress by Borge Warner warned of the dangers of this analysis. It noted:
"If the Patterson case, which dealt in fact with the public
exhibition, is followed to its logical conclusion, any exhibition of a copyrighted motion picture, whether public or
private, would be an infringement if not authorized by
the copyright owner.
"[C]onjectural to some extent is what the courts would
now do if presented with a case of purely private exhibition, as in a private home or in a library for an individual scholar. While even such an exhibition would seem
to be 'copying' under section 1(a) if the theory of the Patterson decision is carried to its logical conclusion, a court
might hesitate to find an infringement in that situation.
It is conceivable that a court might resort to the doctrine
of 'fair use' to hold such a purely private exhibition not
an infringement." Study No. 16, Limitations on Performing Rights, at 11&-117 (1958).
That concern was reflected in the Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright
Law in 1961. He proposed that it be made clear that the exhibition of a motion picture was not the making of a copy, and
instead provided for a limited right of public performance.
He stated:
"Motion picture producers and distributors have urged
that the performance right in motion pictures should extend to what are clearly private performances, including
private performances given in private homes. They
point to Patterson ... to support their position. Motion
picture films are commonly leased for exhibition at specified places and dates. Most leases are for commercial
exhibitions, but many films are also leased for home use.
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It is argued that in either case private exhibitions beyond the terms of the lease should constitute an infringement of copyright.
·"This argument may have some theoretical plausibility, but we would question it for several reasons:
" *Injury to a copyright owner from private performances beyond the terms of a lease would be minimal. He may be entitled to the usual license fee as
damages for a breach of contract, but the statutory
damages for copyright infringement would be
grossly excessive.
"*As a practical matter, unauthorized private performances could rarely be discovered or.controlled.

"*New technical devices will probably make it practical in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in the home. We do not believe the private use
of such a reproduction can or should be precluded
by copyright." Register's Report 29-30 (emphasis
added).

Congress adopted the Register's recommendation and created a right of public display and performance in motion pictures. § 106(4), (5). Of course, the Register is not the Congress, and his views are of only limited significance.
Nevertheless, they surely support the conclusion that home
time shifting is fair use.
The second clue provided in the legislative history came in
the course of the passage of the Sound Recording Amendments of 1971. 85 Stat. 391. The development of the audio
tape recorder made it simple for any individual to make tapes
of copyrighted songs played on the radio. Under prior
Copyright Law, the composer of the song was protected-he
was entitled to claim a so-called "mechanical royalty" from
any person who made such a tape in a manner that was not
fair use. But the performer of the song was not protected at
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all, even from blatant commercial exploitation of his or her
talent. When the practice known as "record piracy" became
widespread, the recording industry persuaded Congress to
enact a special statute extending copyright protection to
sound recordings. The House Report revealed the legislative understanding of how the "fair use" doctrine applies to
home taping:
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use and
with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing
commercially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers
would be in no different position from that of the owners
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the
past 20 years." H. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
7, reprinted in [1971] U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News,
pp. 1566, 1572. 29
29
This subject had been expressly considered during the House Committee hearings. As the District Court noted in this case, Representative
Beister of Pennsylvania engaged in the following dialogue about off-the-air
recording with Ms. Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Register of
Copyrights:
"Mr. Beister. I do not know that I can add very much to the questions
which you have been asked so far.
"I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own home.
"My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes
a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set.
"Now, he may retrieve in addition something else onto his recording, but
nonetheless, he does retrieve the basic sound, and this legislation, of
course, would not point to his activities, would it?
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That this was the opinion of the sponsors of the legislation is
confirmed by the following colloquy when the 1971 amendment was being discussed on the floor of the House of
Representatives:
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes.
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to
record off of a program which comes through the air on
the radio or television, and then used it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this would not be
included under the penalties of this bill?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I
am glad the gentleman raises the point.
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,'
Members will note that under the bill the same practice
which prevails today is called for; namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be fair
use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is made clear in the report." 117 Cong.
Rec. 34, 748 (1971) (emphasis added). 30
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.'
"I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this
question is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?'
"The answer I have given and will give again is that this is something
you cannot control. You simply cannot control it." Hearings on S. 646
before the Subcomm. No.3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 22 (June 9 and 10, 1971).
30
Representative Kastenmeier's views of whether the copyright laws
prohibit home taping do not appear to have changed significantly over the
past decade. In hearings held in 1982, after the Court of Appeals' decision
in this case, he engaged in the following colloquy with a representative of
the National Music Publishers Association:
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Thank you, Mr. Baumgarten. Do I take it as your
legal opinion as part of this panel that some 30 or 40 million people in their
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The Court of Appeals declared that these statements are
"entirely beside the point" because the Amendments were intended to deal with sound recording, not video recording.
659 F. 2d, at 968. That is an unfortunate overstatement.
For purposes of fair use analysis, the policy questions raised
by home time-shifting of video broadcasts are closely related
to the policy questions raised by home taping of musical performances. Indeed, since it appears that Congress was referring to home librarying of audio tapes in the 1971 legislative history, it would seem that the policies favor a finding of
fair use for home time-shifting of free television broadcasts
are even more compelling. 31
homes producing billions of works are now and have been infringing copyright laws?
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes.
"Mr. Kastenmeier. They are all infringers?
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes.
•
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Subject in all respects to whatever the law"Mr. Baumgarten. Whatever relief the court considers appropriate. I
think we saw at the ninth circuit that that would be fashioned in an equitable amount.
"Mr. Kastenmeier. There would be a lot of Americans who I think
would be chagrined to learn that thiat is the case." Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administation of Justice
of House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4783 et al. , 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 540.
31
One statement in the legislative history should be discussed, since it
could be read out of context as suggesting a contrary view. The statement ·
appears in the Senate Report on the 1976 Act and reads as follows:
"The committee's attention has been directed to the special problems involved in the reception of instructional television programs in remote areas
of the country. In certain areas it is currently impossible to transmit such
programs by any means other than communications satellites. A particular difficulty exists when such transmissions extend over several time
zones within the same state, such as in Alaska. Unless individual schools
in such states may make an off-air recording of such transmissions, the programs may not be received by the students during the school's daily schedule. The committee believes that the making by a school located in such a
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c
If neither the legislative history nor the words of the statute unambiguously tell us whether Congress intended to permit or to prohibit the home use of tape recorders to copy television programs for later viewing, there are important
reasons for not interpreting the silence of Congress as a prohibition. Special constitutional values are implicated whenever the Government seeks to regulate or prohibit conduct
that take place entirely within the privacy of the home. 32 Although there is plainly no constitutional bar to a congressional decision to prohibit home time-shifting, the privacy
values at issue would surely be weighed carefully by Congress before adopting any such prohibition. Any such
weighing process would unquestionably yield a fairly explicit
statement on the subject-a statement that is strikingly abremote area of an off-the-air recording of an instructional television transmission for t'he purpose of a delayed viewing of the program by students
for the same school constitutes a 'fair use.' The committee does not intend
to suggest, however, that off-the-air recording for convenience would under
any circumstances, be considered 'fair use.' To meet the requirement of
temporary use the school may retain the recording for only a limited period
of time after the broadcast.'' S. Rep. 94-473, pp. 65-66.
A hasty reading of the italicized sentence-especially the phrase "under
any circumstances"-might suggest that the committee intended to prohibit any time-shifting. But the sentence preceding the italicized one
proves that reading impossible, since it expressly authorizes certain timeshifting for public display. In context, the italicized sentence merely ensures that the preceding sentence not be read too broadly. The Committee wanted to make sure that its approval of one form of time shifting for
public display not be read as suggesting that all time shifting for public display is permissible. No question of public display is presented in this case.
82
"Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at
the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565-566 (1969).
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sent from the 1976 legislative history.
That is especially true in the context of a statute that expressly provides that every act of infringement-even if performed in complete good faith-gives rise to a minimum statutory liability of $100. 38 Even if it is assumed that such a
penalty could seldom be collected, we cannot ignore the concern that literally millions of Americans might be branded as
lawbreakers for conduct that seems morally indistinguishable
from simply watching a free public broadCast at the time it is
offered to them. It is highly improbable that Congress so
intended.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that to the extent timeshifting expands public access to freely broadcast television
programs, it yields societal benefits. Earlier this year, in
Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried,
- - U. S. - - , - - - - - , n. 12 (1983), we acknowledged
the public interest in making television broadcasting more
available. Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But
it supports an interpretation of the concept of "fair use" that
requires the copyright holder to demonstrate some likelihood
of harm before he may condemn a primate act of time-shifting
as a violation of federal law.
When these factors are all weighed in the "rule of reason"
balance, we must conclude that the respondents have not
demonstrated that home time-shifting is not fair use. Congress is, of course, free to change the law. But in light of the
conclusions of the District Court regarding the state of the
empirical data, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that the statute as presently written bars such
Section 504(c)(2) provides, in part:
"In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in
its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not
less than $100."
83
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conduct. 34
VI
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the
34
The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in a sensitive "rule of reason" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be
"productive. It therefore concluded copying a television program merely
to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that he would
otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could never be fair
use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous.
Fair use analysis calls for a sensitive balancing of interests. The distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative. Although
copying to promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a stronger claim to
fair use than copying to avoid interrupting a poker game, the question is
not simply two-dimensional. For one thing, it is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern material with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well have a broader claim to
protection because of the greater potential for commercial harm. Copying
a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a motion picture.
And, of course, not all uses are fungible. Copying for commercial gain
has a much weaker claim to fair use than copying for personal enrichment.
But the notion of social "productivity'' cannot be a complete answer to this
analysis. A teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the
sake of broadening his understanding of what his constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies a news program to help make his decision
on how to vote.
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind person is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to entertain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statutory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the eco-
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power to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972).
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that
the elected representatives of the millions of people who
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible. We are therefore required in this case to apply
the judicially formulated doctrines of contributory infringement and fair use.
The record and findings of the District Court lead us to two
conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television would not
object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private
viewers. And second, respondents failed to demonstrate
that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of non-minimal
harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. We therefore conclude that the respondents
have failed to demonstrate contributory infringement on the
part of Sony.
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this
new technology, just as it so often has in the past. But it is
not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written.
Applying the copyright statute, as it now reads, to the facts
as they have been developed in this case, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals must be reversed.

nomic consequences of copying.

Addendum

The following two footnotes are to be inserted on page ~ of the
Second Draft of the Memorandum of Justice Stevens in 81-1687,
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. et
ux. :
16

E. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse
Racing and Breeding Association, Inc., 554 F.2d 1213 (CAl
1977) (racetrack retained direct infringer to supply .music to
paying customers); KECA MUSIC, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F.
Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977) (cocktail lounge hired musicians to
supply music to paying customers); Dreamland Ball Room v.
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (CA7 1929) (dance hall hired
orchestra to supply music to paying customers).
These cases are often contrasted with the so-called
landlord-tenant cases, in which landlords who leased premises to
a direct infringer for a fixed rental and did not participate
directly in any infringing activity were found not to be liable
for contributory infringement. E. g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d
686 (CA2 1938).
A difficult case was presented in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (CA2 1963). The owner of twentythree chain stores retained the direct infringer to run his
record departmen~ The relationship was structured as a
licensing arrangement, so that the defendant bore none of the
business risk of running the department.
Instead, it received
10% or 12% of the direct infringer's gross receipts. The Court
of Appeals concluded:
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the
spectrum to the employer-employee model, than to the
landlord-tenant model. On the particular facts before
us, .•. Green's relationship to its infringing
licensee, as well as its strong concern for the
financial success of the phonograph record concession,
renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the
'bootleg' records.

"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case
before us cannot be deemed unduly harsh or unfair.
Green has the power to police carefully the conduct of
its concessionaire; our judgment will simply ~ncourage
it to do so, thus placing responsibility where it can
and should be effectively exercised." Id., at 308
(emphasis in original).
---

.

.

[Addendum, p. 2)

17 E. g., Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (CA2 1971); Screen Gems-Columbia
Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
In Gershwin, the direct infringers retained the contributory
infringer to manage their performances.
443 F.2d, at 1160. The
contributory infringer would contact each direct infringer,
obtains the titles of the musical compositions to be performed,
print the programs, and then sells the programs to its own local
organizations for distribution at the time of the direct
infringement.
Id., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized
that the contributory infringer had actual knowledge that the
artists it was managing were performing copyrighted works, was in
a position to police the infringing conduct of the artists, and
derived substantial benefit from the actions of the primary
infringers.
Id., at 1163.
In Screen-Gems, the direct infringer manufactured and sold
bootleg records.
In denying a motion for summary judgment, the
District Court held that the infringer's advertising agency, the
radio stations that advertised the infringer's works, and the
service agency that boxed and mailed the infringing goods could
all be held liable, if at trial it could be demonstrated that
they knew or should have known that they were dealing in illegal
goods.

Addendum II
Instead of present footnote 6, I hope to work some of the
following material into the ultimate opinion at appropriate
places:

Fred Rogers is the president of the corporation that
produces and owns . the copyright in Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
He
is also the show's host. The program is carried by more public
television stations than any other program.
Its audience numbers
over 3,000,000 families a day.
He testified that he had
absolutely no objection to home taping for noncommercial use:
"Some public stations, as well as commercial stations,
program the 'Neighborhood' at hours when some children
cannot use it.
I think that it's a real service to
families to be able to record such programs and show
them at appropriate times.
I have always felt that
with the advent of all of this new technology that
allows people to take the 'Neighborhood' off-the-air,
and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's
what I produce, that they then become much more active
in the programming of their family's television life.
Very framkly, I am opposed to people being programmed
by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has
always been 'You are an important person just the way
you are. You can make healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm
going on too long, but I just feel that anything that
allows a person to be more active in the control of his '
or he r 1 i f e , in a he a 1 thy way , i s i mpo r tan t . " T . R .
2920-2921. See also Def. Exh. PI, p. 85.

John Kenaston is the station manager of Channel 58, an
educational station in Los Angeles affiliated with the Public
Broadcasting Service. The station publishes a guide to its
programs. For each program, the guide tells whether unlimited
home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized subject to
certain restrictions {such as erasure within seven days), or home
taping is not authorized at all. T.R. 2863-2902. The Spring
1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs. Sixty-two of
those programs--or 58 percent--authorize some home taping.
Twenty-one of them--or almost 20 percent--authorize unrestricted
home taping.
Def. Exh. PI.
Lawrence Frymire is the executive director and the secretary
of the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority. Between 20 and
30 percent of the Authority's prime time broadcasting is produced
by the Authority itself.
48.7 percent of all its viewers watch
one of its programs, the New Jersey News Report, and 38.6 percent

watch another, New Jersey News:
Special Report.
~.R. 2833-2836.
The Authority is willing to authorize unrestrictea noncommercial
home taping of its material.
Ibia. Mr. Frymire also testified
that many programs are acquirea by the Authority from other
sources, such as the Public Broaacasting System, with full
authorization to make ana retain copies for seven aays.
T.R.
2844. He testifiea further that the Authority could ana aoes
transfer that authority to it~ viewers.
Ibia.
Julian Gooaman was Chairman of the Board of NBC.
He
testifiea that stuaies preparea by NBC's corporate planning staff
showea "that the home viaeo recoraing business woula have a
substantial growth in the future, but that its effect upon
commercial television ana specifically upon our business would be
minuscule." T.R. 3011.
In May 1978, he gave a speech to the
Federal Communications Bar Association; in which he maae the
following statement, clearea with the planning staff:
"Because of the amount of television programming now
available, ana the fact that few viewers can watch all
of the programs they might want to, we feel that viaeo
recoraing will expana television viewing rather than
subtract from it." T.R. 3016-3017: Def. Exh. OT.
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SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS,
INC., ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[December - , 1983]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners manufacture and sell home video tape recorders. Repondents own the copyrights on some of the television programs that are broadcast on the public airwaves.
Some members of the general public use video tape recorders
sold by petitioners to record some of these broadcasts, as
well as a large number of other broadcasts. The question
presented is whether the sale of petitioners' copying equipment to the general public violates any of the rights conferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act.
Respondents commenced this copyright infringment action
against petitioners in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California in 1976. Respondents alleged
that some individuals had used Betamax video tape recorders
(VTR's) to record some of respondents' copyrighted works
which had been exhibited on commercially sponsored television and contended that these individuals had thereby
infringed respondents' copyrights. Respondents further
maintained that petitioners were liable for the copyright
infringment allegedly committed by Betamax consumers because of petitioners' marketing of the Betamax VTR's. 1 Re' The respondents also asserted causes of action under state law and
§ 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a).

These claims are not before this Court.

~~
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spondents sought no relief against any Betamax consumer.
Instead, they sought money damages and an equitable accounting of profits from petitioners, as well as an injunction
against the manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's.
After a lengthy trial, the District Court denied respondents all the relief they sought and entered judgment for petitioners. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's
judgment on respondent's copyright claim, holding petitioners liable for contributory infringment and ordering the District Court to fashion appropriate relief. 659 F. 2d 963
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1116 (1982); since
we had not completed our study of the case last Term, we ordered reargument,-- U. S. - - (1983). We now reverse.
An explanation of our rejection of respondents' unprecedented attempt to impose copyright liability upon the distributors of copying equipment requires a quite detailed recitation of the findings of the District Court. In summary, those
findings reveal that the average member of the public uses a
VTR principally to record a program he cannot view as it is
being televised and then to watch it once at a later time.
This practice, known as "time-shifting," enlarges the television viewing audience. For that reason, a significant
amount of television programming may be used in this manner without objection from the owners of the copyrights on
the programs. For the same reason, even the two respondents in this case, who do assert objections to time-shifting in
this litigation, were unable to prove that the practice has impaired the commercial value of their copyrights or has created any likelihood of future harm. Given these findings,
there is no basis in the Copyright Act upon which respondents can hold petitioners liable for distributing VTR's to the
general public. The Court of Appeals' holding that respondents are entitled to enjoin the distribution of VTR's, to collect
royalties on the sale of such equipment, or to obtain other relief, if affirmed, would enlarge the scope of respondents' stat-
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utory monopolies to encompass control over an article of commerce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such
an expansion of the copyright privilege is beyond the limits of
the grants authorized by Congress.
I
The two respondents in this action, Universal Studios, Inc.
and Walt Disney Productions, produce and hold the copyrights on a substantial number of motion pictures and other
audiovisual works. In the current marketplace, they can
exploit their rights in these works in a number of ways: by
authorizing theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited
showings on cable and network television, by selling syndication rights for repeated airings on local television stations,
and by marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or
videodiscs.
Some works are suitable for exploitation
through all of these avenues, while the market for other
works is more limited.
Petitioner Sony manufactures millions of Betamax video
tape recorders and markets these devices through numerous
retail establishments, some of which are also petitioners in
this action. 2 Sony's Betamax VTR is a mechanism consisting of three basic components: (1) a tuner, which receives
electromagnetic signals transmitted over the television band
of the public airwaves and separates them into audio and visual signals; (2) a recorder, which records such signals on a
magnetic tape; and (3) an adapter, which converts the audio
and visual signals on the tape into a composite signal that can
be received by a television set.
2
The four retailers are Carter, Hawley, Hales, Stores, Inc.; Associated
Dry Goods Corp.; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Camera Corp. The principal defendants are Sony Corporation, the manufacturer of the equipment, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sony Corporation
of America. The advertising agency of Doyle, Dane, Burn bock, Inc., also
involved in marketing the Betamax, is also a petitioner. An individual
VTR user, Willis Griffiths, was named as a defendant in the District Court,
but respondent sought no relief against him. Griffiths is not a petitioner.
For convenience, we shall refer to petitioners collectively as Sony.
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Several capabilities of the machine are noteworthy. The
separate tuner in the Betamax enables it to record a broadcast off one station while the television set is tuned to"another
channel, permitting the viewer, for example, to watch two
simultaneous news broadcasts by watching one "live" and recording the other for later viewing. Tapes may be reused,
and programs that have been recorded may be erased either
before or after viewing. A timer in the Betamax can be used
to activate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined
times, enabling an intended viewer to record programs that
are transmitted when he or she is not at home. Thus a person may watch a program at home in the evening even
though it was broadcast while the viewer was at work during
the afternoon. The Betamax is also equipped with a pause
button and a fast-forward control. The pause button, when
depressed, deactivates the recorder until it is released, thus
enabling a viewer to omit a commercial advertisement from
the recording, provided, of course, that the viewer is present
when the program is recorded. The fast forward control enables the viewer of a previously recorded program to run the
tape rapidly when a segment he or she does not desire to see
is being played back on the television screen.
The respondents and Sony both conducted surveys of the
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred owners during a sample period in 1978. Although there were
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the
primary use of the machine for most owners was "time-shifting,"-the practice of recording a program to view it once at
a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Time-shifting enables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss because they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or
are viewing a program on another station at the time of a
broadcast that they desire to watch. Both surveys also
showed, however, that a substantial number of interviewees
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had accumulated libraries of tapes. 3 Sony's survey indicated that over 80% of the interviewees watched at least as
much regular television as they had before owning a
Betamax. 4 Respondents offered no evidence of decreased
television viewing by Betamax owners. 5
Sony introduced considerable evidence describing television programs that could be copied without objection from
3

As evidence of how a VTR may be used, respondents offered the testimony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual defendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summarized his testimony as follows:
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax,
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) but
also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however,
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing
them.
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept.
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Earhart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any
Universal film in his library.
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy debate." 480 F. Supp., at 436-437.
Four other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity.
4
The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys as
follows:
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their 'machines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. Defendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine to record programs they otherwise would have missed.
"When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their library, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further
viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 438.
5
"81. 9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2%
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any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, religious, and educational programming. For example, their
survey indicated that 7.3% of all Betamax use is to record
sports events, and representatives of professional baseball,
football, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no objection to the recording of their televised events for home
use. 6
Respondents offered opinion evidence concerning the future impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commercial value of their copyrights. The District Court found,
however, that they had failed to prove any likelihood of future harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting. ld., at
469.

The District Court's Decision
The lengthy trial of the case in the District Court concerned the private, home use of VTR's for recording programs broadcast on the public airwaves without charge to the
viewer. 7 No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to other
persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for public performances, or the copying of programs transmitted on pay orcable television systems was raised. See 480 F. Supp. 429,
432-433, 442 (1979).
The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was
a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material
was broadcast free to the public at large, the noncommercial
reported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480
F . Supp. , at 439.
6
See Def. Exh. OT, Table 20; Tr. 2447-2450, 2480, 2486-2487, 25152516, 2530- 2534.
7
The trial also briefly touched upon demonstrations of the Betamax by
the retailer petitioners which were alleged to be infringments by respondents. The District Court held against respondents on this claim, 480 F.
Supp., at 456-457, the Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, 659 F. 2d, at
976, and respondents did not cross-petition on this issue.
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character of the use, and the private character of the activity
conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest
in increasing access to television programming, an interest
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through the
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 480 F.
Supp., at 454. 8 Even when an entire copyrighted work was
recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair use
"because there is no accompanying reduction in the market
for 'plaintiff's original work."' Ibid.
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a contributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use. The District Court noted that Sony
had no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who
recorded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement,
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement:
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the
United States copyright laws." !d., at 436.
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive
knowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine
would be used to record copyrighted programs, but found
that Sony merely sold a "product capable of a variety of
uses, some of them allegedly infringing." !d., at 461. It
reasoned:
8
The court also found that this "access is not just a matter of convenience, as plaintiffs have suggested. Access has been limited not simply
by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access to the better program has also been limited by the competitive practice of counterprogramming." 480 F. Supp., at 454.
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"Selling a staple article of commerce e. g., a typewriter, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine
technically contributes to any infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial management.
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers of staple items were held liable as contributory infringers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some
purchasers on some occasions would use their product
for a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of
first impression, to be an infringement." Ibid.
Finally, the District Court discussed the respondents'
prayer for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an
injunction either preventing the future sale of Betamax machines, or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable
of recording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated
that it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument enabling the infringement were sued by the copyright holders,"
and that the request for relief in this case "is unique." 480
F. Supp., at 465.
It concluded that an injunction was wholly inappropriate
because any possible harm to respondents was outweighed by
the fact that "the Betamax could still legally be used to
record noncopyrighted material or material whose owners
consented to the copying. An injunction would deprive the
public of the ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing
off-the-air recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
The Court of Appeals' Decision
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment on respondents' copyright claim. It did not set aside
any of the District Court's findings of fact. Rather, it concluded as a matter of law that the home use of a VTR was not
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a fair use because it was not a "productive use." 9 It therefore held that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any
harm to the potential market for the copyrighted works, but
then observed that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect
of mass reproduction made possible by VTR's would tend to
diminish the potential market for respondents' works. 659
F. 2d, at 974.
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Appeals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce
such as tape recorders or photocopying machines. It noted
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise copyright problems." Id., at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the primary purpose of reproducing television programming" and
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material.
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use
even if some copyright owners elect not to enforce their
rights.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's reliance on Sony's lack of knowledge that home use constituted
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defining the remedies for infringement applied also to the nonstatutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his damages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct.
It held that Sony was chargeable with knowledge of the
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of
copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use"
or "the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid.
On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the District Court should reconsider its determination that an in"Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is reproduced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case
precludes an application of fair use. " 659 F. 2d, at 971-972.
9
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junction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring
to "the analogous photocopying area," suggested that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory license may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976.
II
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that:
"The Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.
"The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127, Chief Justice
Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly granted by Congress, 'The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public
of the products of his creative genius." United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158.
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress
that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their
work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance
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between the interests of authors and inventors in the control
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly. 10
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to significant changes in technology. 11 Indeed, it
was the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the
In its report accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in 1909, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives explained this balance:
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in
his writings, .. . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing
to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.
10

"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions:
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit
the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
11
Thus, for example, the development and marketing of player pianos
and perforated roles of music, see White Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908), preceded the enactment of the Copyright
Act of 1909; innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision of the
Copyright law; the development of the technology that made it possible to
retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems, see
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968), and Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974), prompted the enactment of the
complex provisions set forth in 17 U. S. C. § 111 (d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5)
after years of detailed congressional study, see Eastern Microwave, Inc. v.
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982).
By enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391,
Congress also provided the solution to the "record piracy" problems that
had been created by the development of the audio tape recorder. Sony
argues that the legislative history of that Act, see especially H. Rep. No.
487, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7, indicates that Congress did not intend to
prohibit the private home use of either audio or video tape recording equip-

81-1687-0PINION
12

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. 12 Repeatedly, as new developments have
occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary.
Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of
1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to
copyrights is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S.
(8 Peters) 591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringement "are only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson
v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889).
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance
is a recurring theme. See, e. g., Teleprompter Corp. v.
CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968); Williams and Wilkins v. United
States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affirmed by an equally
divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908). Sound policy,
as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market
for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
authority and the institutional ability to accomodate fully the
varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly
marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the
ment. In view of our disposition of the contributory infringement issue,
we express no opinion on that question.
12
"Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the
printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws.
The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected
with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the other. Successive ages
have drawn different balances among the interest of the writer in the control and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the
publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dissemination of ideas."
Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of
Copyright vii-viii (1967).
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scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which
never contemplated such a calculus of interests. In doing so,
we are guided by Justice Stewart's exposition of the correct
approach to ambiguities in the law of copyright:
"The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory
monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good. 'The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.'
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127. See Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-242. When technological change
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright
Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.''
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151,
156 (footnotes omitted).
Copyright protection "subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17
U. S. C. § 102(a). This protection has never accorded the
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his
work. 13 Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright
3
' See, e. g., White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S.
1, 19 (1908); cf. Deep South Packing Co. v. Lathram Corp., 406 U. S. 518,
530-531 (1972). While the law has never recognized an author's right to
absolute control of his work, the natural tendency of legal rights to express
themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of all else is particularly pronounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the
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holder "exclusive" rights to use and to authorize the use of his
work in five qualified ways, · including reproduction of the
copyrighted work in copies. I d., § 106. 14 All reproductions
of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of
the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a "fair use;"
the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to
such a use. Compare id., § 106 with id., § 107.
"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute,
"is an infringer of the copyright." !d., § 501(a). Conversely, anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to
use the copyrighted work in a way specified in the statute or
copyright and the patent. See e. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 156-158 (1948) (copyright owners claiming right to tie
license of one film to license of another under copyright law); Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106 (1932) (copyright owner claiming copyright
renders it immune from state taxation of copyright royalties); BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 349-351 (1908) (copyright owner
claiming that a right to fix resale price of his works within the scope of his
copyright); International Business Machines v. United States, 298 U. S.
131 (1936) (patentees claiming right to tie sale of unpatented article to lease
of patented device).
1
' Section 106 of the Act provides:
"'Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly."
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who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the
copyright with respect to such use.
The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with
a potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his
work, including an injunction to restrain the infringer from
violating his rights, the impoundment and destruction of all
reproductions of his work made in violation of his rights, a
recovery of his actual damages and any additional profits realized by the infringer or a recovery of statutory damages,
and attorneys fees. I d., §§ 502-505. 15
The two respondents in this case do not seek relief against
the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copyrights. Moreover, this is not a class action on behalf of all
copyright owners who license their works for television
broadcast, and respondents have no right to invoke whatever
rights other copyright holders may have to bring infringement actions based on Betamax copying of their works. 16 As
was made clear by their own evidence, the copying of the respondents' programs represents a small portion of the total
use of VTR's. It is, however, the taping of respondents own
copyrighted programs that provides them with standing to
charge Sony with contributory infringement. To prevail,
they have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax
15

Moreover, anyone who willfully infringes the copyright to reproduce a
motion picture for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain is subject to criminal penalties of one year imprisonment and a $25,000
fine for the first offense and two years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for
each subsequent offense, 17 U. S. C. § 506(a), and the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime are forfeited upon conviction, id., § 506(b).
16
In this regard, we reject respondent's attempt to cast this action as
comparable to a class action because of the positions taken by amici with
copyright interests and their attempt to treat the statements made by
amici as evidence in this case. See Brief for Respondent, at 1, and n. 1, 6,
52, 53 and n. 116. The stated desires of amici concerning the outcome of
this or any litigation are no substitute for a class action, are not evidence in
the case, and do not influence our decision; we examine an amicus curiae
brief solely for whatever aid it provides in analyzing the legal questions before us.
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have infringed their copyrights and that Sony should be held
responsible for that infringement.·

III
The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable
for infringment committed by another. In contrast, the Patent Act expressly brands anyone who "actively induces
infringment of a patent" as an infringer, 35 U. S. C. § 271(b),
and further imposes liability on certain individuals labeled
"contributory" infringers, id., §271(c). The absence of such
express language in the copyright statute does not preclude
the imposition of liability for copyright infringments on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity.t7 For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually
all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another.
Such circumstances were plainly present in Kalem Co. v.
Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55 (1911), the copyright decision
of this Court on which respondents place their principal reliance. In Kalem, the Court held that the producer of an un17
As the District Court correctly observed, however, "the lines between
direct infringement, contributory infringment, and vicarious liability are
not clearly drawn .... " 480 F. Supp. 457-458. The lack of clarity in this
area may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an infringer is not merely
one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but
also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright owner.
We note the parties' statements that the questions of petitioners' liability under the "doctrines" of "direct infringement" and "vicarious liability''
are not nominally before this Court. Compare Respondents' Brief, at 9, n.
22, 41, n. 90 with Petitioners' Reply Brief, at 1, n. 2. We also observe,
however, that reasoned analysis of respondents' unprecedented contributory infringement claim necessarily entails consideration of arguments and
case law which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed
the parties to a large extent rely upon such arguments and authority in
support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory
infringement.
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authorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book Ben
Hur was liable for his sale of' the motion picture to jobbers,

who in turn arranged for the commercial exhibition of the
film. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained:
"The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the one for which
especially they were made. If the defendant did not
contribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so
except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on
principles recognized in every part of the law." 222
U.S., at 63.
The use for which the item sold in Kalem had been "especially'' made was, of course, to display the performance that
had already been recorded upon it. The producer had personally appropriated the copyright owner's protected work
and, as the owner of the tangible medium of expression upon
which the protected work was recorded, authorized that use
by his sale of the film to jobbers. But that use of the film
was not his to authorize: the copyright owner possessed the
exclusive right to authorize public performances of his work.
Further, the producer personally advertised the unauthorized public performances, dispelling any possible doubt
as to the use of the film which he had authorized.
Respondents argue that Kalem stands for the proposition
that supplying the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity and encouraging that activity through adverstisement are
sufficient to establish liability for copyright infringement.
This argument rests on a gross generalization that cannot
withstand scrutiny. The producer in Kalem did not merely
provide the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity; the
producer supplied the work itself, albeit in a new medium of
expression. Petitioners in the instant case do not supply
Betamax consumers with respondents' works; respondents
do. Petitioners supply a piece of equipment that is generally
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capable of copying the entire range of programs that may be
televised: those that are uncopyrighted, those that are copyrighted but may be copied without objection from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright holder would prefer not to have copied. The Betamax can be used to make
authorized or unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, but
the range of its potential use is much broader than the particular infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem.
Kalem does not support respondents' novel theory of
liability.
Justice Holmes stated that the producer had "contributed"
to the infringement of the copyright, and the label "contributory infringement" has been applied in a number of lower
court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship between the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at
the time the infringing conduct occurred. In such cases, as
in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liablity
is manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and
had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner. 18 This case, however, plainly does not fall in
18
The so-called "dance hall cases," Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554 F. 2d 1213 (CAl 1977)
(racetrack retained infringer to supply music to paying customers); KECA
MUSIC , Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977)
(cocktail lounge hired musicians to supply music to paying customers);
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F . 2d 354 (CA7
1929) (dance hall hired orchestra to supply music to paying customers) are
often contrasted with the so-called landlord-tenant cases, in which landlords who leased premises to a direct infringer for a fixed rental and did not
participate directly in any infringing activity were found not to be liable for
contributory infringement. E. g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F. 2d 686 (CA2
1938).
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F . 2d 304 (CA2
1963) the owner of twenty-three chain stores retained the direct infringer
to run its record departments. The relationship was structured as a licensing arrangement, so that the defendant bore none of the business risk
of running the department. Instead, it received 10% or 12% of the direct
infringer's gross receipts. The Court of Appeals concluded:
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that category. The only contact between Sony and the users
of the Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at
the moment of sale. The District Court expressly found that
"no employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct contact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted
works off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460. And it further
found that "there was no evidence that any of the copies
made by Griffiths or the other individual witnesses in this
suit were influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] advertise,...
"'1
ments." Ibid.
~ -t-~ " " •
"':l>e\<...\.~

*

"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the employer-employee model, than to the landlord-tenant model. On the particular facts before us, ... Green's relationship to its infringing licensee, as
well as its strong concern for the financial success of the phonograph record
concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 'bootleg'
records.
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully
the conduct of its concessionaire; our judgment will simply encourage it to
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively ex-1
ercised." I d., at 308 (emphasis in original).
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,
443 F . 2d 1159 (CA2 1971), the direct infringers retained the contributory
infringer to manage their performances. The contributory infringer
would contact each direct infringer, obtain the titles of the musical compositions to be performed, print the programs, and then sell the programs to
its own local organizations for distribution at the time of the direct infringement. Id., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the contributory infringer had actual knowledge that the artists it was managing were
performing copyrighted works, was in a position to police the infringing
conduct of the artists, and derived substantial benefit from the actions of
the primary infringers. Id., at 1163.
In Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc . v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc ., 256 F.
Supp. 399 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), the direct infringer manufactured and sold
bootleg records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the District
Court held that the infringer's advertising agency, the radio stations that
advertised the infringer's works, and the service agency that boxed and
mailed the infringing goods could all be held liable, if at trial it could be
demonstrated that they knew or should have known that they were dealing
in illegal goods.

,

Q _

' l
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If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this
case, it must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment
with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory.
The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship
between patent law and copyright law. 19
In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly defined by statute. w The prohibition against contributory in19
E. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106, 131 (1932); Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Grigg, 33 U. S. 591, 657-658 (1834). The two areas of
the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution
which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one
area to the other. See generally, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 217-218
(1954); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345 (1908).
00
35 U. S. C. § 271 provides:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement."
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fringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component especially made for use in connection with a particular patent.
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may
object to the sale of a product that might be used in connection with other patents. Moreover, the Act expressly provides that the sale of a "staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not
contributory infringement.
When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated
entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by
the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated. A
finding of contributory infringement does not, of course, remove the article from the market altogether; it does, however, give the patentee effective control over the sale of that
item. Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is normally the functional equivalent of holding that the disputed
article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee. 21
For that reason, in contributory infringement cases arising
under the patent laws the Court has always recognized the
critical importance of not allowing the patentee to extend his
monopoly beyond the limits of his specific grant. These
cases deny the patentee any right to control the distribution
of unpatented articles unless they are "unsuited for any commercial noninfringing use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm
& Hass Co., 448 U. S. 176, 198 (1980). Unless a commodity
"has no use except through practice of the patented method,"
21
It seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon
all copyright owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this
case, the exclusive right to distribute VTR's simply because they may be
used to infringe copyrights. That, however, is the logical implication of
their claim. The request for an injunction below indicates that respondents
seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband. Their suggestion in this
Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory
license would be an acceptable remedy merely indicates that respondents,
for their part, would be willing to license their claimed monopoly interest in
VTR's to petitioners in return for a royalty.
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ibid, the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution
constitutes contributory infringment. "To form the basis for
contributory infringement the item must almost be uniquely
suited as a component of the patented invention." P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals§ 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale
of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also
adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the
seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the
wheels of commerce." Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1,
48 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517
(1917).
We recognize there are substantial differences between the
patent and copyright laws. But in both areas the contributory infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition
that adequate protection of a monopoly may require the
courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the products or activities that make such duplication
possible. The staple article of commerce doctrine must
strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage
in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly,
the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.
IV
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that question, we need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the district court a significant number of them would be non-infring-
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ing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not
give precise content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so
both (A) because respondents have no right to prevent other
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and
(B) because the District Court's factual findings reveal that
even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents'
programs is legitimate fair use.
A. Authorized Time Shifting
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television programming their combined market share is small. The exact percentage is not specified, but it is well below 10%. 22 If they
were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would have a
significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of
the remaining 90% of the programming in the Nation. No
doubt, many other producers share respondents' concern
about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying.
Nevertheless the findings of the District Court make it clear
that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing audience and
that many producers are willing to allow private time-shifting
to continue, at least for an experimental time period. 23
The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial consisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syndicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on commercial television stations was under 5%. See Tr. 532-533, 549-550.
23
The District Court did not make any explicit findings with regard to
how much broadcasting is wholly uncopyrighted. The record does include
testimony that at least one movie-My Man Godfrey-falls within that category, Tr. 2300-2301, and certain broadcasts produced by the federal government are also uncopyrighted. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. Cf. Schappner
v. Foley, 667 F . 2d 102 (CADC 1981) (explaining distinction between work
produced by the government and work commissioned by the government).
To the extent such broadcasting is now significant, it further bolsters our
conclusion. Moreover, since copyright protection is not perpetual, the
22
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The District Court found:
"Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of
copyrighted material constituted infringement, the Betamax could still legally be used to record noncopyrighted
material or material whose owners consented to the
copying. An injunction would deprive the public of the
ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing off-theair recording.
"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, religious, educational and other programming. This included testimony from representatives of the Offices of
the Commissioners of the National Football, Basketball,
Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the Executive Director of National Religious Broadcasters and
various educational communications agencies. Plaintiffs
attack the weight of the testimony offered and also contend that an injunction is warranted because infringing
uses outweigh noninfringing uses."
''Whatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use recording might be, an injunction which
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
Although the District Court made these statements in the
context of considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the
statements constitute a finding that the evidence concerning
"sports, religious, educational, and other programming" was
sufficient to establish a significant quantity of broadcasting
whose copying is now authorized, and a significant potential
for future authorized copying. That finding is amply supported by the record. In addition to the religious and sports
number of audiovisual works in the public domain necessarily increases
each year.
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officials identified explicitly by the District Court, 24 two items
in the record deserve specific mention.
First is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station manager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles
affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He explained and authenticated the station's published guide to its
programs. 25 For each program, the guide tells whether unlimited home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized
subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure within seven
days), or home taping is not authorized at all. The Spring
1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs. Sixty-two
of those programs or 58% authorize some home taping.
Twenty-one of them or almost 20% authorize unrestricted
home taping. 26
Second is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the
corporation that produces and owns the copyright on Mr.
Rogers' Neighborhood. The program is carried by more
public television stations than any other program. Its audience numbers over 3,000,000 families a day. He testified
that he had absolutely no objection to home taping for noncommercial use and expressed the opinion that it is a real
service to families to be able to record children's programs
and to show them at appropriate times. 27
24
See Tr. 2447-2450 (Alexander Hadden, Major League Baseball); Tr.
2480, 2486-2487 (Jay Moyer, National Football League); Tr. 2515-2516
(David Stern, National Basketball Association); Tr. 2530-2534 (Gilbert
Stein, National Hockey League); Tr. 254~2552 (Thomas Hansen, National
Collegiate Athletic Association); Tr. 2565-2572 (Benjamin Armstrong, National Religious Broadcasters). Those officials were authorized to be the
official spokespersons for their respective institutions in this litigation.
Tr. 2432, 2479, 2509-2510, 2530, 2538, 2563. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
30(b)(6).
25
Tr. 28~2902; Def. Exh. PI.
26
See also Tr. 283~2844 (similar testimony by executive director of New
Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority). Cf. Tr. 2592-2605 (testimony by
chief of New York Education Department's Bureau of Mass Communications approving home taping for educational purposes).
27
"Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
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If there are millions of owners ofVTR's who make copies of
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible should not be stifled simply because the equipment is
used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions
of respondents' works. The respondents do not represent a
class composed of all copyright holders. Yet a finding of contributory infringement would inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of their audience
that is available only through time-shifting.
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders may welcome the practice of time-shifting does not mean that respondents should be deemed to have granted a license to copy
their programs. Third party conduct would be wholly irrelevant in an action for direct infringement of respondents'
copyrights. But in an action for contributory infringement
against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder
may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his
programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the outcome. In this case, the record
makes it perfectly clear that there are many important producers of national and local television programs who find
nothing objectionable about the enlargement in the size of the
'Neighborhood' at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all
of this new technology that allows people to tape the 'Neighborhood' offthe-air, and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's what I
produce, that they then become much more active in the programming of
their family's television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being
programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always
been 'You are an important person just the way you are. You can make
healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life,
in a healthy way, is important.'' T. R. 2920-2921. See also Def. Exh. PI,
p. 85.
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television audience that results from the practice of timeshifting for private home use. 28 The seller of the equipment
that expands those producers' audiences cannot be a contributory infringer if, as is true in this case, it has had nodirect involvement with any infringing activity.
B. Unauthorized Time-Shifting
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not necessarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not
an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 154-155.
Moreover, the definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of the
It may be rare for large numbers of copyright owners to authorize
duplication of their works without demanding a fee from the copier. In
the context of public broadcasting, however, the user of the copyrighted
work is not required to pay a fee for access to the underlying work. The
traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon the television medium-eommercially sponsored free public broadcast over the public airwaves-is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the
value of displaying the works will be received in the form of advertising
revenues.
In the context of television programming, some producers evidently believe that permitting home viewers to make copies of their works off the air
actually enhances the value of their copyrights. Irrespective of their reasons for authorizing the practice, they do so, and in significant enough
numbers to create a substantial market for a non-infringing use of the Sony
VTR's. No one could dispute the legitimacy of that market if the producers had authorized home taping of their programs in exchange for a license
fee paid directly by the home user. The legitimacy of that market is not
compromised simply because these producers have authorized home taping
of their programs without demanding a fee from the home user. The copyright law does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the use of
his works, and as this record clearly demonstrates, the owner of a copyright may well have economic or noneconomic reasons for permitting certain kinds of copying to occur without receiving direct compensation from
the copier. It is not the role of the courts to tell copyright holders the best
way for them to exploit their copyrights: even if respondents' competitors
were ill-advised in authorizing home videotaping, that would not change
the fact that they have created a substantial market for a paradigmatic
non-infringing use of petitioners' product.
28
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present Act is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107
through 118." Those sections describe a variety of uses of
copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright
notwithstanding the provisions of § 106." The most pertinent in this case is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the
doctrine of "fair use." 29
That section identifies various factors 30 that enable a Court
to apply an "equitable rule of reason" analysis to particular
claims of infringement. 31 Although not conclusive, the first
29
The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, did not have a "fair use" provision. Although that Act's compendium of exclusive rights "to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" was broad enough to
encompass virtually all potential interactions with a copyrighted work, the
statute was never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the
statute literally in every situation. When Congress amended the statute
in 1976, it indicated that it "intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House
Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66.
30
Section 107 provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include"(!) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107.
8
' The nature of the section is explained in these comments from the
House Report on the fair use section:
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question
must be decided on its own facts ....
General intention behind the provision
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factor requires that "the commercial or nonprofit character of
an activity" be weighed in ~my fair use decision. 32 If the
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or
profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court's findings plainly establish
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. Moreover, when one
considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual
work, see 17 U. S. C. § 107(2), and that timeshifting merely
enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that
the entire work is reproduced, see id., at § 107(3), does not
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair
use.
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Congress has also directed us to consider "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply.
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis. " H. Rep. No.
94-1476, pp. 6&-66.
32
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered-'the purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this
factor includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as
under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions." H. Rep. No.
94-1476, p. 66.
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work." I d., at§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copying for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to
obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have.
But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not
be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would
merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing
benefit. 33
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market
for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will result.
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood
may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose,
the likelihood must be demonstrated.
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with
regard to home time-shifting. The District Court described
respondents' evidence as follows:
Cf. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958) , reprinted as Study
No. 14 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
86th Cong. , 2d Sess. , p. 30 (1960):
"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm
from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat
lex."
33

81-1687-0PINION
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

31

"Plaintiffs' experts a~mitted at several points in the
trial that the time-shifting without librarying would result in 'not a great deal of harm.' Plaintiffs' greatest
concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of important
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.'
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible
boundaries' are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost
control over his program."' 480 F. Supp., at 467.
Later in its opinion, the District Court observed:
"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of harm hinge on speculation about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a
measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant
level of imprecision involved in the calculations." I d., at
469. 34
There was no need for the District Court to say much about
past harm. "Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual harm to
their copyrights has occurred to date." Id., at 451.
On the question of potential future harm from time-shifting, the District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the
evidence. It rejected respondents' "fear that persons
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be measured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will
decrease," by observing that current measurement technology allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. I d., at
466. 35 It rejected respondents' prediction "that live televiSee also 480 F. Supp., at 451:
"It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs' argument is more complicated
and speculative than was the plaintiff's in Williams & Wilkins. . . . Here,
plaintiffs ask the court to find harm based on many more assumptions ....
As is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, some of these assumptions are
based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that they are to
some extent inconsistent and illogical."
35
"There was testimony at trial, however, that Nielsen Ratings has already developed the ability to measure when a Betamax in a sample home
is recording the program. Thus, the Betamax will be measured as a part
34
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sion or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch
Betamax tapes as an alternative," with the observation that
"[t]here is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption."
Ibid. 36 It rejected respondents' "fear that time-shifting will
reduce audiences for telecast reruns," and concluded instead
that "given current market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 37 And it declared that
respondents' suggestion "that theater or film rental exhiof the live audience. The later diary can augment that measurement with
information about subsequent viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 466.
In a separate section, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion
that the commercial attractiveness of television broadcasts would be diminished because Betamax owners would use the pause button or fast-forward
control to avoid viewing advertisements:
"It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while recording. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward
and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For
most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As defendants' survey showed, 92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and
only 25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers will have
to make the same kinds of judgments they do now about whether persons
viewing televised programs actually watch the advertisements which interrupt them." Id., at 468.
"""Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies when they would
otherwise be watching television or going to the movie theater. There is
no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax
owners will play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish
to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey does not
show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on television viewing or
theater attendance." Ibid.
37
"The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept.
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original televised material and that the more people there are in this original audience,
the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices,
including the success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, the
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs
can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There is no survey
within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is comprised of persons who have not seen the program. In any event, if ratings
can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given
market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid.
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bition of a program will suffer because of time-shift recording
of that program" "lacks merit." 480 F. Supp., at 467. 38
After completing that review, the District Court restated
its overall conclusion several times, in several different ways.
"Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal." Ibid. "The audience benefits from the time-shifting
capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more persons to view their broadcasts." Ibid. "No likelihood of
harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there
had been no actual harm to date." I d., at 468-469. "Testimony at trial suggested that Betamax may require adjustments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even a
likelihood of harm." I d., at 469. "Television production by
plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has ever been, and,
in five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial picture." Ibid.
The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact
that to the extent time-shifting expands public access to
freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal benefits. Earlier this year, in Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried,-- U.S.--,-----, n.
12 (1983), we acknowledged the public interest in making
television broadcasting more available. Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But it supports an interpretation of
88
"This suggestion lacks merit. By definition, time-shift recording entails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape when
the later theater run begins. Of course, plaintiffs may fear that the
Betamax will keep the tapes long enough to satisfy all their interest in the
program and will, therefore, not patronize later theater exhibitions. To
the extent this practice involves librarying, it is addressed in section V. C. ,
infra. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the
public interest in later theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures will be reduced any more by Betamax recording than it already is by the television
broadcast of the film." 480 F. Supp., at 467.
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the concept of "fair use" that requires the copyright holder to
demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may condemn
a private act of time-shifting ·as a violation of federal law.
When these factors are all weighed in the "equitable rule of
reason" balance, we must conclude that this record amply
supports the District Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use. In light of the findings of the District Court
regarding the state of the empirical data, it is clear that the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the statute as presently written bars such conduct. 39
The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in any "equitable rule of reason" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be
"productive." It therefore concluded that copying a television program
merely to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that
he would otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could
never be fair use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous.
Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a sensitive balancing of interests. The distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be
wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor
certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting
a poker game, the question is not simply two-dimensional. For one thing,
it is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern material with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well
have a broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for commercial harm. Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to
fair use than copying a motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are
fungible. Copying for commercial gain has a much weaker claim to fair
use than copying for personal enrichment. But the notion of social "productivity" cannot be a complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who
copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher
who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his
specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the sake of broadening her understanding of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies
a news program to help make a decision on how to vote.
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind person is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to entertain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no
39
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In summary, the record and findings of the District Court
lead us to two conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television
would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by
private viewers. And second, respondents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of,
their copyrighted works. The Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Sony's sale of such
equipment to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondent's copyrights.

v
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the
power to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972).
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that
the elected representatives of the millions of people who
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible.
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this
new technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that
have not yet been written. Applying the copyright statute,
as it now reads, to the facts as they have been developed in
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statutory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the economic consequences of copying.
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this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1687

SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. UNIVERSAL CITY
STUDIOS, INC., ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

Memorandum of JUSTICE STEVENS.
Petitioners (Sony) have manufactured and sold several million home video tape recorders to members of the general
public in recent years. Respondents are owners of copyrighted motion picture films and television programs. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
Sony guilty of the nonstatutory tort of contributory infringement, and it ordered the District Court to fashion appropriate relief: an injunction against the further sale of the equipment, an award of damages, or a continuing royalty pursuant
to "a judicially created compulsory license." 659 F. 2d 963,
976, n. 18 (1981).
The Court of Appeals' holding raises at least three questions of copyright law that this Court has never previously
confronted: (1) whether the act of making a single copy of
copyrighted work for a private, noncommercial use ever constitutes copyright infringement; (2) whether the manufacturer of copying equipment may be held liable for contributory infringement for advertising and selling the equipment
to the general public; and (3) whether a judicially imposed
continuing royalty is a permissible form of relief for contributory infringment.
We granted certiorari to address these important ques-
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tions. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982). Because certain ultimate
facts found by the District Court are dispositive of the contributory infringement issue, we need decide only that question. In brief, the critical facts are these: the principal use of
the video tape recorder is to enable its owner to view a program he would otherwise miss; this practice, known as "timeshifting," enlarges the television viewing audience. For that
reason, a significant number of producers of television programs have no objection to the copying of their programs for
private home viewing. For the same reason, even the two
respondents in this case, who do object to time shifting, were
unable to prove that the practice has caused them any actual
harm or creates any likelihood of future harm.
Thus, for two independent and sufficient reasons the sale
of VTR's to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondents' copyrights. First, respondents have no right to object to the use ofVTR's to make
legitimate copies of programs produced by others, or to interfere with the sale of equipment that makes such copying possible. Second, since there is an admitted public interest in
increasing access to ·television programming, and since the
practice of time-shifting for private home use involves neither a commercial exploitation of respondents' copyrights nor
any diminution in the value of the monopolies granted to
them, it is a non-infringing fair use of copyrighted programs.
The sale of equipment that is primarily used for that purpose
is plainly not contributory infringement. 1
1
The questions of direct infringement are relevant only to the extent
they bear on the question of contributory infringement. For respondents
have disavowed the existence of any genuine controversy with the individual user of the Betamax. In a press release issued by one of the respondents after its victory in the Court of Appeals in this case, it stated, in part:
"Millions of families in the United States and around the world are now
involved in videotaping programming in their own homes for their own private use. We have no intention, in this or any other litigation, of pursuing
individuals to interfere with this practice.

[Footnote 1 is continued on p. 3]
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Although the two grounds of decision are relatively
straightforward, the importance of the case makes it appropriate to set forth the facts and the relevant legal history in
some detail.
I
Sony manufactures the Betamax video tape recorder
(VTR), a piece of equipment having three components: (1) a
tuner, which receives electromagnetic signals transmitted
over the airwaves and separates them into audio and visual
signals; (2) a recorder, which records such signals on magnetic tapes; and (3) an adapter, which converts the audio and
visual signals on the tape back into a composite signal that
can be received by a television set. At the time of trial, the
Betamax was marketed in four models, at retail prices ranging from about $875 to $1,000. Sony also sold tapes of various sizes, the longest being a three-hour tape that sold for
about $21.00. Tapes may be reused, and programs that
have been recorded on tape may be erased either before or
after viewing. The Betamax can be used with different
kinds of television sets and is capable of recording one show
while the set is off, or is tuned to another show. Thus, for
example, a viewer could see two simultaneous news telecasts
by watching one and recording the second for later viewing.
The Betamax is equipped with three devices that affect its
utility-a timer, a pause button, and a fast-forward control.
The timer can activiate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined times and thus makes it possible to record programs that are broadcast when the owner is not at home.
''We -first initiated this case in 1976, more than five years ago, when
there were relatively few tape recorders in homes. Since that time we
have come to realize that the interests of all concerned can be better accommodated by passage of new laws." Excerpt from statement by E.
Cardon Walker, Chairman of Walt Disney Productions, on November 2,
1981, quoted in App. to Br. for Petitioners, p. 2.
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The pause button allows the owner to deactivate the recorder
temporarily; thus, if he is watching a program while the machine is recording, he may omit a commercial advertisement
by depressing the pause button. The fast-forward control
enables the viewer of a recorded program to run the tape rapidly when a segment he does not desire to see is on the
screen.
The trial of the case in the District Court concerned only
the private, home use of VTR's. 2 See 480 F. Supp. 429,
432-433 (1979). No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to
other persons, the use of tapes for public performances, or
the copying of programs broadcast on cable television systems was raised. All of the evidence related to programs
that had been broadcast to the public at large.
Both plaintiffs and defendants conducted surveys of the
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred own2

The District Court explained:
" 'Home-use' recording as used in this opinion is the operation of the
Betamax in a private home to record a program for subsequent home viewing. The programs involved in this lawsuit are broadcast free to the public
over public airwaves. The court heard extensive testimony from defendant William Griffiths and four non-defendant individuals about this activity, and the court's declaration of non-infringement is limited to this home
use-situation.
"It is important to note the limits of this holding. Neither pay nor cable
television stations are plaintiffs in this suit and no defendant recorded the
signals from either. The court is not ruling on tape swapping, organized
or informal. The court is not ruling on tape duplication within the home or
outside, by individuals, groups or corporations. Nor is the court ruling on
off-the-air recording for use outside the home. e. g., by teachers for classrooms, corporations for employees, etc. No defendant engaged in any of
these activities and the facts necessary to determine their legality are not
before this court.
"The ramifications of this new technology are greater than the boundaries of this lawsuit. A court reviewing the limited claims of specified parties in a particular factual setting cannot and should not undertake the role
of a government commission or legislative body exploring and evaluating
all the uses and consequences of the videotape recorder." 480 F. Supp., at
442.
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ers during a sample period in 1978. Although there were
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the
primary use of the machine for most owners was for "timeshifting," i. e., to record programs they otherwise would
have missed. Both surveys also showed, however, that a
substantial number of interviewees had accumulated libraries
of cassettes. 3 Defendants' survey indicated that over 80
percent of the interviewees watched the same amount or
more regular television as they had before owning a Betamax. 4 Plaintiffs offered no evidence of decreased television
viewing by Betamax owners. 5
3
The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys
as follows:
"Plaintiffs' survey found that the average number of cassettes owned by
the interviewees was 31. 73. 63.9% of plaintiffs' interviewees had less than
five cassettes with movies on them and 81.1% had less than five cassettes
with television programs on them. Defendants' interviewees reported an
average of 25.21 cassettes with material recorded off-the-air.
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their machines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. Defendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine to record programs they otherwise would have missed.
''When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their library, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further
viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 438.
• "81. 9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2%
reported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480
F. Supp., at 439.
5
As evidence of how a VTR may be used, plaintiffs offered the testimony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual defendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summarized his testimony as follows:
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax,
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase)
but also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however,
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing
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Defendants introduced considerable evidence describing
television programs that could be copied without objection
from any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports,
religious, and educational programming. For example, their
survey indicated that 7.3 percent of all Betamax use is to
record sports events, see Def. Exh. OT, Table 20, and representatives of professional baseball, football, basketball, and
hockey testified that they had no objection to the recording of
their televised events for home use. 6
Each of the plaintiffs proved that it owns a large inventory
of copyrighted programs and motion pictures. They also
proved that even after a motion picture has been exhibited in
the theater market and over network television, the commercial value of the copyright is not exhausted because many
programs are later televised over local stations, or sold or
rented to the public on prerecorded cassettes or discs. Finally, plaintiffs offered opinion evidence concerning the future impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commercial value of their copyrights. The District Court found,
however, that they had failed to prove any likelihood of future harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting. I d., at
469.

The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was
them.
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept.
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Earhart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any
Universal film in his library.
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy debate.'' 480 F. Supp., at 436-437.
Four other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity.
6
See Tr. 2447-2450, 2480, 248&-2487, 251~2516, 2530-2534.
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a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material
was broadcast free to the public at large, the noncommercial
character of the use, and the private character of the activity
conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest
in increasing access to television programming, an interest
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through the
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 7 480
F. Supp., at 454. Even when an entire copyrighted work
was recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair
use "because there is no accompanying reduction in the market for 'plaintiff's original work."' Ibid.
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a contributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was considered infringement. The District Court noted that Sony had
no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who recorded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement,
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement:
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the
United States copyright laws." Id., at 436.
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive
lmowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine
would be used to record copyrighted programs, but found
480 F. Supp., at 454. The court also found that this "access is not just
a matter of convenience, as plainitffs have suggested. Access has been
limited not simply by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access
to the better program has also been limited by the competitive practice of
counterprogramming." Ibid.
7
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that Sony merely sold a "product capable of a variety of
uses, some of them allegedly infringing." ld., at 461. It
reasoned:
"Selling a staple article of commerce-e. g., a typewriter, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machinetechnically contributes to any infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial management.
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers
of staple items were held liable as contributory infringers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some purchasers on some occasions would use their product for a
purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of first
impression, to be an infringement." Ibid.
Finally, the District Court discussed the plaintiffs' prayer
for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an injunction either preventing the future sale of Betamax machines,
or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable of recording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated that
it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument enabling the
infringement were sued by the copyright holders," and that
the request for relief in this case ''is unique." 480 F. Supp.,
at 465.
It concluded that an injunction was wholly inappropriate
because any possible harm was outweighed by the fact that
"the Betamax could still legally be used to record
noncopyrighted material or material whose owners consented
to the copying. An injunction would deprive the public of
the ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing off-theair recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It did not set aside any of
the District Court's findings of fact. It concluded as a mat-

I
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ter of law that the home use of a VTR was not a fair use because it was not a "productive use.'' 8 It therefore held that
it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any harm to the potential market for the copyrighted works, but then observed
that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect of mass reproduction made possible by VTR's would tend to diminish
the potential market for respondents' works. 659 F. 2d, at
974.
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Appeals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce
such as a tape recorder or a photocopying machine. It noted
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise copyright problems." !d., at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the primary purpose of reproducing television programming" and
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material.
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use
even if some copyright owners elected not to enforce their
rights.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's reliance on Sony's lack of lmowledge that home use constituted
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defining the remedies for infringement applied also to the nonstatutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his damages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct.
It held that Sony was chargeable with lmowledge of the
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of
copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use"
or ''the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid.
On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the Dis8
''Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is reproduced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case
precludes an application of fair use. " 659 F . 2d, at 971-972.
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trict Court should reconsider its detennination that an injunction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring
to "the analagous photocopying area," suggested that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory license may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976.
II
Dean Warren's foreword to a notable series of lectures on
copyright law provides an equally appropriate background
for our consideration of whether Sony should be deemed a
contributory infringer of respondents' copyrights:
"The protection of property in the products of the mind
has long presented the challenging problem of balancing
several important and competing social interests. Although the number of writers and inventors among us
is small, their contribution to the intellectual and material advancement of society is unique and indispensable.
The importance of that contribution was early recognized in the Constitution, in the grant of power to Congress 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.' (U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8.) It is
significant, perhaps, that 'Authors and Inventors' are
the only callings thus singled out for such special attention, and it is also significant that the need for balancing
the interest of the creator and the interests of society is
emphasized in this constitutional language, which refers
to the creator's 'exclusive Right' to his creation, but recognizes the public interest by restricting the duration of
such rights to 'limited Times.'
"Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the printing press and had its early beginnings
in the British censorship laws. The fortunes of the law
of copyright have always been closely connected with

cover

n~r

+ee-h~t~loj 1e5

1¥ L1t6

(hat
htt5

fr-tlct-ru

M

pa~ t. HftB poitd>
wAr

ot.tl

iS

fhiS

/!lA.ffrafrto..fe.

;P

{,ow-f

will /ILj

1hrs

TS

to

[tJt~.t'rlbufbry tttfr}lljf ·
,vtevt

w(o

t

CtJ ~c ef

(

Corijre7?f~i1af

-

81-1687-MEMORANDUM
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

11

freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the
other. Successive ages have drawn different balances
among the interest of the writer in the control and
exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dissemination of ideas." 9
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to significant changes in technology. Repeatedly,
as such developments have occurred in this country, it has
been the Congress that fashioned the new rules that new
technology made necessary. Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to copyrights in this country is
wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters , 33 U. S. (8 Peters)
591, 661-662 (1834). The remedies for infringement "are
only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889).
The development and marketing of player pianos and perforated rolls of music at the turn of the century gave rise to
litigation raising the question whether the use of such rolls
infringed the copyrights owned by composers and music publishers. The sale of well over a million rolls in 1902 made it
evident that the economic issue was significant. Adopting a
construction of the pre-1909 version of the Copyright Act
that, as Justice Holmes acknowledged, gave to the music
"copyright less scope than its rational significance," the
Court held that the piano rolls were not copies of copyrighted
songs within the meaning of the Act. White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908); id., at 19
(Holmes, J., concurring). Quoting from an English case considering a similar question, the Court noted that the copy• Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967) [hereafter Kaplan].
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right on the sheet music did not involve any .exclusive right
''to the performance in private of the music indicated by such
sheets," id., at 13. The Court assumed that Congress was
aware of the prevailing view, reflected in an international
convention to which the United States was not a party, that
''the manufacture and sale of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the [copyrighted music] are not considered
as constituting musical infringement." Id., at 14-15. It
held that the policy considerations at stake "properly addressed themselves to the legislative, and not to the judicial,
branch of the government." I d., at 18. The following year
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1909.
When the 1909 Act was passed, the Librarian of Congress,
Dr. Herbert Putnam, was following a practice of allowing single copies of copyrighted works to be made at the Library. 10
Even though the 1909 Act might have been construed literally to prescribe the practice, the activity went unchallenged
for decades. The matter did not attract serious attention
until innovations in copying techniques made it relatively
easy to reproduce entire articles or to make multiple copies.
When the National Institute of Health and the National Library of Medicine adopted the practice of photocopying entire
articles from medical journals and supplying them to researchers, litigation did ensue. The courts, however, declined to hold that the development of the new technology
had changed the traditional understanding. Williams and
Wilkins v. United States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affirmed by an equally divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975).
The problem posed by the new technology was resolved by
Congress when it revised the Copyright Act in the following
year. In§ 108 of the 1976 revision, Congress enacted a special statutory exemption for library copying, distinguishing
10
See Library of Congress, Rules and Practice 6 (1913). Dr. Putnam
had been active in the movement that led to the passage of the 1909 Act.
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 213 (1954).
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between the reproduction of multiple copies and the reproduction or distribution of a single copy. .
A similar sequence of events followed the development of
technology that made it possible to retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems. In 1960, United
Artists Television, Inc., the owner of a number of copyrights
on motion pictures, sought to enjoin the operator of a community antenna television system (CATV) from intercepting and
retransmitting signals carrying its copyrighted productions.
The Court held that the CATV operator did not "perform"
the copyrighted works in the "manner envisioned by the Congress that enacted the law in 1909." Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists, 392 U. S. 390, 395 (1968). Although the
Court was sharply divided on the question whether that was
a fair reading of the statutory language, there was complete
agreement on the proposition that Congress was far better
equipped than the Court to fashion a fair resolution of the
problems presented by the sophisticated technological developments that had occurred in recent years. 11
The Fortnightly case was followed by Teleprompter Corp.
v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394, in which the Court considered the
11
"We have been invited by the Solicitor General in an amicus curiae
brief to render a compromise decision in this case that would, it is said,
accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, communications, and antitrust policy. We decline the invitation. That job is for
Congress." [footnotes omitted] 392 U. S., at 401.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas wrote:
"Our major object, I suggest, should be to do as little damage as possible to
traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until the
Congress legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the interested parties face." Id., at 404.
At the end of his opinion, he added:
.
"The task of caring for CATV is one for the Congress. Our ax, being a
rule of law, must cut straight, sharp, and deep; and perhaps this is a situation that calls for the compromise of theory and for the architectural improvisation which only legislation can accomplish." Id., at 408.
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copyright holders' argument that CATV systems diluted the
commercial value of the market for licensed television programs. Recognizing that the retransmissions by CATV systems would augment the size of the potential audience for a
broadcast-much as would the video tape recording of programs for later home viewing-the Court concluded:
"These shifts in current business and commercial relationships, while of significance with respect to the organization and growth of the communications industry,
simply cannot be controlled by means of litigation based
on copyright legislation enacted more than half a century
ago, when neither broadcast television nor CATV was
yet conceived. Detailed regulation of these relationships, and any ultimate resolution of the many sensitive
and important problems in this field, must be left to Congress." ld., at 414.
In due course Congress did enact legislation that regulates
the complex relationships among copyright holders, commercial television stations, and CATV system operators in a comprehensive and detailed way that could not possibly have
been fashioned by a court. 12
This history of deference to Congress when major new
a The statutory provisions themselves, see 17 U. S. C. § 111, are much
too long to quote in full, but their complexity is indicated in the following
paragraph from Judge Markey's opinion in Eastern Microwave , Inc. v.
Doubleday Sports, Inc. , 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982):
"Under the congressionally mandated scheme, television broadcast stations like WOR-TV continue to pay license or royalty fees directly to copyright owners like Doubleday, while CATV systems pay license fees under
their compulsory licenses to the United States Copyright Office in accord
with formulae provided in 17 U. S. C. § 111(d)(2)(B). The fees paid by
CATV systems are distributed to copyright owners like Doubleday by
Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Tribunal), as provided for in 17 U. S. C.
§ 111(d)(5). The Congressional scheme thus provided for compensation
from CATV systems to copyright owners measured by the number of cable
viewers or potential viewers, and placed the responsibility for payment of
that compensation on the CATV systems." (footnotes omitted)
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technology dramatically changes the market for copyrighted
material must inform our judgment in this important respect.
A refusal by this Court to embark on an unprecedented
course of lawmaking will merely allow Congress to fashion
the controlling rules for the future.

III
Whereas most novel problems of copyright law require a
reexamination of the delicate compromise between the copyright owner's commercial interest in the legitimate exploitation of his statutory monopoly and the public interest in access to ideas and information, the contributory infringement
issue presented by this case implicates a third interest that
demands separate recognition: the economic interest in the
manufacture and sale of an article of commerce that is capable of substantial noninfringing contributions to the public
good.
Neither the 1909 Copyright Act nor the 1976 Copyright
Act mentions the doctrine of contributory infringement. 13
From the absence of any explicit discussion, we may infer
that Con ess did not intend any significant chan e in the ·udicially-created doctrine of contributory_in.fri!!geme_nh
e lower courts have generally applied the doctrine to
two categories of persons having a relationship with a direct
infringer at the time of the direct infringement. One group
includes persons who employ the direct infringer to engage in
the activity that proves infringing and who fail to exercise
their power to supervise and control the acts. 14 The other
11

The doctrine is mentioned briefly in the legislative history of the 1976
Act:
"Use of the phrase 'to authorize' [in § 106's list of exclusive rights] is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers.
For example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if he engages in the business of renting it
to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance." 1975 Senate
Report 57; 1976 House Report 61.
14
E. g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and
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includes persons who knowingly participate as agents of the
direct infringer in the infringing enterprise. 1-5 Sony clearly
fits neither of these molds; its only contact with the witnesses
in this case was at the moment of sale. The District Court
Breeding Association, Inc., 554 F. 2d 1213 (CA11977) (racetrack retained
direct infringer to supply music to paying customers); KECA MUSIC, Inc.
v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977)(cocktaillounge
hired musicians to supply music to paying customers); Dreamland Ball
Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. 2d 354 (CA7 1929) (dance hall
hired orchestra to supply music to paying customers).
These cases are often contrasted with the so-called landlord-tenant
cases, in which landlords who leased premises to a direct infringer for a
fixed rental and did not participate directly in any infringing activity were
found not to be liable for contributory infringement. E. g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F. 2d 686 (CA2 1938).
A difficult case was presented in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green
Co., 316 F. 2d 304 (CA2 1963). The owner of twenty-three chain stores
retained the direct infringer to run its record departments. The relationship was structured as a licensing arrangement, so that the defendant bore
none of the business risk of running the department. Instead, it received
10% or 12% of the direct infringer's gross receipts. The Court of Appeals
concluded:
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the employer-employee model, than to the landlord-tenant model. On the particular facts before us, ... Green's relationship to its infringing licensee, as
well as its strong concern for the financial success of the phonograph record
concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 'bootleg'
records.
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully
the conduct of its concessionaire; our judgment will simply encourage it to
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively exercised." Id., at 308 (emphasis in original).
16
E. g., Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,
Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v.
Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S. D. N. Y. 1966).
In Gershwin, the direct infringers retained the contributory infringer to
manage their performances. 443 F. 2d, at 1160. The contributory infringer would contact each direct infringer, obtains the titles of the musical
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expressly found that "no employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI
had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing
activity or direct contact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted works off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460.
And it further found that "there was no evidence that any of
the copies made by Griffiths or the other individual witnesses
in this suit were influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] advertisements." Ibid.
The only case in which this Court has held anyone liable for
contributory infringement was Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,
222 U. S. 55 (1911). In that case the holder of the copyright
in the book Ben Hur sued Kalem, the producer and distributor of an unauthorized film dramatization of the book. The
Court upheld a finding that the public exhibition of the film
by Kalem's customers was a direct infringement of copyright,
and that the sale of the plagarized film was a contributory infringement. Speaking through Justice Holmes, the Court
explained:
"But again it is said that the defendant did not produce
the representations, but merely sold the films to jobbers,
and on that ground ought not to be held. In some cases
where an ordinary article of commerce is sold nice quescompositions to be performed, print the programs, and then sells the programs to its own local organizations for distribution at the time of the direct infringement. ld., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized that
the contributory infringer had actual lmowledge that the artists it was
managing were performing copyrighted works, was in a position to police
the infringing conduct of the artists, and derived substantial benefit from
the actions of the primary infringers. !d., at 1163.
In Screen-Gems, the direct infringer manufactured and sold bootleg
records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the District Court
held that the infringer's advertising agency, the radio stations that advertised the infringer's works, and the service agency that boxed and mailed
the infringing goods could all be held liable, if at trial it could be demonstrated that they !mew or should have !mown that they were dealing in illegal goods.
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tions may arise as to the point at which the seller becomes an accomplice in a subsequent illegal use by the
buyer. It has been held that mere indifferent supposition or knowledge on the part of the seller that the buyer
of spiritous liquor is contemplating such unlawful use is
not enough to connect him with the possible unlawful
consequences, Graves v. Johnson, 179 Massachusetts,
53, but that if the sale was made with a view to the illegal resale the price could not be recovered. Graves v.
Johnson, 156 Massachusetts, 211. But no such niceties
are involved here. The defendant not only expected but
invoked by advertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the
one for which especially they were made. If the defendant did not contribute to the infringement it is impossible
to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on principles recognized in every part of the law."
222 U. S., at 62-63.
The commodity sold in Kalem was the completed copy of a
particular copyrighted work. The use for which it had been
"especially'' made was the direct infringement of the plaintiff's copyright. In contrast, the Betamax is a piece of equipment that is generally capable of copying any program that
may be televised-those that are uncopyrighted, those that
are copyrighted but which may be copied without any objection from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright
holder would prefer not to have copied. Like a camera, it
may make authorized or unauthorized reproductions, but the
range of its potential use is much broader than the particular
infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem. In
order to consider whether the unlawful use of a Betamax is
sufficiently pervasive to justify excluding it from the market,
it is useful to consider more generally how the balance among
competing values has been struck in the most closely related
area of the law-patent law .

-

.
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The Constitutional predicates for the copyright statute and
the patent statute are one and the same. "To promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts~ by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U. S. Const.,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright is designed to provide authors with a sufficient incentive to stimulate their creative
activity without unnecessarily curtailing the countervailing
public interest in the free exchange of thought. 16 The monopoly privilege does not necessarily encompass all possible
rewards that might logically flow from the grant, 17 particu1
•

"Copyright law wants to give any necessary support and encouragement to the creation and dissemination of fresh signals or messages to stir
human intelligence and sensibilities: it recognizes the importance of these
excitations for the development of individuals and society. Especially is
copyright directed to those kinds of signals which are in their nature 'fragile'-so easy of replication that incentive to produce would be quashed by
the prospect of rampant reproduction by freeloaders. To these signals
copyright affords what I have called 'headstart,' that is, a group of rights
amounting to a qualified monopoly running for a limited time.
"The headstart conferred should be moderate in all its dimensions.
Magnify the headstart and you may conceivably run the risk of attracting
too much of the nation's energy into the copyright-protected sectors of the
economy. But more serious is the danger of hobbling unduly the reception
and enjoyment of the signals by their potential audience, or of clogging the
utilization of the signals by other authors in the creation of further or improved signals for additional audiences." Kaplan 74-75.
17
See, e. g., White·Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U. S., at 19 (Holmes J., concurring). In Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530-531 (1972), we wrote:
"Moreover, we must consider petitioner's claim in light of this Nation's
historical antipathy to monopoly and of repeated congressional efforts to
preserve and foster competition. As this Court recently said without
dissent:
'[I]n rewarding useful invention, the "rights and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded." Kendall
v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 329 (1859). To that end the prerequisites to
obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the patent has issued the limitations of its exercise are equally strictly enforced.'
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larly if the rewards are more fairly attributable to the expansion of the market brought about by technological advances
that are unrelated to an author's creativity.'8 - The public interest in allowing these advances to evolve in a free commercial market is strongly implicated when a copyright owner
seeks to enjoin the distribution of an article of commerce.
<"' In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly defined by statute. 19 The prohibition against contributory inSears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 230 (1964).
"It follows that we should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument
for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere inference from
ambiguous statutory language. We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the
area of public use narrower, than courts had previously thought."
11
"The general problem for the near future is after all a happy one, that
of dealing with a rapidly expanding market for copyrighted works-and it
is not impertinent to remind the contestants that this condition has been
largely brought about by independent scientific invention owing little to
any of the copyrighted factions." Kaplan 110.
1
' 35 U. S. C. § 271 provides:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which
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fringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component especially made for use in connection with a particular patent.
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may
object to the sale of a product that might be used in connection with other patents.
In contributory infringement cases arising under the patent laws the Court has recognized the critical importance of
not allowing the patentee to extend his monopoly beyond the
limits of his specific grant. These cases deny the patentee
any right to control the distribution of unpatented articles
unless they are ''unsuited for any commercial noninfringing
use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448
U. S. 176, 198 (1950). Unless a commodity "has no use except through practice of the patented method," ibid, the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution constitutes
contributory infringment. "To form the basis for contributory infringement the item must almost be uniquely suited as
a component of the patented invention." P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals § 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also adapted
to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a
contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels
of commerce." Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 48
(1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517 (1917).
Although there are substantial differences between the
patent and copyright laws, there is no reason to grant the
copyright holder any broader right to bar noninfringing activities than the patent holder. Indeed, arguably, the copyright holder should have a lesser right, for by precluding
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory

infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement."
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noninfringing uses he may not only block the .wheels of commerce, but also impose an unjustified tax on the free marketplace of ideas. There should be no finding of contributory
infringement for the seller of a staple article of commerce
that is used to infringe, unless the seller directly participates
in, or directly induces, an act of infringement. An article is a
staple article of commerce if it is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, if we apply the patent
law rule, it need merely be capable of significant noninfringing uses.
IV
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that question, we need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the district court a significant number of them would be non-infringing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not
give precise content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: private
cial · e-shiftin.r in the home. It doesso
both because respondents have no right to prevent other
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and
because the district court's factual findings reveal that the respondents failed to prove that even unauthorized home timeshifting is not legitimate fair use. We therefore need not analyze commercial use, public use, or home library-building,
all of which would raise additional complicating issues.
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television programming their combined market share is small. The exact percentage is not specified, but it is well below 10%. 20 If they
:~~~The

record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial con-
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prevail, the outcome of this litigation will have a significant
impact on both the producers and the viewerS of the remaining 90% of the programming in the Nation. No doubt, many
other producers share respondents' concern about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying, but the findings of
the District Court make it perfectly clear that time-shifting
may enlare the total viewing audience and that many producers are perfectly willing to allow private time-shifting to continue, at least for an experimental time period. 21
The District Court found:
"Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of
copyrighted material constituted infringement, the
Betamax could still legally be used to record
noncopyrighted material or material whose owners consented to the coying. An injunction would deprive the
public of the ability to use the Betamax for this
noninfringing off-the-air recording.
"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, religious, educational and other programming. This included testimony from representatives of the Offices of
the Commissioners of the National Football, Basketball,
Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the Exsisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syndicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on commercial television stations was under 5 percent. See Tr. 532-533,
549-550.
21
The district court did not make any explicit findings with regard to how
much broadcasting is wholly uncopyrighted. The record does include testimony that at least one movie-My Man Godfrey-falls within that category, Tr. 2300-2301, and certain broadcasts produced by the federal government are also uncopyrighted. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. Cf. Schappner
v. Foley, 667 F. 2d 102 (CADC 1981) (explaining distinction between work
produced by the government and work commissioned by the government).
To the extent such broadcasting is significant, it further bolsters our
conclusion.

81-1687-MEMORANDUM
24

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

ecutive Director of National Religious Broadcasters and
various educational communications agencies. Plaintiffs
attack the weight of the testimony offered and also contend that an injunction is warranted because infringing
uses outweigh noninfringing uses."
''Whatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use recording might be, an injunction which
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
We interpret these statements as a finding that the evidence offered by the defendant concerning "sports, religious,
educational, and other programming" was sufficient to establish a non-minimal quantity of broadcasting whose copying is
authorized. That finding is amply supported by the record.
In addition to the religious and sports officials identified explicitly by the District Court, 22 two items in the record deserve specific mention.
First is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station manager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles
affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He explained and authenticated the station's published guide to its
programs. Tr. 2863-2902; Def. Exh. Pl. For each program, the guide tells whether unlimited home taping is au21
See Tr; 2447-2450 (Alexander Hadden, Major League Baseball); Tr.
2480, ~2487 (Jay Moyer, National Football League); Tr. 2515-2516
(David Stern, National Basketball Association); Tr. 2530-2534 (Gilbert
Stein, National Hockey League); Tr. 2543-2552 (Thomas Hansen, National
Collegiate Athletic Association); Tr. 2565-2572 (Benjamin Annstrong, National Religious Broadcasters). Those officials were authorized to be the
official spokespersons for their respective institutions in this litigation.
Tr. 2432, 2479, 2509-2510, 2530, 2538, 2563. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
30(b)(6).

."
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thorized, home taping is authorized subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure within seven days), or home taping is
not authorized at all. The Spring 1978 edition of the guide
described 107 programs. Sixty-two of those programs-or
58o/c-authorize some home taping. Twenty-one of themor almost 20%-authorize unrestricted home taping. 23
Second is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the
corporation that produces and owns the copyright in Mr.
Rogers' Neighborhood as well as the show's host. The program is carried by more public television stations than any
other program. Its audience numbers over 3,000,000 families a day. He testified that he had absolutely no objection
to home taping for noncommercial use:
"Some public stations, as well as commercial stations,
program the 'Neighborhood' at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that it's a real service to
families to be able to record such programs and show
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with
the advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the 'Neighborhood' off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's what I
produce, that they then become much more active in the
programming of their family's television life. Very
frankly, I am opposed to people being programmed by
others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always
been 'You are an important person just the way you are.
You can make healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm going on
too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life, in a
healthy way, is important." T. R. 2920-2921. See also
See also Tr. 2833-2844 (similar testimony by executive director of New
Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority). Cf. Tr. 2592-2605 (testimony by
chief of New York Education Department's Bureau of Mass Communications approving home taping for educational purposes) .
21

.r
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Def. Exh. PI, p. 85.
If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible should not be stifled absent proof that the manufacturer
is inducing or participating directly in infringing activity.
The respondents do not represent a class composed of all
copyright holders. Yet a finding of contributory infringement would inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters
in reaching the portion of their audience that is available only
through time-shifting.
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders have no objection to copying that may constitute infringement does not
mean that respondents are judicially deemed to have granted
a license to copy their programs. Third party conduct would
be wholly irrelevant in an action for direct infringement of respondents' copyrights. But in an action for contributory infringement against the seller of copying equipment, _!..plaintiff co i~ prevail nnlesL he s eaks for
Virtually..&! copyright holders with an interest in h outCom
In this case, although others plainly share the respondents' concerns, the record makes it perfectly clear that
there are many important producers of national and local
television programs who find nothing objectionable about the
enlargement in the size of the television audience that results
from the practice of time-shifting for private home use. :u
u In a special staff study for the Federal Communications Commission
made in February 1980, the following conclusion was stated unequivocally:
"Clearly, the principal use of the VCR is for time-shift purposes. Because both major rating services-A.C. Nielsen and Arbitron-now include an indication of VCR use, this time-shift phenomenon should actually
be an asset to the networks and broadcasters. Shows which would have
been missed can now be recorded for later viewing. Because rating serv-
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The seller of the equipment that expands those producers'
audiences cannot be a contributory infringer if, as is true in
this case, it has had no direct involvement with any infringing
activity.

v

Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are under
some circumstances not infringing. An unlicensed use of the
copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with one of
the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S.
151, 154-155. As amended in 1976, the Act grants the
owner of a copyright five specific exclusive rights. 25 Respondents allege that the preparation of a single copy for
time-shifting violates their exclusive right ''to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." § 106(1).
However, the fact the time-shifting involves the temporary
reproduction of a copyrighted work does not resolve the
question whether home time shifting constitutes infringeices are prepared to report such time-shifting, broadcasters should actually
be helped by this consumer convenience. An audience that was previously
unavailable to them is now viewing, and the viewing is properly attributed
in audience reports." Id., at 61~2.
21
Section 106 of the Act provides:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly."
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ment. For the definition of the exclusive rights in § 106 is
prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107 through 118."
Those sections describe a variety of uses of copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright notwithstanding the provisions of § 106." The most pertinent in this case
is § 107, the legislative endorsement of the doctrine of "fair
use." 211
The 1909 Act did not have a "fair use" provision. Moreover, that Act's compendium of exclusive rights-"to print,
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" 'l:T_
was plainly broad enough to encompass virtually all potential
interactions with a copyrighted work. Yet the statute was
never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the
statute literally in every situation.
When Congress
amended the statute in 1976, it indicated that it "intended to
restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House Report
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66. Congress therefore codified § 107 in a form that identifies various factors
that enable a Court to apply a "rule of reason" analysis to
particular claims of infringement. 28
•"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, ibncluding such use by reproductin in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infrigement of copyright.
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factor to be considered shall include"(!) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107.
27
Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075.
111
The essence of the section is captured in these comments from the
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Three different factors lead to the conclusion that, under a
''rule of reason" analysis, the respondents failed to carry
their burden of proving in this case that home _time shifting is
not fair use. Those factors are (A) their complete failure to
show that home time shifting would harm the potential market for, or the value of, any identifiable copyrighted material,
(B) the legislative history tending to show that Congress understood such activity to be fair use, and (C) the profoundly
disturbing policy implications of a finding that home time
shifting is not fair use.
A
House Report on the fair use section:
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question
must be decided on its own facts. . . .
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered'the purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this factor
includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not intended to
be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of
copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as under the present
law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other
factors in fair use decisions. . . .
General intention behind the provision
'The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply.
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H. Rep. No.
94-1476, pp. S{H36,
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The flexible character of the fair use doctrine "precludes
the fonnulation of exact rules." H. Rep. No. 94-1476, pp.
65-66. Nevertheless, in exercising the judgment required
by this "rule of reason," we must be especially responsive to
the language of § 107 identifying factors that Congress believed might be relevant to most fair use analyses. One factor is particularly important: "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."
§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for
creative effort. If a use has no demonstrable effect upon the
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work,
prohibiting such a use would not affect the author's incentive
to create the work in the first place. It would merely inhibit
access to ideas without any countervailing benefit. 29
·
Of course, every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright. But noncommercial
uses are a different matter. Any plaintiff seeking to challenge the noncommercial use of a copyrighted work should,
as a threshold matter, prove either that the particular use is
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would be
more likely than not that some non-minimal damage would
result to the potential market for, or the value of, his particular copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will result.
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the eviCf. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as Study
No. 14 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. , p. 30 (1960):
"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm
from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the partial marriage between
the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex."
21
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dence that some meaningful likelihood of future hann exists.
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood
may be presumed. But if it is for purely private purposes,
the likelihood, it must be demonstrated.
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with
regard to home time-shifting. The District Court described
respondents' evidence as follows:
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the trial
that the time-shifting without librarying would result in
'not a great deal of hann.' Plaintiffs' greatest concern
about time-shiftipg is with 'a point of important philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.' They
fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible boundaries'
are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost control over his
program.'" 480 F. Supp., at 467.
Later in its opinion, the District Court observed:
"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of hann hinge on speculation about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a
measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant
level of imprecision involved in the calculations." I d., at
469. 30
There was no need for the District Court to say much about
past hann. "Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual hann to
their copyrights has occurred to date." Id., at 451.
On the question of potential future harm from time-shifting, the District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the
30

See also 480 F. Supp., at 451:
"It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs' argument is more complicated
and speculative than was the plaintiff's in Williams & Wilkins . ... Here,
plaintiffs ask the court to find harm based on many more assumptions. . . .
As is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, some of these assumptions are
based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that they are to
some extent inconsistent and illogical."
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evidence. It rejected respondents' . "fe~ that persons
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be measured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will
decrease," by observing that current measurement technology allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. I d., at
466. 31 It rejected respondents' prediction "that live television or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch
Betamax tapes as an alternative," with the observation that
"[t]here is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption."
Ibid. 32 It rejected respondents' "fear that time-shifting will
reduce audiences for telecast reruns," and concluded instead
that "given current market practices, this should aid plain51

"There was testimony at trial, however, that Nielsen Ratings has already developed the ability to measure when a Betamax in a sample home
is recording the program. Thus, the Betamax will be measured as a part
of the live audience. The later diary can augment that measurement with
information about subsequent viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 466.
In a separate section, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion
that the commercial attractiveness of television broadcasts would be diminished because Betamax owners would use the pause button or fast-forward
control to avoid viewing advertisements:
"It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while recording. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward
and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For
most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As defendantss' survey showed, 92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and
only 25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers will have
to make the same kinds of judgments they do now about whether persons
viewing televised programs actually watch the advertisements which interrupt them." ld., at 468.
31
"Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies when they would
otherwise be watching television or going to the movie theater. There is
no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax
owners will play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish
to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey does not
show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on television viewing or
theater attendance." Ibid.
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tiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 33 And it declared that
respondents' suggestion "that theater or film rental exhibition of a program will suffer because of time-shift recording
of that program" "lacks merit." 480 F. Supp., at 467. 34
Mter completing that review, the District Court restated
its overall conclusion several times, in several different ways.
"Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal." Ibid. "The audience benefits from the time-shifting
capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more persons to view their broadcasts." Ibid. 36 "No likelihood of
"The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept.
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original televised material and that the more people there are in this original audience,
the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices,
including the success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, the
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs
can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There is no survey
within the lmowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is comprised of persons who have not seen the program. In any event, if ratings
can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given
market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid.
lW "This suggestion lacks merit.
By definition, time-shift recording entails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape when
the later theater run begins. Of course, plaintiffs may fear that the
Betamax will keep the tapes long enough to satisfy all their interest in the
program and will, therefore, not patronize later theater exhibitions. To
the extent this practice involves librarying, it is addressed in section V.C.,
infra. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the
public interest in later theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures will be reduced any more by Betamax recording than it already is by the television
broadcast of the film." 480 F. Supp., at 467.
36
Some of the evidence in support of this conclusion by the District Court
is striking. Julian Goodman, Chairman of the Board of NBC, testified
that in May 1978 he had given a speech to the Federal Communications Bar
Association. After conferring with NBC's corporate planning staff, he explained to his audience:
31

81-1687-MEMORANDUM
34

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there
had been no actual harm to date." 480 F. Supp., at 468-469.
"Testimony at trial suggested that Betamax may require adjustments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even
a likelihood of harm." I d., at 469. "Television production
by plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has ever been,
and, in five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to
suggest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial
picture." Ibid.
B
The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act does not
expressly focus on the question whether use of the Betamax
for home time-shifting is "fair use." That history does, however, contain two clues that strongly support the conclusion
that Congress assumed that such private use was entirely
legitimate.
The first clue came early in the process that constituted the
General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law that resulted in
the Sound Recording Amendments of 1971 and ultimately the
1976 Copyright Act. Under the 1909 Act, there was no provision covering motion pictures. In 1912, the Act was
amended to include them within its scope, but the 1909 Act
was not well suited to deal with them. In 1937, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit had responded by declaring
that the unauthorized projection of a documentary motion
"Because of the amount of television programming now available, and the
fact that few viewers can watch all of the programs they might want to, we
feel that video recording will expand television viewing rather than subtract from it." Tr. 3017; Def. Exh. OT.
And Benjamin Armstrong, executive director of National Religious
Broadcasters, testified that he had surveyed the 25 member religious television stations and they had all favored home taping "because it does give
an opportunity for greater exposure of their programming." Tr. 2571.
Moreover, "in terms of Betamax, or similar devices, it tends to give a
greater impact to the message which is being conveyed or portrayed on the
television program. In this event we feel it's beneficial." Ibid .

...
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picture on a movie screen constituted the making of a "copy''
and was therefore infringing. Patterson v. Century Productions, 93 F. 2d 489 (1937). A study prepared for Congress
by Borge Varmer warned of the dangers of this analysis. It
noted:
"If the Patterson case, which dealt in fact with the public
exhibition, is followed to its logical conclusion, any exhibition of a copyrighted motion picture, whether public or
private, would be an infringement if not authorized by
the copyright owner.
"[C]onjectural to some extent is what the courts would
now do if presented with a case of purely private exhibition, as in a private home or in a library for an individual scholar. While even such an exhibition would seem
to be 'copying' under section 1(a) if the theory of the Patterson decision is carried to its logical conclusion, a court
might hesitate to find an infringement in that situation.
It is conceivable that a court might resort to the doctrine
of 'fair use' to hold such a purely private exhibition not
an infringement." 36
That concern was reflected in the Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright
Law in 1961. He proposed that it be made clear that the exhibition of a motion picture was not the making of a copy, and
instead provided for a limited right of public performance.
He stated:
"Motion picture producers and distributors have urged
that the performance right in motion pictures should extend to what are clearly private performances, including
•varmer, Limitations on Perfonning Rights (1958), reprinted as Study
No. 16 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
86th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 116-117 (1960).
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private perfonnances given in private homes. They
point to Patterson ... to support their position. Motion
picture films are commonly leased for exhibition at specified places and dates. Most leases are for commercial
exhibitions, but many films are also leased for home use.
It is argued that in either case private exhibitions beyond the tenns of the lease should constitute an infringement of copyright.
"This argument may have some theoretical plausibility, but we would question it for several reasons:
"*Injury to a copyright owner from private performances beyond the tenns of a lease would be minimal.
He may be entitled to the usual license fee as damages
for a breach of contract, but the statutory damages for
copyright infringement would be grossly excessive.
"*As a practical matter, unauthorized private performances could rarely be discovered or controlled.
"*New technical devices will probably make it practical
in the future to reproduce televised motion pictures in
the home. We do not believe the private use of such a
reproduction can or should be precluded by copyright."
Register's Report 29-30 (emphasis added).
Congress adopted the Register's recommendation and created a right of public display and perfonnance in motion
pictures. § 106(4), (5). Of course, the Register is not the
Congress, and his views are of only limited significance.
Nevertheless, they surely support the conclusion that home
time shifting is fair use.
The second clue provided in the legislative history came in
the course of the passage of the Sound Recording Amendments of 1971. 85 Stat. 391. The development of the audio
tape recorder made it simple for any individual to make tapes
of copyrighted songs played on the radio. Under prior
Copyright Law, the composer of the song was protected-he
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was entitled to claim a so-called "mechanical royalty'' from
any person who made such a tape in a manner that was not
fair use. But the performer of the song was not protected at
all, even from blatant commercial exploitation of his or her
talent. When the practice known as "record piracy'' became
widespread, the recording industry persuaded Congress to
enact a special statute extending copyright protection to
sound recordings. The House Report revealed the legislative understanding of how the "fair use" doctrine applies to
home taping:
"In approving the creation of a limited copyright in
sound recordings it is the intention of the Committee
that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights
than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from
broadcasts or from tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use and
with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing
commercially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers
would be in no different position from that of the owners
of copyright in recorded musical compositions over the
past 20 years." H. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
7, reprinted in [1971] U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News,
pp. 1566, 1572. 37
31

This subject had been expressly considered during the House Committee hearings. As the District Court noted in this case, Representative
Beister of Pennsylvania engaged in the following dialogue about off-the-air
recording with Ms. Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Register of
Copyrights:
"Mr. Beister. I do not !mow that I can add very much to the questions
which you have been asked so far.
"I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own home.
"My son has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes
a hit, he will retrieve it onto his little set.
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That this was the opinion of the sponsors of the legislation is
confirmed by the following colloquy when the 1971 amendment was being discussed on the floor of the House of
Representatives:
"Mr. Kazen. Am I correct in assuming that the bill
protects copyrighted material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Yes.
"Mr. Kazen. In other words, if your child were to
record off of a program which comes through the air on
the radio or television, and then used it for her own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this would not be
included under the penalties of this bill?
"Mr. Kastenmeier. This is not included in the bill. I
am glad the gentleman raises the point.
"On page 7 of the report, under 'Home Recordings,'
Members will note that under the bill the same practice
which prevails today is called for; namely, this is considered both presently and under the proposed law to be fair
use. The child does not do this for commercial purposes. This is made clear in the report." 117 Cong.
Rec. 34, 748 (1971) (emphasis added). 38
"Now, he may retrieve in addition something else onto his recording, but
nonetheless, he does retrieve the basic sound, and this legislation, of
course, would not point to his activities, would it?
"Miss Ringer. I think the answer is clearly, 'No, it would not.'
"I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this
question is usually asked: 'What about the home recorders?'
"The answer I have given and will give again is that this is something
you cannot control. You simply cannot control it.'' Hearings on S. 646
before the Subcomm. No.3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 22 (June 9 and 10, 1971).
38
Representative Kastenmeier's views of whether the copyright laws
prohibit home taping do not appear to have changed significantly over the
past decade. In hearings held in 1982, after the Court of Appeals' decision
in this case, he engaged in the following colloquy with a representative of
the Nationa! Music Publishers Association:

....

..

\,
'
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The Court of Appeals declared that these statements are
"entirely beside the point" because the Amendments were intended to deal with sound recording, not video recording.
659 F. 2d, at 968. That is an unfortunate overstatement.
For purposes of fair use analysis, the policy questions raised
by home time-shifting of video broadcasts are closely related
to the policy questions raised by home taping of musical performances. Indeed, since it appears that Congress was referring to home librarying of audio tapes in the 1971 legislative history, it would seem that the policies favor a finding of
fair use for home time-shifting of free television broadcasts
are even more compelling. 39
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Thank you, Mr. Baumgarten. Do I take it as your
legal opinion as part of this panel that some 30 or 40 million people in their
homes producing billions of works are now and have been infringing copyright laws?
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes.
"Mr. Kastenmeier. They are all infringers?
"Mr. Baumgarten. Yes.
"Mr. Kastenmeier. Subject in all respects to whatever the law"Mr. Baumgarten. Whatever relief the court considers appropriate. I
think we saw at the ninth circuit that that would be fashioned in an equitable amount.
"Mr. Kastenmeier. There would be a lot of Americans who I think
would be chagrined to learn that thiat is the case." Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administation of Justice
of House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4783 et al., 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. , at 540.
• One statement in the legislative history should be discussed, since it
could be read out of context as suggesting a contrary view. The statement
appears in the Senate Report on the 1976 Act and reads as follows:
"The committee's attention has been directed to the special problems involved in the reception of instructional television programs in remote areas
of the country. In certain areas it is currently impossible to transmit such
programs by any means other than communications satellites. A particular difficulty exists when such transmissions extend over several time
zones within the same state, such as in Alaska. Unless individual schools
in such states may make an off-air recording of such transmissions, the programs may not be received by the students during the school's daily sched-

.-
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If neither the legislative history nor the words of the statute unambiguously tell us whether Congress intended to permit or to prohibit the home use of tape recorders to copy television programs for later viewing, there are important
reasons for not interpreting the silence of Congress as a prohibition. Special constitutional values are implicated whenever the Government seeks to regulate or prohibit conduct
that take place entirely within the privacy of the home. 40 Although there is plainly no constitutional bar to a congressional decision to prohibit home time-shifting, the privacy
values at issue would surely be weighed carefully by Congress before adopting any such prohibition. Any such
weighing process would unquestionably yield a fairly explicit
ule. The committee believes that the making by a school located in such a
remote area of an off-the-air recording of an instructional television transmission for the purpose of a delayed viewing of the program by students
for the same school constitutes a 'fair use.' The committee does not intend
to suggest, however, that off-the-air recording for convenience would under
any circumstances, be considered 'fair use.' To meet the requirement of
temporary use the school may retain the recording for only a limited period
of time after the broadcast." S. Rep. 94-473, pp. 65-66.
A hasty reading of the italicized sentence-especially the phrase ''under
any circumstances"-might suggest that the committee intended to prohibit any time-shifting. But the sentence preceding the italicized one
proves that reading impossible, since it expressly authorizes certain timeshifting for public display. In context, the italicized sentence merely ensures that the preceding sentence not be read too broadly. The Committee wanted to make sure that its approval of one form of time shifting for
public display not be read as suggesting that all time shifting for public display is permissible. No question of public display is presented in this case.
-whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at
the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565-566 (1969).

·"
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statement on the subject-a statement that is strikingly absent from the 1976 legislative history.
That is especially true in the context of a statute that expressly provides that every act of infringement-even if performed in complete good faith-gives rise to a minimum statutory liability of $100. 41 Even if it is assumed that such a
penalty could seldom be collected, we cannot ignore the concern that literally millions of Americans might be branded as
lawbreakers for conduct that seems morally indistinguishable
from simply watching a free public broadcast at the time it is
offered to them. It is highly improbable that Congress so
intended.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that to the extent timeshifting expands public access to freely broadcast television
programs, it yields societal benefits. Earlier this year, in
Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried,
- - U. S. - - , - - - - - , n. 12 (1983), we acknowledged
the public interest in making television broadcasting more
available. Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But
it supports an interpretation of the concept of "fair use" that
requires the copyright holder to demonstrate some likelihood
of harm before he may condemn a private act of time-shifting
as a violation of federal law.
When these factors are all weighed in the "rule of reason"
balance, we must conclude that the respondents have not
demonstrated that home time-shifting is not fair use. In
light of the findings of the District Court regarding the state
of the empirical data, it is clear that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the statute as presently written bars
•• Section 504(c)(2) provides, in part:
"In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in
its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not
less than $100."
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such conduct. 42
VI
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the
41

The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in a sensitive ''rule of reason" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be
''productive. It therefore concluded copying a television program merely
to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that he would
otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could never be fair
use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous.
Fair use analysis calls for a sensitive balancing of interests. The distinction between ''productive" and ''unproductive" uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative. Although
copying to promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a stronger claim to
fair use than copying to avoid interrupting a poker game, the question is
not simply two-dimensional. For one thing, it is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern material with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well have a broader claim to
protection because of the greater potential for commercial harm. Copying
a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a motion picture.
And, of course, not all uses are fungible. Copying for commercial gain
has a much weaker claim to fair use than copying for personal enrichment.
But the notion of social ''productivity'' cannot be a complete answer to this
analysis. A teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the
sake of broadening his understanding of what his constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies a news program to help make his decision
on how to vote.
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind person is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to entertain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statutory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the eco-

--
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power to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is ·permissive, the
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972).
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that
the elected representatives of the millions of people who
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible. We are therefore required in this case to apply
the judicially formulated doctrines of contributory infringement and fair use.
The record and findings of the District Court lead us to two
conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television would not
object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private
viewers. And second, respondents failed to demonstrate
that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of non-minimal
harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. We therefore conclude that the respondents
have failed to demonstrate contributory infringement on the
part of Sony.
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this
new technology, just as it so often has in the past. But it is
not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written.
Applying the copyright statute, as it now reads, to the facts
as they have been developed in this case, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals must be reversed.

nomic consequences of copying.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1687

SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS,
INC., ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1984]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners manufacture and sell home video tape recorders. Respondents own the copyrights on some of the television programs that are broadcast on the public airwaves.
Some members of the general public use video tape recorders
sold by petitioners to record some of these broadcasts, as
well as a large number of other broadcasts. The question
presented is whether the sale of petitioners' copying equipment to the general public violates any of the rights conferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act.
Respondent commenced this copyright infringement action
against petitioners in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California in 1976. Respondents alleged
that some individuals had used Betamax video tape recorders
(VTR's) to record some of respondents' copyrighted works
which had been exhibited on commercially sponsored television and contended that these individuals had thereby
infringed respondents' copyrights. Respondents further
maintained that petitioners were liable for the copyright
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infringment allegedly committed by Betamax consumers because of petitioners' marketing of the Betamax VTR's. 1 Respondents sought no relief against any Betamax consumer.
Instead, they sought money damages and an equitable accounting of profits from petitioners, as well as an injunction
against the manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's.
After a lengthy trial, the District Court denied respondents all the relief they sought and entered judgment for petitioners. 480 F. Supp. 429 (1979). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's
judgment on respondent's copyright claim, holding petitioners liable for contributory infringment and ordering the District Court to fashion appropriate relief. 659 F. 2d 963
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1116 (1982); since
we had not completed our study of the case last Term, we ordered reargument, - - U. S. - - (1983). We now reverse.
An explanation of our rejection of respondents' unprecedented attempt to impose copyright liability upon the distributors of copying equipment requires a quite detailed recitation of the findings of the District Court. In summary, those
findings reveal that the average member of the public uses a
VTR principally to record a program he cannot view as it is
being televised and then to watch it once at a later time.
This practice, known as "time-shifting," enlarges the television viewing audience. For that reason, a significant
amount of television programming may be used in this manner without objection from the owners of the copyrights on
the programs. For the same reason, even the two respondents in this case, who do assert objections to time-shifting in
this litigation, were unable to prove that the practice has impaired the commercial value of their copyrights or has created any likelihood of future harm. Given these findings,
there is no basis in the Copyright Act upon which respond' The respondents also asserted causes of action under state law and
§ 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a).

These claims are not before this Court.
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ents can hold petitioners liable for distributing VTR's to the
general public. The Court of Appeals' holding that respondents are entitled to enjoin the distribution of VTR's, to collect
royalties on the sale of such equipment, or to obtain other relief, if affirmed, would enlarge the scope of respondents' statutory monopolies to encompass control over an article of commerce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such
an expansion of the copyright privilege is beyond the limits of
the grants authorized by Congress.
I
The two respondents in this action, Universal Studios, Inc.
and Walt Disney Productions, produce and hold the copyrights on a substantial number of motion pictures and other
audiovisual works. In the current marketplace, they can
exploit their rights in these works in a number of ways: by
authorizing theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited
showings on cable and network television, by selling syndication rights for repeated airings on local television stations,
and by marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or
videodiscs.
Some works are suitable for exploitation
through all of these avenues, while the market for other
works is more limited.
Petitioner Sony manufactures millions of Betamax video
tape recorders and markets these devices through numerous
retail establishments, some of which are also petitioners in
this action. 2 Sony's Betamax VTR is a mechanism consisting of three basic components: (1) a tuner, which receives
2
The four retailers are Carter, Hawley, Hales, Stores, Inc.; Associated
Dry Goods Corp.; Federated Department Stores, Inc.; and Henry's Camera Corp. The principal defendants are Sony Corporation, the manufacturer of the equipment, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sony Corporation
of America. The advertising agency of Doyle, Dane, Burnbock, Inc., also
involved in marketing the Betamax, is also a petitioner. An individual
VTR user, Willis Griffiths, was named as a defendant in the District Court,
but respondent sought no relief against him. Griffiths is not a petitioner.
For convenience, we shall refer to petitioners collectively as Sony.
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electromagnetic signals transmitted over the television band
of the public airwaves and separates them into audio and visual signals; (2) a recorder, which records such signals on a
magnetic tape; and (3) an adapter, which converts the audio
and visual signals on the tape into a composite signal that can
be received by a television set.
Several capabilities of the machine are noteworthy. The
separate tuner in the Betamax enables it to record a broadcast off one station while the television set is tuned to another
channel, permitting the viewer, for example, to watch two
simultaneous news broadcasts by watching one "live" and recording the other for later viewing. Tapes may be reused,
and programs that have been recorded may be erased either
before or after viewing. A timer in the Betamax can be used
to activate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined
times, enabling an intended viewer to record programs that
are transmitted when he or she is not at home. Thus a person may watch a program at home in the evening even
though it was broadcast while the viewer was at work during
the afternoon. The Betamax is also equipped with a pause
button and a fast-forward control. The pause button, when
depressed, deactivates the recorder until it is released, thus
enabling a viewer to omit a commercial advertisement from
the recording, provided, of course, that the viewer is present
when the program is recorded. The fast forward control enables the viewer of a previously recorded program to run the
tape rapidly when a segment he or she does not desire to see
is being played back on the television screen.
The respondents and Sony both conducted surveys of the
way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred owners during a sample period in 1978. Although there were
some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the
primary use of the machine for most owners was "time-shifting,"-the practice of recording a program to view it once at
a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Time-shifting enables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss be-
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cause they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or
are viewing a program on another station at the time of a
broadcast that they desire to watch. Both surveys also
showed, however, that a substantial number of interviewees
had accumulated libraries of tapes. 3 Sony's survey indicated that over 80% of the interviewees watched at least as
much regular television as they had before owning a
Betamax. 4 Respondents offered no evidence of decreased
As evidence of how a VTR may be used, respondents offered the testimony of William Griffiths. Griffiths, although named as an individual defendant, was a client of plaintiffs' law firm. The District Court summarized his testimony as follows:
"He owns approximately 100 tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax,
he intended not only to time-shift (record, play-back and then erase) but
also to build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however,
proved too expensive, and he is now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing
them.
·
"Griffiths copied about 20 minutes of a Universal motion picture called
'Never Give An Inch,' and two episodes from Universal television series
entitled 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' and 'Holmes and Yo Yo.' He would have
erased each of these but for the request of plaintiffs' counsel that it be kept.
Griffiths also testified that he had copied but already erased Universal
films called 'Alpha Caper' (erased before anyone saw it) and 'Amelia Earhart.' At the time of his deposition Griffiths did not intend to keep any
Universal film in his library.
"Griffiths has also recorded documentaries, news broadcasts, sporting
events and political programs such as a rerun of the Nixon/Kennedy debate." 480 F. Supp., at 436-437.
Four other witnesses testified to having engaged in similar activity.
• The District Court summarized some of the findings in these surveys as
follows:
"According to plaintiffs' survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners use their machines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time. Defendants' survey showed that 96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine to record programs they otherwise would have missed.
"When plaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in their library, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In defendants' survey, of the
total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been
viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further
viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 438.
8
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television viewing by Betamax owners. 5
Sony introduced considerable evidence describing television programs that could be copied without objection from
any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, religious, and educational programming. For example, their
survey indicated that 7.3% of all Betamax use is to record
sports events, and representatives of professional baseball,
football, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no objection to the recording of their televised events for home
use. 6
Respondents offered opinion evidence concerning the future impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commercial value of their copyrights. The District Court found,
however, that they had failed to prove any likelihood of future harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting. !d., at
469.

The District Court's Decision
The lengthy trial of the case in the District Court concerned the private, home use of VTR's for recording programs broadcast on the public airwaves without charge to the
viewer. 7 No issue concerning the transfer of tapes to other
persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for public performances, or the copying of programs transmitted on pay orcable television systems was raised. See 480 F. Supp. 429,
432--433, 442 (1979).
5
"81.9% of the defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or
more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2%
reported their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax." 480
F . Supp. , at 439.
6
See Def. Exh. OT, Table 20; Tr. 2447-2450, 2480, 2486-2487, 2515-2516, 2530-2534.
7
The trial also briefly touched upon demonstrations of the Betamax by
the retailer petitioners which were alleged to be infringments by respondents. The District Court held against respondents on this claim, 480 F.
Supp., at 456-457, the Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, 659 F. 2d, at
976, and respondents did not cross-petition on this issue.
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The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was
a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material
was broadcast free to the public at large, the noncommercial
character of the use, and the private character of the activity
conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court
found that the purpose of this use served the public interest
in increasing access to television programming, an interest
that "is consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through the
public airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102." 480 F.
Supp., at 454. 8 Even when an entire copyrighted work was
recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair use
"because there is no accompanying reduction in the market
for 'plaintiff's original work.~" Ibid.
As an independent ground of decision, the District Court
also concluded that Sony could not be held liable as a contributory infringer even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use. The District Court noted that Sony
had no direct involvement with any Betamax purchasers who
recorded copyrighted works off the air. Sony's advertising
was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement,
but its instruction booklet contained the following statement:
"Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of
such material may be contrary to the provisions of the
United States copyright laws." Id., at 436.
The District Court assumed that Sony had constructive
knowledge of the probability that the Betamax machine
8

The court also found that this "access is not just a matter of convenience, as plaintiffs have suggested. Access has been limited not simply
by inconvenience but by the basic need to work. Access to the better program has also been limited by the competitive practice of counterprogramming." 480 F. Supp., at 454.
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would be used to record copyrighted programs, but found
that Sony merely sold a "product capable of a variety of
uses, some of them allegedly infringing." ld., at 461. It
reasoned:
"Selling a staple article of commerce e. g., a typewriter, a recorder, a camera, a photocopying machine
technically contributes to any infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if
deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand
the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial management.
"Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers of staple items were held liable as contributory infringers whenever they 'constructively' knew that some
purchasers on some occasions would use their product
ior a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of
first impression, to be an infringement." Ibid.
Finally, the District Court discussed the respondents'
prayer for injunctive relief, noting that they had asked for an
injunction either preventing the future sale of Betamax machines, or requiring that the machines be rendered incapable
of recording copyrighted works off the air. The court stated
that it had "found no case in which the manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and advertisors of the instrument enabling the infringement were sued by the copyright holders,"
and that the request for relief in this case "is unique." 480
F. Supp., at 465.
It concluded that an injunction was wholly inappropriate
because any possible harm to respondents was outweighed by
the fact that "the Betamax could still legally be used to
record noncopyrighted material or material whose owners
consented to the copying. An injunction would deprive the
public of the ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing
off-the-air recording." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
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The Court of Appeals' Decision
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment on respondents' copyright claim. It did not set aside
any of the District Court's findings of fact. Rather, it concluded as a matter of law that the home use of a VTR was not
a fair use because it was not a "productive use." 9 It therefore held that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove any
harm to the potential market for the copyrighted works, but
then observed that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect
of mass reproduction made possible by VTR's would tend to
diminish the potential market for respondents' works. 659
F. 2d, at 974.
On the issue of contributory infringement, the Court of Appeals first rejected the analogy to staple articles of commerce
such as tape recorders or photocopying machines. It noted
that such machines "may have substantial benefit for some
purposes" and do not "even remotely raise copyright problems." Id. , at 975. VTR's, however, are sold "for the primary purpose of reproducing television programming" and
"virtually all" such programming is copyrighted material.
Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that
VTR's were not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use
even if some copyright owners elect not to enforce their
rights.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's reliance on Sony's lack of knowledge that home use constituted
infringement. Assuming that the statutory provisions defining the remedies for infringement applied also to the nonstatutory tort of contributory infringement, the court stated
that a defendant's good faith would merely reduce his damages liability but would not excuse the infringing conduct.
It held that Sony was chargeable with knowledge of the
homeowner's infringing activity because the reproduction of
''Without a 'productive use', i. e. when copyrighted material is reproduced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the sort involved in this case
precludes an application of fair use." 659 F. 2d, at 971-972.
9
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copyrighted materials was either "the most conspicuous use"
or "the major use" of the Betamax product. Ibid.
On the matter of relief, the Court of Appeals concluded
that "statutory damages may be appropriate," that the District Court should reconsider its determination that an injunction would not be an appropriate remedy; and, referring
to "the analogous photocopying area," suggested that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory license may very well be an acceptable resolution of the relief
issue. 659 F. 2d, at 976.
II
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that:
"The Congress shall have Power . . . to Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.
"The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127, Chief Justice
Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly granted by Congress, 'The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public
of the products of his creative genius." United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158.
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As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress
that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their
work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly. 10
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to significant changes in technology. 11 Indeed, it
In its report accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in 1909, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives explained this balance:
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in
his writings, ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing
to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.
10

"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions:
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit
the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
11
Thus, for example, the development and marketing of player pianos
and perforated roles of music, see White Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908), preceded the enactment of the Copyright
Act of 1909; innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision of the
Copyright law; the development of the technology that made it possible to
retransmit television programs by cable or by microwave systems, see
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968), and Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974), prompted the enactment of the
complex provisions set forth in 17 U. S. C. § 111 (d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5)
after years of detailed congressional study, see Eastern MicrO'Wave, Inc. v.
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA2 1982).
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was the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the
printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. 12 Repeatedly, as new developments have
occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary.
Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of
1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the protection given to
copyrights is wholly statutory. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S.
(8 Peters) 591, 661--662 (1834). The remedies for infringement "are only those prescribed by Congress." Thompson
v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889).
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance
is a recurring theme. See, e. g., Teleprompter Corp. v.
CBS, 415 U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390 (1968); White-Smith Music Publishing Co.
v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908); Williams and Wilkins v.
United States, 487 F. 2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affirmed by an
equally divided court, 420 U. S. 376 (1975). Sound policy, as
well as history, supports our consistent deference to ConBy enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, 85 Stat. 391,
Congress also provided the solution to the "record piracy'' problems that
had been created by the development of the audio tape recorder. Sony
argues that the legislative history of that Act, see especially H. Rep. No.
487, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7, indicates that Congress did not intend to
prohibit the private home use of either audio or video tape recording equipment. In view of our disposition of the contributory infringement issue,
we express no opinion on that question.
12
"Copyright protection became necessary with the invention of the
printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship laws.
The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected
with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the other. Successive ages
have drawn different balances among the interest of the writer in the control and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related interest of the
publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dissemination of ideas."
Foreword to B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of
Copyright vii-viii (1967).
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gress when major technological innovations alter the market
for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
authority and the institutional ability to accomodate fully the
varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.
In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly
marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the
scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which
never contemplated such a calculus of interests. In doing so,
we are guided by Justice Stewart's exposition of the correct
approach to ambiguities in the law of copyright:
"The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory
monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good. 'The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.'
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127. See Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241-242. When technological change
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright
Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose."
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151,
156 (footnotes omitted).
Copyright protection "subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17
U. S. C. § 102(a). This protection has never accorded the
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his

81-1687-0PINION
SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

14

work.'8 Rather, the Copyright Act grants the copyright
holder "exclusive" rights to use and to authorize the use of his
work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the
copyrighted work in copies. I d., § 106. 14 All reproductions
of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of
the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a "fair use;"
the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to
such a use. Compare id., § 106 with id., § 107.
See, e. g., White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S.
1, 19 (1908); cf. Deep South Packing Co. v. Lathram Corp., 406 U. S. 518,
530-531 (1972). While the law has never recognized an author's right to
absolute control of his work, the natural tendency of legal rights to express
themselves in absolute tenns to the exclusion of all else is particularly pronounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the
copyright and the patent. See e. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 156-158 (1948) (copyright owners claiming right to tie
license of one film to license of another under copyright law); Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106 (1932) (copyright owner claiming copyright
renders it immune from state taxation of copyright royalties); BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 349-351 (1908) (copyright owner
claiming that a right to fix resale price of his works within the scope of his
copyright); International Business Machines v. United States, 298 U. S.
131 (1936) (patentees claiming right to tie sale of unpatented article to lease
of patented device).
1
' Section 106 of the Act provides:
"'Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perfonn
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly."
18
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"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute,
"is an infringer of the copyright." I d., § 501(a). Conversely, anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to
use the copyrighted work in a way specified in the statute or
who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the
copyright with respect to such use.
The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with
a potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his
work, including an injunction to restrain the infringer from
violating his rights, the impoundment and destruction of all
reproductions of his work made in violation of his rights, a
recovery of his actual damages and any additional profits realized by the infringer or a recovery of statutory damages,
and attorneys fees. I d., §§ 502-505. 15
The two respondents in this case do not seek relief against
the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copyrights. Moreover, this is not a class action on behalf of all
copyright owners who license their works for television
broadcast, and respondents have no right to invoke whatever
rights other copyright holders may have to bring infringement actions based on Betamax copying of their works. 16 As
Moreover, anyone who willfully infringes the copyright to reproduce a
motion picture for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain is subject to criminal penalties of one year imprisonment and a $25,000
fine for the first offense and two years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine for
each subsequent offense, 17 U. S. C. § 506(a), and the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime are forfeited upon conviction, id., § 506(b).
16
In this regard, we reject respondent's attempt to cast this action as
comparable to a class action because of the positions taken by amici with
copyright interests and their attempt to treat the statements made by
amici as evidence in this case. See Brief for Respondent, at 1, and n. 1, 6,
52, 53 and n. 116. The stated desires of amici concerning the outcome of
this or any litigation are no substitute for a class action, are not evidence in
the case, and do not influence our decision; we examine an amicus curiae
16
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was made clear by their own evidence, the copying of the respondents' programs represents a small portion of the total
use of VTR's. It is, however, the taping of respondents own
copyrighted programs that provides them with standing to
charge Sony with contributory infringement. To prevail,
they have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax
have infringed their copyrights and that Sony should be held
responsible for that infringement.

III
The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable
for infringment committed by another. In contrast, the Patent Act expressly brands anyone who "actively induces
infringment of a patent" as an infringer, 35 U. S. C. § 271(b),
and further imposes liability on certain individuals labeled
"contributory" infringers, id., §271(c). The absence of such
express language in the copyright statute does not preclude
the imposition of liability for copyright infringments on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. 17 For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually
brief solely for whatever aid it provides in analyzing the legal questions before us.
17
As the District Court correctly observed, however, "the lines between
direct infringement, contributory infringment, and vicarious liability are
not clearly drawn .... " 480 F. Supp. 457-458. The lack of clarity in this
area may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an infringer is not merely
one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but
also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright owner.
We note the parties' statements that the questions of petitioners' liability under the "doctrines" of "direct infringement" and "vicarious liability''
are not nominally before this Court. Compare Respondents' Brief, at 9, n.
22, 41, n. 90 with Petitioners' Reply Brief, at 1, n. 2. We also observe,
however, that reasoned analysis of respondents' unprecedented contributory infringement claim necessarily entails consideration of arguments and
case law which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed
the parties to a large extent rely upon such arguments and authority in
support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory
infringement.
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all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another.
Such circumstances were plainly present in Kalem Co. v.
Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55 (1911), the copyright decision
of this Court on which respondents place their principal reliance. In Kalem, the Court held that the producer of an unauthorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book Ben
Hur was liable for his sale of the motion picture to jobbers,
who in turn arranged for the commercial exhibition of the
film. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained:
"The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the one for which
especially they were made. If the defendant did not
contribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so
except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on
principles recognized in every part of the law." 222
U.S., at 63.
The use for which the item sold in Kalem had been "especially'' made was, of course, to display the performance that
had already been recorded upon it. The producer had personally appropriated the copyright owner's protected work
and, as the owner of the tangible medium of expression upon
which the protected work was recorded, authorized that use
by his sale of the film to jobbers. But that use of the film
was not his to authorize: the copyright owner possessed the
exclusive right to authorize public performances of his work.
Further, the producer personally advertised the unauthorized public performances, dispelling any possible doubt
as to the use of the film which he had authorized.
Respondents argue that Kalem stands for the proposition
that supplying the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity and encouraging that activity through adverstisement are

81-1687-0PINION
18

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

sufficient to establish liability for copyright infringement.
This argument rests on a gross generalization that cannot
withstand scrutiny. The producer in Kalem did not merely
provide the "means" to accomplish an infringing activity; the
producer supplied the work itself, albeit in a new medium of
expression. Petitioners in the instant case do not supply
Betamax consumers with respondents' works; respondents
do. Petitioners supply a piece of equipment that is generally
capable of copying the entire range of programs that may be
televised: those that are uncopyrighted, those that are copyrighted but may be copied without objection from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright holder would prefer not to have copied. The Betamax can be used to make
authorized or unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, but
the range of its potential use is much broader than the particular infringing use of the film Ben Hur involved in Kalem.
Kalem does not support respondents' novel theory of
liability.
Justice Holmes stated that the producer had "contributed"
to the infringement of the copyright, and the label "contributory infringement" has been applied in a number of lower
court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship between the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at
the time the infringing conduct occurred. In such cases, as
in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liablity
is manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and
had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner. 18 This case, however, plainly does not fall in
18
The so-called "dance hall cases," Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554 F . 2d 1213 (CAl 1977)
(racetrack retained infringer to supply music to paying customers); KECA
MUSIC , Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co. , 432 F . Supp. 72 (W. D. Mo. 1977)
(cocktail lounge hired musicians to supply music to paying customers);
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F . 2d 354 (CA7
1929) (dance hall hired orchestra to supply music to paying customers) are
often contrasted with the so-called landlord-tenant cases, in which land-
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that category. The only contact between Sony and the users
of the Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at
the moment of sale. The District Court expressly found that
lords who leased premises to a direct infringer for a fixed rental and did not
participate directly in any infringing activity were found not to be liable for
contributory infringement. E. g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F. 2d 686 (CA2
1938).
In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304 (CA2
1963) the owner of twenty-three chain stores retained the direct infringer
to run its record departments. The relationship was structured as a licensing arrangement, so that the defendant bore none of the business risk
of running the department. Instead, it received 10% or 12% of the direct
infringer's gross receipts. The Court of Appeals concluded:
"[The dance-hall cases] and this one lie closer on the spectrum to the employer-employee model, than to the landlord-tenant model. On the particular facts before us, ... Green's relationship to its infringing licensee, as
well as its strong concern for the financial success of the phonograph record
concession, renders it liable for the unauthorized sales of the 'bootleg'
records.
"[T]he imposition of vicarious liability in the case before us cannot be
deemed unduly harsh or unfair. Green has the power to police carefully
the conduct of its concessionaire; our judgment will simply encourage it to
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively exercised." Id., at 308 (emphasis in original).
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,
443 F. 2d 1159 (CA2 1971), the direct infringers retained the contributory
infringer to manage their performances. The contributory infringer
would contact each direct infringer, obtain the titles of the musical compositions to be performed, print the programs, and then sell the programs to
its own local organizations for distribution at the time of the direct infringement. Id., at 1161. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the contributory infringer had actual knowledge that the artists it was managing were
performing copyrighted works, was in a position to police the infringing
conduct of the artists, and derived substantial benefit from the actions of
the primary infringers. Id., at 1163.
In Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 399 (SDNY 1966), the direct infringer manufactured and sold bootleg records. In denying a motion for summary judgment, the District
Court held that the infringer's advertising agency, the radio stations that
advertised the infringer's works, and the service agency that boxed and
mailed the infringing goods could all be held liable, if at trial it could be
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"no employee of Sony, Sonam or DDBI had either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct contact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyrighted
works off-the-air." 480 F. Supp., at 460. And it further
found that "there was no evidence that any of the copies
made by Griffiths or the other individual witnesses in this
suit were influenced or encouraged by [Sony's] advertisements." Ibid.
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this
case, it must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment
with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory.
The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to
which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship
between patent law and copyright law. 19
demonstrated that they knew or should have known that they were dealing
in illegal goods.
11
E. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 106, 131 (1932); Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Grigg, 33 U. S. 591, 657-658 (1834). The two areas of
the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution
which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one
area to the other. See generally, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 217-218
(1954); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 345 (1908).
We have consistently rejected the proposition that a similar kinship exists between copyright law and trademark law, and in the process of doing
so have recognized the basic similarities between copyrights and patents.
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 91-92 (1879); see also, United Drug
Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 97 (1918)(trademark right "has little or
no analogy'' to copyright or patent); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 254
(1877); Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 322 (1871). Given the fundamental differences between copyright law and trademark law, in this copyright case we do not look to the standard for contributory infringement set
forth in Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U. S. 844, 854-855
(1982), which was crafted for application in trademark cases.
There we
observed that a manufacturer or distributor could be held liable to the
owner of a trademark if it intentionally induced a merchant down the chain
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In the Patent Code both the concept of infringement and
the concept of contributory infringement are expressly defined by statute. 20 The prohibition against contributory infringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component especially made for use in connection with a particular patent.
There is no suggestion in the statute that one patentee may
object to the sale of a product that might be used in connection with other patents. Moreover, the Act expressly proof distribution to pass off its product as that of the trademark owner's or if
it continued to supply a product which could readily be passed off to a particular merchant whom it knew was mislabeling the product with the tradeIf Inwood's narrow standard for contributory
mark owner's mark.
trademark infringement governed here, respondents' claim of contributory
infringement would merit little discussion. Sony certainly does not ''intentionally induce[ ]" its customers to make infringing uses of respondents'
copyrights, nor does it supply its products to identified individuals known
by it to be engaging in continuing infringement of respondents' copyrights,
see id., at 855.
"'35 U. S. C. § 271 provides:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
"(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.
"(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
"(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infrigement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement or contributory infringement."
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vides that the sale of a "staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not
contributory infringement.
When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated
entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by
the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated. A
finding of contributory infringement does not, of course, remove the article from the market altogether; it does, however, give the patentee effective control over the sale of that
item. Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is normally the functional equivalent of holding that the disputed
article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee. 21
For that reason, in contributory infringement cases arising
under the patent laws the Court has always recognized the
critical importance of not allowing the patentee to extend his
monopoly beyond the limits of his specific grant. These
cases deny the patentee any right to control the distribution
of unpatented articles unless they are "unsuited for any commercial noninfringing use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm
& Hass Co., 448 U. S. 176, 198 (1980). Unless a commodity
"has no use except through practice of the patented method,"
ibid, the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution
constitutes contributory infringment. "To form the basis for
contributory infringement the item must almost be uniquely
suited as a component of the patented invention." P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals § 17.02[2] (1982). "[A] sale
21
It seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon
all copyright owners collectively, much less the two respondents in this
case, the exclusive right to distribute VTR's simply because they may be
used to infringe copyrights. That, however, is the logical implication of
their claim. The request for an injunction below indicates that respondents
seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband. Their suggestion in this
Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory
license would be an acceptable remedy merely indicates that respondents,
for their part, would be willing to license their claimed monopoly interest in
VTR's to petitioners in return for a royalty.
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of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also
adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the
seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the
wheels of commerce." Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1,
48 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517
(1917).
We recognize there are substantial differences between the
patent and copyright laws. But in both areas the contributory infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition
that adequate protection of a monopoly may require the
courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the products or activities that make such duplication
possible. The staple article of commerce doctrine must
strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage
in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly,
the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.
IV
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that question, we need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not
they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only
consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the district court a significant number of them would be non-infringing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need not
give precise content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so
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both (A) because respondents have no right to prevent other
copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and
(B) because the District Court's factual findings reveal that
even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents'
programs is legitimate fair use.
A. Authorized Time Shifting
Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable
copyrights, but in the total spectrum of television programming their combined market share is small. The exact percentage is not specified, but it is well below 10%. 22 If they
were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would have a
significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of
the remaining 90% of the programming in the Nation. No
doubt, many other producers share respondents' concern
about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying.
Nevertheless the findings of the District Court make it clear
that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing audience and
that many producers are willing to allow private time-shifting
to continue, at least for an experimental time period. 23
The District Court found:
"Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of
copyrighted material constituted infringement, the Beta22

The record suggests that Disney's programs at the time of trial consisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syndicated series. Universal's percentage in the Los Angeles market on commercial television stations was under 5%. See Tr. 532-533, 549-550.
28
The District Court did not make any explicit findings with regard to
how much broadcasting is wholly uncopyrighted. The record does include
testimony that at least one movie-My Man Godfrey-falls within that category, Tr. 2300-2301, and certain broadcasts produced by the federal government are also uncopyrighted. See 17 U. S. C. § 105. Cf. Schappner
v. Foley, 667 F. 2d 102 (CADC 1981) (explaining distinction between work
produced by the government and work commissioned by the government).
To the extent such broadcasting is now significant, it further bolsters our
conclusion. Moreover, since copyright protection is not perpetual, the
number of audiovisual works in the public domain necessarily increases
each year.
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max could still legally be used to record noncopyrighted
material or material whose owners consented to the
copying. An injunction would deprive the public of the
ability to use the Betamax for this noninfringing off-theair recording.
"Defendants introduced considerable testimony at
trial about the potential for such copying of sports, religious, educational and other programming. This included testimony from representatives of the Offices of
the Commissioners of the National Football, Basketball,
Baseball and Hockey Leagues and Associations, the Executive Director of National Religious Broadcasters and
various educational communications agencies. Plaintiffs
attack the weight of the testimony offered and also contend that an injunction is warranted because infringing
uses outweigh noninfringing uses."
"Whatever the future percentage of legal versus illegal home-use recording might be, an injunction which
seeks to deprive the public of the very tool or article of
commerce capable of some noninfringing use would be an
extremely harsh remedy, as well as one unprecedented
in copyright law." 480 F. Supp., at 468.
Although the District Court made these statements in the
context of considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the
statements constitute a finding that the evidence concerning
"sports, religious, educational, and other programming" was
sufficient to establish a significant quantity of broadcasting
whose copying is now authorized, and a significant potential
for future authorized copying. That finding is amply supported by the record. In addition to the religious and sports
officials identified explicitly by the District Court, 24 two items
in the record deserve specific mention.
See Tr. 2447-2450 (Alexander Hadden, Major League Baseball); Tr.
2480, 2486-2487 (Jay Moyer, National Football League); Tr. 2515-2516
(David Stern, National Basketball Association); Tr. 2530-2534 (Gilbert
Stein, National Hockey League); Tr. 2543-2552 (Thomas Hansen, National
24

81-1687-0PINION
26

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

First is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station manager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles
affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He explained and authenticated the station's published guide to its
programs. 26 For each program, the guide tells whether unlimited home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized
subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure within seven
days), or home taping is not authorized at all. The Spring
1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs. Sixty-two
of those programs or 58% authorize some home taping.
Twenty-one of them or almost 20% authorize unrestricted
home taping. 26
Second is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the
corporation that produces and owns the copyright on Mr.
Rogers' Neighborhood. The program is carried by more
public television stations than any other program. Its audience numbers over 3,000,000. families a day. He testified
that he had absolutely no objection to home taping for noncommercial use and expressed the opinion that it is a real
service to families to be able to record children's programs
and to show them at appropriate times. <n
Collegiate Athletic Association); Tr. 2565-2572 (Benjamin Armstrong, National Religious Broadcasters). Those officials were authorized to be the
official spokespersons for their respective institutions in this litigation.
Tr. 2432, 2479, 25W-2510, 2530, 2538, 2563. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
30(b)(6).
26
Tr. 2863-2902; Def. Exh. PI.
211
See also Tr. 2833-2844 (similar testimony by executive director of New
Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority). Cf. Tr. 2592-2605 (testimony by
chief of New York Education Department's Bureau of Mass Communications approving home taping for educational purposes).
21
"Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
'Neighborhood' at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show
them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all
of this new technology that allows people to tape the 'Neighborhood' offthe-air, and I'm speaking for the 'Neighborhood' because that's what I
produce, that they then become much more active in the programming of
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If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible should not be stifled simply because the equipment is
used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions
of respondents' works. The respondents do not represent a
class composed of all copyright holders. Yet a finding of contributory infringement would inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of their audience
that is available only through time-shifting.
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders may welcome the practice of time-shifting does not mean that respondents should be deemed to have granted a license to copy
their programs. Third party conduct would be wholly irrelevant. in an action for direct infringement of respondents'
copyrights. But in an action for contrilnttory infringement
against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder
may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his
programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the outcome. In this case, the record
makes it perfectly clear that there are many important producers of national and local television programs who find
nothing objectionable about the enlargement in the size of the
television audience that results from the practice of timeshifting for private home use. 28 The seller of the equipment
their family's television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being
programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always
been 'You are an important person just the way you are. You can make
healthy decisions.' Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life,
in a healthy way, is important." T. R. 2920-2921. See also Def. Exh. PI,
p. 85.
28

It may be rare for large numbers of copyright owners to authorize
duplication of their works without demanding a fee from the copier. In
the context of public broadcasting, however, the user of the copyrighted
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that expands those producers' audiences cannot be a contributory infringer if, as is true in this case, it has had nodirect involvement with any infringing activity.
B. Unauthorized Time-Shifting
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not necessarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not
an infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statute. Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 154-155.
Moreover, the definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of the
present Act is prefaced by the words "subject to sections 107
through 118." Those sections describe a variety of uses of
copyrighted material that "are not infringements of copyright
work is not required to pay a fee for access to the underlying work. The
traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon the television medium-eommercially sponsored free public broadcast over the public airwaves-is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the
value of displaying the works will be received in the form of advertising
revenues.
In the context of television programming, some producers evidently believe that permitting home viewers to make copies of their works off the air
actually enhances the value of their copyrights. Irrespective of their reasons for authorizing the practice, they do so, and in significant enough
numbers to create a substantial market for a non-infringing use of the Sony
VTR's. No one could dispute the legitimacy of that market if the producers had authorized home taping of their programs in exchange for a license
fee paid directly by the home user. The legitimacy of that market is not
compromised simply because these producers have authorized home taping
of their programs without demanding a fee from the home user. The copyright law does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the use of
his works, and as this record clearly demonstrates, the owner of a copyright may well have economic or noneconomic reasons for permitting certain kinds of copying to occur without receiving direct compensation from
the copier. It is not the role of the courts to tell copyright holders the best
way for them to exploit their copyrights: even if respondents' competitors
were ill-advised in authorizing home videotaping, that would not change
the fact that they have created a substantial market for a paradigmatic
non-infringing use of petitioners' product.
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notwithstanding the provisions of § 106." The most pertinent in this case is §'107, the legislative endorsement of the
doctrine of "fair use." 29
That section identifies various factors 30 that enable a Court
to apply an "equitable rule of reason" analysis to particular
claims of infringement. 31 Although not conclusive, the first
21

The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, did not have a "fair use" provision. Although that Act's compendium of exclusive rights ''to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" was broad enough to
encompass virtually all potential interactions with a copyrighted work, the
statute was never so construed. The courts simply refused to read the
statute literally in every situation. When Congress amended the statute
in 1976, it indicated that it "intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House
Report No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66.
110
Section 107 provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include"(!) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C. § 107.
31
The House Report expressly stated that the fair use doctrine is an "eq- }
uitable reason of reason" in its explanation of the fair use section:
"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever
emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question
must be decided on its own facts. . . .
General intention behind the provision
"The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply.
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factor requires that "the commercial or nonprofit character of
an activity" be weighed in any fair use decision. 32 If the
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or
profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court's findings plainly establish
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized
as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. Moreover, when one
considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual
work, see 17 U. S. C. § 107(2), and that timeshifting merely
enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been inHowever, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact
rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and
some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H. Rep. No.
94-1476, pp. 65-66.
The Senate Committee similarly eschewed a rigid, bright line approach
to fair use. The Senate Report endorsed the view "that off-the-air recording for convenience" could be considered "fair use" under some circumstances, although it then made it clear that it did not intend to suggest that
off-the-air recording for convenience should be deemed fair use under any
circumstances imaginable. Senate Report 94-473, pp. 65-66. The latter
qualifying statement is quoted by the dissent, post, at 25, and if read in
isolation, would indicate that the Committee intended to condemn all offthe-air recording for convenience. Read in context, however, it is quite
clear that that was the farthest thing from the Committee's intention.
82
"The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered-'the purpose and character of the use'-to state explicitly that this
factor includes a consideration of 'whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.' This amendment is not intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that, as
under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity, whil~ not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions." H. Rep. No.
94-1476, p. 66.
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vited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that
the entire work is reproduced, see id., at § 107(3), does not
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair
use. 83
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Congress has also directed us to consider "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." !d., at§ 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copying for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to
obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have.
But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not
be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would
It has been suggested that "consumptive uses of copyrights by home
VTR users are commercial even if the consumer does not sell the homemade tape because the consumer will not buy tapes separately sold by the
copyrightholder." Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing before Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Adminstration of
Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Congress, 2d Session, pt. 2, p. 1250 (1982) (memorandum of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe).
Furthermore, "[t]he error in ~cusing such theft as noncommerical," we
are told, "can be seen by simplJ\analogy: jewel theft is not converted into a
noncommercial veniality if stolen jewels are simply worn rather than sold."
Ibid. The premise and the analogy are indeed simple, but they add nothing to the argument. The use to which stolen jewlery is put is quite irrelevant in determining whether ~epriving its true owner of his present
possessory interest in it is venial; because of the nature of the item and the
true owner's interests in physical possession of it, the law finds the taking
objectionable even if the thief does not use the item at all. Theft of a particular item of personal property of course may have commercial significance, for the thief deprives the owner of his right to sell that particular
item to any individual. Timeshifting does not even remotely entail comparable consequences to the copyright owner. Moreover, the timeshifter
no more steals the program by watching it once than does the live viewer,
and the live viewer is no more likely to buy pre-recorded videotapes than is
the timeshifter. Indeed, no live viewer would buy a pre-recorded videotape if he did not have access to a VTR.
88

'.
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merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing
benefit. 34
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different matter. A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market
for the copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder
with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will result.
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.
If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood
may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose,
the likelihood must be demonstrated.
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with
regard to home time-shifting. The District Court described
respondents' evidence as follows:
"Plaintiffs' experts admitted at several points in the
trial that the time-shifting without librarying would result in 'not a great deal of harm.' Plaintiffs' greatest
concern about time-shifting is with 'a point of important
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.'
They fear that with any Betamax usage, 'invisible
84
Cf. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as Study
No. 14 in Senate Judiciary Committee, Copyright Law Revision, Studies
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 30 (1960):
"In certain situations, the copyright owner suffers no substantial harm
from the use of the work. . . . Here again, is the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimis non curat
lex."
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boundaries' are passed: 'the copyright owner has lost
control over his program."' 480 F. Supp., at 467.
Later in its opinion, the District Court observed:
"Most of plaintiffs' predictions of hann hinge on speculation about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a
measurement system which Sidney Sheinberg, MCA's
president, calls a 'black art' because of the significant
level of imprecision involved in the calculations." I d., at
469. 36
There was no need for the District Court to say much about
past hann. "Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual hann to
their copyrights has occurred to date." ld., at 451.
On the question of potential future harm from time-shifting, the District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the
evidence. It rejected respondents' "fear that persons
'watching' the original telecast of a program will not be measured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will
decrease," by observing that current measurement technology allows the Betamax audience to be reflected. I d., at
466. 36 It rejected respondents' prediction "that live televia& See also 480 F. Supp., at 451:
"It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs' argument is more complicated
and speculative than was the plaintiff's in Williams & Wilkins. . . . Here,
plaintiffs ask the court to find harm based on many more assumptions. . . .
As is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra, some of these assumptions are
based on neither fact nor experience, and plaintiffs admit that they are to
some extent inconsistent and illogical."
"""There was testimony at trial, however, that Nielsen Ratings has already developed the ability to measure when a Betamax in a sample home
is recording the program. Thus, the Betamax will be measured as a part
of the live audience. The later diary can augment that measurement with
information about subsequent viewing." 480 F. Supp., at 466.
In a separate section, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion
that the commercial attractiveness of television broadcasts would be diminished because Betamax owners would use the pause button or fast-forward
control to avoid viewing advertisements:

81-1687-0PINION
34

SONY CORP. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC.

sion or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch
Betamax tapes as an alternative," with the observation that
"[t]here is no factual basis for [the underlying] assumption."
Ibid. 37 It rejected respondents' "fear that time-shifting will
reduce audiences for telecast reruns," and concluded instead
that "given current market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid. 38 And it declared that
respondents' suggestion "that theater or film rental exhibition of a program will suffer because of time-shift recording
of that program" "lacks merit." 480 F. Supp., at 467. 39
"It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while recording. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-forward
and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has passed. For
most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As defendants' survey showed, 92% of the programs were recorded with commercials and
only 25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers will have
to make the same kinds of judgments they do now about whether persons
viewing televised programs actually watch the advertisements which interrupt them." I d., at 468.
87
"Here plaintiffs assume that people will view copies when they would
otherwise be watching television or going to the movie theater. There is
no factual basis for this assumption. It seems equally likely that Betamax
owners will play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish
to see and no movie they want to attend. Defendants' survey does not
show any negative effect of Betamax ownership on television viewing or
theater attendance." Ibid.
38
"The underlying assumptions here are particularly difficult to accept.
Plaintiffs explain that the Betamax increases access to the original televised material and that the more people there are in this original audience,
the fewer people the rerun will attract. Yet current marketing practices,
including the success of syndication, show just the opposite. Today, the
larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price plaintiffs
can demand from broadcasters from rerun rights. There is no survey
within the knowledge of this court to show that the rerun audience is comprised of persons who have not seen the program. In any event, if ratings
can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase and, given
market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them." Ibid.
31
"This suggestion lacks merit. By definition, time-shift recording entails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape when
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Mter completing that review, the District Court restated
its overall conclusion several times, in several different ways.
"Harm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal." Ibid. "The audience benefits from the time-shifting
capability have already been discussed. It is not implausible
that benefits could also accrue to plaintiffs, broadcasters, and
advertisers, as the Betamax makes it possible for more persons to view their broadcasts." Ibid. "No likelihood of
harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there
had been no actual harm to date." I d., at 468-469. "Testimony at trial suggested that Betamax may require adjustments in marketing strategy, but it did not establish even a
likelihood of harm." I d., at 469. "Television production by
plaintiffs today is more profitable than it has ever been, and,
in five weeks of trial, there was no concrete evidence to suggest that the Betamax will change the studios' financial picture." Ibid.
The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact
that to the extent time-shifting expands public access to
freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal benefits. Earlier this year, in Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, - - U. S. - - , - - - - - , n.
12 (1983), we acknowledged the public interest in making
television broadcasting more available. Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But it supports an interpretation of
the concept of "fair use" that requires the copyright holder to
demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may condemn
a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law.
the later theater run begins. Of course, plaintiffs may fear that the
Betamax will keep the tapes long enough to satisfy all their interest in the
program and will, therefore, not patronize later theater exhibitions. To
the extent this practice involves librarying, it is addressed in section V.C.,
infra. It should also be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the
public interest in later theatrical exhibitions of motion pictures will be reduced any more by Betamax recording than it already is by the television
broadcast of the film." 480 F. Supp., at 467.
'
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When these factors are all weighed in the "equitable rule of
reason" balance, we must conclude that this record amply
supports the District Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use. In light of the findings of the District Court
regarding the state of the empirical data, it is clear that the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the statute as presently written bars such conduct. 40
The Court of Appeals chose not to engage in any "equitable rule of reason" analysis in this case. Instead, it assumed that the category of "fair
use" is rigidly circumscribed by a requirement that every such use must be
"productive." It therefore concluded that copying a television program
merely to enable the viewer to receive information or entertainment that
he would otherwise miss because of a personal scheduling conflict could
never be fair use. That understanding of "fair use" was erroneous.
Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a sensitive balancing of interests. The distinction between "productive" and ''unproductive" uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be
wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor
certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting
a poker game, the question is not simply two-dimensional. For one thing,
it is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern material with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well
have a broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for commercial harm. Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to
fair use than copying a motion picture. And, of course, not all uses are
fungible. Copying for commercial gain has a much weaker claim to fair
use than copying for personal enrichment. But the notion of social "productivity'' cannot be a complete answer to this analysis. A teacher who
copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive. But so is a teacher
who copies for the sake of broadening his personal understanding of his
specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the sake of broadening her understanding of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies
a news program to help make a decision on how to vote.
Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind person is expressly identified by the House Committee Report as an example
of fair use, with no suggestion that anything more than a purpose to entertain or to inform need motivate the copying. In a hospital setting, using a
VTR to enable a patient to see programs he would otherwise miss has no
productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being
of the patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to
television programming may result in a comparable benefit. The statu40
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In summary, the record and findings of the District Court
lead us to two conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television
would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by
private viewers. And second, respondents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of,
their copyrighted works. The Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Sony's sale of such
equipment to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondent's copyrights.

v
"The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the
power to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the
sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only
from Congress." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 530 (1972).
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that
the elected representatives of the millions of people who
. watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible.
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this
new technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws that
have not yet been written. Applying the copyright statute,
as it now reads, to the facts as they have been developed in
this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.
tory language does not identify any dicohotomy between productive and
nonproductive time-shifting, but does require consideration of the economic consequences of copying.

